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A New Warning From the Ransomware Underground
Ransomware continues to move across sectors that society depends on most, and two fresh victim listings reported on August 4, 2026, highlight just how broad the threat has become. Threat intelligence monitoring attributed two separate victim additions to the Krybit and Chaos ransomware operations, with a Brazilian university and a U.S. healthcare-network company appearing in the reports.
The first listing names Centro Universitário CESMAC, a higher-education institution in Maceió, Alagoas, Brazil, as a purported Krybit victim. CESMAC describes itself as a major regional university offering programs ranging from law and engineering to medicine, pharmacy, nursing and information systems.
Centro Universitário CESMAC
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The second listing names Healthcare Highways, a U.S. company focused on medical provider networks, as an alleged victim of the Chaos ransomware group. Healthcare Highways says its network connects thousands of primary-care physicians, specialists and facilities while supporting employers, health plans and other healthcare organizations.
Healthcare Highways
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The reports are important, but they require careful wording. A ransomware group’s appearance on a victim list is an allegation, not automatically proof that an intrusion, encryption event, or data theft has been independently confirmed. At the time of this analysis, the material supplied for the report consists primarily of threat-intelligence claims.
The Two Claims Appeared Within Hours
The threat-monitoring posts supplied in the original report identify CESMAC as a Krybit victim at approximately 20:57 UTC+3 on August 4, 2026, while Healthcare Highways was listed under Chaos at approximately 18:57 UTC+3.
The proximity of the reports is striking. Two organizations from completely different sectors appeared in ransomware intelligence feeds on the same day, reinforcing the increasingly decentralized nature of modern extortion campaigns.
Rather than focusing exclusively on one industry, ransomware operators can pursue organizations based on perceived access, valuable information, operational dependency, or their ability to withstand prolonged disruption.
CESMAC: A University With a Large Digital Footprint
CESMAC is not simply a small educational website. Its official institutional information describes a university established in 1973 that has expanded into a broad collection of academic programs and research activities.
Centro Universitário CESMAC
Its current academic portfolio includes fields such as medicine, nursing, pharmacy, dentistry, psychology, engineering, law, information systems and other disciplines. That breadth potentially creates a substantial digital environment containing student information, faculty records, administrative systems, research materials and other institutional data.
CESMAC’s website also shows active academic and administrative activity during July and August 2026, including postgraduate programs, academic events and the beginning of the 2026.2 academic semester.
Centro Universitário CESMAC
That timing makes the allegation particularly sensitive. An attack against an educational institution does not necessarily remain confined to a website. Universities operate interconnected environments involving student portals, faculty systems, financial operations, research infrastructure, email, authentication platforms and third-party services.
Why a University Can Become a High-Value Ransomware Target
Universities have long represented attractive targets because they combine large populations with decentralized technology environments.
Students, professors, researchers, contractors and administrative employees may all require different levels of access. Hundreds or thousands of accounts can create a sprawling identity environment in which a compromised credential can potentially become an entry point.
Research data can also have significant value. Intellectual property, unpublished research, personal information, financial documents and internal communications may all become useful leverage in an extortion campaign.
The important point is that ransomware criminals do not necessarily need to encrypt every system to cause serious damage. If attackers obtain sensitive information, they can potentially threaten publication even when backups prevent traditional encryption-based extortion from succeeding.
Healthcare Highways Represents a Different Kind of Risk
The second alleged victim, Healthcare Highways, operates in an especially sensitive ecosystem.
According to its official website, the company powers healthcare provider networks and connects patients, employers and healthcare providers. It says its network includes more than 12,000 primary-care physicians, more than 69,000 specialists and more than 3,000 facilities and ancillary providers.
Healthcare Highways
That makes a ransomware allegation involving the organization more consequential than a simple corporate website disruption.
Healthcare networks sit between multiple parties. Even when an organization is not itself a hospital, its technology can support administrative processes, provider relationships, benefits information and other healthcare-related operations.
Why Healthcare Remains a Prime Target
Healthcare organizations are particularly attractive to extortion groups because operational disruption can have immediate consequences.
A manufacturing company may be able to temporarily stop production. A healthcare organization may have to continue serving patients, processing benefits, coordinating providers and maintaining access to essential information.
That pressure can create a powerful incentive for criminals.
