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A Disturbing Discovery Inside the European Parliament
The European Parliament has once again found itself at the center of Europe’s growing spyware controversy. But the latest case is even more unsettling because the person targeted was not simply a politician or public figure. The victim was a former member of the very parliamentary committee created to investigate the abuse of commercial spyware such as Pegasus.
A July 3, 2026 investigation by the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab confirmed that former European Parliament member Stelios Kouloglou was infected with NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware while he was serving on the Parliament’s PEGA committee, which investigated the misuse of spyware across Europe. Citizen Lab’s forensic examination found evidence of Pegasus infections on his iPhone and concluded with high confidence that he had been targeted.
The case is particularly serious because the compromise potentially gave the attackers access to confidential documents, communications and committee deliberations. Citizen Lab did not attribute the operation to a specific government or NSO Group customer, meaning the identity of the party behind the surveillance remains unresolved.
There is, however, an important correction to the circulating claim that has been spreading online: Daniel Freund was previously targeted with suspected Candiru spyware in 2024, but the newly confirmed Pegasus infection reported by Citizen Lab concerns Stelios Kouloglou. The two cases should not be merged into one incident.
The Name at the Center of the Confirmed Pegasus Case
Stelios Kouloglou Was the Confirmed PEGA Committee Target
Stelios Kouloglou, a Greek politician and former MEP, served on the European Parliament’s PEGA committee during the period covered by Citizen Lab’s investigation. The committee was established to examine the use of Pegasus and other spyware against journalists, activists, politicians and civil-society figures.
Citizen Lab found that Kouloglou’s device had been infected with Pegasus and identified multiple Apple threat notifications associated with targeting. The investigation found evidence relating to infections in 2022 and again in 2023, with another Apple notification arriving in April 2024.
The timing makes the case especially sensitive. A politician involved in examining surveillance technology was himself exposed to precisely the type of surveillance his committee was attempting to understand.
Why the PEGA Committee Matters
Europe’s Spyware Problem Became a Parliamentary Investigation
The PEGA committee was created after a series of scandals demonstrated that commercial spyware could be used against people far beyond traditional criminal investigations.
Pegasus, developed by NSO Group, is among the world’s best-known mercenary spyware platforms. Once successfully deployed, sophisticated spyware can potentially provide an attacker with extraordinary access to a target’s digital life, depending on the specific infection method and device protections.
That can include communications, files, location information, contacts and other sensitive data. The danger is not limited to the individual carrying the phone. A compromised politician can also become a gateway to colleagues, confidential sources, parliamentary discussions and institutional information.
This is why the Kouloglou case is more consequential than an ordinary smartphone compromise.
The Most Important Correction: Daniel Freund Was a Different Case
Freund Was Targeted With Candiru, Not Pegasus
The online post supplied for this article identifies Daniel Freund as the victim of the newly reported Pegasus infection. That attribution is inaccurate.
Citizen
Daniel Freund does have his own important spyware case.
In May 2024, Freund, a German MEP and prominent critic of former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, reported that he had been targeted by an attempted spyware attack. The operation involved a malicious link delivered through a deceptive email. Security researchers associated the attack with Candiru, another commercial spyware provider, rather than NSO Group’s Pegasus.
Freund’s case was reportedly unsuccessful because he did not click the malicious link. The distinction matters: being targeted, attempting to infect a device and successfully infecting a device are three different things.
The Freund Attack Was Still Highly Serious
An Unsuccessful Infection Does Not Mean an Unimportant Attack
The fact that
According to the Gesellschaft für Freiheitsrechte, Freund received an email apparently originating from a Ukrainian student. The message contained a manipulated link that could have enabled Candiru spyware to infiltrate his device if he had followed it.
The attack demonstrated how modern spyware operations can begin with something deceptively ordinary: an email, a link, a meeting invitation or a message that appears relevant to the target’s professional activities.
For a politician dealing with sensitive European affairs, the smartphone itself can become an intelligence target.
The Confirmed Pegasus Infection Is Even More Alarming
Kouloglou’s Device Was Actually Compromised
The Citizen Lab investigation is significant because it goes beyond an attempted phishing campaign.
