The Gentlemen Ransomware Claims Two More Victims, Paula Fish and Amicell, as the Gang’s Campaign Continues to Expand + Video

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Featured ImageA New Pair of Dark Web Claims Raises Fresh Concerns

Ransomware does not always announce itself with a dramatic system outage or a public statement from the victim. Increasingly, the first warning comes from a darker corner of the internet: a ransomware group quietly adding another organization to its leak site.

On July 31, 2026, threat intelligence monitoring attributed to the ThreatMon Threat Intelligence Team reported that the ransomware operation known as The Gentlemen had added Paula Fish and Amicell to its list of alleged victims. The two entries were reportedly detected within seconds of each other, at approximately 21:23:49 and 21:24:10 UTC+3.

At this stage, however, these should be treated as ransomware claims, not independently confirmed breaches. The supplied report does not establish whether either organization suffered data theft, encryption, operational disruption, or financial loss.

That distinction matters. Ransomware leak sites are controlled by criminals, and victim listings can sometimes contain incomplete, exaggerated, misleading, or disputed information. Still, when such claims appear alongside an already active ransomware operation, they deserve attention from defenders, affected organizations, customers, and security researchers.

What Happened on July 31?

According to the ThreatMon activity notification provided for this report, The Gentlemen ransomware group allegedly added Paula Fish as a victim at 21:23:49 UTC+3 on July 31, 2026.

Less than a minute later, another alert reported that Amicell had also been added, with the recorded time listed as 21:24:10 UTC+3.

The extremely close timing is notable, but it does not necessarily mean the two organizations were attacked during the same intrusion. Ransomware operators can update leak sites in batches, publish previously completed attacks, or add victims after negotiations fail.

The Claims Remain Unverified

The most important word in this story is claimed.

The information supplied by the ThreatMon alert identifies the organizations as victims, but it does not provide independently verified evidence such as a statement from Paula Fish, a disclosure from Amicell, regulatory filings, forensic findings, leaked sample data, or confirmation from another authoritative source.

Therefore, it would be irresponsible to state as fact that either organization was breached.

For now, the appropriate description is that The Gentlemen has allegedly listed Paula Fish and Amicell as victims.

Why The Gentlemen Matters

The Gentlemen is not an isolated ransomware name appearing out of nowhere. Security researchers have been tracking the group as a rapidly expanding Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operation.

Microsoft Threat Intelligence tracks the operators behind The Gentlemen as Storm-2697 and describes the operation as a financially motivated RaaS platform. Microsoft has also documented the ransomware’s ability to encrypt files while aggressively propagating across compromised environments.

Microsoft

The group has become particularly concerning because the RaaS model allows the operators to separate the development and infrastructure side of the criminal business from the people actually carrying out intrusions.

That means a ransomware brand can grow much faster than a conventional criminal hacking crew.

A Rapidly Expanding Ransomware Operation

Recent research has placed The Gentlemen among the most active ransomware groups operating in 2026.

One analysis reported hundreds of publicly claimed victims, while Check Point described the group as having more than 400 public victims and ranking among the world’s most active ransomware operations.

Ransomnews

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Other reporting has similarly highlighted the

TechRadar

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The significance is not simply the number of names appearing on a leak site.

The bigger concern is the industrialization of ransomware.

Ransomware Has Become a Business Model

Modern ransomware groups increasingly operate more like technology companies than traditional hacking crews.

There are administrators, affiliates, negotiators, developers, access brokers, infrastructure providers, malware builders, and data-exfiltration specialists.

The central operators provide the platform and tools.

Affiliates conduct intrusions.

Initial Access Brokers can provide compromised credentials or access to vulnerable systems.

The result is a criminal ecosystem capable of conducting multiple attacks simultaneously.

The

Security research has identified The Gentlemen as a RaaS operation that relies on affiliates to expand its reach.

Microsoft says the operation transitioned into an affiliate-based RaaS model in September 2025.

Microsoft

This approach is particularly dangerous because the operators do not need to personally conduct every intrusion.

Instead, the platform can recruit additional criminals who already possess intrusion skills, access to compromised organizations, or experience with penetration-testing tools.

That creates a multiplier effect.

Double Extortion Makes the Threat Worse

The Gentlemen is also associated with the familiar but devastating double-extortion model.

Under this approach, attackers do not simply encrypt files.

They attempt to steal sensitive information before encryption.

The victim is then pressured from two directions: restore access to its systems or risk having stolen information published.

Microsoft has documented this encryption-plus-exfiltration approach in its analysis of The Gentlemen ransomware.

Microsoft

This changes the economics of an incident.

