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A New Warning From the Data-Breach Underground
The latest warning from Have I Been Pwned (HIBP) highlights another disturbing development in the expanding ShinyHunters extortion ecosystem. According to HIBP, Alcon was targeted in a ShinyHunters extortion campaign, with information allegedly taken from the eye-care company appearing online during August 2026.
The reported dataset contains approximately 218,000 email addresses, with much of the information described as corporate business-to-business contact data. HIBP also reported that 49% of the email addresses were already present in its database, showing how modern breaches frequently overlap with information exposed in previous incidents.
The important word here is “allegedly.” At the time of this report, the available information establishes that HIBP has identified and catalogued the dataset, but that should not automatically be interpreted as independent confirmation that every claimed detail about the intrusion has been verified by Alcon itself.
The Alcon Data Claim
According to
The reported dataset contains roughly 218,000 email addresses, making this a significant exposure even though the number is considerably smaller than some of the enormous databases that have appeared in recent cybercrime campaigns.
The nature of the information is particularly interesting because HIBP characterized much of it as corporate B2B contact information. That distinction matters. A database dominated by business contacts may contain fewer passwords or direct financial records than a traditional consumer breach, but it can still become extremely valuable to attackers.
Why 218,000 Email Addresses Matter
An email address may appear harmless compared with a password, credit-card number, or government identification number. In reality, a large collection of verified corporate addresses can become a powerful weapon for phishing, impersonation, business-email compromise and social engineering.
Attackers do not necessarily need passwords when they can convincingly imitate suppliers, executives, technology providers, customers or internal departments.
A corporate email database can also provide attackers with information about an organization’s structure. Names, domains, job titles and relationships between employees can help criminals construct highly believable messages.
The danger therefore does not necessarily come from the email addresses themselves. It comes from what attackers can build around them.
The 49% Overlap Is a Major Clue
One of the most revealing numbers in the HIBP report is not the 218,000 figure but the 49% overlap.
Nearly half of the reported Alcon email addresses were already present in Have I Been Pwned. That means the incident is not occurring in isolation. A substantial portion of the exposed identities had apparently appeared in previous breach datasets.
This demonstrates one of the biggest problems in modern cybersecurity: data accumulates.
An individual may have used the same email address for dozens of services over many years. Every separate breach adds another layer of information that can eventually be combined with previous leaks.
Breaches Are Becoming Cumulative
The modern cybercrime economy increasingly depends on aggregation rather than a single dramatic theft.
An attacker might obtain an email address from one incident, a company affiliation from another, a telephone number from a third and purchasing information from a fourth. None of those pieces alone may be catastrophic.
Together, however, they can create an extremely detailed profile.
This is why a breach containing “only” email addresses should not be dismissed. The value of leaked data depends not only on what was stolen today, but also on what can be combined with it tomorrow.
ShinyHunters’ Extortion Model
ShinyHunters has become strongly associated with a ransom-and-release model in which attackers allegedly steal information, demand payment and threaten publication if the victim refuses to comply.
The FBI has previously warned that ShinyHunters is associated with large-scale data breaches and extortion campaigns targeting major organizations. The FBI also cautioned that threat actors can use real or exaggerated claims about stolen information to pressure victims into paying.
Internet Crime Complaint Center
That warning is important when interpreting the Alcon report.
The appearance of a dataset connected to a company’s name does not, by itself, establish every allegation made by a threat actor. Verification remains critical.
The Threat Actor Does Not Need to Prove Everything
Extortion campaigns are built around uncertainty.
Attackers want a victim to believe that the stolen information is authentic, extensive and damaging enough to justify paying a ransom. They may release samples, publish selected records or advertise an alleged victim on an underground platform.
The objective is psychological as much as technical.
A company under pressure must determine whether the data is authentic, how much was stolen, where it originated, whether the attackers still have access and whether paying would actually prevent further publication.
The Bigger ShinyHunters Pattern
The Alcon allegation also fits a broader pattern surrounding ShinyHunters-branded extortion activity.
Google Threat Intelligence Group has documented ShinyHunters-branded extortion operations involving stolen SaaS-related data, including the use of extortion emails, data samples and threats designed to pressure victims into paying.
