CRPxO Claims Johnson & Johnson and A101 as New Ransomware Victims — What We Know So Far + Video

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A New Pair of High-Profile Claims

A fresh wave of dark-web ransomware activity has placed two very different organizations in the spotlight. According to a ThreatMon threat-intelligence alert published on July 31, 2026, the ransomware group known as CRPxO has allegedly added Johnson & Johnson and Turkish retailer A101 to its victim list.

The reports appeared only minutes apart and immediately raised questions about whether CRPxO is expanding beyond the healthcare organizations and smaller businesses it has targeted in recent campaigns. The timing is particularly notable because publicly tracked CRPxO activity has already shown a rapidly expanding victim list across healthcare, technology, professional services and other industries.

But there is an important distinction that must be made before the claims are treated as confirmed breaches: a ransomware group’s victim listing is not, by itself, proof that an organization was successfully compromised. At the time of writing, the Johnson & Johnson and A101 allegations should therefore be described as claims rather than confirmed incidents.

What ThreatMon Reported

ThreatMon’s alert states that its threat-intelligence team detected dark-web ransomware activity associated with CRPxO and identified Johnson & Johnson as a newly listed victim.

The reported timestamp for the Johnson & Johnson entry was August 1, 2026, at 02:51:24 UTC+3, while the A101 entry was timestamped approximately one minute earlier, at 02:50:24 UTC+3. The original social-media post was published on July 31 according to the supplied material.

The two listings appearing almost simultaneously are significant because ransomware operators frequently publish batches of victims rather than adding organizations randomly throughout the day.

Johnson & Johnson Becomes the Most Notable Name in the Claims

The Johnson & Johnson allegation immediately stands out because of the company’s enormous global footprint.

Johnson & Johnson operates across pharmaceutical and medical-technology businesses and has a much larger international presence than many of the organizations previously associated with CRPxO.

That makes the claim particularly consequential if it is eventually confirmed. A compromise involving a company of this scale could potentially involve corporate systems, employee information, internal documents, intellectual property, research-related information, third-party infrastructure or other sensitive business data.

However, none of those possibilities should currently be presented as confirmed facts. The available evidence establishes that a threat-intelligence source reported a CRPxO victim listing, not that Johnson & Johnson’s systems were definitively breached or that specific data was stolen.

A101 Adds a Major Turkish Target to the Story

The second organization named in the alert is A101, one of Turkey’s major retail chains.

Unlike Johnson & Johnson, A101 is primarily associated with mass-market retail and operates within a very different commercial environment. The alleged addition therefore potentially represents another expansion of CRPxO’s victimology.

If the listing is legitimate and ultimately verified, it could indicate that CRPxO is not limiting itself to healthcare-related organizations. Existing intelligence already shows CRPxO activity extending beyond healthcare into technology, finance, transportation, manufacturing and professional services.

CRPxO Is No Longer an Unknown Name

CRPxO is a relatively young ransomware operation, but its activity has become increasingly visible during 2026.

Threat-intelligence tracking shows multiple CRPxO claims appearing in concentrated waves. One public tracker lists numerous organizations attributed to the group, including healthcare providers, technology companies, financial organizations, law firms and other professional-service businesses.

Another threat-intelligence profile describes CRPxO as an extortion-focused ransomware actor with activity involving healthcare and biopharmaceutical organizations. Its documented techniques include data encryption and data exfiltration, two characteristics associated with modern double-extortion ransomware operations.

The Healthcare Connection Matters

CRPxO’s earlier targeting makes the Johnson & Johnson claim especially interesting.

During July, multiple healthcare-related organizations were publicly associated with CRPxO, including dental practices and healthcare providers. SOCRadar, for example, documented alleged CRPxO claims against healthcare organizations and emphasized that these incidents were allegations originating from threat-intelligence monitoring.

This creates two possible interpretations.

The first is that CRPxO may be intentionally pursuing organizations with valuable medical and pharmaceutical information. The second is that healthcare was simply one of several sectors the group found vulnerable and profitable.

The Johnson & Johnson claim, if confirmed, would make the first possibility considerably more interesting.

A Shift Toward Larger Organizations?

One of the biggest questions surrounding the latest claims is whether CRPxO is moving toward larger enterprises.