Healthcare Highways states that its mission involves connecting providers, patients and employers while maintaining quality and efficiency.
Healthcare Highways
Any disruption affecting those connections could therefore have consequences beyond the company’s internal IT department.
The Chaos Allegation Deserves Particular Attention
The second report attributes the Healthcare Highways listing to the Chaos ransomware group.
Chaos has appeared in recent threat-intelligence discussions as an evolving ransomware operation. Recent reporting and security-community discussions have also focused on techniques intended to make malicious communications blend more naturally into legitimate browser traffic.
That evolution matters because ransomware groups increasingly compete not only through encryption technology but also through stealth, initial-access techniques, credential theft and methods designed to evade conventional security controls.
Krybit Continues to Draw Attention
Krybit is another ransomware name that has appeared in recent threat-intelligence reporting.
Earlier 2026 security-community reporting described Krybit as an emerging ransomware group, illustrating how quickly new names can enter an already crowded extortion ecosystem.
The appearance of CESMAC on an alleged victim list therefore deserves monitoring, particularly if Krybit later publishes evidence, samples, screenshots or stolen files.
However, until such evidence is independently verified, the responsible description remains an alleged ransomware victim listing.
A Victim Listing Is Not the Same as a Confirmed Breach
This distinction is crucial.
Threat actors frequently publish victim names to create pressure. A listing can indicate a genuine compromise, but it can also precede an eventual disclosure, contain exaggerated claims, or in some circumstances represent an attempt to manufacture credibility.
Security researchers therefore look for corroborating indicators.
Those indicators can include leaked files, cryptographic hashes, screenshots, samples of stolen information, infrastructure telemetry, victim confirmation, law-enforcement notifications, incident-response findings or evidence that systems actually experienced unauthorized access.
Without those additional signals, a victim-listing report should be treated as an intelligence lead rather than a final incident verdict.
The Dark Web Has Become Part of the Extortion Strategy
Modern ransomware is no longer simply about locking files and displaying a ransom note.
The criminal business model has increasingly incorporated public pressure.
Attackers can announce victims, threaten to publish stolen information, release partial samples, negotiate privately and eventually publish data if demands are not met.
This creates multiple stages of pressure.
The victim may first discover suspicious activity. Then comes the extortion demand. After that, the attacker can threaten publication. Finally, the stolen information may be released through underground channels or other distribution mechanisms.
The result is a cyberattack that can become a reputational crisis, regulatory issue and operational emergency simultaneously.
The Education-Healthcare Combination Is Significant
The two organizations named in these reports represent sectors that contain particularly sensitive information.
Education involves identity records, financial information, academic records and research.
Healthcare involves provider information, benefits data and potentially sensitive personal or medical information.
The alleged targeting of both sectors on the same day demonstrates why ransomware defense cannot be treated as a problem limited to banks, technology companies or large corporations.
Any organization with valuable data and internet-connected infrastructure can become attractive.
The Real Question Is What Happened Before the Listing
The most important unanswered question is not simply whether the organizations appeared on a ransomware website.
It is how the attackers allegedly reached them.
Potential initial-access pathways in ransomware campaigns can include compromised credentials, phishing, exposed remote-access services, vulnerable internet-facing applications, stolen session tokens, third-party compromise and other forms of unauthorized access.
The exact method used against CESMAC or Healthcare Highways has not been established by the material supplied here.
That distinction prevents speculation from becoming misinformation.
Identity Security May Be Central
Credentials remain one of the most important defensive boundaries for organizations of this size.
Universities have thousands of users and frequently integrate numerous cloud services. Healthcare organizations similarly depend on extensive networks of employees, providers, partners and external systems.
Multi-factor authentication, phishing-resistant authentication, privileged-access management and continuous monitoring can substantially reduce the likelihood that a stolen password becomes an unrestricted pathway into an environment.
But authentication alone is not enough.
Organizations must also monitor abnormal logins, impossible travel patterns, privilege escalation, unusual data transfers and suspicious authentication behavior.
Segmentation Can Limit the Damage
Network segmentation is another critical layer.
If an attacker compromises one workstation, that machine should not automatically provide a route into every important server and database.
Separating administrative systems, research environments, identity infrastructure, backups and sensitive data repositories can slow lateral movement.
This becomes particularly important during ransomware attacks because the attacker may spend time moving through the network before deploying encryption or stealing data.
