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A Choice Loaded With History
Hungary’s political transition is entering a symbolic and potentially decisive phase. The Tisza Party, now holding a constitutional majority in Parliament, has selected András Baka, the former president of Hungary’s Supreme Court who was removed from office under Viktor Orbán’s government, as its choice for president of the republic.
The decision carries far more weight than a routine presidential nomination. Baka is not simply a respected lawyer with an impressive international career. He is also a figure whose personal history is deeply connected to one of the most controversial chapters in Hungary’s modern constitutional development.
His return would place a former target of the Orbán-era restructuring of the judiciary at the head of a state whose presidency has increasingly been criticized for becoming politically subordinate to the government.
For Tisza leader Péter Magyar, the nomination represents an opportunity to send a powerful message about institutional independence, constitutional restoration and the relationship between political power and the rule of law. At the same time, it carries political risks because Baka has openly criticized the Orbán system, potentially making it difficult for him to present himself as a completely neutral symbol of national unity.
The choice therefore raises a larger question: Can a president who was once pushed out by the previous political establishment become a unifying figure for a country emerging from that era?
Who Is András Baka?
András Baka is an internationally recognized Hungarian legal scholar and former senior judge whose career stretches across academia, public administration, domestic courts and European institutions.
He began his professional life at the Institute for Legal Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, establishing himself as a serious legal thinker before moving into public administration.
He later became director general of the College of Public Administration, building experience that extended beyond academic theory into the practical operation of government institutions.
But the defining chapter of Baka’s career came at the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.
A Career at the European Court of Human Rights
Between 1991 and 2008, Baka served for two terms as a judge at the European Court of Human Rights.
The position placed him inside one of
That experience matters enormously in the current Hungarian political environment.
A president with years of experience at the ECtHR would bring a constitutional perspective shaped not only by Hungarian law but also by European human-rights principles.
It would also make Baka particularly familiar with the international scrutiny surrounding Hungary’s rule-of-law record.
From Strasbourg to Hungary’s Supreme Court
After returning to Hungary, Baka was elected president of the Supreme Court by Parliament in 2009.
At the time, his appointment represented the continuation of a distinguished judicial career.
But
In 2010, Viktor
Among those changes was the transformation of the Supreme Court into the Curia.
The institutional restructuring also resulted in Baka losing his position as head of the country’s highest court.
The European Court Case That Changed His Legacy
Baka later challenged the circumstances surrounding his removal.
The European Court of Human Rights ultimately ruled in his favor, finding violations of his rights, including freedom of expression and fair-trial protections.
That judgment became an important part of
His experience turned him into more than a former senior judge. He became a prominent voice in debates over judicial independence, constitutional safeguards and the rule of law in Hungary.
His supporters can therefore interpret his nomination as a symbolic reversal of the institutional changes that ended his judicial leadership.
His critics, however, could argue that his long-standing criticism of the Orbán government makes him a politically loaded choice rather than an entirely neutral presidential candidate.
Why the Presidency Matters Even When It Has Limited Power
Hungary’s president does not wield the same executive authority as the prime minister.
The presidency is primarily ceremonial, with constitutional and representational responsibilities rather than direct control over government policy.
Yet ceremonial power should not be confused with irrelevance.
A president can influence public debate through speeches, appointments, constitutional decisions and the moral authority associated with the office.
The presidency can also become a national symbol during periods of political transition.
That symbolic role has been particularly important because several recent Hungarian presidents struggled to establish themselves as independent figures capable of standing apart from the government.
The Fidesz Era and the Changing Presidency
Since 2010,
János Áder, a veteran Fidesz politician, completed both available terms and remained closely associated with the governing political establishment.
Before him, László Sólyom represented a very different model.
Sólyom had been supported by Fidesz while the party was still in opposition, but he developed an independent legal and constitutional identity.
His presidency demonstrated that even within
He was not given a second term.
The Pál Schmitt Scandal
Pál Schmitt, who succeeded Sólyom, had a much closer relationship with Fidesz.
His presidency ended after a plagiarism scandal surrounding his doctoral dissertation.
The episode reinforced the broader perception that the presidency could become vulnerable when political loyalty was valued over institutional independence.
János Áder subsequently took the position and became the only president during the early Orbán period to complete two full terms.
Katalin Novák and the Pardon Crisis
Katalin
A former Fidesz politician and government minister, Novák was often presented as part of a younger and more Western-facing generation within the party.
Her presidency collapsed after the controversy surrounding a presidential pardon connected to a child sexual-abuse case.
The scandal triggered enormous public anger and ultimately forced Novák to resign.
It became one of the most damaging political crises of the later Orbán era.
Tamás Sulyok and the Short Presidential Chapter
After
Sulyok had a comparatively low public profile and lacked the political identity associated with some of his predecessors.
His presidency also ended before the normal completion of the term.
