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A New Warning Hidden Inside the Modern Web
The internet was built to move information faster, more efficiently, and at greater scale. Yet the same technologies designed to make websites faster can sometimes create unexpected paths for attackers to make them slower.
A newly disclosed class of denial-of-service attacks, collectively known as CDN Tsunami, exposes one such weakness. Researchers found that seemingly tiny HTTP/3 request streams can be transformed by major content delivery networks into much larger volumes of HTTP/1.1 traffic toward origin servers. In some tested configurations, the resulting bandwidth amplification reached roughly 350 times the attacker’s traffic.
The discovery is significant because the attacker does not necessarily need a huge botnet or enormous upstream bandwidth. Instead, the attack takes advantage of the translation layer between modern HTTP/3 traffic at the CDN edge and older HTTP/1.1 communication between the CDN and the origin server.
The Core Problem: One Connection, Two HTTP Generations
Modern CDNs frequently sit between visitors and the websites they access. A browser may communicate with the CDN using HTTP/3 over QUIC, while the CDN communicates with the origin server using HTTP/1.1.
That architecture is practical and widespread, but it creates a protocol boundary.
The researchers argue that this boundary can become an amplification point because HTTP/3 provides compression and multiplexing features that HTTP/1.1 does not share in the same way.
An attacker can therefore send a relatively small amount of traffic toward the CDN while forcing the CDN to generate substantially more work and traffic toward the origin.
Six Major CDN Providers Were Examined
The research evaluated the behavior of Alibaba, Baidu, Cloudflare, Amazon CloudFront, Fastly, and Tencent.
All six were found vulnerable to the bandwidth amplification technique under the tested conditions.
Five of the six were also vulnerable to the connection amplification technique.
Cloudflare was the exception for the connection-based technique because its architecture buffers the complete request before establishing the corresponding connection to the origin.
What Makes CDN Tsunami Different
Traditional DDoS attacks generally depend on overwhelming a target with a large amount of traffic.
CDN Tsunami takes a different approach.
Instead of simply sending enormous amounts of traffic, the attacker attempts to make the CDN perform the amplification.
The CDN becomes the mechanism that transforms a relatively inexpensive client-side request into a much more expensive origin-side workload.
That distinction matters because the attacker may require considerably fewer resources than the origin server needs to absorb.
HTTP/3 Bandwidth Amplification Explained
The first technique is called HTTP/3 Bandwidth Amplification, or HBA.
It takes advantage of QPACK, the header compression mechanism used by HTTP/3.
QPACK allows headers to be represented efficiently, including through references to previously stored entries in a dynamic table.
HTTP/1.1 does not provide an equivalent mechanism for forwarding those compressed references.
When the CDN converts an HTTP/3 request into HTTP/1.1 traffic, it must reconstruct the complete header information before sending the request onward.
The result is a potentially dramatic difference between what the attacker sends and what the origin receives.
Why QPACK Matters
Imagine an attacker can represent a large header using only a small indexed reference.
The client sends that compact representation to the CDN.
The CDN understands the reference and reconstructs the complete header.
When the request is translated into HTTP/1.1, the compressed representation disappears and the expanded header must be transmitted.
That means a few bytes entering the CDN can eventually become thousands of bytes leaving it toward the origin.
The process is not an accidental bandwidth multiplier in the traditional sense. It is a consequence of protocol translation combined with compression semantics.
The Dynamic Table Creates an Even Bigger Effect
The researchers found the largest amplification when the CDN supported the QPACK dynamic table.
The attacker first sends a request containing a large header that the CDN stores inside its dynamic table.
Subsequent HTTP/3 requests can then refer to that header using a small index.
The attacker does not need to repeatedly transmit the full header.
The CDN, however, still needs to reconstruct it when generating the HTTP/1.1 request.
Alibaba, Baidu, and Tencent were identified as supporting the relevant dynamic-table behavior in the tested configurations.
Each advertised a 4 KB table with a maximum entry size of 3,072 bytes.
Measured Bandwidth Amplification
The researchers reported the following maximum amplification factors using the QPACK static table:
Baidu: 66.06x
Alibaba: 65.8x
Tencent: 54.08x
Amazon CloudFront: 51.2x
Cloudflare: 48.27x
Fastly: 36.41x
The dynamic-table technique pushed the theoretical and measured impact considerably further.