Backups Are Necessary but Not Sufficient
Offline and otherwise protected backups remain one of the most important ransomware defenses.
But backups do not automatically solve the entire problem.
If criminals steal information before encryption, an organization can restore its systems while still facing an extortion threat.
This is why modern ransomware resilience requires both availability protection and data-protection controls.
A company needs to be able to restore systems while also limiting what an attacker can access and exfiltrate in the first place.
Universities Need to Treat Cybersecurity as Infrastructure
Academic freedom and technological openness can make university networks challenging to secure.
Research environments often require flexibility. Students need access to systems. Researchers collaborate with external institutions. Faculty members may use specialized software and cloud services.
Security controls therefore have to be designed around academic workflows rather than simply blocking everything unusual.
The challenge is finding the balance between openness and segmentation.
Healthcare Networks Face an Even Narrower Margin for Error
Healthcare organizations face a different pressure.
Security controls cannot create unnecessary obstacles for legitimate access to essential services.
A security system that locks out clinicians or administrators during a critical workflow can itself become an operational problem.
This makes identity-aware security, carefully designed access controls, resilient infrastructure and tested incident-response procedures particularly important.
What Organizations Should Do After a Victim Listing Appears
A newly published victim listing should trigger investigation rather than panic.
Security teams should immediately review authentication events, endpoint alerts, firewall activity, privileged-account activity, unusual outbound traffic and data-access patterns.
They should also verify whether backups remain intact and whether administrative credentials may have been exposed.
At the same time, organizations should preserve logs and forensic evidence rather than allowing an emergency cleanup process to destroy valuable indicators.
Communication Matters as Much as Technology
A ransomware incident can quickly become a communications crisis.
Organizations need a prepared process for informing employees, customers, partners, regulators and law enforcement when appropriate.
The worst possible situation is improvising communication after attackers have already begun releasing information publicly.
A prepared incident-response plan should define who makes technical decisions, who handles legal questions, who communicates externally and who coordinates with third parties.
Threat Intelligence Should Become an Early-Warning System
The CESMAC and Healthcare Highways reports also demonstrate the value of monitoring threat intelligence.
A victim listing may appear before a company publicly acknowledges an incident.
That does not make every listing accurate, but it gives defenders another signal to investigate.
Organizations should monitor ransomware leak sites, underground intelligence feeds, domain impersonation, credential exposure and mentions of corporate infrastructure.
The goal is not simply to know when an organization has been attacked.
The goal is to detect indications of compromise early enough to contain the attack.
Deep Analysis: What These Two Alleged Victims Tell Us
Ransomware Is Becoming a Continuous Pressure Campaign
The modern ransomware ecosystem increasingly behaves like a persistent criminal industry rather than a collection of isolated attacks.
Groups maintain infrastructure, recruit affiliates, acquire access and advertise their successes.
Victim-listing websites function partly as marketing platforms designed to demonstrate that the group remains active.
Reputation Has Become a Weapon
For ransomware operators, credibility matters.
A group that repeatedly publishes convincing evidence of successful compromises can potentially gain leverage over future victims.
That creates an incentive to publicize attacks.
For defenders, however, this means that every claim must be separated into three categories: alleged, supported and confirmed.
The First Hours Can Matter Most
If CESMAC or Healthcare Highways were genuinely compromised, the early response could determine how far the attackers progress.
An attacker who has gained initial access may spend time identifying privileged accounts, discovering network shares and locating valuable data.
Rapid detection can potentially interrupt that process before the final extortion stage.
Data Theft Can Be More Dangerous Than Encryption
Encryption creates downtime.
Data theft can create a much longer problem.
Once confidential information leaves an
That is why ransomware defenses increasingly need strong controls around data discovery, access and exfiltration.
Healthcare Data Creates Exceptional Extortion Pressure
Any unauthorized exposure involving healthcare-related information can create serious consequences.
Patients may worry about privacy.
Providers may worry about operational continuity.
Employers and insurers may face contractual or regulatory concerns.
The broader ecosystem can therefore magnify the consequences of one compromised organization.
Universities Contain Valuable Human Data
Academic institutions similarly hold extensive personal information.
Student records, staff records, financial information and research data can all become targets.
Universities also have large populations of users, which can increase the number of potential credential-compromise opportunities.