Google Cloud
This makes the latest Alcon report more significant than an isolated underground post.
It appears within a wider ecosystem in which stolen corporate data can be converted into leverage through publication threats.
The Brinks Home Connection
The HIBP post also references another recent ShinyHunters campaign involving Brinks Home.
According to the information provided by HIBP, attackers allegedly published approximately 732,000 unique email addresses after targeting Brinks Home. The reported dataset also contained purchase information and partial payment-card data, with 78% of those addresses already appearing in HIBP.
The contrast between the two cases is striking.
The Alcon dataset reportedly contains primarily corporate B2B contact information, while the Brinks Home dataset allegedly included purchasing information and partial card data.
Yet both cases illustrate the same fundamental problem: previously leaked information continues to circulate and becomes increasingly useful when combined with newly stolen records.
Why Partial Payment Data Still Matters
Partial payment-card information does not necessarily mean that attackers obtained complete usable credit-card numbers.
However, even incomplete financial information can be valuable for fraud and social engineering.
A criminal who knows that a person made a particular purchase, knows the approximate date, has their email address and possesses partial payment information may be able to construct a highly convincing fraudulent communication.
The information can also be used to make phishing messages appear legitimate.
The Rise of Data-Driven Phishing
Modern phishing is increasingly moving away from generic messages such as “Your account has been suspended.”
Attackers can now personalize communications around real businesses, real transactions and real relationships.
A message saying that a payment failed is far more convincing when the attacker knows what the recipient recently purchased.
A message supposedly coming from an organization’s IT department becomes more credible when the criminal already knows the employee’s corporate email address and job function.
This is where seemingly ordinary breach information becomes dangerous.
The Corporate B2B Problem
Business-to-business contact databases can be especially attractive because they contain people who routinely communicate with outside organizations.
Employees receive invoices, contracts, delivery notifications, software renewal notices, security alerts and vendor communications every day.
Attackers can exploit that normal business activity.
A malicious email does not necessarily need to look extraordinary. Sometimes it only needs to resemble something the recipient receives every week.
The Human Element Remains the Weakest Link
Organizations can deploy endpoint detection, firewalls, multifactor authentication and sophisticated identity systems, but an employee can still be targeted with a carefully engineered message.
That is why breach response cannot stop at resetting passwords.
Organizations must consider what attackers can do with exposed identities, relationships and business context.
The more accurate the stolen information becomes, the more convincing the attack can become.
Have I Been
HIBP serves a different purpose from an underground leak marketplace.
Its role is to help people determine whether their email addresses have appeared in known breach datasets. The service is particularly useful because it allows individuals to identify exposure without directly searching criminal forums themselves.
The Alcon report also demonstrates the importance of breach aggregation.
HIBP’s finding that 49% of the reported Alcon addresses were already known provides an important signal: new breaches often add to an existing history rather than creating an entirely new identity exposure.
What the 49% Figure Really Tells Us
The 49% number should not be interpreted as saying that 49% of Alcon’s employees were breached previously.
It refers to the proportion of email addresses in the reported dataset that were already present in HIBP.
That distinction is crucial.
A single person can appear in multiple unrelated breach datasets, and the same corporate address may have been exposed by different services over many years.
The statistic therefore demonstrates data reuse and accumulation rather than necessarily identifying the original source of each exposure.
A Breach Can Outlive the Company
One of the darkest realities of data breaches is that publication is difficult to reverse.
Once information is copied, criminals can redistribute it, combine it with other datasets or use it in future attacks.
Even if the original website hosting a stolen database disappears, copies may remain elsewhere.
This creates a long-term security problem for affected individuals and organizations.
Why Extortion Is So Effective
Extortion succeeds because organizations are forced to make decisions under extreme uncertainty.
A company may face operational disruption, regulatory concerns, customer notification requirements, reputational damage and legal exposure simultaneously.
Threat actors understand that pressure.
They can use deadlines and publication threats to force executives into making decisions before the full scope of an incident is understood.
The Psychological Weapon
Cyber extortion is therefore not simply about stealing files.