Researchers performed forensic analysis of Kouloglou’s device and found evidence consistent with Pegasus infection. Citizen Lab assessed with high confidence that the device had been targeted and infected with NSO Group’s spyware.
That distinction changes the threat assessment considerably.
An attempted infection tells investigators that someone wanted access. A forensic confirmation of infection indicates that the attacker succeeded, at least for the periods identified by researchers.
Confidential Parliamentary Information May Have Been Exposed
The Real Target Could Have Been Bigger Than One Phone
One of the most troubling aspects of the investigation is the possibility that attackers could have accessed confidential documents and committee deliberations.
A parliamentarian investigating spyware is likely to handle information about surveillance operations, witnesses, technical evidence, political discussions and potentially vulnerable individuals.
Compromising such a
The attacker may not need to directly penetrate a parliamentary network if the desired information is already available through the communications of a committee member.
The Spyware Industry Creates a Difficult Accountability Problem
Commercial Tools Can Create State-Level Capabilities
The Pegasus ecosystem represents a broader transformation in digital surveillance.
Governments no longer necessarily need to develop every surveillance capability internally. Commercial spyware companies can provide sophisticated intrusion technologies to government customers, creating a market in which highly invasive capabilities can become available to state agencies.
That creates a complicated accountability chain.
The software company develops the capability. A government or government-linked entity may acquire it. Operators deploy it against selected targets. Victims discover the intrusion later, sometimes through forensic research rather than through any official notification.
When something goes wrong, determining responsibility can become extraordinarily difficult.
Citizen Lab Has Not Named the Government Behind the Attack
Attribution Remains an Open Question
One of the most important details in the Citizen Lab report is what researchers did not claim.
Although the researchers concluded with high confidence that Kouloglou was targeted and infected with Pegasus, they did not publicly identify a specific NSO Group customer as responsible.
That means claims assigning responsibility to a particular government should be treated carefully unless additional evidence emerges.
Spyware investigations can identify technical infrastructure, malware families, targeting patterns and infection timelines without necessarily proving which government ordered an operation.
Attribution requires a higher evidentiary threshold.
The European Parliament Has Been Targeted Before
Kouloglou Was Not an Isolated Case
The Kouloglou investigation does not exist in a vacuum.
Citizen Lab notes that other European Parliament members have previously been targeted with Pegasus or other mercenary spyware. French MEP Nathalie Loiseau was confirmed as a Pegasus target, while Bulgarian MEP Elena Yoncheva was also notified of targeting. Daniel Freund separately disclosed the 2024 Candiru incident.
These cases form a disturbing pattern.
European politicians involved in national security, foreign affairs, human rights, rule-of-law investigations and spyware oversight can represent unusually valuable intelligence targets.
Why Political Surveillance Is Different
A Compromised Politician Can Become an Institutional Vulnerability
When spyware is used against an ordinary individual, the consequences can already be severe.
When the target is a parliamentarian, however, the potential impact expands.
The victim may communicate with other elected officials, government representatives, journalists, researchers, diplomats and whistleblowers. Their phone may contain documents relating to legislative negotiations and confidential conversations that were never intended for public disclosure.
In this environment, the smartphone becomes more than a personal device.
It can become an unofficial archive of institutional activity.
Pegasus Shows Why Smartphone Security Has Become a Democratic Issue
The Phone in Your Pocket Can Be a High-Value Intelligence Target
Modern smartphones contain an extraordinary concentration of personal and professional information.
For politicians, journalists, lawyers and activists, the device can hold years of communications and access to cloud accounts, authentication systems and professional networks.
Sophisticated spyware therefore changes the traditional meaning of surveillance.
An attacker does not necessarily need to place a physical surveillance device in a room. The surveillance platform can travel with the victim.
It can potentially follow them across borders, meetings and private conversations.
The European Context Makes the Story More Sensitive
Spyware Has Become a Rule-of-Law Issue
Europe has spent years debating whether commercial spyware can be compatible with fundamental rights, judicial oversight and democratic accountability.
The controversy intensified after researchers uncovered cases involving journalists, opposition figures, activists and politicians.
The European
The fact that a former member of that committee was later confirmed to have been infected creates an uncomfortable contradiction.