Ransomware groups often begin with smaller organizations because they can be easier to compromise and may have fewer security resources. Once an operation develops reliable access methods, affiliates and extortion infrastructure, attackers can begin pursuing larger targets.

CRPxO’s recent victim lists already show considerable variety, including technology companies, insurance organizations, healthcare providers and professional-service firms.

A confirmed Johnson & Johnson compromise would represent a dramatic escalation in the profile of the alleged targets.

The Timing Could Be More Important Than the Names

The most interesting detail may not actually be the identity of either organization.

It is the timing.

ThreatMon reported Johnson & Johnson and A101 within approximately one minute of each other. That pattern can be consistent with automated monitoring of an extortion site or with a ransomware group publishing multiple victim records as part of a campaign update.

It does not prove that the same intrusion technique was used against both organizations.

Nevertheless, simultaneous listings can provide researchers with clues about how an extortion operation manages its victim pipeline.

Double Extortion Changes the Risk

Modern ransomware is no longer simply about encrypting files.

Many ransomware operations combine encryption with data theft. The attackers first obtain access, move through the environment, identify valuable information, exfiltrate selected data and then use encryption or the threat of publication to increase pressure on the victim.

CRPxO has been associated in public reporting with this broader extortion model. Threat-intelligence research has identified data exfiltration and encryption among techniques associated with the group.

This means that even if an organization restores its systems from backups, the incident may remain serious because stolen information can still be used as leverage.

A Data Leak Is Not Automatically Proven

The existence of a victim listing should not be confused with proof of data theft.

Threat actors can exaggerate, recycle old information, post organizations prematurely, or sometimes list organizations whose environments were never successfully compromised.

This is why professional threat-intelligence reporting often labels ransomware leak-site entries as alleged until the victim organization, independent forensic evidence or another reliable source confirms the incident.

That distinction is especially important when the organization involved is a major multinational company.

Johnson & Johnson Has a Long Cybersecurity History

Johnson & Johnson is not unfamiliar with cybersecurity threats.

The

That historical record does not confirm the latest CRPxO allegation.

It does, however, demonstrate why cybersecurity is particularly important for a company operating pharmaceutical, medical-device and healthcare-related infrastructure.

The Potential Impact Would Extend Beyond IT

A confirmed attack against a healthcare giant would potentially have consequences beyond ordinary corporate data loss.

Healthcare and pharmaceutical companies manage valuable intellectual property, clinical information, research documentation, commercial contracts, regulatory records and extensive third-party relationships.

A successful intrusion could therefore create several simultaneous risks: operational disruption, data exposure, intellectual-property theft, regulatory complications and reputational damage.

At this stage, however, there is no reliable public evidence establishing that any of these consequences occurred in the alleged Johnson & Johnson incident.

A101 Represents a Different Risk Profile

The A101 allegation creates a different cybersecurity picture.

Retail companies process enormous amounts of transactional information and depend heavily on digital infrastructure. Point-of-sale systems, employee accounts, logistics platforms, supplier relationships, customer databases and e-commerce systems can all become attractive targets.

A successful ransomware intrusion against a large retailer could potentially disrupt stores, distribution networks or internal operations.

Again, these are potential consequences, not confirmed outcomes of the reported CRPxO claim.

Why Retailers Are Attractive Targets

Retailers are attractive to cybercriminals for a simple reason: availability matters.

A retailer cannot easily tolerate prolonged outages. Every hour of disruption can potentially affect sales, inventory, logistics, payment operations and customer service.

That creates pressure during negotiations.

Ransomware operators understand this economic reality. Their leverage is often strongest when an organization depends on continuously available systems.

CRPxO’s Expanding Victimology

Public tracking suggests that

The group has been associated with healthcare, technology, professional services, financial services, manufacturing and transportation organizations.

That breadth is important because it suggests that the group’s strategy may be opportunistic rather than tied to one vertical.

If the Johnson & Johnson and A101 listings are confirmed, the pattern becomes even clearer.

The Threat Actor Economy Is Becoming More Industrialized

Ransomware operations increasingly resemble businesses.

There are operators, affiliates, initial-access brokers, infrastructure providers, negotiators and data-leak platforms. Some groups recruit affiliates and offer revenue-sharing arrangements to individuals capable of obtaining access to organizations.

Research published in July described CRPxO as operating with characteristics associated with ransomware-as-a-service, including affiliate recruitment and a double-extortion model.

