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A Dangerous Weakness Hidden Inside the Browser
Password managers are supposed to be the last line of defense for an organization’s most valuable secrets. They store administrator credentials, cloud accounts, API keys, multifactor authentication secrets, customer passwords, infrastructure documentation, and sometimes the keys needed to unlock entire environments.
That is why a newly patched vulnerability in N-able’s Passportal browser extension deserves serious attention.
The flaw, tracked as CVE-2026-15580, could have allowed a malicious website or embedded iframe to communicate with the Passportal browser extension, extract long-lived authentication tokens, and potentially maintain access to a victim’s decrypted password vault long after the original malicious webpage had been closed.
N-able responded quickly after receiving the vulnerability report, releasing Passportal browser extension version 3.49.6 to address the issue. The vulnerability had been assigned a CVSS v4.0 score of 9.4, placing it firmly in the critical-risk category.
For organizations that depend on Passportal, particularly managed service providers (MSPs), the issue is more than another browser-extension security bug. The potential impact reaches beyond a single employee because one compromised administrator account can provide access to credentials and infrastructure belonging to numerous customers.
The Original Problem in Simple Terms
At the center of the vulnerability was the way the Passportal browser extension handled communication between webpage content and its internal components.
The extension used JavaScript’s window.postMessage() mechanism to exchange information between a webpage content script and a Passportal popover iframe.
There is nothing inherently insecure about postMessage(). In fact, it is a legitimate browser feature used by countless modern applications.
The danger appears when an extension accepts messages without sufficiently verifying who sent them, where they originated, and whether the request should actually be trusted.
According to the reported vulnerability, the affected Passportal implementation trusted messages from arbitrary origins and allowed attacker-controlled data to influence which extension functions were executed.
That created a potentially devastating chain.
A victim only needed to visit a malicious webpage for the attacker-controlled page to attempt communication with the vulnerable extension.
Why a Browser Extension Became the Attack Surface
Browser extensions operate in a privileged environment compared with ordinary webpages.
A normal website is heavily restricted by the browser’s security model. It cannot simply access passwords stored inside another application, read extension databases, or directly communicate with privileged extension functionality.
Extensions, however, can be granted additional capabilities.
This creates an important security boundary: web content must never be allowed to impersonate trusted extension components.
The reported Passportal vulnerability appears to have weakened precisely that boundary.
Instead of the extension treating messages from arbitrary webpages as untrusted input, the vulnerable implementation reportedly allowed supported requests to reach sensitive functionality.
That meant the attack did not necessarily require the victim to install malware or execute a suspicious program.
The browser itself could become the delivery mechanism.
The Potentially Dangerous Message Flow
The reported issue involved messages sent through window.postMessage().
A simplified example of the underlying security problem looks like this:
window.postMessage(
{
method: sensitiveRequest
},
“”
);
The important lesson is not the particular method name, but the use of an unrestricted target such as “” combined with an extension that does not independently authenticate the sender.
A secure implementation should never assume that because a message reached an extension component, it must have originated from a trusted source.
Instead, the receiver should validate multiple security properties before processing the request.
Deep Analysis: Why Origin Validation Matters
A safer defensive design begins by validating the message origin.
For example:
window.addEventListener("message", (event) => {
if (event.origin !== TRUSTED_ORIGIN) {
return;
}
if (event.source !== expectedWindow) {
return;
}
// Continue only after additional authentication checks. });
This is only an illustrative defensive pattern, not a complete implementation.
A robust extension should also validate the expected window or frame, enforce a cryptographically unpredictable nonce where appropriate, reject unexpected message schemas, and ensure that sensitive operations require explicit authorization.
Developers should never rely on a single security check when handling privileged cross-context messages.
The Difference Between Autofill Theft and Vault-Level Access
Not every password-manager vulnerability has the same consequences.
Some browser-extension vulnerabilities allow attackers to steal credentials only when a user visits a particular website.
That is already serious, but the blast radius can be relatively narrow.
The reported Passportal flaw was potentially much broader.
Instead of simply tricking an extension into filling a password into an attacker-controlled page, the vulnerability reportedly exposed authentication material that could allow interaction with Passportal’s backend services.
That distinction changes the entire threat model.
A stolen password may compromise one account.
A stolen session token associated with a password-management platform could potentially expose a much larger collection of secrets.
The 100-Day Persistence Problem
One of the most concerning details in the report was the reported lifetime of the refresh token.
The token was described as potentially remaining valid for up to 100 days.
That dramatically changes the meaning of a browser-based token theft.
Imagine a user visits a malicious webpage on Monday.
The webpage captures authentication material.
The user closes the tab.
The browser appears normal.
The malicious website disappears.
Yet the stolen refresh token could potentially remain useful for weeks or months if it has not been revoked.
This is why token lifetime is not merely a convenience setting. It is a security-control decision.
Why Refresh Tokens Are Especially Valuable
Access tokens are generally designed to provide temporary access.
Refresh tokens exist to obtain new access tokens without forcing the user to authenticate again.
That makes them particularly attractive to attackers.
If an attacker obtains a valid refresh token, simply closing the browser may not terminate the attacker’s access.
The security team may need to invalidate sessions, revoke tokens, rotate credentials, or otherwise force reauthentication.