The institution investigating surveillance was itself not immune to surveillance.
The Timing Matters
Surveillance During Sensitive Political Periods Is Particularly Concerning
Spyware operations can become especially dangerous around elections, legislative negotiations and geopolitical crises.
Daniel
Kouloglou’s case covers a different timeline, but it similarly demonstrates how long-term surveillance can intersect with parliamentary responsibilities.
Even if investigators cannot establish the attacker’s motive, access to a political target’s communications can provide intelligence that remains valuable for months or years.
The Bigger Threat Is Silent Surveillance
The Victim May Not Know Anything Happened
One of the most frightening characteristics of mercenary spyware is its ability to operate without obvious signs.
Traditional hacking may involve ransomware notes, deleted files or unusual network activity.
Spyware can be different.
Its objective is often to remain invisible.
That means a successful operation can produce no dramatic moment that tells the victim their phone has been compromised.
The discovery may come much later through forensic examination, an Apple threat notification or an investigation by a specialist security organization.
Apple Threat Notifications Have Become an Important Defense Layer
Detection Can Give Targets a Crucial Warning
Apple has increasingly used threat notifications to warn individuals believed to be targeted by sophisticated mercenary spyware.
Citizen
Such notifications do not eliminate the threat.
But they can give a potential victim an opportunity to seek forensic assistance, secure accounts, replace devices and investigate possible compromise.
For high-risk individuals, early warning can make a substantial difference.
Commercial Spyware Is Not the Same as Ordinary Malware
These Tools Are Built for Targeted Intelligence Operations
Consumer malware is usually designed to reach as many victims as possible.
Mercenary spyware operates differently.
The objective is generally not mass infection.
It is precision.
A small number of strategically important targets can be more valuable than thousands of ordinary victims.
That makes detection particularly difficult because conventional security systems may not see the same patterns associated with mass malware campaigns.
The Dark Web Angle Should Be Treated Carefully
Spyware Intelligence Should Not Be Confused With Dark Web Claims
The original post comes from an account describing itself as Dark Web Intelligence, but the underlying evidence in this case does not depend on a dark-web leak.
The strongest evidence comes from Citizen
That distinction is important for readers.
A dark-web account can report a legitimate security development, but its description should not automatically be treated as the primary evidence.
In this case, the original social-media summary appears to have mixed a real Citizen Lab investigation with the wrong victim’s identity.
What This Means for European Institutions
Parliamentary Security Needs to Go Beyond Network Protection
European institutions traditionally have to think about cybersecurity in terms of networks, email systems and servers.
Spyware changes that equation.
A parliament can have strong perimeter security and still face a serious intelligence threat if individual officials are targeted through their personal devices.
Security programs therefore need to combine institutional defenses with individual-device protection.
High-risk officials require specialized threat monitoring, secure communications practices, forensic capabilities and rapid incident-response procedures.
The Human Element Remains the Weakest Link
A Convincing Message Can Open the Door
The Freund incident demonstrates why social engineering remains so effective.
An attacker does not necessarily need to defeat the strongest encryption system in the world.
They may only need to convince a target to click a link.
A message connected to Ukraine, European politics, a conference, a journalist or another professional interest can look completely legitimate to a busy politician.
That is why technical defenses must be combined with security awareness.
The Most Important Lesson for Politicians
Sensitive People Need Sensitive Security
Politicians increasingly operate through smartphones.
They use them for messaging, authentication, documents, social media, calls and meetings.
That convenience creates a concentrated attack surface.
Officials working on intelligence, defense, foreign affairs, sanctions, human rights or surveillance oversight should be treated as high-value targets rather than ordinary users.
The Kouloglou case makes that point painfully clear.
The Most Important Lesson for Citizens
Spyware Is Not Only a Government Problem
It would be easy to read this story and assume Pegasus is something that concerns only politicians.
That would be a mistake.
The technology and techniques developed for high-value surveillance contribute to a broader security ecosystem.
The same fundamental weaknesses exploited against prominent targets can reveal weaknesses in mobile platforms, communication systems and security practices.
The average person may never be targeted by Pegasus.
But the security improvements created because of these attacks can benefit everyone.
