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A New Cyber Threat Is Following College Athletes Into the Digital Spotlight
College athletics has changed dramatically in the social-media era. Student-athletes are no longer visible only on game days, television broadcasts, campus posters, or team websites. Through social platforms, interviews, sponsorships, brand partnerships, and name, image, and likeness (NIL) opportunities, many athletes now operate as highly visible online personalities.
That visibility creates opportunities—but it can also create a dangerous attack surface.
The FBI and the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) are warning student-athletes that criminals are increasingly capable of turning publicly available information into highly personalized cyber-enabled sexual exploitation and extortion schemes. The warning is particularly important in the NIL era, when athletes may deliberately make their identities, contact information, schedules, interests, and professional relationships more accessible online.
The message from federal authorities is straightforward: being targeted is not the victim’s fault, and responding quickly can prevent a bad situation from becoming much worse.
Why Student-Athletes Are Attractive Targets
College athletes can have unusually detailed public profiles. A university roster may reveal a player’s full name, jersey number, position, hometown, academic program, and team schedule. Social media can add photographs, friends, relationships, travel plans, family members, favorite locations, and other personal details.
NIL activity can expand that digital footprint even further.
The NCAA describes NIL activities as arrangements in which student-athletes are compensated for allowing companies, brands, or individuals to use their name, image, or likeness. These can include social-media posts, appearances, endorsements, camps, clinics, and promotional events.
For legitimate businesses, that visibility is valuable.
For criminals, it can become intelligence.
Public Information Can Become an Attack Weapon
A scammer does not necessarily need to compromise an athlete’s computer before launching an attack.
A criminal can study public accounts, identify the athlete’s university, determine which social networks they use, identify sponsors, learn the names of teammates, and discover the people or organizations that matter most to the target.
That information can then be used to create a much more convincing phishing message.
Instead of receiving an obviously suspicious email from an unknown sender, an athlete might receive a message that appears to come from Instagram, TikTok, Snapchat, an email provider, a university department, a sponsor, or another service connected to their public identity.
The more convincing the message looks, the more likely the victim is to act before stopping to question it.
The First Stage: Create Panic and Urgency
One of the most important characteristics of these attacks is psychological pressure.
The criminal wants the victim to believe something must be done immediately.
A message may claim that an account has violated platform rules, that suspicious activity has been detected, that an account will be deleted, or that a security problem requires immediate verification.
The attacker may then request a password, recovery code, authentication token, or one-time verification code.
The urgency is deliberate.
When people believe they have only seconds or minutes to protect an important account, they are more likely to ignore warning signs.
One-Time Codes Can Become the Key to an Account
A stolen password is dangerous, but a stolen authentication code can be equally valuable to an attacker.
If a criminal has already obtained enough information to initiate an account-recovery process, convincing the victim to hand over a one-time code may allow the attacker to complete the takeover.
Once inside the account, the criminal may change passwords, modify recovery information, remove legitimate sessions, and attempt to lock the victim out.
The attack then moves from simple phishing into account compromise.
Fake Login Pages Can Steal Everything at Once
Another common technique is credential phishing.
Instead of asking the victim to directly provide a password in a message, the attacker may send a link leading to a fake login page designed to resemble a legitimate service.
The victim sees familiar branding and assumes the page is genuine.
They enter a username and password.
The credentials are immediately delivered to the attacker.
The criminal may then attempt to access other accounts if the same password has been reused elsewhere.
This is why password reuse can turn one successful phishing attempt into a much larger compromise.
What Happens After the Account Is Hijacked
An account takeover can give an offender access to far more than public posts.
Private conversations, archived messages, cloud storage, photographs, contact lists, emails, and other information may become accessible depending on the compromised account and its connected services.
Attackers can also impersonate the victim.
They may message friends, teammates, family members, coaches, or business contacts while pretending to be the athlete.
That creates a second wave of risk.
A compromised
The Extortion Stage Is Designed to Trigger Fear
Once an offender obtains an intimate image—or convinces the victim that they possess one—the strategy can change completely.
The criminal may threaten to distribute the material to teammates, friends, family members, coaches, university officials, sponsors, or the wider public.
The victim may then be told to send money, provide additional images, reveal personal information, or perform some other action.
The objective is not simply financial gain.
The offender is attempting to control the victim through fear.