Even organizations with reliable backups can still face serious consequences if attackers successfully steal confidential information.

The Backup Problem

Backups remain one of the most important defenses against ransomware.

But backups alone are no longer enough.

If attackers steal customer records, employee information, contracts, intellectual property, financial documents, or other sensitive material, restoring systems does not erase the stolen data.

That is why modern ransomware defense has to address both availability and confidentiality.

Organizations need to ask two different questions:

Can we restore our systems?

And can we prove what information attackers were able to access?

The Importance of Initial Access

One of the most revealing aspects of The Gentlemen’s activity is how much modern ransomware depends on obtaining access before encryption ever begins.

Research from Check Point has associated the group with compromised credentials and vulnerable edge infrastructure, while other research has described exploitation of internet-facing systems as an important access route.

Check Point Research

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This reinforces an uncomfortable cybersecurity reality.

The ransomware executable is often the final stage of an attack.

The real battle may have been lost days or weeks earlier when an exposed service, stolen credential, or vulnerable remote-access system was compromised.

Why Edge Devices Matter

VPN appliances, firewalls, remote-access gateways, and other internet-facing infrastructure remain attractive targets because compromising them can provide a pathway directly into an organization’s internal environment.

A vulnerable edge device can effectively become the front door to the network.

That makes patch management particularly important.

A security team can have excellent endpoint protection, but if attackers enter through an unpatched internet-facing system, the organization may still be exposed.

Credentials Are Another Weak Point

Stolen credentials are equally dangerous.

Attackers do not always need to discover a new vulnerability.

Sometimes they can simply purchase, steal, reuse, or obtain legitimate credentials.

Once authenticated, malicious activity can resemble normal administrative behavior.

This makes identity security one of the most important layers in modern ransomware defense.

The Human Element Remains Critical

Technical defenses cannot eliminate every risk.

Employees can still fall victim to phishing, credential theft, malicious documents, fake login pages, social engineering, and other techniques.

For this reason, security awareness remains relevant even as ransomware becomes increasingly automated.

A compromised employee account can become the first step in a much larger intrusion.

The Danger of Lateral Movement

Getting inside one computer is not necessarily the ultimate goal.

The real prize may be the wider corporate network.

The Gentlemen ransomware has been analyzed as having aggressive self-propagation capabilities designed to move through compromised environments. Microsoft specifically highlighted its ability to combine encryption with rapid lateral movement.

Microsoft

That capability can dramatically reduce the time defenders have to respond.

An attacker who compromises one endpoint today could potentially affect many systems tomorrow.

Why Speed Matters During an Attack

Ransomware incidents are often won or lost during the period between initial compromise and widespread encryption.

If defenders detect suspicious authentication activity, unusual administrative commands, mass file access, credential dumping, or unexpected network connections early enough, they may be able to isolate affected systems.

Once encryption begins across servers, workstations, and shared storage, containment becomes significantly more difficult.

The AI-Assisted Cybercrime Question

Another emerging issue surrounding The Gentlemen is the use of AI-assisted development.

Check Point reported that the

Check Point Blog

This does not mean AI independently created or launched the ransomware campaign.

Rather, AI can potentially lower the amount of time and expertise required to build supporting tools, scripts, interfaces, and automation.

That is an important distinction.

The danger is not a magical autonomous hacker.

The danger is experienced criminals becoming more efficient.

The Criminal Ecosystem Is Becoming Faster

Ransomware has historically evolved from individual hackers into organized criminal enterprises.

Now the ecosystem is becoming even more modular.

One group may specialize in access.

Another may provide malware.

Another may operate negotiation infrastructure.

Another may steal data.

Another may recruit affiliates.

This specialization allows criminal groups to scale without every participant needing to understand every part of the attack chain.

What the Paula Fish Claim Could Mean

If the Paula Fish listing is eventually confirmed, investigators would need to determine whether attackers accessed internal systems, stole data, encrypted systems, or simply claimed the organization without sufficient evidence.

The public listing alone cannot answer those questions.

Organizations facing such a claim should immediately preserve relevant logs, authentication records, endpoint telemetry, cloud audit trails, and network data.

The first priority should be determining whether the claim corresponds to a real intrusion.

What the Amicell Claim Could Mean

The same principle applies to Amicell.

A ransomware listing is a warning signal, not a complete forensic report.

If the organization has been compromised, investigators will need to establish the initial access vector, determine the attacker timeline, identify compromised accounts and systems, and assess whether data was exfiltrated.

Only after that investigation can the true scope of the incident be understood.