What Undercode Say:
The Real Story Is More Serious Than the Viral Post
The original claim contains a genuine and important cybersecurity story, but it incorrectly identifies Daniel Freund as the MEP whose device was confirmed infected with Pegasus.
Two Separate Spyware Cases Must Be Distinguished
Stelios Kouloglou is the former MEP whose Pegasus infection was confirmed by Citizen Lab. Daniel Freund was separately targeted in 2024 in an unsuccessful Candiru spyware operation.
The Difference Between Targeting and Infection Matters
Freund’s case demonstrates that attackers attempted to compromise his device. Kouloglou’s case is more definitive because forensic analysis found evidence of an actual Pegasus infection.
The Committee Connection Makes the Incident Exceptional
Kouloglou was not simply another politician. He served on the PEGA committee, which was specifically investigating spyware abuse.
Surveillance Oversight Was Itself Targeted
That creates a deeply uncomfortable possibility: individuals responsible for investigating surveillance technology can become intelligence targets because of the information they possess.
The Potential Intelligence Value Was Enormous
A committee member could have access to documents, discussions, evidence and contacts that would be valuable to an intelligence operator.
A Smartphone Can Function as an Intelligence Archive
For a modern politician, a smartphone can contain communications accumulated over years and connections to hundreds of people.
The Threat Is Bigger Than the Individual
Compromising one official can expose communications involving colleagues, staff, journalists, researchers and government officials.
Attribution Must Remain Evidence-Based
Citizen Lab did not identify a specific government behind the Kouloglou Pegasus operation. That uncertainty should remain part of the story.
Governments Should Not Be Accused Without Evidence
The existence of a spyware infection does not automatically establish which government ordered it.
Spyware Vendors Create an Accountability Gap
Commercial spyware allows governments to acquire extraordinary surveillance capabilities from private companies, creating complicated questions about responsibility.
The Technology Is Designed for Precision
Unlike ransomware, mercenary spyware does not need millions of victims to be effective.
One Target Can Be Enough
A single compromised parliamentarian may provide access to information worth far more than a large collection of ordinary accounts.
Political Intelligence Is Extremely Valuable
Foreign-policy discussions, sanctions, elections and diplomatic contacts can all create incentives for targeted surveillance.
Europe Has Already Seen Multiple Cases
The Kouloglou incident follows earlier cases involving European political figures targeted with Pegasus, Predator and other spyware.
This Is Becoming a Pattern
Repeated cases make it increasingly difficult to treat spyware targeting of European officials as isolated technical incidents.
Apple Notifications Matter
Threat notifications can provide high-risk individuals with an early warning that something unusual may be happening.
Detection Still Comes Too Late in Some Cases
A notification or forensic investigation may occur after an attacker has already gained access.
Prevention Is Therefore Critical
Security programs need to focus on reducing the chance that a malicious link or exploit can succeed in the first place.
Phishing Remains a Powerful Weapon
The Freund case shows that highly sophisticated spyware campaigns can begin with a deceptively simple message.
Social Engineering Can Defeat Human Assumptions
The most convincing malicious messages are often built around information the recipient already expects to receive.
Political Targets Are Particularly Exposed
Public officials routinely receive unsolicited communications, invitations, documents and messages from unknown people.
Security Training Must Reflect Reality
Generic advice about suspicious emails is not enough for high-value targets.
Officials Need Specialized Protection
Political leaders and sensitive parliamentary staff should have security procedures designed around targeted surveillance rather than ordinary cybercrime.
Institutional Security Must Include Personal Devices
Protecting a parliamentary network does not protect an official whose smartphone is independently compromised.
Cloud Accounts Add Another Layer
A compromised phone can potentially expose authentication mechanisms and connected services, increasing the consequences of an intrusion.
The Human Cost Is Easy to Underestimate
Behind every spyware infection is a person whose private communications may have become accessible to an unknown operator.
Democracy Depends on Confidentiality
Politicians need to communicate privately to negotiate, investigate and make decisions.
Surveillance Can Affect Political Behavior
Even the fear of being monitored can change how officials communicate and whom they trust.
That Creates a Chilling Effect
If lawmakers believe sensitive communications may be monitored, legitimate oversight can become more difficult.