Reputation Becomes the
For a college athlete, the consequences can feel enormous.
A victim may worry about a scholarship, starting position, team relationships, academic standing, sponsorships, NIL contracts, family relationships, or future professional opportunities.
An attacker understands that fear.
That is precisely why the threat can become so psychologically powerful.
The criminal does not necessarily need to know whether the material would actually destroy the athlete’s career. The threat itself can be enough to create panic.
Shame Is Part of the Attack
Sextortion succeeds partly because victims can feel embarrassed or ashamed.
They may believe that admitting what happened will make other people judge them.
They may fear that friends will blame them for trusting someone online.
They may worry that parents or coaches will be angry.
They may even believe that asking for help will make the situation worse.
This is exactly the isolation an offender wants.
The FBI repeatedly emphasizes that victims should understand that sextortion is a crime and that victims should seek help rather than allowing fear and shame to keep them isolated.
Paying Rarely Solves the Problem
One of the most dangerous assumptions is that paying will make the attacker disappear.
It often does not.
Once a criminal discovers that threats produce money or additional material, the victim can become an even more attractive target.
The demand may increase.
The deadline may become shorter.
A new threat may appear.
The offender may claim that another payment is necessary before the material is deleted.
This can create an escalating cycle in which the victim continues complying while gaining less and less control.
NCMEC likewise warns that cooperating with or paying blackmailers rarely stops the blackmail.
The Numbers Show Why This Warning Matters
The broader sextortion problem has expanded dramatically.
According to the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children, NCMEC received more than 50,000 reports of financially motivated sextortion in 2025, averaging approximately 137 reports every day. That was a substantial increase from more than 36,000 reports in 2024.
Those statistics concern children and teenagers and should not be interpreted as a direct count of incidents involving college athletes.
But they demonstrate the scale and speed of the wider threat.
They also show why education, rapid reporting, and early intervention matter.
The Threat Is Evolving Beyond Traditional Phishing
Sextortion is no longer simply a case of someone receiving an unsolicited threatening message.
Modern attacks can combine social engineering, credential theft, account takeover, impersonation, stolen personal information, financial fraud, and sexual exploitation.
An attacker may begin with a phishing message.
The phishing attempt may lead to account compromise.
The compromised account may expose private conversations.
Those conversations may provide additional information.
That information can then be used to make an extortion threat more believable.
The result is a chain of attacks rather than a single scam.
NIL Creates a New Layer of Exposure
The rise of NIL has created legitimate opportunities for student-athletes to build brands and generate income.
But personal branding also encourages athletes to become more accessible.
They may maintain public business emails, communicate with unfamiliar companies, accept messages from prospective partners, post promotional content, and interact with new followers.
The NCAA itself provides resources designed to help student-athletes understand NIL activities and service providers.
The cybersecurity challenge is making sure that increased visibility does not become unrestricted access.
Athletes Need to Separate Public and Private Identities
One of the strongest defenses is compartmentalization.
An
Separating identities can reduce the damage caused by a single compromise.
A public contact channel can remain accessible for legitimate NIL opportunities while more sensitive accounts receive stronger privacy protections.
Social Media Privacy Is a Security Control
Privacy settings are sometimes treated as a convenience feature.
They should instead be considered part of an athlete’s security strategy.
Information about family members, travel plans, home locations, daily routines, private relationships, and personal schedules can give attackers material for social engineering.
The less information an attacker can collect, the harder it becomes to construct a believable targeted scam.
MFA Helps—but It Must Be Used Correctly
Multi-factor authentication can provide an important additional layer of protection.
However, MFA does not eliminate social engineering.
If an attacker convinces a victim to provide a one-time authentication code, the second factor can effectively be defeated through manipulation.
That means athletes should treat authentication codes as secrets.
A legitimate service should not require a user to hand a one-time code to an unsolicited contact.
Password Managers Can Reduce the Blast Radius
Using unique passwords for every important account is another critical defense.
A password manager can make this practical by generating and storing strong, unique credentials.
If one service is compromised, a unique password limits the opportunity for an attacker to reuse that credential against another account.
For athletes whose personal, academic, professional, and NIL identities overlap, this distinction can be particularly important.
Athletes Should Treat Unexpected Links as Security Events
A message does not need to contain obvious malware to be dangerous.
A link can lead to a phishing page.
A document can contain malicious content.