For Alibaba, Baidu, and Tencent, the research reported amplification reaching approximately 350x under the tested conditions.
Small Attack Traffic Can Become Large Origin Traffic
The attacker-side bandwidth remained below approximately 500 Kbps against the three CDNs supporting the dynamic table.
Against the other providers, the attacker-side traffic remained below approximately 5 Mbps in the experiments.
Meanwhile, the researchers measured more than 100 Mbps reaching the origin during the relevant tests.
That difference illustrates the fundamental danger.
The attacker does not necessarily need to match the capacity of the server being attacked.
The CDN can effectively multiply the traffic and workload before it reaches the origin.
HTTP/3 Connection Amplification Is Another Threat
The second technique is called HTTP/3 Connection Amplification, or HCA.
Unlike HBA, this attack does not primarily target bandwidth.
It targets the number of backend connections that the CDN creates.
HTTP/3 allows multiple independent streams to travel over a single client connection.
A CDN receiving those streams may create separate HTTP/1.1 connections to the origin.
That creates an opportunity for a single client-side connection to consume a disproportionate amount of backend connection capacity.
How Connection Exhaustion Happens
Five of the six tested CDNs were observed opening HTTP/1.1 connections toward the origin after receiving the HTTP/3 HEADERS frame, before the entire request body had arrived.
An attacker can exploit that behavior by keeping the HTTP/3 streams alive while sending DATA frames very slowly.
The CDN continues treating the requests as incomplete.
Meanwhile, the backend connections remain occupied.
This creates a classic resource exhaustion problem.
The attacker is effectively asking the CDN to reserve origin-side resources for requests that make very little progress.
A Single HTTP/3 Connection Can Hide Many Streams
HTTP/3 multiplexing makes the situation more interesting.
A single client connection can carry many streams.
If each stream causes the CDN to establish another backend connection, the number of origin-side connections can grow much faster than the number of client connections.
The researchers demonstrated this behavior using an Apache server configured with a 300-second timeout and a 256-connection limit.
Four HTTP/3 connections, each carrying 96 streams, forced 384 backend connections in the tested scenario.
Fastly Behaved Differently
Fastly’s behavior placed a separate limit on the attack.
The researchers found that Fastly capped backend connections at 10 per HTTP/3 connection.
The experiment therefore required 48 client connections carrying eight streams each to produce the tested backend connection pressure.
Even with that restriction, the technique caused measurable performance degradation.
The Performance Impact Was Visible
The effect was not limited to theoretical resource calculations.
Benign clients experienced dramatically longer response times while the attack was running.
Alibaba reached approximately 60 seconds.
Baidu and CloudFront reached as much as 90 seconds and returned HTTP 504 Gateway Timeout responses.
Fastly reached approximately 15 seconds and returned HTTP 503 Service Unavailable.
Tencent closed the client-side connection roughly 10 seconds after receiving a probe request and did not return a response during the relevant experiment.
The Attack Has Important Boundaries
The research should not be interpreted as proof that every CDN deployment is automatically vulnerable.
The experiments were deliberately bounded.
The researchers limited origin bandwidth to 100 Mbps and attacker traffic to 30 Mbps.
They did not report testing above those limits.
The paper argues that the attacks should scale against higher-capacity servers, but that particular conclusion was not experimentally demonstrated at larger bandwidth levels.
That distinction is important when evaluating the real-world severity of the technique.
The 350x Number Needs Context
The headline figure of 350x is striking, but it should not be treated as a universal amplification ratio.
The researchers found the strongest behavior on Alibaba, Baidu, and Tencent under specific experimental conditions involving QPACK dynamic-table support.
The static-table results were substantially lower.
CloudFront, Cloudflare, and Fastly produced maximum static-table amplification factors between approximately 36x and 51x.
In other words, the 350x figure represents a specific high-amplification configuration, not a guaranteed result against every website using a vulnerable CDN.
Amplification Peaked Around 64 Streams
The researchers also observed that amplification increased as concurrency grew but eventually began to decline.
The peak occurred around 64 concurrent streams in the reported measurements.
The researchers attributed the decline to CPU overhead at the CDN edge.
However, the study did not provide direct edge CPU measurements.