Journalists Face the Same Problem
Political sources and journalists can become indirectly exposed when a politician’s device is compromised.
Whistleblowers Are Especially Vulnerable
A compromised communication channel can expose people who rely on confidential contact with officials or investigators.
Parliamentary Investigations Need Secure Channels
Sensitive inquiries into surveillance abuse should use communications systems designed to withstand targeted attacks.
Commercial Spyware Regulation Remains Necessary
The technology itself is not disappearing simply because governments criticize its misuse.
Oversight Must Follow the Technology
Legal frameworks need to address not only who can deploy spyware but also how vendors sell, monitor and restrict these capabilities.
Transparency Is Essential
Without independent investigations, victims may never know what happened to their devices or information.
Citizen
Technical forensic investigations can uncover operations that would otherwise remain invisible.
The Biggest Danger Is Normalization
Repeated spyware scandals could eventually become treated as routine political espionage.
That Would Be a Mistake
Targeted surveillance against democratic institutions should remain an extraordinary security concern.
The Kouloglou Case Sends a Clear Warning
The people investigating spyware are not automatically protected from it.
The Freund Case Sends Another Warning
Even when an attempted infection fails, the attacker may have selected the target because of their political importance.
Europe Is Facing a Strategic Cybersecurity Challenge
The issue is no longer simply whether a phone can be hacked.
The larger question is whether democratic institutions can protect confidential political activity in an era when commercial surveillance technology has become increasingly sophisticated.
The Corrected Story Is More Powerful
The viral version of the story may have confused two different MEP cases, but the verified facts are arguably even more disturbing: a former member of Europe’s spyware-investigating committee was actually infected with Pegasus, while another prominent MEP was separately targeted by suspected Candiru spyware.
The Final Lesson
When surveillance technology reaches the people tasked with investigating it, cybersecurity stops being merely a technical issue.
It becomes an institutional, political and democratic-security issue.
✅ Citizen Lab Confirmed a Pegasus Infection
Citizen Lab confirmed with high confidence that former MEP Stelios Kouloglou was targeted and infected with NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware while serving on the PEGA committee.
❌ Daniel Freund Was Not the Confirmed Pegasus Victim in This Report
The circulating post incorrectly attributes the Citizen Lab Pegasus finding to Daniel Freund. Freund was targeted in 2024 in a separate case involving suspected Candiru spyware.
❌ A Specific Government Has Not Been Proven Responsible
Citizen Lab did not attribute
Deep Analysis: What the Incident Reveals About Modern Political Espionage
Command 01 — Follow the Target
The first analytical question should always be: why this person?
Kouloglou’s position on the PEGA committee provides an obvious intelligence-value explanation. The committee was investigating spyware, meaning its members could possess information directly relevant to surveillance operations.
Command 02 — Separate the Malware Families
Pegasus and Candiru should not be treated as interchangeable names for the same spyware.
They are products associated with different companies and different operational ecosystems. The fact that both appear in cases involving European politicians illustrates the breadth of the mercenary-spyware market rather than proving that one operation was responsible for another.
Command 03 — Separate Targeting From Compromise
Security reporting must distinguish between an attempted attack and a confirmed infection.
Freund’s case is an example of attempted compromise. Kouloglou’s case is a confirmed Pegasus infection based on forensic evidence.
That distinction is essential for accurate threat intelligence.
Command 04 — Follow the Information
The next question is what the attacker could gain.
A committee member may have access to sensitive parliamentary conversations, internal documents and contacts.
The value of such information can extend far beyond the victim’s personal life.
Command 05 — Examine the Institutional Impact
The incident should not be evaluated only as a smartphone hack.
The relevant question is whether the compromise could affect the integrity of parliamentary oversight.
If officials investigating surveillance can themselves be monitored, the confidentiality of the investigative process becomes a security concern.
Command 06 — Avoid Premature Attribution
Attribution is one of the hardest problems in cyber intelligence.
A malware family can establish what tool was used without automatically establishing who ordered the operation.
That is why Citizen
Command 07 — Track the Pattern
Multiple European politicians have been targeted by sophisticated commercial spyware.