A fake login page can steal credentials.
A shortened URL can hide the real destination.
The safest approach is to avoid using links in unexpected messages when an account needs attention.
Instead, open the official application or type the known website address manually.
What to Do If an Attack Has Already Started
The first objective is to stop giving the attacker additional leverage.
Do not negotiate.
Do not argue.
Do not promise payment.
Do not send additional images.
Do not provide identity documents or authentication codes.
Instead, preserve the available evidence and seek help.
Preserve Evidence Before Blocking the Attacker
Victims should preserve relevant information such as usernames, profile URLs, email addresses, phone numbers, messages, payment requests, transaction details, and timestamps.
Screenshots can help document what happened.
However, intimate material should not be unnecessarily copied or redistributed while attempting to document the incident.
Evidence should be preserved carefully and provided to appropriate authorities or support organizations when requested.
Secure the Account From a Trusted Device
If an account has been compromised, the victim should use a trusted device to access the legitimate service directly.
Change the password.
Sign out other active sessions.
Review account-recovery information.
Check connected applications.
Remove unfamiliar devices.
Enable multi-factor authentication.
Review email forwarding rules and other settings where relevant.
The goal is to eliminate the
Check the Rest of the Digital Identity
Account recovery should not stop with the compromised platform.
If the same password was used elsewhere, change it immediately.
Review email accounts.
Review cloud storage.
Review social networks.
Review financial services where appropriate.
Check whether unknown devices or sessions are connected to important accounts.
A single compromised account can sometimes reveal enough information to trigger attacks against other services.
Tell Someone You Trust
Isolation is one of the
A victim should consider telling a trusted parent, teammate, coach, counselor, athletic department representative, compliance officer, campus safety professional, or another trusted adult.
The first person an athlete tells can make an enormous difference.
Athletic departments should therefore have a clear response process before an incident occurs—not after.
Universities Need an Incident-Response Playbook
This warning is not only about individual athletes.
Universities have a role to play.
Athletic departments should establish clear procedures for handling sextortion, account compromise, impersonation, doxxing, and other forms of cyber-enabled exploitation.
Staff should know who receives reports.
They should know how evidence is preserved.
They should know when law enforcement should be contacted.
They should understand how to communicate with platforms.
Most importantly, athletes should know where to go without fear of being blamed.
NIL Education Should Include Cybersecurity
NIL education traditionally focuses on contracts, taxes, compliance, branding, sponsorships, and business relationships.
Cybersecurity needs to become part of that conversation.
An athlete learning how to negotiate a sponsorship should also learn how to verify a potential sponsor.
An athlete creating a business email should learn how to secure it.
An athlete building a public social-media profile should understand the information an attacker can extract from it.
Brand-building and security should not be treated as separate disciplines.
Criminals Can Exploit Trust in Legitimate Opportunities
The NIL ecosystem creates another potential social-engineering opportunity because athletes may regularly communicate with people they do not personally know.
A fake brand representative can appear credible.
A fake talent manager can appear credible.
A fake photographer can appear credible.
A fake university representative can appear credible.
The attacker does not necessarily need sophisticated malware.
Sometimes, credibility is enough.
AI Could Make Impersonation Even More Convincing
Artificial intelligence adds another layer to the threat environment.
Attackers can potentially use publicly available photographs, writing styles, voice samples, and other information to construct more convincing impersonation attempts.
AI-generated content can also make it harder for victims and organizations to determine whether a communication is genuine.
That makes verification increasingly important.
When money, credentials, intimate material, or sensitive personal information is involved, trust should be established through an independent communication channel.
Deep Analysis: How the Attack Chain Works
Command 01 — Reconnaissance
The attacker begins by collecting public information about the athlete, including social profiles, university affiliation, schedules, relationships, sponsorships, and contact information.
Command 02 — Target Selection
The criminal looks for a person whose public visibility and perceived reputation create leverage.
Command 03 — Social Engineering
The attacker creates a believable story designed to make the victim respond quickly.
Command 04 — Credential Capture
A fake login page, malicious link, impersonation attempt, or request for a one-time code can provide access to an important account.
Command 05 — Account Takeover
Once credentials are obtained, the attacker attempts to establish control and maintain access.
Command 06 — Intelligence Collection
Private messages, contacts, photographs, emails, and cloud data may provide additional information.