That means the explanation remains an interpretation of the observed behavior rather than a fully demonstrated causal measurement.
The Internet-Wide Exposure Was Also Investigated
To estimate how widespread the architecture might be, the research team examined subdomains associated with the Tranco Top 1M list.
They crawled CNAME and NS records and matched them against known CDN-assigned suffixes.
The researchers then used the aioquic implementation to probe potential HTTP/3 endpoints.
The process identified 151,685 subdomains hosted by the six providers.
Of those, 42,330 responded to HTTP/3 requests and were classified as potentially vulnerable based on the researchers’ detection criteria.
CloudFront Had the Largest Potential Count
Among the potentially vulnerable endpoints, the largest numbers were associated with:
Amazon CloudFront: 17,431
Cloudflare: 12,371
Fastly: 11,606
These figures should not be interpreted as confirmed attacks against those websites.
The probing demonstrated that the CDN edge responded to HTTP/3.
It did not mean that the researchers attacked the corresponding third-party origin servers.
This Is an Architectural Problem, Not Just a Website Bug
One of the most important aspects of CDN Tsunami is where the mitigation belongs.
The researchers state that the proposed defenses operate at the CDN layer rather than requiring changes to individual origin websites.
That makes sense because the vulnerable behavior originates in the translation between HTTP/3 at the edge and HTTP/1.1 at the backend.
An individual website owner may have limited visibility into how that translation occurs.
Lessons From CDN Judo
The researchers compared CDN Tsunami with an earlier study known as CDN Judo, published in 2020.
That work examined similar amplification behavior involving HTTP/2-to-HTTP/1.1 conversion.
The earlier research reported amplification of approximately 44x with the static table and 166x with the dynamic table.
The comparison demonstrates an uncomfortable pattern.
HTTP evolution can introduce new performance capabilities while simultaneously creating new translation-layer risks.
Recommended Mitigation: Control Header Expansion
One proposed defense is to limit the size of individual header entries inserted into the QPACK dynamic table.
The researchers suggested a limit of approximately 512 bytes.
A strict limit reduces the amount of data that can be represented through a tiny indexed reference.
It therefore makes it harder to create an extreme difference between attacker-side traffic and origin-side traffic.
Recommended Mitigation: Limit Dynamic References
Another defense is to restrict how many times one dynamic-table entry can be referenced within a single stream.
The researchers suggested no more than 10 references.
This approach directly limits how often an attacker can repeatedly transform a small indexed value into a larger decompressed header.
Recommended Mitigation: Limit Decompressed Requests
A CDN can also enforce a maximum size for the fully decompressed HTTP/1.1 request.
The researchers suggested rejecting requests exceeding approximately 64 KB before forwarding them to the origin.
This creates a safety boundary after decompression but before the expanded request consumes origin resources.
Recommended Mitigation: Buffer the Complete Request
The connection amplification technique points toward another defense.
A CDN could buffer the complete HTTP/3 request, including HEADERS and DATA frames, before opening a connection to the origin.
This prevents incomplete client-side requests from immediately consuming backend connections.
It also changes the economics of slow-stream attacks because the CDN would not reserve an origin connection merely because a HEADERS frame arrived.
Recommended Mitigation: Control Backend Connection Creation
CDNs can also limit how many origin connections a single HTTP/3 client connection is allowed to create.
That would reduce the multiplication effect created by HTTP/3 multiplexing.
Even if an attacker opens many streams, the CDN would impose a hard ceiling on how many backend resources those streams can consume.
Recommended Mitigation: Independent Backend Timeouts
The researchers also recommended independent timeouts for CDN-to-origin connections.
A suggested threshold was approximately 30 seconds without meaningful forwarded data.
This is important because an attacker can otherwise exploit the difference between a long-lived client connection and a backend connection that is waiting for progress.
The origin should not remain tied to an inactive or deliberately slow client indefinitely.
Baidu and Tencent Responded
The disclosure section of the research states that Baidu and Tencent confirmed the findings and deployed proposed mitigations.
Tencent’s deployed defenses reportedly include restrictions on dynamic-table header sizes and limits on CDN-to-origin connections.
The researchers also reported bug bounty awards of approximately $350 from Baidu and $150 from Tencent.
The other four providers acknowledged the disclosure and were still discussing the findings internally according to the paper.