The Importance of Independent Verification

Ransomware reporting requires a careful balance.

Ignoring criminal claims can cause organizations to miss early warning signs.

Treating every claim as confirmed fact can create misinformation.

The best approach is to report what is known, clearly identify what is alleged, and separate intelligence from verified evidence.

That distinction is particularly important for organizations whose reputation may be affected by a public ransomware listing.

The Broader Pattern Is More Important Than Two Names

Even if either of these claims eventually proves inaccurate, the broader threat remains real.

The Gentlemen has demonstrated the ability to operate at scale.

Security researchers have observed the

Microsoft

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Therefore, the latest claims should not be viewed only as two isolated names.

They are another indicator of a ransomware ecosystem that continues to expand.

Deep Analysis: How The Gentlemen Threat Changes the Ransomware Landscape

The Leak Site Is an Intelligence Signal

A ransomware victim listing can provide defenders with an early warning signal even before an organization publicly acknowledges an incident.

Security teams should monitor threat intelligence feeds for their own domains, brands, subsidiaries, and partners.

Claims Must Be Scored by Confidence

Not every ransomware claim deserves the same confidence level.

A listing accompanied by verifiable stolen samples, victim confirmation, technical indicators, and independent reporting is considerably stronger than an unsupported name appearing on a criminal website.

Timing Can Reveal Operational Patterns

The near-simultaneous appearance of Paula Fish and Amicell is interesting because it may indicate batch publishing or coordinated activity.

However, timing alone cannot establish a shared intrusion.

Investigators should avoid drawing conclusions until additional evidence appears.

Ransomware Groups Benefit From Publicity

Criminal operators have an incentive to make their campaigns appear successful.

Victim counts can help attract affiliates and demonstrate credibility inside underground communities.

That creates a reason to treat raw victim counts cautiously.

Public Listings Can Pressure Victims

The purpose of a leak site is not simply to publish information.

It is also a psychological weapon.

The threat of public disclosure can increase pressure on executives, legal teams, insurers, and incident responders.

Reputation Becomes Part of the Attack

A ransomware incident can affect far more than IT infrastructure.

Customers may become concerned.

Partners may demand explanations.

Regulators may become involved.

Investors may ask questions.

The attackers understand this.

Encryption Is Only One Part of the Damage

Modern ransomware should not be measured solely by how many computers become encrypted.

Data theft, operational downtime, legal costs, forensic investigations, recovery expenses, and reputational damage can become equally significant.

The Cloud Does Not Eliminate Ransomware Risk

Moving workloads into cloud environments can reduce certain infrastructure risks, but it does not automatically prevent ransomware.

Compromised identities, stolen credentials, excessive permissions, malicious OAuth applications, and poorly configured cloud services can create new attack paths.

Identity Security Deserves Priority

Organizations should treat privileged identities as high-value assets.

Strong multifactor authentication, phishing-resistant authentication, privileged access management, conditional access policies, and continuous monitoring can significantly reduce the effectiveness of stolen credentials.

Network Segmentation Can Limit the Blast Radius

A flat network gives attackers more opportunities to move laterally.

Segmentation can create barriers between user endpoints, servers, backups, production environments, and sensitive systems.

It does not guarantee prevention, but it can make widespread encryption considerably harder.

Immutable Backups Remain Essential

Backups should be isolated from ordinary administrative credentials wherever possible.

If attackers can delete or encrypt backups, recovery becomes much more difficult.

Organizations should regularly test restoration instead of simply assuming that backups work.

Detection Must Look Beyond Malware

Traditional antivirus detection is important, but ransomware investigations require broader visibility.

Suspicious logins, abnormal administrative behavior, privilege escalation, mass file modification, unusual data transfers, and unexpected remote execution can all provide early warning.

Endpoint Visibility Can Change the Outcome

EDR technology can help identify suspicious processes, credential access, lateral movement, and abnormal encryption behavior.

The technology becomes significantly more useful when security teams actively investigate alerts instead of treating them as passive notifications.

Exfiltration Detection Is Increasingly Important

Because double extortion is now common, organizations need to monitor outbound data flows.

Large transfers to unfamiliar destinations can be particularly important when they involve sensitive repositories.

Third-Party Risk Cannot Be Ignored

A company may have strong internal defenses but still be exposed through a supplier, contractor, managed service provider, or software partner.

Attackers understand these relationships.

Compromising one organization can potentially create opportunities against others.

Ransomware Can Become a Supply-Chain Problem

When stolen data or credentials are reused to target connected organizations, the original victim may not be the final target.

This creates a cascading effect.

One compromise can potentially create several additional compromises.