According to the article, his mandate was terminated through a brief provision inserted into the 17th constitutional amendment, which he subsequently signed.
The succession of presidential crises has contributed to a larger debate about whether Hungary’s presidency has been functioning as a genuine constitutional institution or primarily as an extension of the prevailing political system.
Tisza Wants to Rewrite the Constitutional Framework
The Baka nomination cannot be separated from
Péter Magyar has indicated that his party intends to adopt a new constitution during the parliamentary term.
The party has also indicated that it may consider direct election of the president.
That would represent a major institutional change.
Direct presidential elections could give the office considerably greater democratic legitimacy, even if the formal constitutional powers remained limited.
It could also fundamentally change the relationship between Parliament, the government and the presidency.
Why Direct Presidential Elections Could Change Hungary
A directly elected president would have a political mandate independent of Parliament.
That could create a new source of democratic legitimacy.
It could also produce institutional tension.
If the president and prime minister belonged to opposing political camps, Hungary could move toward a more competitive system in which the presidency becomes an active counterweight rather than a ceremonial position.
That possibility makes the selection of Baka even more interesting.
His legal background and independence could become especially important if Tisza eventually decides to strengthen the presidency.
Tisza’s First Major Political Misstep
The road to Baka was not smooth.
Péter Magyar initially promised public consultation over the presidential selection.
That promise created expectations that ordinary citizens, civil society and political supporters would have a meaningful role in choosing the candidate.
Instead, Magyar quickly announced that Tisza was considering women’s world chess champion Judit Polgár.
The nomination generated significant criticism.
The problem was not necessarily Polgár herself.
The controversy centered on the apparent contradiction between promising consultation and announcing a candidate before such consultation had meaningfully taken place.
Judit Polgár Rejects the Nomination
Polgár ultimately declined the offer.
The episode became an early political warning for Tisza.
A party that had built much of its appeal around political renewal, transparency and opposition to the established political order suddenly found itself accused of repeating one of the practices it had criticized.
That perception mattered.
Political movements often lose public support not because of one enormous scandal but because voters begin to sense a contradiction between rhetoric and behavior.
The Polling Consequences
The article reports that Medián recorded a decline of approximately 3 to 5 percentage points in support for Tisza following the failed nomination.
Despite the decline, Tisza remained extraordinarily strong among decided party voters, at approximately 68 percent according to the cited polling.
The numbers therefore do not indicate a collapse.
Instead, they demonstrate that even a dominant opposition movement can experience measurable consequences when a decision conflicts with its political narrative.
For Tisza, the lesson is straightforward.
The party cannot afford to treat its political mandate as unlimited.
Why Baka Was Different
The selection of Baka offered Tisza a way to move away from the controversy surrounding Polgár.
Rather than choosing a celebrity or political outsider with enormous public recognition, the party selected someone whose professional identity is directly connected to constitutional law and judicial independence.
That makes the choice more substantive.
Baka also carries a powerful personal story.
He was once removed from
He subsequently won a case against the Hungarian state before the European Court of Human Rights.
Now, years later, a party promising to rebuild Hungary’s constitutional institutions wants him to become president.
The symbolism is almost impossible to miss.
The Other Candidates
Tisza reportedly considered three candidates before selecting Baka.
Historian Ignác Romsics was one of the alternatives.
The other was independent lawyer Botond Fülöp, who publishes under the pseudonym Vidéki Prókátor.
Fülöp is particularly notable because he helped expose the pardon controversy that ultimately contributed to Katalin Novák’s resignation.
Each candidate represented a different political message.
Romsics represented historical and intellectual authority.
Fülöp represented transparency, investigative activism and accountability.
Baka represented constitutional law, judicial independence and institutional restoration.
Baka as a Symbol of Institutional Repair
The strongest argument for Baka is therefore not simply his résumé.
It is what his résumé represents.
He represents an era before the most dramatic restructuring of Hungary’s judicial institutions.
He represents European judicial standards.
He represents a direct confrontation with the constitutional changes of the Orbán government.
And he represents a legal establishment that has experienced the consequences of political interference firsthand.
For a new governing party promising institutional reform, that symbolism is extremely valuable.
But National Unity May Be Difficult
The presidency is supposed to represent the nation as a whole.
That creates a problem for Baka.
His independence is one of his greatest strengths, but it could simultaneously become his greatest political weakness.
He has been a prominent critic of the Orbán system.
Supporters of the former government may therefore see his nomination as partisan revenge rather than national reconciliation.
Tisza will need to explain that distinction carefully.
A president who is independent from government is not necessarily a president who is hostile to one political party.
That distinction will likely become central to the political debate.
The Larger Battle Over Hungary’s Rule of Law
The Baka nomination also reflects a much larger European debate about Hungary.
For more than a decade, Hungary has faced international criticism over judicial independence, institutional checks and balances, media freedom and constitutional governance.