No CVE Has Been Assigned
No CVE identifier had been assigned to CDN Tsunami at the time described by the research.
That is not unusual for a systemic CDN architecture weakness.
A CVE is often associated with a specific software vulnerability, while this research involves behavior created by protocol translation and CDN implementation choices across multiple providers.
The absence of a CVE should therefore not be interpreted as an absence of security significance.
No Wild Exploitation Has Been Reported
The available research does not report exploitation of CDN Tsunami in the wild.
That distinction is important.
The study demonstrates that the attack techniques work under controlled experimental conditions, but it does not establish that criminal groups are already using them against public websites.
The difference between demonstrated exploitability and confirmed active exploitation should remain clear.
Another QPACK-Related Warning
The CDN Tsunami disclosure arrives shortly after another QPACK-related security issue.
On July 8, FoxIO researcher Sébastien Féry reported that roughly 260 bytes of specification-compliant QPACK traffic could crash servers running XQUIC.
XQUIC is Alibaba’s QUIC and HTTP/3 library and provides HTTP/3 functionality for the Tengine web server used across Alibaba’s cloud and CDN infrastructure.
The proximity of these disclosures highlights how much security attention HTTP/3 and QPACK are now receiving.
OpenSSL Adds Another QUIC Security Concern
The OpenSSL Project also disclosed CVE-2026-14456 on August 13.
The issue was described as low severity and involved a QUIC server queuing incoming channels for unknown destination connection IDs without enforcing a limit.
The fix introduces a limit for pending connections, with a default value of 256.
Although this is separate from CDN Tsunami, the timing reinforces a broader trend.
QUIC and HTTP/3 are becoming increasingly important security surfaces as their adoption expands.
DDoS Is Moving Toward Amplification Again
The broader DDoS landscape makes the research particularly relevant.
Cloudflare’s first-half 2026 DDoS reporting indicated that the center of gravity for attack vectors had shifted from traditional botnet floods toward reflection and amplification.
DNS-based attacks reportedly accounted for 34.3% of network-layer activity during the first half of 2026.
CDN Tsunami fits naturally into that larger security conversation.
The internet is increasingly becoming an environment where attackers search for ways to multiply the effect of every packet they send.
Why CDN Architecture Deserves More Security Attention
CDNs are often viewed primarily as performance infrastructure.
They cache content, terminate connections, absorb traffic spikes, accelerate websites, and protect origins from direct exposure.
But every layer of abstraction introduces translation.
And translation creates assumptions.
HTTP/3 is optimized for modern client connections, while HTTP/1.1 remains deeply embedded in backend infrastructure.
The security question is no longer simply whether each protocol is safe by itself.
The question is what happens when they interact.
The Real Weak Point May Be the Boundary
The most interesting lesson from CDN Tsunami is that neither HTTP/3 nor HTTP/1.1 necessarily needs to be inherently broken for an amplification vulnerability to appear.
The weakness emerges at the boundary.
HTTP/3 compresses and multiplexes traffic.
The CDN expands and translates it.
HTTP/1.1 receives the resulting request.
The origin server then pays the resource cost.
That sequence creates an economic imbalance that attackers can exploit.
What Security Teams Should Watch
Organizations using CDN infrastructure should pay attention to several indicators.
Unexpected increases in backend connection counts can be an early warning.
Sudden HTTP 503 or 504 responses may indicate resource exhaustion.
A dramatic difference between traffic arriving at the CDN edge and traffic reaching the origin deserves investigation.
Long-lived HTTP/3 streams with extremely slow DATA frame delivery are another behavior worth monitoring.
Unusual growth in request header sizes or repeated references to compressed headers can also justify closer inspection.
Monitoring Should Exist on Both Sides
One of the biggest operational mistakes would be monitoring only the CDN.
A CDN may report normal client traffic while the origin experiences abnormal connection pressure.
Security teams should therefore correlate edge telemetry with origin telemetry.
Metrics should include HTTP/3 stream counts, backend connection counts, request completion rates, origin bandwidth, connection duration, 503 and 504 responses, and unusual header expansion.
The goal is to identify situations where a small client-side signal produces a disproportionately large backend effect.
What Undercode Say:
The Bigger Security Story Behind CDN Tsunami
CDN Tsunami is a reminder that performance optimization and security engineering cannot be separated.