It is about controlling the
The attacker wants the company to imagine the worst possible scenario: customers leaving, confidential information appearing online, competitors seeing internal data and regulators asking difficult questions.
That fear can become the real weapon.
Why Companies Should Not Assume Email Data Is Low Risk
An organization might initially conclude that an email-address leak is relatively minor because no passwords were reported.
That would be a dangerous assumption.
Email addresses can facilitate credential attacks, password-reset abuse, phishing, impersonation, spam and targeted social engineering.
They can also act as identifiers that connect records across multiple databases.
The value of an email address increases dramatically when paired with other information.
The Authentication Problem
If employees reuse passwords across services, previously exposed email addresses can become the starting point for credential-stuffing attacks.
Even when passwords are not included in the Alcon dataset, attackers can test exposed identities against unrelated services.
Multifactor authentication significantly reduces this risk, particularly phishing-resistant authentication methods.
But organizations should not rely on authentication alone.
The Vendor Ecosystem Matters Too
B2B information creates another potential attack surface: vendors.
Suppose an attacker knows that an employee at a company regularly communicates with a specific supplier.
The criminal can impersonate that supplier and send a realistic invoice, account-change request or document.
The victim may have no reason to suspect that the message is fraudulent.
This makes vendor verification and payment controls increasingly important.
Deep Analysis: What the Alcon Incident Reveals About Modern Data Extortion
The First Command: Treat Allegations as Evidence, Not Proof
The first rule when analyzing an underground breach claim should be simple: separate the existence of a dataset from the claims surrounding it.
HIBP’s identification of data is meaningful, but it should not automatically be treated as confirmation of every detail attributed to ShinyHunters.
The distinction protects readers from turning cybercrime marketing into established fact.
The Second Command: Follow the Data
The next step is to determine what information was allegedly exposed.
In the Alcon case, the reported emphasis is on email addresses and corporate B2B contact information.
That immediately suggests a different threat profile from a breach dominated by passwords, medical records or full financial credentials.
The consequences may still be serious, but the likely attack paths are different.
The Third Command: Measure Data Overlap
The 49% HIBP overlap deserves particular attention.
It suggests that nearly half of the reported addresses were already part of HIBP’s breach corpus.
This is a reminder that defenders should analyze identities across multiple historical incidents rather than treating every breach as a completely independent event.
The Fourth Command: Look for Chaining Opportunities
Attackers rarely stop with one dataset.
They can combine corporate contact information with publicly available professional information, social-media profiles, previous breach records and leaked credentials.
This creates what could be described as a breach-chain effect.
One breach supplies the missing piece for another.
The Fifth Command: Assume Phishing Will Follow
Whenever a large number of corporate email addresses become available, phishing should be considered a likely downstream risk.
Security teams should watch for unusual login attempts, suspicious password resets, impersonation attempts and unexpected messages referencing legitimate company relationships.
The greatest danger may occur weeks or months after the initial publication.
The Sixth Command: Protect the Identity Layer
Organizations should prioritize identity security after a breach.
That means enforcing multifactor authentication, reviewing privileged accounts, detecting suspicious authentication behavior and monitoring password reuse.
Where possible, phishing-resistant authentication should be preferred.
The Seventh Command: Watch Third Parties
B2B contact information can expose more than the affected company.
Suppliers, contractors, customers and partners may also become targets.
Security teams should therefore communicate with relevant third parties rather than treating the incident as an isolated internal matter.
The Eighth Command: Verify Financial Requests
The Brinks Home example demonstrates why organizations should be particularly careful with financial communications following a breach.
Any request to change banking information, payment instructions or invoice details should receive independent verification.
Email alone should never be treated as sufficient proof of a payment change.
The Ninth Command: Monitor for Impersonation
Companies affected by an extortion campaign should consider monitoring for fraudulent domains, fake support accounts and impersonation attempts.
Attackers may exploit the
The Tenth Command: Educate Employees With Context
Generic security training is increasingly insufficient.
Employees should understand why a message mentioning a real customer, vendor or recent purchase may still be fraudulent.
The more personalized cybercrime becomes, the more contextual security awareness becomes necessary.
The Eleventh Command: Prepare Before Publication
Organizations should have an incident-response plan that covers the possibility of stolen information being publicly released.