Baka’s history at the European Court of Human Rights gives him unusual credibility on these questions.
If elected, he could become an important bridge between Hungary’s domestic constitutional system and European legal institutions.
That could be particularly significant during a period of constitutional reform.
A President With Something to Prove
There is also a deeply human element to the story.
Baka was once removed from the institution he led.
He challenged the treatment he received.
An international court ultimately found violations of his rights.
Now, after years spent outside the center of Hungarian political power, he has been selected to become head of state.
It is difficult not to see this as one of the most striking political reversals of Hungary’s recent history.
But the symbolism alone will not be enough.
Baka would have to demonstrate that his presidency is about rebuilding institutions rather than settling old political scores.
What Undercode Say:
The Meaning Behind Baka’s Return
András
It is a statement about what Tisza believes the Hungarian state should look like after the Orbán era.
The choice places constitutional law at the center of political reconstruction.
It also gives Tisza a candidate with international credibility.
That credibility could become important if Hungary attempts to repair relationships with European institutions.
Baka’s history makes him uniquely positioned to speak about judicial independence.
He has personally experienced the consequences of institutional restructuring.
That experience could strengthen his authority.
However, symbolic politics can easily become dangerous.
If Tisza presents Baka simply as the man who was wronged by Fidesz, the presidency could immediately become trapped in the politics of revenge.
That would undermine the argument that he represents national unity.
The strongest version of the Baka presidency would instead frame his history as evidence of why institutions must be stronger than individual governments.
The distinction is critical.
A constitutional democracy cannot depend on whether the president personally likes or dislikes the government.
Institutions must survive changes in political leadership.
That is precisely why
Tisza’s decision also shows that the party learned something from the Judit Polgár controversy.
The Polgár episode emphasized popularity.
The Baka decision emphasizes institutional credibility.
That is a meaningful strategic shift.
It suggests that Tisza understands the presidency as part of a broader constitutional project.
The next question is whether Tisza can maintain public confidence while implementing that project.
The
But enormous power creates enormous responsibility.
If Tisza uses its majority to remove every official associated with Fidesz, critics could argue that the new government is simply replacing one political establishment with another.
That would be particularly damaging to a party campaigning on institutional renewal.
A better approach would be to establish transparent standards for appointments and removals.
Those standards should apply regardless of political affiliation.
The Baka case could become the first test of that principle.
His appointment could symbolize independence if the process is transparent.
It could instead symbolize political retaliation if the process appears predetermined.
The same person can therefore represent two completely different political narratives.
Everything depends on how Tisza handles the transition.
There is another important issue.
If Hungary adopts a new constitution, the presidency could become one of the most consequential institutions in the country.
Direct presidential elections would change the political equation dramatically.
A directly elected president would have an independent democratic mandate.
That could strengthen checks and balances.
But it could also produce institutional conflict.
Hungary would then need clearer constitutional rules governing disputes between the president and government.
Baka’s legal expertise could become extremely valuable in designing such a system.
His experience at the European Court of Human Rights could also help ensure that constitutional reform remains compatible with European legal principles.
But institutional reform cannot depend on one individual.
Even an exceptionally respected president cannot repair a democratic system alone.
Courts, Parliament, regulators, prosecutors, public institutions and civil society all need meaningful independence.
That is where the Tisza project will ultimately be judged.
The most important question is therefore not whether Baka is independent.
The question is whether Tisza can build institutions that remain independent after Baka leaves office.
That is the real test of constitutional reform.
The Polgár controversy should also remain a warning.
Political movements often become vulnerable when internal decision-making becomes centralized.
Tisza promised consultation.
It then moved rapidly toward a presidential nomination.
The resulting backlash showed that voters are paying attention not only to what the party promises but also to how it behaves.
A constitutional majority does not eliminate the need for political legitimacy.
In fact, it increases that need.
The larger
That may be the most important lesson from Hungary’s recent political history.
Power changes governments.
Institutions determine whether democracy survives those changes.
Baka’s nomination therefore carries an unusually powerful contradiction.
He is politically significant precisely because he is associated with independence.
But the more politically significant his appointment becomes, the harder it will be to maintain the perception that he stands above party politics.
That tension will follow him into the presidency.
Ultimately,
If he protects constitutional limits even when they inconvenience Tisza, his independence will become credible.
If he challenges abuses regardless of which political camp commits them, his presidency could become genuinely transformative.
If he instead becomes primarily a symbol of the anti-Orbán transition, Hungary may lose an opportunity to build something more durable.
The coming constitutional debate could therefore matter even more than the presidential election itself.
Baka may be the face of the transition.
But the institutions created during that transition will determine Hungary’s future.
Deep Analysis
Why Technical Thinking Matters in Constitutional Reform
Although constitutional politics is not cybersecurity, the same principle applies to institutional security: never trust a system simply because its current administrator appears trustworthy.