This model can dramatically increase the number of potential victims because the core operators do not necessarily need to conduct every intrusion themselves.

Why Affiliate Models Matter

An affiliate model creates decentralization.

One group can maintain the ransomware infrastructure while multiple independent attackers search for vulnerable organizations. This allows campaigns to scale faster than a traditional centralized criminal operation.

For defenders, this creates a problem: blocking one attacker’s infrastructure may not stop the entire ecosystem.

The defensive response must therefore focus on vulnerabilities, credentials, identity systems, exposed services and behavioral indicators rather than relying only on known attacker addresses.

Initial Access Remains the Critical Battle

Regardless of the ransomware brand, attackers still need a way inside.

That may involve stolen credentials, phishing, compromised remote-access tools, exploited internet-facing vulnerabilities, exposed management interfaces or compromised third-party services.

Public reporting on CRPxO has pointed to several potential access mechanisms and has emphasized the importance of monitoring exposed infrastructure and remote-management systems.

For defenders, this means perimeter security remains essential even in an era dominated by identity-based attacks.

Credential Theft Can Be the Beginning of the Chain

A stolen password may look insignificant when viewed in isolation.

In a modern enterprise, however, a single compromised credential can become the first step in a much larger intrusion.

If an attacker obtains access to an employee account, they may attempt privilege escalation, search for additional credentials, access cloud services, move laterally and identify sensitive data.

This is why strong authentication, phishing-resistant MFA and aggressive credential monitoring remain some of the most important defenses against ransomware.

The Cloud Has Changed the Battlefield

Corporate data is no longer concentrated inside a single data center.

Organizations now rely on SaaS platforms, cloud storage, remote-access systems, identity providers and third-party applications.

That creates additional opportunities for attackers.

A ransomware operation does not necessarily need to encrypt every server if it can steal sensitive documents from cloud services and threaten to publish them.

Data Exfiltration Can Be More Dangerous Than Encryption

Encryption causes immediate operational pain.

Data theft can create long-term consequences.

Once sensitive files leave an

This is one reason double extortion has become such a powerful ransomware strategy.

The Johnson & Johnson Claim Requires Independent Confirmation

The strongest responsible conclusion today is simple: the Johnson & Johnson incident is an allegation requiring verification.

The available evidence supports the existence of a reported CRPxO listing, but it does not independently establish the extent of an intrusion, whether encryption occurred, whether data was stolen or whether Johnson & Johnson has acknowledged an incident.

That distinction should remain at the center of reporting.

The Same Standard Applies to A101

The A101 allegation should receive the same treatment.

A threat

Independent confirmation could come from the organization itself, regulators, forensic investigators, law-enforcement disclosures or credible third-party technical evidence.

Until then, the correct terminology is alleged victim.

Why Dark-Web Monitoring Still Matters

Even unverified ransomware claims can provide valuable intelligence.

A leak-site listing can reveal which companies attackers are targeting, how frequently the group is operating, which industries appear vulnerable and whether the threat actor is changing its victim profile.

Threat-intelligence teams can use this information to identify warning signs before an alleged breach becomes a confirmed crisis.

This makes dark-web monitoring a defensive capability rather than merely a source of alarming headlines.

A Sudden Victim Surge Can Reveal Operational Changes

When a ransomware group begins posting victims at a higher frequency, researchers should ask what changed.

The group may have acquired new affiliates.

It may have discovered a vulnerability affecting a widely deployed technology.

It may have gained access to an initial-access broker.

Or it may simply be publishing previously undisclosed victims in batches.

The number of listings alone cannot identify the cause, but the pattern deserves attention.

The CRPxO Campaign Deserves Continued Monitoring

CRPxO’s recent activity is increasingly difficult to dismiss as isolated incidents.

Public intelligence has documented multiple alleged victims and identified recurring ransomware and exfiltration techniques associated with the operation.

The latest claims therefore fit into an existing pattern of activity, even though the two newest allegations remain unconfirmed.

What Organizations Should Learn From the Claims

Companies should not wait until their own name appears on a leak site.

Organizations should continuously audit internet-facing assets, patch critical vulnerabilities, enforce phishing-resistant authentication, monitor privileged accounts and maintain offline or otherwise resilient backups.

Incident-response plans should also assume that attackers may steal data before deploying ransomware.