Waiting until data appears online can leave security and communications teams scrambling.
Preparation should include legal, technical, communications and customer-support procedures.
The Twelfth Command: Do Not Ignore Old Breaches
The 49% overlap demonstrates why historical breach exposure matters.
Organizations should periodically review whether corporate identities have appeared in known breach databases.
Old credentials and old contact information can remain useful to criminals long after the original incident has disappeared from the news.
The Thirteenth Command: Expect Secondary Scams
Recent reporting has shown that stolen ShinyHunters-related data can be reused by other criminals for scams, including sextortion campaigns. Malwarebytes reported that scammers were using leaked email addresses to make fraudulent threats appear more credible.
Malwarebytes
This creates an important secondary threat.
A person may receive a scam weeks after a breach and incorrectly assume that the sender must have direct access to their devices.
The Fourteenth Command: Do Not Confuse Data Exposure With Device Compromise
An exposed email address does not mean an individual’s computer or phone has been hacked.
This distinction is particularly important when criminals use breach data to make frightening claims.
A threat actor may know an email address, company name or previous purchase without having any access to the victim’s device.
The Fifteenth Command: Understand the Economics
Data extortion works because stolen information has multiple possible uses.
It can be sold, reused for phishing, combined with other databases, leveraged against executives or used to pressure a company into paying.
The attacker therefore does not need every record to have enormous individual value.
A sufficiently large dataset can provide many opportunities.
The Sixteenth Command: Watch the Reuse Cycle
The same stolen information can circulate repeatedly.
A database published during one extortion campaign may later appear in phishing kits, scam lists or other criminal datasets.
That means the original incident can generate security consequences long after the victim believes the event has ended.
The Seventeenth Command: Reduce the Blast Radius
Organizations cannot prevent every employee from ever appearing in a breach.
They can, however, reduce what happens when an identity is exposed.
Strong authentication, least privilege, segmentation, endpoint security and monitoring all reduce the potential damage.
The Eighteenth Command: Protect Executives
Corporate contact databases can be especially useful for targeting executives.
Attackers can impersonate suppliers, lawyers, financial institutions or employees.
Executive accounts should therefore receive stronger monitoring and authentication controls.
The Nineteenth Command: Separate Confirmation From Attribution
Even if the dataset is genuine, attribution remains another question.
Finding authentic information does not automatically prove exactly who stole it, how they entered the environment or which infrastructure was used.
Cybersecurity reporting should maintain those distinctions.
The Twentieth Command: Follow the Official Response
The strongest confirmation will ultimately come from the affected organization and credible investigative sources.
For Alcon, that means watching for an official statement, regulatory filing, customer notification or security advisory that clarifies what happened.
Until then, the responsible description remains an alleged ShinyHunters-related data exposure.
The Twenty-First Command: Assume the Data Will Be Copied
Once stolen information is published, defenders should assume copies exist.
The objective then shifts from trying to erase the dataset completely to reducing its usefulness.
That means changing credentials, strengthening authentication, monitoring accounts and warning potential targets.
The Twenty-Second Command: Treat Identity as a Long-Term Asset
Companies often think about cybersecurity in terms of systems and servers.
But identity is increasingly the real asset under attack.
An email address, employee name, job title and relationship map can provide enough information to launch a sophisticated attack without directly attacking the company’s infrastructure.
The Twenty-Third Command: The Breach Is Only the Beginning
The publication of 218,000 email addresses may represent only the first stage of the incident’s impact.
The next stage could involve phishing.
The stage after that could involve credential attacks.
Later stages could involve impersonation or business-email compromise.
That is why breach response should extend beyond the moment the stolen database becomes public.
The Twenty-Fourth Command: Build for Data Permanence
Organizations should operate under the assumption that sensitive information, once stolen, may never truly disappear.
This mindset changes how companies approach data minimization.
The less unnecessary information retained, the less information an attacker can steal.
The Twenty-Fifth Command: Data Minimization Is Security
Companies should regularly ask a simple question:
Do we really need to keep this information?
If an old contact record, unused account or unnecessary database field serves no business purpose, eliminating it can reduce future breach exposure.