Attackers Do Not Need a Famous Brand
One misconception about ransomware is that criminals only pursue globally famous corporations.
In reality, an organization can become attractive because of its data, accessibility, operational dependence or perceived ability to pay.
The alleged selection of a regional university illustrates this broader threat model.
Third-Party Connections Expand the Attack Surface
Modern organizations rarely operate alone.
Universities use cloud platforms, payment providers, learning-management systems, software vendors and research partners.
Healthcare networks depend on providers, employers, payers, technology vendors and other external organizations.
Every connection can become part of the security equation.
Security Teams Must Think Beyond Their Own Domain
An organization can have excellent internal security while remaining exposed through a third party.
Vendor access should therefore be monitored and restricted.
Privileged third-party accounts should receive particular attention.
Inactive accounts should be removed.
Remote access should require strong authentication.
Internet Exposure Remains Dangerous
Publicly reachable systems require continuous monitoring.
Old VPN appliances, remote-management interfaces, administrative portals and vulnerable web applications can become attractive entry points.
Organizations should maintain an accurate inventory of internet-facing assets and rapidly remediate critical vulnerabilities.
Ransomware Groups Benefit From Automation
Criminal groups can increasingly automate reconnaissance, credential testing, infrastructure discovery and data processing.
This allows relatively small teams to operate at a scale that would have been difficult in earlier ransomware eras.
Defenders therefore need automation on their side as well.
Detection Cannot Depend on One Tool
Antivirus alone is not enough.
Firewall monitoring alone is not enough.
Endpoint detection alone is not enough.
Identity monitoring alone is not enough.
Modern defense requires multiple overlapping signals so that an attacker who defeats one layer encounters another.
Incident Response Must Be Practiced
A plan that exists only in a document may fail during a crisis.
Organizations should conduct ransomware simulations.
Teams should practice isolating endpoints, disabling compromised accounts, restoring systems and communicating with stakeholders.
The objective is to turn emergency procedures into familiar actions.
Recovery Speed Can Change the Economics
The faster an organization can recover independently, the less leverage an attacker may have.
This does not eliminate data-extortion risk, but it can reduce the pressure created by operational shutdown.
Resilience therefore becomes part of cybersecurity strategy.
Ransomware Is Also a Business Problem
The consequences of an attack can extend beyond IT.
Legal departments may become involved.
Executives may face difficult decisions.
Customers may demand answers.
Partners may reconsider integrations.
Insurance providers may require detailed investigations.
Cybersecurity therefore needs executive-level attention.
The Threat Intelligence Signal Should Be Taken Seriously
Even an unconfirmed victim listing deserves investigation.
Ignoring it because it has not yet been proven could allow a genuine intrusion to continue.
Treating it as confirmed without evidence, however, can create unnecessary panic.
The correct response lies between those extremes.
Verification Is the Foundation of Responsible Reporting
The supplied reports identify the alleged victims and ransomware groups, but they do not independently establish the full scope of either incident.
That means claims about stolen records, encrypted systems, ransom demands or leaked databases should not be presented as facts unless additional evidence emerges.
This distinction is especially important when dealing with sensitive organizations.
CESMAC’s Public Activity Suggests a Large Digital Environment
CESMAC’s own website shows ongoing academic operations, events and institutional programs during 2026.
Centro Universitário CESMAC
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A compromise, if confirmed, could therefore affect a broad collection of users and services rather than a single isolated webpage.
Healthcare
Healthcare Highways describes itself as a connector between healthcare providers, patients and employers.
Healthcare Highways
That intermediary role means cybersecurity concerns can potentially extend beyond one company and into a wider network of healthcare relationships.
The Two Claims Show Sector Diversity
One alleged victim belongs to higher education.
The other operates in healthcare.
That contrast illustrates the central reality of ransomware in 2026: attackers do not need an organization to belong to one particular industry before considering it valuable.
Public Pressure May Follow Private Intrusion
If the claims prove legitimate, the next stage could involve evidence publication or additional extortion activity.
Organizations should therefore monitor for new postings rather than treating the initial victim listing as the end of the incident.
The Absence of Evidence Today Does Not Prove Absence of an Attack
A company may need time to investigate.
Forensic analysis can take days or weeks.
Organizations sometimes delay public announcements while determining the scope of an incident.
Therefore, the current absence of a public confirmation should not automatically be interpreted as proof that nothing happened.