Command 07 — Psychological Escalation
The offender introduces fear by claiming that intimate material will be exposed.
Command 08 — Extortion
The victim is pressured to provide money, additional images, information, or another form of compliance.
Command 09 — Expansion
If the victim complies, the attacker may increase demands rather than ending the campaign.
Command 10 — Secondary Targeting
A compromised account can be used to impersonate the athlete and attack teammates, friends, relatives, or other contacts.
Deep Analysis: Why the
Reputation Is the Leverage
The
It may be the
Visibility Creates Both Value and Risk
NIL depends on visibility, but visibility also gives attackers more information to weaponize.
The Attack Is Often Psychological
Technology provides the initial access, but fear and urgency drive the victim’s actions.
The Criminal Wants the Victim Isolated
An isolated victim is easier to manipulate than someone who immediately involves trusted people.
Paying Can Reinforce the Attack
Payment can demonstrate to the criminal that the victim is willing and able to comply.
One Compromise Can Become Several
A stolen password can lead to social-media access, which can lead to private information, which can lead to impersonation and additional attacks.
Public Data Should Be Treated as Intelligence
A photo, school name, sponsor, travel destination, or contact address can become useful information when combined with other details.
Security Needs to Follow the
The larger the public profile becomes, the more important account protection becomes.
Athletic Departments Are Part of the Security Boundary
Universities cannot assume cybersecurity is solely the
Trust Must Be Verified
A message that looks official is not automatically legitimate.
Urgency Is a Warning Sign
The demand to “act now” is often intended to prevent the victim from thinking.
Authentication Codes Are Not Verification Tokens for Strangers
A genuine security process should not require a user to disclose a one-time code to an unsolicited contact.
Password Reuse Magnifies Damage
One compromised password can become a master key if it is reused across multiple services.
Evidence Can Become Critical
Messages, account details, payment requests, and timestamps may help investigators understand the attack.
Blocking Is Not the Same as Erasing
The victim should preserve evidence before blocking whenever practical.
The Victim Is Not the Criminal
The responsibility belongs to the person conducting the exploitation and extortion.
Silence Benefits the Attacker
Reporting can disrupt the
NIL Security Should Be Standard Education
Cybersecurity should become a routine component of athlete branding programs.
Account Recovery Should Be Practiced Before an Incident
Athletes should know how to recover their accounts before an attacker takes control.
Trusted Contacts Should Be Identified in Advance
A victim should not have to decide whom to trust while under an active extortion threat.
Schools Should Rehearse Their Response
A written policy is useful, but a tested incident-response process is better.
Sponsors Also Have a Role
Brands working with athletes should provide secure and verifiable communication channels.
Social Platforms Are Part of the Ecosystem
Platforms need effective reporting, account-recovery, impersonation, and abuse-response mechanisms.
Extortion Is an Ongoing Campaign
The first threat may be only the beginning if the criminal believes pressure is working.
Emotional Pressure Can Defeat Technical Controls
Even strong security tools can be undermined when a victim is manipulated into voluntarily giving away credentials.
Human Awareness Remains Essential
Technology can detect suspicious links, but users still need to recognize manipulation.
Digital Reputation Is Now an Attack Surface
For athletes, an online identity can be directly connected to scholarships, sponsorships, career prospects, and personal relationships.
The Best Defense Is Layered
Privacy controls, unique passwords, MFA, cautious browsing, account monitoring, and rapid reporting work best together.
Preparation Reduces Panic
Knowing exactly what to do before an incident occurs can prevent desperate decisions during an attack.
Reporting Should Be Normalized
Athletes should feel safe reporting suspicious activity before it becomes an emergency.
Cybersecurity Is Now Part of Athlete Protection
The modern athlete needs protection not only on the field but also across the digital identity surrounding it.
What Undercode Say:
The Digital Athlete Is a High-Value Target
The FBI and NCAA warning highlights a cybersecurity problem that is easy to underestimate: the modern college athlete is simultaneously a student, public figure, content creator, brand representative, and sometimes a small business operator.
NIL Changed the Attack Surface
NIL has created legitimate economic opportunities, but it also encourages athletes to publish more information and communicate with more people. The same visibility that attracts sponsors can attract criminals.
Public Information Is Not Harmless
A criminal does not need classified information to launch a convincing attack. A university name, jersey number, Instagram account, sponsor, hometown, and public email address can be enough to construct a believable social-engineering scenario.