Security Teams Should Hunt Before Encryption

The encryption stage is often the most visible part of a ransomware attack.

By that point, attackers may already have spent days inside the environment.

Security teams should therefore hunt for suspicious authentication, unusual administrative activity, large outbound transfers, unexpected use of remote-management software and abnormal access to sensitive repositories.

Stopping the attacker before encryption can transform a catastrophic ransomware event into a contained security incident.

The Biggest Warning Is the Combination of Scale and Speed

The most concerning aspect of the latest claims is the possibility that CRPxO is scaling.

A threat actor capable of repeatedly compromising organizations across multiple sectors can create a very different risk environment from a small ransomware crew targeting isolated businesses.

If the group continues expanding its victim list, defenders should expect more aggressive targeting and potentially more sophisticated access operations.

Public Claims Can Also Become Psychological Weapons

Ransomware is partly a technical crime and partly a psychological operation.

Threat actors want executives, employees, customers and investors to believe that a company is already compromised and that publication is imminent.

The public listing itself can therefore create pressure even before the underlying claim is independently verified.

This is another reason organizations need carefully prepared crisis-communication strategies.

Silence Does Not Automatically Mean Confirmation

An organization not immediately commenting on a ransomware claim should not be interpreted as proof that the incident occurred.

Companies may need time to investigate.

They may be coordinating with law enforcement.

They may be assessing whether systems or data were actually affected.

They may also have no incident to disclose at all.

Responsible reporting should avoid turning silence into evidence.

What Happens If Johnson & Johnson Confirms the Incident?

A confirmation would immediately elevate the story.

Researchers would likely examine the suspected intrusion path, affected subsidiaries, systems, data categories, attacker infrastructure and whether sensitive healthcare or intellectual-property information was stolen.

Regulators and customers could also demand additional information depending on the nature and scope of the incident.

The

What Happens If A101 Confirms the Claim?

A confirmed A101 compromise could raise questions about retail operations, customer information, employee data, logistics and third-party systems.

The impact would depend heavily on what the attackers accessed.

A limited corporate-network compromise would have a very different consequence from a breach involving customer or payment-related systems.

Confirmation Would Matter More Than the Headline

The cybersecurity industry has learned an uncomfortable lesson from years of ransomware reporting: the first headline is often not the final truth.

Threat actors can make claims quickly.

Forensic investigations take time.

The difference between the two is where accurate cybersecurity journalism begins.

The Current Evidence Supports Caution

At present, the strongest conclusion is that ThreatMon has reported CRPxO listings naming Johnson & Johnson and A101.

Existing public intelligence supports the broader assessment that CRPxO is an active ransomware/extortion operation with multiple reported victims.

But the specific July 31 claims should remain classified as allegations until independent confirmation emerges.

What Undercode Say:

  1. The Headline Is Bigger Than the Evidence

The Johnson & Johnson name makes this story immediately attention-grabbing, but the evidence currently available does not justify calling it a confirmed breach.

2. CRPxO Is Clearly Active

The latest claims do not appear in isolation. Multiple independent threat-intelligence sources have tracked CRPxO activity during July 2026.

3. The Victim Profile Is Expanding

CRPxO’s reported victims span healthcare, technology, professional services, financial services and other sectors.

4. Healthcare Remains Important

The group’s earlier healthcare targeting makes Johnson & Johnson particularly interesting because of the company’s enormous pharmaceutical and medical footprint.

5. A101 Changes the Picture

The alleged A101 listing suggests the operation may be targeting organizations far beyond healthcare.

6. Two Listings in One Minute Matter

The extremely close timestamps suggest a coordinated publication event or automated victim-list update.

7. Automation Could Be the Hidden Story

If CRPxO is automating parts of its victim discovery or publication process, its ability to scale could become more dangerous.

8. Scale Is the Real Threat

The greatest concern is not necessarily one specific victim but the possibility of a ransomware operation increasing its operational tempo.

9. Double Extortion Remains Powerful

Encryption creates disruption, while stolen information creates continuing pressure.

10. Data Theft Changes Recovery

Backups can restore systems, but they cannot erase copies of information already stolen by attackers.

11. Large Companies Are Not Invulnerable

A multinational company can have enormous cybersecurity budgets and still contain vulnerable employees, applications, suppliers and infrastructure.