HTTP/3 was designed to make the web faster and more resilient.
QPACK was designed to reduce repetitive header overhead.
Multiplexing was designed to make better use of connections.
CDNs were designed to shield origins from traffic.
Yet those benefits can interact in unexpected ways.
The attacker does not need to defeat every security mechanism individually.
They can search for the gap between them.
That is the central lesson.
A protocol can be secure while its translation into another protocol creates an amplification opportunity.
A CDN can protect an origin from volumetric attacks while unintentionally becoming an amplifier for a different class of attack.
Compression can reduce traffic for legitimate users while increasing the difference between input size and processing cost.
Multiplexing can reduce connection overhead while allowing one connection to represent dozens or hundreds of backend requests.
This is why security testing needs to evaluate complete architectures rather than isolated components.
The most dangerous assumption is that fewer bytes automatically mean less risk.
Bytes are only one resource.
CPU time matters.
Memory matters.
Connection slots matter.
File descriptors matter.
Queue depth matters.
Application worker threads matter.
Timeouts matter.
A request that costs an attacker almost nothing can still be expensive for the infrastructure receiving it.
CDN operators therefore need to think in terms of resource asymmetry.
The question should not simply be how much traffic a client can generate.
The question should be how much work that traffic can force the infrastructure to perform.
HTTP/3 also demonstrates why backward compatibility deserves security testing.
The internet cannot replace HTTP/1.1 overnight.
CDNs will continue translating between generations of protocols for years.
Every translation point should therefore be treated as a security boundary.
Compression tables deserve strict limits.
Decompressed request sizes deserve strict limits.
Backend connection creation deserves strict limits.
Slow streams deserve independent timeouts.
Client connections should not be allowed to indirectly consume unlimited origin resources.
The 350x figure is impressive, but the architectural lesson is more important than the headline number.
Even a 20x amplification can be dangerous when the attacker can sustain the request cheaply.
Even a 5x connection multiplication can matter when the origin has a finite connection pool.
Even a small number of malicious streams can become significant if they remain open for minutes.
The future of DDoS defense will increasingly involve identifying these economic asymmetries.
Attackers will continue looking for places where one unit of their effort forces many units of work elsewhere.
That means security teams must monitor not only traffic volume but also traffic efficiency from the attacker’s perspective.
CDN Tsunami also shows why protocol modernization should include adversarial testing.
Every new feature should be examined for how it behaves under hostile input.
Compression should be tested against expansion.
Multiplexing should be tested against stream multiplication.
Caching should be tested against cache abuse.
Connection reuse should be tested against connection exhaustion.
Request translation should be tested against protocol amplification.
The most important question is simple: what happens when the feature is used exactly as designed, but by someone who does not have the user’s best interests in mind?
That question often reveals vulnerabilities that conventional testing misses.
Deep Analysis
Inspect HTTP/3 Connectivity
Security teams can begin with a basic HTTP/3 and HTTP response inspection:
curl -I --http3 https://example.com
This can help determine whether an endpoint accepts HTTP/3 from the client side.
Inspect HTTP Headers
Administrators can review response headers for CDN-related information:
curl -sI https://example.com | sed -n '1,40p'
This can reveal caching, proxy, server, and transport-related headers that help identify the delivery architecture.
Check DNS and CNAME Records
A basic DNS inspection can help determine whether a domain points through a CDN:
dig example.com CNAME dig example.com NS
The objective is not to attack the service but to understand whether a CDN is acting as an intermediary.
Monitor Backend Connections
Linux administrators can inspect active TCP connections with:
ss -tan
For more focused connection statistics:
ss -s
Unexpected growth in established or waiting connections can provide an early indication of resource exhaustion.
Monitor Network Traffic
Administrators can monitor network throughput using:
sar -n DEV 1
The command provides recurring network statistics and can help identify sudden traffic changes.
Monitor Listening Services
To identify services accepting connections:
ss -lntp
This is useful when determining which backend services could become resource bottlenecks during a connection-exhaustion event.
Watch System Resource Pressure
During an incident, CPU and memory utilization should be correlated with network and connection metrics:
top
or:
vmstat 1
A rise in CPU consumption without a corresponding increase in legitimate traffic can justify deeper investigation.