Extortion Works Because Fear Works
The technology behind these schemes can be relatively simple. The psychological manipulation is the sophisticated part. Criminals understand that athletes may be terrified of losing control over their reputation.
The First Goal Should Be Breaking the Isolation
Victims need another person involved as quickly as possible. A trusted parent, counselor, coach, compliance official, or campus security representative can help replace panic with a structured response.
Universities Should Stop Treating These Incidents as Personal Problems
If an athletic department provides athletes with public-facing branding resources, it should also provide cybersecurity education and an incident-response pathway.
Security Training Must Match the Modern NIL Environment
Telling athletes to “be careful online” is not enough. Training should cover phishing, MFA-code theft, account recovery, impersonation, privacy exposure, fake sponsors, malicious links, sextortion, and evidence preservation.
The Numbers Are a Warning, Not a Forecast of Athlete Cases
The more than 50,000 NCMEC reports in 2025 concern children and teens, not specifically NCAA athletes. Nevertheless, the rapid increase demonstrates that sextortion has become a major online exploitation problem.
Criminals Follow Attention
Where there is attention, there is potential leverage. Athletes with large audiences naturally attract more legitimate interactions—and therefore more opportunities for malicious actors to blend into those interactions.
The Best Time to Build a Response Plan Is Before an Attack
Every athletic program should know who receives a report, who preserves evidence, who contacts platforms, who coordinates with law enforcement, and how the athlete is supported.
Privacy Should Not Mean Disappearing
Athletes do not need to abandon social media or NIL opportunities. They need to separate public exposure from sensitive information and understand which details should remain private.
MFA Is Necessary but Not Magical
Multi-factor authentication significantly strengthens account security, but social engineering can still trick users into surrendering authentication codes. Security education must therefore accompany technical controls.
The
The most important decision after an extortion threat is often not whether to pay. It is whether to remain alone or seek help.
Criminals Want Fast Decisions
The attacker benefits when the victim reacts emotionally before documenting the incident, consulting someone trustworthy, or checking whether the threat is real.
Account Security and Personal Safety Are Connected
A hacked social-media account can expose relationships, private conversations, schedules, and contacts. Cybersecurity can therefore become a personal-safety issue.
The
A public Instagram account, NIL email, personal email, university account, cloud storage, financial services, and messaging applications should not all depend on the same password or recovery path.
One Compromised Account Should Not Collapse Everything
Segmentation and unique credentials can limit the damage when one account is successfully attacked.
AI Will Increase the Importance of Verification
As synthetic images, voices, and messages become easier to produce, visual or conversational familiarity will become a weaker indicator of authenticity.
Trust Should Be Independently Confirmed
If an apparent sponsor, university official, platform representative, or manager requests sensitive information, verify the request through a known and separate channel.
The Goal Is Resilience, Not Perfect Prevention
No security strategy can guarantee that an athlete will never be targeted. The objective is to make compromise harder, limit damage, and ensure that victims can recover quickly.
Reporting Is a Defensive Tool
A report can help preserve evidence, connect incidents, assist investigators, and potentially protect other victims.
The Message From the FBI Is Bigger Than College Sports
The same techniques can affect influencers, creators, students, professionals, and ordinary social-media users. The athlete-specific warning reflects a broader evolution in online exploitation.
Cybersecurity Belongs in Athlete Development
Training should not end with physical conditioning, academic performance, contracts, and media preparation. Digital safety should be part of the same development process.
NIL Has Become a Security Issue
The business side of college athletics now intersects directly with cybersecurity, privacy, fraud prevention, and identity protection.
Preparation Can Take Away the
A victim who already knows to stop communicating, preserve evidence, secure accounts, and seek help is much harder to control than someone discovering these steps for the first time during a crisis.
The Strongest Message Is Simple
Criminals depend on fear, secrecy, urgency, and isolation. Breaking any one of those elements can weaken the attack.
Student-Athletes Should Not Be Afraid to Ask for Help
The
Colleges Have an Opportunity to Get Ahead of the Threat
The NCAA already provides NIL education and resources. Extending that education into cybersecurity would be a logical next step as athletes become increasingly visible online.
The Real Security Boundary Is the Person
Firewalls, antivirus tools, MFA, password managers, and anti-phishing systems all matter. But an attacker who successfully manipulates the person behind the account can sometimes bypass even strong technical defenses.