12. Retail Has Its Own Weak Points

Retail environments depend on constant availability, making downtime particularly expensive.

13. Healthcare Has High-Value Data

Pharmaceutical and medical organizations hold intellectual property and sensitive information that can be extremely valuable to attackers.

14. Attackers Follow Economics

Ransomware groups generally seek targets where disruption and data exposure can create maximum negotiating leverage.

15. Affiliates Accelerate Growth

Ransomware-as-a-service models allow criminal operators to scale by outsourcing portions of the intrusion process.

16. One Group Can Have Many Attackers

The brand seen on a leak site may represent an ecosystem rather than a single hacker sitting behind a keyboard.

17. Initial Access Is the Critical Point

Stopping an attacker before they establish persistence is dramatically easier than removing them after lateral movement.

18. Identity Security Is Central

Strong authentication and privileged-access controls can prevent stolen credentials from becoming full network compromise.

19. Perimeter Security Still Matters

Internet-facing systems remain attractive targets, particularly when vulnerabilities can provide direct access.

20. Remote Management Is High Risk

Remote-access infrastructure provides attackers with exactly what they want: legitimate-looking access to internal systems.

21. Monitoring Must Be Continuous

Organizations cannot protect themselves effectively by checking their exposure once a year.

22. Dark-Web Monitoring Has Defensive Value

Threat-actor listings can provide early warning even when the underlying claims still require confirmation.

23. Threat Claims Can Be Manipulated

Attackers have incentives to exaggerate their success, so every claim needs independent validation.

24. False Positives Have Consequences

Incorrectly reporting a company as breached can cause unnecessary panic, reputational damage and financial consequences.

25. Journalism Needs a Confidence Scale

The difference between “claimed,” “alleged,” “reported,” and “confirmed” is not cosmetic. It is fundamental to responsible cybersecurity reporting.

26. Johnson & Johnson Deserves Extra Scrutiny

Because of the

27. A101 Deserves Equal Attention

A major retailer can provide attackers with a large operational and customer-facing attack surface.

28. Timing May Reveal Campaign Structure

The simultaneous listings could help researchers understand how CRPxO manages victim publication.

29. Victim Lists Are Intelligence

Even when claims are unverified, changes in victim geography and industry can reveal strategic shifts.

  1. The Group May Be Testing New Markets

The move between healthcare, professional services, technology and retail could represent experimentation with different target environments.

31. Attackers Learn From Every Campaign

Successful compromises teach criminals which technologies, industries and security weaknesses produce results.

32. Defenders Must Learn Faster

The best response is not simply patching after an attack but identifying patterns before attackers exploit them.

33. Ransomware Is Now an Enterprise Risk

The consequences can reach legal, financial, operational, regulatory and reputational departments simultaneously.

34. Backups Are Necessary but Insufficient

A mature ransomware defense requires backup resilience plus identity security, segmentation, detection, response and data-loss controls.

35. Third Parties Matter

A company’s security is influenced by vendors, suppliers, contractors and technology providers connected to its environment.

36. Data Minimization Reduces Damage

Organizations that retain less unnecessary sensitive information have less valuable material available for attackers to steal.

37. Incident Response Must Begin Early

The longer an attacker remains undetected, the greater the probability of credential theft, lateral movement and data exfiltration.

38. Public Claims Should Trigger Investigation

An unverified listing should not cause panic, but it should never simply be ignored.

39. The Next Update Could Change Everything

A statement from either organization, additional leak-site evidence or forensic confirmation could dramatically change the assessment.

40. The Real Story Is Still Developing

CRPxO’s alleged targeting of Johnson & Johnson and A101 is significant enough to monitor closely, but the responsible conclusion today remains that these are ransomware claims, not confirmed breaches.

Deep Analysis: What Commands the Threat Landscape Is Showing

Command 1 — Verify Before Amplifying

Security teams should immediately search internal telemetry for indicators associated with the alleged exposure rather than assuming the dark-web claim is accurate.

Command 2 — Review Authentication Logs

Investigators should examine unusual successful logins, impossible-travel events, newly created accounts, privilege changes and authentication attempts from unexpected locations.

Command 3 — Hunt for Lateral Movement

Security teams should investigate abnormal administrative activity and unexpected connections between workstation, server and identity infrastructure.

Command 4 — Audit Internet-Facing Assets

Organizations should inventory every public-facing VPN, firewall, remote-access gateway, application and management interface.