Inspect Recent Kernel and Network Messages
Linux systems can also be checked for relevant network or resource warnings:
journalctl -k --since "30 minutes ago"
This may expose kernel-level connection failures, resource exhaustion messages, or other symptoms associated with infrastructure stress.
Review Web Server Error Patterns
Apache administrators can inspect recent HTTP errors with:
grep -E " 503 | 504 " /var/log/apache2/access.log | tail -100
Nginx installations can similarly examine:
grep -E " 503 | 504 " /var/log/nginx/access.log | tail -100
A sudden concentration of gateway failures should be correlated with CDN and origin telemetry.
Check Connection Duration
Long-lived connections deserve particular attention during suspected resource exhaustion.
A basic connection inspection can be performed with:
ss -tanp
Security teams can then investigate unusually persistent connections and determine whether they correspond to legitimate application behavior.
Establish Practical Limits
The most effective defense is architectural rather than reactive.
CDNs should enforce limits around decompressed request size, dynamic-table usage, backend connection creation, and connection lifetime.
Origin administrators should also configure sensible web-server limits and timeouts.
Do Not Treat HTTP/3 as the Enemy
The solution is not to abandon HTTP/3.
HTTP/3 provides substantial performance and reliability advantages.
The better approach is to ensure that protocol translation does not create uncontrolled resource multiplication.
Modern infrastructure needs modern controls.
The Security Priority Should Be Resource Economics
The strongest takeaway from CDN Tsunami is that DDoS defense should increasingly focus on resource economics.
How much bandwidth does the attacker spend?
How much bandwidth does the CDN spend?
How many backend connections are created?
How much CPU is consumed?
How long do those resources remain occupied?
How quickly can legitimate clients recover?
These questions provide a more realistic picture of attack severity than bandwidth alone.
Verification Status
✅ The core CDN Tsunami research is technically consistent with the supplied report, including the HBA and HCA techniques, the tested CDN providers, and the reported amplification measurements.
✅ The reported 350x amplification requires important context, because the highest factor was associated with specific tested configurations involving QPACK dynamic-table behavior rather than every CDN or every HTTP/3 deployment.
❌ It would be inaccurate to describe the 42,330 endpoints as confirmed compromised or attacked, because the researchers’ internet-wide probing identified potentially vulnerable HTTP/3 endpoints without attacking those third-party origin servers.
Prediction
(+1) CDN Providers Will Tighten HTTP/3 Translation Controls
The discovery is likely to push major CDN providers toward stricter controls around QPACK dynamic tables, decompressed request sizes, backend connection creation, and slow HTTP/3 streams.
(+1) HTTP/3 Security Testing Will Become More Important
As HTTP/3 adoption expands, researchers are likely to discover more vulnerabilities involving protocol translation, compression, multiplexing, and resource allocation.
(+1) DDoS Defense Will Shift Further Toward Amplification Economics
Security teams will increasingly evaluate how efficiently a small amount of attacker traffic can consume backend bandwidth, connections, CPU, memory, and application workers.
(-1) Origin Servers Will Remain Exposed If CDNs Ignore Backend Behavior
If CDN-to-origin translation continues without strict limits, organizations may remain vulnerable even when their own web applications and firewalls are correctly configured.
(+1) Protocol Boundaries Will Become Major Security Checkpoints
HTTP/3-to-HTTP/1.1 conversion is likely to become another example of why security assessments must test complete delivery architectures rather than individual protocols in isolation.
The Bigger Lesson for the Web
CDN Tsunami is not simply another DDoS technique.
It is a warning about the hidden complexity of the modern internet.
A browser can send a tiny request.
A CDN can interpret it.
A compression mechanism can expand it.
A protocol translation layer can multiply its consequences.
An origin server can then pay the final price.
That chain can turn a small amount of attacker activity into a serious availability problem.
The lesson for defenders is equally clear.
Do not measure security only by how much traffic enters your network.
Measure what that traffic forces every intermediary and backend component to do.
HTTP/3 is not inherently the problem.
CDNs are not inherently the problem.
Compression is not inherently the problem.
The danger emerges when powerful technologies interact without strict resource boundaries.
That is where the next generation of DDoS attacks may increasingly live, not in bigger floods, but in smarter packets that make the infrastructure itself do the heavy lifting.
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