But Allegations Must Remain Allegations
The opposite error is equally dangerous.
A ransomware
Independent confirmation remains essential.
The Most Important Indicator Will Be Evidence
Screenshots, sample files, verified stolen information, forensic findings or a direct statement from the affected organization would substantially change the confidence level.
Until then, the responsible assessment is that both organizations have been reported as alleged victims.
Defenders Should Act Before Confirmation
Security teams do not need to wait for public confirmation before reviewing their systems.
If an organization is named by a credible threat-intelligence source, investigating suspicious activity is a rational defensive measure.
The Ransomware Economy Rewards Speed
Attackers benefit when defenders are slow.
Every additional hour can provide opportunities for credential theft, privilege escalation, reconnaissance and data exfiltration.
The defensive objective is therefore simple: detect, contain and investigate as early as possible.
Backups Should Be Tested, Not Merely Stored
An organization may believe it has reliable backups until it actually attempts restoration.
Regular recovery testing verifies whether critical systems can be rebuilt under pressure.
That capability can dramatically improve resilience during ransomware incidents.
Identity Should Become the New Security Perimeter
As organizations migrate more systems to cloud platforms, protecting identity becomes increasingly important.
Strong authentication, least privilege, privileged-access controls and continuous monitoring should be treated as foundational controls.
Sensitive Data Needs Its Own Defense
Organizations should know what information is most valuable and where it resides.
If sensitive records are scattered across poorly controlled systems, attackers have more opportunities to steal them.
Data classification and access control can reduce that exposure.
The Next Phase May Be More Targeted Extortion
Ransomware operations increasingly have incentives to select targets strategically.
Rather than simply spreading malware indiscriminately, criminals can focus on organizations where operational disruption and sensitive data create maximum pressure.
Universities and Healthcare Will Remain Attractive
Both sectors combine large amounts of valuable information with complex technology environments.
That makes continued targeting unsurprising.
The defensive lesson is that security investment must reflect the value of the information being protected.
What Happens Next Matters More Than the Initial Claim
The coming days will determine whether these listings develop into confirmed incidents.
If evidence appears, the story could expand into questions surrounding initial access, stolen information, operational disruption and potential regulatory consequences.
If no supporting evidence emerges, confidence in the claims should remain limited.
The Bigger Lesson Is Resilience
Ultimately, the most important lesson from the two reports is not the names of the ransomware groups.
It is the need for organizations to assume that sophisticated attackers will eventually test their defenses.
The goal is not to build an impossible-to-penetrate system.
The goal is to make compromise difficult, detect intrusion quickly, limit lateral movement, protect sensitive data and recover rapidly.
What Undercode Say:
Ransomware Has Become an Information War
The most important development is the transformation of ransomware from simple file encryption into a broader information-extortion ecosystem.
Allegations Can Still Create Damage
Even before an attack is confirmed, a public victim listing can create reputational pressure for an organization.
Verification Must Come First
Neither CESMAC nor Healthcare Highways should be described as definitively breached solely because of the supplied threat-intelligence claims.
CESMAC Deserves Close Monitoring
The university operates a broad academic environment with numerous programs and digital services, making the alleged listing significant if confirmed.
Centro Universitário CESMAC
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Healthcare Highways Deserves Equal Attention
Its position within healthcare-provider networks potentially increases the importance of any confirmed compromise.
Healthcare Highways
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The Two Targets Are Not Randomly Interesting
Education and healthcare both process valuable information and depend heavily on digital infrastructure.
Attackers Understand Operational Pressure
A victim that cannot easily tolerate downtime can become more attractive to extortion groups.
Data Theft Changes the Equation
Strong backups can mitigate encryption, but they cannot automatically undo the consequences of stolen information.
Threat Intelligence Is an Early Warning
Victim-list monitoring can provide defenders with another signal to investigate suspicious activity.
Social Media Amplifies Cybercrime Claims
A ransomware allegation can spread globally within minutes, sometimes long before investigators finish establishing what happened.
The Information Gap Is Dangerous
Attackers can exploit uncertainty by forcing organizations to respond while investigators are still determining the facts.
Security Teams Need Speed and Discipline
Fast investigation should not come at the expense of evidence preservation.
Identity Remains Critical
Compromised credentials can provide attackers with access without requiring an obvious malware infection at the beginning of an intrusion.