Security Teams Need Threat Intelligence

Threat intelligence becomes especially valuable when it connects technical indicators with criminal infrastructure, known tactics, victimology, and emerging campaigns.

A simple alert saying “ransomware group active” is less useful than intelligence explaining how the group obtains access and what it does afterward.

Incident Response Plans Must Be Tested

An incident response document sitting in a folder is not a response plan.

Teams should practice scenarios involving compromised credentials, unavailable systems, stolen data, unavailable backups, executive communications, and regulatory obligations.

Exercises expose weaknesses before attackers do.

The First Hours Matter

The first hours following suspected compromise can determine whether an incident remains contained or becomes a company-wide crisis.

Rapid isolation, credential containment, evidence preservation, and communication between IT, security, legal, and leadership are critical.

Paying Does Not Remove All Risk

Even when organizations pay a ransom, attackers may retain stolen data.

There is also no guarantee that criminals will delete copies of information or provide reliable decryption tools.

That is why response planning must focus on recovery and containment rather than assuming payment is the solution.

The

The most concerning aspect of this campaign is not simply the identity of the latest alleged victims.

It is the demonstrated scalability of the operation.

A successful RaaS platform can recruit affiliates, distribute tooling, acquire access, and attack organizations across multiple regions simultaneously.

Ransomware Recruitment Creates a Multiplier

Every new capable affiliate can potentially bring new victims.

That means ransomware growth is not necessarily linear.

A successful criminal platform can experience rapid expansion when its infrastructure, economics, and reputation attract additional operators.

Criminal Economics Drive Technical Evolution

Attackers adopt new techniques when those techniques improve profitability.

If better automation reduces intrusion time, it becomes attractive.

If credential theft produces reliable access, it becomes attractive.

If data theft increases ransom pressure, it becomes attractive.

Cybercrime follows economic incentives.

Defenders Must Think Like Economists Too

Security teams should identify which defensive investments reduce the attacker’s return on investment.

Strong authentication can make stolen passwords less useful.

Segmentation can make lateral movement slower.

Immutable backups can reduce ransom leverage.

Data minimization can reduce the value of stolen information.

The Best Defense Is Layered Defense

There is no single product that guarantees protection from The Gentlemen or any other ransomware group.

Effective defense comes from multiple layers working together.

Identity security, patching, segmentation, EDR, backups, logging, threat intelligence, employee awareness, and tested incident response all contribute to resilience.

The July 31 Claims Should Be Watched Closely

The next development will be important.

If Paula Fish or Amicell confirms an incident, additional information could clarify what happened, what data was affected, and whether systems were encrypted.

If no evidence emerges, the claims may remain unresolved.

Either way, security teams should treat the listings as signals worth investigating rather than definitive proof.

What Undercode Say:

The Real Story Is Bigger Than Two Victims

The appearance of Paula Fish and Amicell on an alleged ransomware victim list is important, but it should not be presented as confirmed evidence of a breach.

The larger story is The

Claims Need Verification

The supplied ThreatMon alert is useful threat intelligence, but it does not independently prove compromise.

Our assessment is therefore to use the language “claimed victim” until additional evidence becomes available.

The Gentlemen Is No Longer a Minor Threat

Research from Microsoft and other security organizations shows that The Gentlemen has developed into a serious RaaS operation rather than a small experimental ransomware crew.

Microsoft

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Scale Is the Critical Factor

The

Attackers do not need to personally execute every operation.

Affiliates Expand the Attack Surface

The affiliate model essentially turns ransomware into a platform.

More affiliates mean more potential intrusions.

Initial Access Remains the Battlefield

Organizations should spend as much time protecting remote-access systems, credentials, and exposed infrastructure as they spend preparing for encryption events.

Vulnerability Management Is Not Optional

Unpatched internet-facing infrastructure can become an

Rapid patching should therefore be treated as an operational security requirement.

Credentials Are Equally Important

Multifactor authentication can significantly reduce the usefulness of stolen passwords, particularly when stronger phishing-resistant methods are deployed.

Lateral Movement Is the Next Danger

Once attackers gain access, the objective may quickly shift from one machine to the entire environment.

Network segmentation can limit this progression.

Data Theft Changes the Equation

Backups cannot solve a data-exfiltration problem.

Organizations need controls designed to detect and restrict unauthorized data movement.

Double Extortion Is Here to Stay

The combination of encryption and data theft gives criminals leverage even against companies with strong recovery capabilities.

The Human Cost Is Often Invisible

Behind every ransomware listing are employees dealing with disrupted work, customers waiting for services, and management teams facing difficult decisions.