The Twenty-Sixth Command: B2B Data Deserves Protection
Business contact information should not automatically be treated as harmless public information.
Internal databases can contain relationships, organizational structures and operational details that are useful to attackers.
Protecting B2B information should therefore be part of an organization’s broader security strategy.
The Twenty-Seventh Command: Transparency Builds Trust
If the Alcon allegations are ultimately confirmed, clear communication will matter.
Customers and business partners need to know what information was involved, what was not involved and what actions they should take.
Ambiguous statements can create more fear than accurate explanations.
The Twenty-Eighth Command: Security Teams Need Threat Intelligence
The speed at which stolen data moves through criminal ecosystems means companies need visibility beyond their own networks.
Threat intelligence can help identify when corporate domains, employee addresses or company information appear in suspicious environments.
Early warning can provide valuable time.
The Twenty-Ninth Command: Attackers Are Monetizing Trust
The most important lesson may be that criminals are not simply stealing information.
They are stealing credibility.
A message becomes believable because it contains something real.
A company name.
A genuine email address.
A real purchase.
A legitimate employee.
A known vendor.
That is what makes modern social engineering so dangerous.
The Thirtieth Command: The Real Battlefield Is Context
Cybersecurity increasingly depends on recognizing whether information fits the context in which it is being used.
An email can contain a correct name and still be fraudulent.
An invoice can contain a genuine vendor name and still be malicious.
A password-reset request can arrive at the correct email address and still be an attack.
Context matters more than ever.
What Undercode Say:
The Alcon Claim Is Significant but Should Be Read Carefully
The reported Alcon exposure deserves attention, but responsible cybersecurity reporting requires a distinction between reported evidence and independently confirmed facts.
HIBP has identified the dataset and reported its characteristics, while the broader attribution and intrusion details should remain qualified until Alcon or another authoritative source provides additional confirmation.
The Most Important Number May Be 49%
The 49% overlap is arguably more revealing than the 218,000-record headline.
It demonstrates how today’s breaches build upon yesterday’s breaches.
The same identities can repeatedly circulate through the underground economy, creating an expanding digital history around individuals and organizations.
ShinyHunters Represents a Broader Extortion Trend
The FBI has described ShinyHunters as a cybercriminal group associated with large-scale data breaches and extortion.
Internet Crime Complaint Center
Google Threat Intelligence has also documented ShinyHunters-branded extortion activity involving stolen SaaS data and coercive tactics.
Google Cloud
That broader evidence makes the current claim worthy of investigation, even though it does not independently prove every detail of the Alcon allegation.
Email Data Can Become an Attack Infrastructure
A database of 218,000 email addresses is not merely a list.
It can become a targeting infrastructure.
It can help criminals identify companies, employees and relationships.
It can support phishing campaigns.
It can help criminals test credentials.
It can facilitate impersonation.
Its value increases when combined with information from previous breaches.
Data Reuse Is the Hidden Crisis
Cybersecurity discussions often focus on the size of a breach.
But the more important question may be:
How many times has this information already been exposed?
If a person has appeared in ten separate breaches, the eleventh breach may provide attackers with enough additional context to make previously ineffective attacks successful.
The B2B Dimension Deserves More Attention
Corporate contact data can expose the connective tissue of an organization.
Attackers can see who works there, who communicates with vendors and potentially which departments handle finance, technology or administration.
That makes B2B exposure a potential stepping stone toward more damaging attacks.
The Threat Does Not End With Publication
Once the dataset becomes available, criminals other than the original attackers can potentially exploit it.
This creates a secondary-market problem.
One breach can therefore create an ecosystem of follow-on attacks.
The Human Cost Is Often Invisible
A leaked email address may not produce immediate financial damage.
Instead, the consequences can appear gradually through spam, phishing, impersonation attempts and fraudulent communications.
Victims may never know that a message they received months later originated from an old breach.
The Cybersecurity Industry Must Think in Layers
Organizations need layered defenses because no single control solves the problem.
Authentication protects accounts.
Monitoring identifies suspicious activity.
Employee awareness reduces social-engineering success.
Threat intelligence provides visibility.
Data minimization reduces exposure.