Command 5 — Patch Critical Systems

Known exploited vulnerabilities affecting internet-facing infrastructure should receive immediate attention, particularly when exploitation could provide privileged access.

Command 6 — Examine Outbound Traffic

Large or unusual transfers to previously unseen external infrastructure can be an important indicator of data exfiltration.

Command 7 — Review Cloud Activity

Security teams should investigate abnormal downloads, mass file access and suspicious OAuth applications across cloud environments.

Command 8 — Protect Privileged Accounts

Administrative accounts should receive stronger controls, phishing-resistant authentication and continuous monitoring.

Command 9 — Segment Critical Systems

Network segmentation can prevent a compromised endpoint from becoming a pathway into high-value systems.

Command 10 — Test Recovery

Organizations should regularly verify that backups can actually restore critical services under ransomware conditions.

Command 11 — Monitor Third Parties

Security teams should review vendor access and immediately disable unnecessary external accounts.

Command 12 — Prepare Communications

A ransomware claim can become a public-relations crisis before the technical investigation is finished, so communication procedures should already exist.

❌ Johnson & Johnson Breach Confirmed

There is currently no independently verified evidence in the sources reviewed establishing that Johnson & Johnson suffered a confirmed CRPxO ransomware breach. The available information supports reporting this as a threat-actor/intelligence claim, not a confirmed incident.

❌ A101 Breach Confirmed

The supplied ThreatMon alert reports A101 as a CRPxO victim, but the available independent sources reviewed do not establish that A101 was definitively compromised. The allegation should therefore remain unconfirmed.

✅ CRPxO Is an Active Ransomware/Extortion Operation

Multiple threat-intelligence sources independently document CRPxO activity and reported victims during July 2026. Its publicly described activity includes ransomware/extortion behavior, data exfiltration and encryption-related techniques.

Prediction

(+1) CRPxO Will Continue Expanding Its Victim List

The strongest near-term prediction is that additional organizations will appear in CRPxO-related monitoring feeds. The group’s recent activity shows a sustained stream of alleged victims rather than a single isolated campaign.

(+1) More Industries Will Be Targeted

If CRPxO continues operating at its current pace, the victim profile is likely to become even more diverse. Healthcare, technology and professional services have already appeared prominently in public tracking, while the A101 claim would represent another step toward broader retail targeting.

(+1) Larger Organizations Could Become More Attractive

A confirmed major-enterprise compromise would provide CRPxO with greater publicity and potentially greater extortion leverage. That could encourage the group and its affiliates to pursue organizations with larger revenues and more valuable data.

(-1) Not Every New Victim Claim Will Be Confirmed

Ransomware leak-site listings should not be treated as definitive evidence. Some future CRPxO claims may remain unverified, be disputed by victims or prove less significant than initially suggested.

(-1) The Johnson & Johnson Claim Could Remain Unsubstantiated

Unless independent evidence or an official disclosure emerges, the current Johnson & Johnson allegation may never develop into a publicly confirmed incident.

(+1) Threat Intelligence Will Become More Important

The speed at which ransomware groups publish claims means defenders increasingly need real-time monitoring rather than relying solely on traditional incident reports.

(-1) Public Panic Could Outpace Technical Evidence

The appearance of a globally recognized company on a ransomware list can generate headlines instantly. The technical investigation, however, may take days or weeks. This gap creates fertile ground for misinformation.

(+1) Early Detection Will Remain the Best Defense

Organizations that identify suspicious authentication, privilege escalation and data movement before encryption occurs will have a significantly better chance of containing ransomware attacks.

Final Assessment

CRPxO’s reported addition of Johnson & Johnson and A101 is a development worth watching, especially because it may signal a broader and more aggressive victim-selection strategy.

But the most important fact is also the easiest one to overlook: a ransomware claim is not automatically a confirmed breach.

The broader CRPxO threat is real enough to deserve serious attention. Its documented victim activity, apparent use of extortion tactics and growing cross-sector reach show that the group is becoming an increasingly relevant part of the 2026 ransomware landscape.

For Johnson & Johnson and A101, the next decisive evidence will come from independent technical findings, official statements or additional credible intelligence.

Until then, the correct description is clear: CRPxO has allegedly claimed both organizations, but the specific breaches remain unconfirmed.

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