Public Claims Can Create Panic

A ransomware listing can trigger uncertainty before investigators know what actually happened.

That is why responsible reporting must distinguish claims from confirmed incidents.

Threat Intelligence Can Provide Early Warning

Monitoring criminal infrastructure and leak sites can give defenders valuable time to investigate.

Time Is the Most Valuable Defensive Resource

The sooner an organization detects an intrusion, the more opportunities it has to isolate systems and prevent escalation.

AI Could Accelerate Criminal Operations

AI-assisted development may allow experienced criminals to produce tools faster.

The important risk is acceleration, not autonomous cybercrime.

Ransomware Is Becoming Industrialized

The Gentlemen illustrates how modern cybercrime can combine specialized skills, infrastructure, access, malware, negotiation, and extortion into one scalable business.

Organizations Need Resilience, Not Just Prevention

No security program can guarantee that an attacker will never enter.

The goal should be to make intrusion difficult, detect it quickly, limit its spread, and recover reliably.

Backups Must Be Tested

An untested backup is an assumption.

A tested restoration process is a capability.

Privileged Accounts Need Extra Protection

Administrative credentials can provide attackers with extraordinary control.

They should be protected with stronger authentication and tightly controlled permissions.

Third-Party Connections Need Monitoring

Suppliers and partners can become pathways into sensitive environments.

Security programs should therefore account for external dependencies.

Incident Response Should Include Data Theft

Organizations need procedures for determining what information was accessed or removed, not merely which machines were encrypted.

Ransomware Defense Is an Executive Issue

The impact of an attack can reach legal, financial, operational, and reputational departments.

Cybersecurity cannot remain isolated inside the IT department.

The Latest Claims Are a Warning

Whether or not these two specific claims are eventually confirmed, they demonstrate the continuing activity surrounding The Gentlemen.

The Threat Is Moving Faster

RaaS allows criminals to scale faster than traditional one-off hacking operations.

Defenders Must Become Faster Too

Continuous monitoring, automated containment, strong identity controls, and practiced response procedures can reduce the attacker’s advantage.

Verification Must Come Before Conclusions

Paula Fish and Amicell should remain classified as alleged victims unless independent evidence confirms the claims.

The Bigger Lesson

The most important lesson from this incident is simple: ransomware defense begins long before encryption starts.

Security Starts With the Front Door

Internet-facing systems, credentials, remote access, and exposed services deserve constant attention.

Then Comes the Interior

Once attackers enter, segmentation, monitoring, least privilege, and endpoint visibility determine how far they can go.

And Finally, Recovery

Organizations need reliable backups, tested recovery procedures, crisis communications, and legal preparation before an incident happens.

Undercode’s Assessment

The July 31 listings should be treated as a credible threat-intelligence signal but an unconfirmed breach claim.

The

The Final Warning

Ransomware groups do not need every claim to be successful.

They only need enough real attacks to keep affiliates interested, victims under pressure, and their criminal business profitable.

✅ The Gentlemen Is an Active Ransomware Operation

Microsoft and multiple security researchers independently document The Gentlemen as an active Ransomware-as-a-Service operation with encryption, data theft, and lateral-movement capabilities.

Microsoft

+1

⚠️ Paula Fish and Amicell Are Currently Claims, Not Confirmed Breaches

The supplied ThreatMon alerts identify both organizations as alleged victims, but the available evidence does not independently establish that either organization was breached or that data was stolen.

✅ The Group Has Demonstrated Significant Growth

Independent security research has documented hundreds of claimed victims and identified The Gentlemen as one of the most active ransomware operations in 2026.

Ransomnews

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Prediction

(+1) The Gentlemen Will Likely Continue Adding Victims

The

(+1) More Organizations Will Increase Ransomware Monitoring

As The

(+1) More Technical Research Will Expose the

The continued activity of The Gentlemen will likely produce additional research into its infrastructure, affiliates, malware, initial-access techniques, and lateral-movement behavior.

(-1) Victim Listings Will Not Always Equal Confirmed Breaches

Some future claims may remain unverified or disputed. Ransomware groups control their own leak platforms, meaning victim listings should never automatically be treated as independently established facts.

(+1) The Ransomware Economy Will Remain Highly Competitive

The success of large RaaS operations creates incentives for competing groups to improve recruitment, tooling, automation, and extortion strategies.

(+1) Defensive Speed Will Become Even More Important

As ransomware operators improve automation and propagation, organizations that can detect suspicious activity early and isolate compromised systems will have a significantly better chance of limiting the damage.

▶️ Related Video (72% Match):

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