That does not automatically prove one coordinated campaign, but it demonstrates that European political figures remain attractive targets for operators with access to advanced surveillance technology.
Command 08 — Examine the Timing
Targeting around elections, parliamentary investigations and major political disputes deserves particular scrutiny.
Timing alone cannot establish motive, but it can help investigators determine whether an operation coincided with a strategically sensitive period.
Command 09 — Protect the Device, Not Just the Network
Political cybersecurity strategies have traditionally emphasized institutional networks.
Modern spyware demonstrates why individual devices must receive equal attention.
Command 10 — Treat Mobile Security as National Security
For high-level officials, a smartphone can contain enough information to create significant political and diplomatic consequences if compromised.
Mobile-device security should therefore be treated as part of institutional security architecture.
Command 11 — Assume High-Value Targets Receive Personalized Attacks
Mass phishing is noisy.
Targeted spyware campaigns can be highly personalized.
Attackers may research the
Command 12 — Make Security Friction Normal
High-risk officials may need additional authentication, device restrictions, secure communication channels and professional forensic support.
The inconvenience is small compared with the consequences of a successful intrusion.
Command 13 — Preserve Forensic Evidence
When spyware is suspected, preserving the device and obtaining expert forensic analysis can be crucial.
Without evidence, investigators may never be able to distinguish a successful compromise from an unsuccessful attempt.
Command 14 — Strengthen Independent Oversight
The Kouloglou case reinforces the importance of independent organizations capable of examining suspected spyware infections.
Independent forensic research can provide evidence that governments or vendors may not voluntarily disclose.
Command 15 — Regulate the Market
The underlying question is increasingly about the commercial surveillance industry itself.
Who can buy these tools?
Against whom can they be deployed?
What happens when they are misused?
Who audits the customers?
Those questions require answers.
Command 16 — Protect Democratic Confidentiality
Democratic institutions depend on private conversations.
If politicians cannot safely communicate about investigations, elections, corruption or national security, the damage extends beyond cybersecurity.
It reaches the functioning of democracy itself.
Prediction
(+1) European Spyware Oversight Will Become More Aggressive
The confirmation of a Pegasus infection involving a former PEGA committee member is likely to strengthen calls for stricter controls over commercial spyware in Europe.
(+1) High-Risk Officials Will Receive Stronger Mobile Protections
European institutions are likely to place greater emphasis on mobile-device security, forensic monitoring and rapid response for politicians handling sensitive information.
(+1) Independent Forensic Investigations Will Become More Important
As sophisticated spyware becomes harder to detect, organizations such as Citizen Lab will remain critical for uncovering attacks that would otherwise stay hidden.
(-1) More Political Targets May Be Discovered
The confirmed Kouloglou case may not be the final example. Additional forensic investigations could reveal other European officials who were targeted without knowing it.
(-1) Attribution May Remain Difficult
Even when investigators confirm that Pegasus or another sophisticated spyware platform was used, identifying the exact government or intelligence service responsible may remain impossible without additional evidence.
(-1) Commercial Spyware Will Continue to Challenge European Cybersecurity
Unless governments establish stronger controls over the sale and deployment of mercenary spyware, highly sophisticated surveillance capabilities are likely to remain available to state actors.
The Bigger Picture
The most important lesson from this episode is not simply that Pegasus remains dangerous.
It is that the boundaries between cybersecurity, political espionage and democratic security are rapidly disappearing.
A smartphone belonging to a parliamentarian can contain confidential conversations, investigative material, political strategy and information about other people. When that device is compromised, the consequences can spread far beyond its owner.
The corrected facts make the story especially revealing.
Stelios Kouloglou was the PEGA committee member whose Pegasus infection Citizen Lab confirmed. Daniel Freund was separately targeted with suspected Candiru spyware in 2024.
Two different cases. Two different spyware ecosystems. One disturbing conclusion.
European politicians involved in sensitive democratic and security work remain valuable targets for highly sophisticated surveillance operations.
And when the people investigating spyware become victims of spyware themselves, Europe is forced to confront an uncomfortable question: how can democratic institutions effectively police surveillance when the surveillance industry may already be capable of reaching inside the institutions doing the policing?
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