Incident response limits damage.
Together, these layers create resilience.
Alcon Should Be Watched for Further Confirmation
The next important development will be whether Alcon publicly confirms an incident and explains what information was involved.
That confirmation would allow the cybersecurity community to distinguish between the current dataset report and the verified technical details of the intrusion.
The Bigger Lesson Is About Digital Permanence
The most uncomfortable lesson from the Alcon report is that data does not simply disappear after a breach.
Once exposed, it can remain useful indefinitely.
That makes prevention, minimization and identity protection more important than ever.
✅ HIBP Reported the Alcon Dataset
Fact: Have I Been Pwned reported a new Alcon-related breach dataset containing approximately 218,000 email addresses, with 49% already present in its database. The figures are based on the supplied HIBP announcement.
✅ ShinyHunters Has a Documented Extortion History
Fact: The FBI has publicly warned about ShinyHunters and described the group as associated with large-scale data breaches and extortion campaigns.
Internet Crime Complaint Center
❌ The Full Alcon Intrusion Has Not Been Independently Confirmed Here
Fact: The available evidence reviewed for this article does not independently establish every detail of the alleged Alcon intrusion or prove that all 218,000 addresses were obtained directly from Alcon. The incident should therefore continue to be described as alleged pending an authoritative confirmation.
Prediction
(+1) More Corporate Contact Data Will Likely Surface
The most likely near-term development is additional reporting about corporate contact datasets allegedly connected to ShinyHunters or other extortion operations. The continued reuse of leaked information creates a large pool of identities that criminals can exploit.
(+1) Phishing Will Become the Most Immediate Risk
For individuals whose email addresses appear in exposed datasets, the biggest practical danger may not be a direct account takeover but highly personalized phishing.
Attackers can combine leaked addresses with publicly available information to create messages that look surprisingly legitimate.
(+1) Breach Overlap Will Continue Increasing
As more datasets are leaked, future incidents will increasingly contain identities already present in earlier breaches.
The percentage of “new” information in major datasets may therefore continue declining while the value of data correlation increases.
(+1) B2B Contact Information Will Become More Valuable
Corporate identities provide attackers with access to organizational relationships, vendor communications and internal workflows.
That makes business contact databases increasingly attractive targets even when they contain no passwords or complete financial information.
(-1) Secondary Scams Will Likely Increase
As ShinyHunters-associated datasets circulate, unrelated criminals can reuse the information for phishing, impersonation and other scams. Recent reporting has already documented scammers exploiting ShinyHunters-linked leaked email addresses for fraudulent sextortion messages.
Malwarebytes
(-1) Organizations May Face Long-Term Exposure
Even if Alcon or another affected organization secures its systems quickly, published information can continue circulating.
The technical intrusion can end while the information-security consequences continue for months or years.
(+1) Identity Security Will Become the Main Defensive Priority
The broader lesson points toward stronger identity protection: multifactor authentication, phishing-resistant credentials, continuous monitoring and better employee verification procedures.
The companies that treat leaked identities as an ongoing security problem rather than a one-time incident will be better positioned to withstand the next wave of attacks.
Final Assessment
The reported 218,000-address Alcon exposure is significant not simply because of its size, but because it illustrates the direction of modern cyber extortion: steal useful identity data, pressure the victim, publish enough information to create credibility, and allow the stolen records to become fuel for future attacks.
The 49% overlap with existing HIBP data may ultimately be the most important statistic in the entire report. It shows that the cybercrime economy is becoming increasingly cumulative, with every new breach adding another layer to an enormous and constantly expanding pool of compromised identities.
For Alcon, the central question now is not merely whether 218,000 email addresses appeared online. The more important questions are where the information came from, what additional data may have been exposed, whether unauthorized access has been fully contained, and what attackers can do by combining this dataset with information stolen elsewhere.
Until those questions receive authoritative answers, the responsible conclusion is clear: the Alcon incident should be treated as a serious alleged data exposure, not as a fully confirmed breach narrative. But regardless of how the final investigation develops, the underlying warning is already real—stolen identity data has a long memory, and criminals are becoming increasingly skilled at turning yesterday’s leaks into tomorrow’s attacks.
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