A resilient political system needs structural safeguards.
The following Linux-style commands provide a useful metaphor for understanding the difference between replacing people and actually securing institutions.
Inspect who currently controls critical system resources sudo systemctl list-units --type=service
Review administrative privileges
sudo getent group sudo
Inspect permissions on sensitive configuration files
sudo find /etc -type f -perm /o+w -print
Identify processes running with elevated privileges
ps aux | awk '$1 == "root" {print $0}'
Review recent authentication activity
sudo journalctl -u systemd-logind --since "30 days ago"
Search configuration for hard-coded administrative assumptions
sudo grep -RniE "admin|root|sudo|privilege" /etc 2>/dev/null
The Institutional Equivalent
The political equivalent is simple.
Who controls the courts?
Who appoints senior officials?
Who can remove them?
Who reviews their decisions?
Who can challenge constitutional changes?
Who protects the independence of prosecutors and regulators?
Who audits the government?
Who prevents a parliamentary majority from rewriting the rules solely for its own benefit?
These questions matter more than the political identity of any single president.
The Principle of Least Privilege
Cybersecurity uses the principle of least privilege.
Users should receive only the authority required to perform their functions.
Constitutional democracies need a similar principle.
Governments should have enough power to govern.
Parliaments should have enough authority to legislate.
Courts should have enough independence to review government action.
Presidents should have enough authority to protect constitutional principles without becoming alternative executives.
The danger appears when one institution accumulates too much power.
Monitoring Matters
A secure computer system requires monitoring.
A healthy democracy requires institutional transparency.
Appointments should be explainable.
Dismissals should be legally justified.
Constitutional amendments should be scrutinized.
Public institutions should maintain records.
Independent journalists and civil society should be able to investigate government decisions.
Without those mechanisms, replacing one leadership group with another does not necessarily improve system security.
The Real Test for Tisza
Tisza now faces the same challenge.
It can remove officials associated with Fidesz.
It can appoint independent figures.
It can rewrite constitutional provisions.
But none of those actions automatically creates institutional independence.
The real test is whether Tisza voluntarily accepts limits on its own power.
That is considerably harder.
Political parties usually support checks and balances when they are in opposition.
The real democratic test begins when they control the government.
A Constitutional Security Model
A stronger Hungarian system would require several layers of protection.
An independent judiciary would provide one layer.
A genuinely autonomous presidency could provide another.
Parliamentary oversight would provide another.
Independent regulators would create additional safeguards.
Transparent appointment procedures would reduce political capture.
Strong freedom-of-information rules would increase visibility.
And a free media environment would provide external monitoring.
That is how institutional resilience is built.
Not through one hero.
Not through one party.
Not through one election.
But through multiple independent safeguards working together.
Presidential Powers
✅ Fact:
Baka’s European Court Career
✅ Fact: András Baka served as a judge at the European Court of Human Rights and later became president of Hungary’s Supreme Court before being removed following the institutional restructuring under the Orbán government.
Baka’s Human-Rights Case
✅ Fact: The European Court of Human Rights found violations concerning Baka’s rights in connection with his removal and treatment as Supreme Court president.
Prediction
(+1) Constitutional Reform Becomes the Bigger Story
(+1) Baka’s nomination is likely to become a symbolic centerpiece of Tisza’s broader constitutional reform agenda.
His legal background gives Tisza credibility on judicial independence.
His European Court experience could strengthen
His history makes him a powerful symbol of institutional change.
If Tisza proceeds with a new constitution, Baka could become an important constitutional counterweight.
Direct presidential elections could eventually transform the traditionally limited role of Hungary’s head of state.
(-1) Political Polarization Could Follow
Baka’s history as a critic of the Orbán system could make it difficult for some Fidesz supporters to accept him as a neutral national figure.
Tisza could face accusations of replacing one political establishment with another if institutional removals appear politically motivated.
The controversy surrounding the earlier Polgár nomination shows that Tisza remains vulnerable to accusations of centralized decision-making.
The Road Ahead
A Presidency Bigger Than One Person
András
A man once removed from the
That reversal is historically powerful.
But Hungary’s future will not ultimately be determined by the symbolism of Baka’s biography.
It will be determined by what happens after the symbolism fades.
The Ultimate Test of the Tisza Era
If Tisza truly wants to create a new political system, it must build institutions that can eventually constrain Tisza itself.
That is the hardest test of democratic reform.
Baka could become a powerful symbol of that transformation, particularly because his career connects Hungary’s domestic legal system with Europe’s broader human-rights framework.
But the strongest legacy would not be a presidency built around opposition to Orbán.
It would be a presidency built around a principle that survives both Orbán and Tisza:
No government should be powerful enough to make constitutional institutions serve the government instead of the public.
That is where
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