Digital Awareness Can Protect Both Careers and Lives
The most important outcome is not simply preventing an account takeover or financial loss. It is ensuring that a victim does not become trapped by fear and believes there is no way out.
The Future of Athlete Security Must Be Digital Too
College sports have entered an era where identity, reputation, money, and technology are deeply interconnected. Protecting athletes therefore requires protecting their digital identities with the same seriousness given to their physical safety and professional futures.
✅ FBI Warning Is Consistent With Official Guidance
The FBI officially describes financially motivated sextortion as a crime in which offenders use sexually explicit material or threats of exposure to pressure victims for money or other compliance, and it encourages victims to report exploitation.
✅ NCMEC’s 2025 Figures Are Correct
NCMEC reported more than 50,000 financially motivated sextortion reports in 2025, averaging 137 reports per day, compared with more than 36,000 in 2024. These figures concern children and teens and should not be presented as statistics specifically for NCAA athletes.
⚠️ The Athlete-Specific Numbers Should Not Be Exaggerated
The available NCMEC figures demonstrate the scale of sextortion among children and teens, but they do not establish how many NCAA student-athletes have been victimized. The broader trend supports the warning, but the two populations should remain analytically separate.
Prediction
(+1) Cybersecurity Education Will Become Part of NIL Training
As NIL becomes more sophisticated, universities and athletic departments are likely to expand education beyond contracts and branding to include phishing, identity protection, account security, privacy, impersonation, and online exploitation.
(+1) Athletic Departments Will Build Formal Response Procedures
The growing complexity of digital threats will encourage schools to establish dedicated procedures for reporting sextortion, account compromise, impersonation, and other cyber-enabled attacks.
(+1) Account Segmentation Will Become More Common
Athletes with significant public profiles will increasingly separate personal accounts from NIL and business identities, reducing the damage caused by individual compromises.
(+1) Verification Will Become More Important in NIL Deals
Athletes and their representatives will likely adopt stronger verification procedures before sharing credentials, signing documents, sending sensitive information, or communicating with unfamiliar business contacts.
(-1) Attackers Will Continue Exploiting Public Athlete Information
As long as athletes maintain highly visible digital identities, criminals will have opportunities to use publicly available information for social engineering, impersonation, phishing, and extortion.
(-1) AI Could Increase the Credibility of Impersonation
Synthetic voices, images, messages, and other AI-assisted content may make fraudulent communications increasingly convincing, creating additional challenges for athletes and athletic departments.
(-1) Sextortion Will Remain Difficult to Report
Fear, shame, and concern about reputation can continue to prevent victims from seeking help quickly, allowing attackers to maintain psychological control.
(-1) Criminals Will Keep Moving Toward Private Channels
NCMEC has already reported that offenders are moving conversations more quickly toward private messaging and encrypted applications, creating additional challenges for detection and investigation.
The Final Warning: Visibility Should Not Become Vulnerability
Awareness Is the First Layer of Defense
The FBI and NCAA warning arrives at a moment when student-athletes are becoming more visible, more commercially active, and more connected than ever before. That visibility is not inherently dangerous. It is part of the modern college sports economy.
But visibility must be accompanied by security.
The Right Response Is Not Panic
If an athlete receives a threatening message, the worst reaction is often the one the attacker is trying to provoke: panic, secrecy, immediate payment, and continued communication.
The better response is controlled and methodical: preserve evidence, stop engaging, secure accounts, involve someone trustworthy, and report the incident.
Help Exists
The FBI advises victims to report exploitation through its official reporting channels. For incidents involving minors, NCMEC provides the CyberTipline and its free Take It Down service to help address the distribution of explicit images.
The central lesson is therefore bigger than cybersecurity.
A criminal may be able to weaponize an athlete’s public identity, but that does not mean the criminal controls the outcome.
The Strongest Defense Is Preparedness
Student-athletes should be able to build their brands, pursue NIL opportunities, communicate with fans, and participate in the digital economy without being forced into silence by fear.
The answer is not to eliminate visibility.
It is to make that visibility safer.
And in an environment where a public profile can become the starting point for phishing, account takeover, impersonation, and sextortion, digital safety is no longer an optional skill for the modern college athlete—it is part of protecting the person behind the profile.
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