Segmentation Limits Blast Radius
Separating systems can prevent a single compromised device from becoming the gateway to an entire environment.
Privileged Accounts Require Extra Protection
Administrative credentials can provide disproportionate control and therefore deserve stronger safeguards.
Third Parties Matter
External providers and partners can expand an
Monitoring Must Extend Beyond Endpoints
Identity, network, cloud and data-access telemetry can all reveal different stages of an intrusion.
Backups Need Isolation
Attackers who can reach backup infrastructure may attempt to destroy recovery options.
Recovery Testing Is Essential
A backup that cannot be restored under pressure is not a reliable recovery strategy.
Public Communication Should Be Prepared
Organizations should have predetermined processes for communicating during a cyber crisis.
Ransomware Is an Executive Issue
The consequences can involve legal, financial, operational and reputational decisions—not merely technical repairs.
Healthcare Creates Additional Sensitivity
Healthcare-related systems can contain information whose exposure may have lasting consequences for individuals.
Education Has Its Own Data Risks
Universities can hold extensive personal, financial, academic and research information.
The Threat Is Cross-Sector
The simultaneous appearance of two very different organizations demonstrates the breadth of the ransomware economy.
New Groups Can Scale Quickly
Emerging ransomware operations can become relevant surprisingly quickly when they obtain access to affiliates, infrastructure and victims.
Criminal Branding Matters
Ransomware groups use victim lists partly to demonstrate credibility to other criminals and potential victims.
Evidence Should Determine Confidence
Screenshots, leaked files, technical indicators and victim confirmation are more valuable than unsupported claims.
The Next Few Days Matter
Additional disclosures could clarify whether either alleged incident involved encryption, data theft or both.
Defensive Teams Should Not Wait
Investigation can begin immediately even when public confirmation is unavailable.
The Best Outcome Is Quiet Containment
If an organization detects an intrusion early and removes the attacker before major damage occurs, the public may never hear the full story.
Resilience Reduces Leverage
The more effectively an organization can restore operations, the less power an attacker may gain from disruption.
Prevention Still Beats Negotiation
Strong authentication, segmentation, patching, monitoring and backups remain more reliable than relying on negotiations after compromise.
Ransomware Will Keep Adapting
Criminal groups are continuously changing their tactics, meaning defensive programs must evolve as well.
These Two Claims Are a Reminder
The real warning is not that two organizations appeared on a list.
It is that organizations across education and healthcare continue to operate in an environment where a single successful intrusion can become an operational and reputational crisis.
✅ CESMAC Is a Brazilian Higher-Education Institution
CESMAC’s official website confirms that the institution is located in Maceió, Alagoas, Brazil, and describes its history, academic programs and institutional mission.
Centro Universitário CESMAC
✅ Healthcare Highways Operates Healthcare Provider Networks
Healthcare
Healthcare Highways
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❌ The Ransomware Breaches Are Not Independently Confirmed Here
The supplied ThreatMon reports identify CESMAC and Healthcare Highways as alleged victims of Krybit and Chaos respectively, but the available evidence does not independently establish that either organization suffered a confirmed breach, encryption event or data theft. The claims should therefore remain classified as allegations pending corroboration.
Prediction
(-1) Ransomware Pressure Is Likely to Continue
The broader ransomware environment suggests that organizations in education, healthcare and other data-rich sectors will continue facing extortion attempts.
(+1) Early Detection Can Limit the Damage
If either organization detects suspicious activity quickly, isolates affected systems and protects privileged credentials, the ultimate impact could be significantly smaller than the initial victim listing suggests.
(-1) Data Extortion Could Become the Bigger Threat
Even where encryption is defeated by reliable backups, stolen information can continue to provide attackers with leverage.
(+1) Evidence Could Bring Clarity
Within the coming days, additional technical evidence, official statements or leaked samples may clarify whether the two victim listings represent confirmed compromises or unverified claims.
(-1) Threat Actors Will Continue Using Public Listings
Ransomware groups have a strong incentive to publicize alleged victims because visibility can increase pressure and reinforce their criminal reputation.
(+1) Resilience Remains the Strongest Defense
Organizations that combine strong identity security, segmentation, continuous monitoring, protected backups and practiced incident response will be better positioned to withstand ransomware—even when attackers manage to breach the outer perimeter.
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