This is also why organizations should monitor not only login events but unusual token refresh behavior and API activity.
The MSP Multiplier Effect
The Passportal scenario becomes even more serious when viewed through the lens of managed service providers.
MSPs often manage technology environments for many customers.
One administrator might therefore have access to credentials associated with:
Customer cloud environments.
Remote management platforms.
VPN infrastructure.
Domain administrators.
Backup systems.
Network equipment.
Email platforms.
SaaS applications.
API credentials.
Multifactor authentication secrets.
Internal documentation.
A compromised MSP administrator is therefore not necessarily an isolated account compromise.
It can become a gateway into multiple organizations.
This is why vulnerabilities in MSP-focused platforms deserve supply-chain-level scrutiny even when the vulnerable component itself is relatively small.
The Hidden Danger of Centralized Trust
Centralized password management provides enormous operational advantages.
Instead of employees storing passwords in spreadsheets, browser notes, text files, or unsecured documents, credentials can be centrally protected and audited.
But centralization also creates concentration of risk.
The more secrets a platform protects, the more attractive it becomes to attackers.
A successful compromise of a password-management platform can potentially transform one technical weakness into hundreds or thousands of downstream security incidents.
That is the uncomfortable tradeoff behind centralized security systems: the system becomes stronger operationally while simultaneously becoming a higher-value target.
Decrypted Passwords Raise the Stakes
The reported architecture also raises another important security question.
According to the disclosure, password requests appeared to be processed server-side, with decrypted password values and TOTP codes being returned to the browser extension.
This approach may be necessary for certain product architectures, but it means that authentication and authorization around password retrieval become extremely important.
If an attacker can impersonate a legitimate extension request, the attacker may not need to break encryption directly.
Instead, the attacker could potentially abuse the application’s legitimate decryption workflow.
That is a critical distinction.
Breaking encryption is usually difficult.
Abusing an authorized system that performs decryption on your behalf can be much easier.
The Cryptographic Material Question
The report also raised concerns about sensitive key-related material reportedly being present in authentication tokens.
JWTs deserve particular attention here.
A JWT is designed primarily to provide an integrity-protected representation of claims. Its contents are normally encoded rather than automatically encrypted.
In other words, putting sensitive information inside a JWT does not automatically make that information secret.
The defensive rule is straightforward:
Never treat an ordinary signed JWT as a secure vault for confidential cryptographic material.
If sensitive secrets genuinely need confidentiality, the architecture should use appropriate encryption and key-management mechanisms rather than relying on token encoding.
Why Token Theft Can Be Worse Than Password Theft
A password can sometimes be detected through a credential-change event.
A stolen session token can behave differently.
From the
That can make detection more difficult.
Attackers may also deliberately avoid making obvious changes immediately after stealing authentication material.
Instead, they may observe the environment, collect additional information, identify valuable accounts, and wait for an opportunity.
This is why incident response should treat exposed authentication tokens as potentially compromised credentials rather than assuming that changing a user’s password automatically resolves the problem.
N-able’s Rapid Response
One positive aspect of the incident was the vendor’s reported response speed.
Researchers reportedly contacted N-able on July 6 after identifying suspicious token-request behavior.
N-able provided a test account on July 8, received the detailed report, and deployed the updated browser extension on July 9.
That is a remarkably short disclosure-to-patch window for a vulnerability of this severity.
Security research is most valuable when vendors and researchers can work together without unnecessary delays.
Rapid communication reduces the period in which attackers might discover and exploit the same weakness independently.
The Security Fix
The updated Passportal extension reportedly introduced additional controls around sensitive extension messages.
The patched implementation checks that sensitive messages originate from the trusted extension context.
It also reportedly verifies the sender frame and a nonce before processing sensitive requests.
These controls address an important principle in browser-extension security:
Authentication should happen at the security boundary, not be assumed from the environment around it.
Every privileged message should be treated as hostile until its origin and context have been independently validated.
What Passportal Customers Should Do Now
Organizations using Passportal should immediately verify that Chrome and Edge installations are running version 3.49.6 or later.
Do not assume that because the extension automatically updates, every endpoint has already received the fixed version.
Enterprise environments should confirm the installed version through browser-management tools, endpoint-management platforms, or other centralized inventory systems.
Administrators should also identify systems that may have remained on version 3.49.5 during the exposure window.
Investigate Before You Rotate Everything Blindly
Credential rotation is important, but it should be performed intelligently.
Security teams should first establish which users were potentially exposed and whether suspicious activity occurred during the vulnerable period.
Useful investigation areas include:
Authentication logs.
API access logs.
Session creation.
Token refresh activity.
Password retrieval events.
TOTP retrieval events.
Unexpected geographic activity.
Unusual IP addresses.
New devices.
Unexpected administrative actions.
Customer-environment access.
Changes to stored credentials.
A compromised token can sometimes provide more useful forensic evidence than the original malicious webpage.
Defensive Commands for Incident Investigation
Organizations can begin with basic endpoint and browser inventory checks.
For Windows environments, administrators can inspect installed browser-extension information with PowerShell:
Get-ChildItem "$env:LOCALAPPDATA\Google\Chrome\User Data\Defaultxtensions" |
Select-Object Name
For Microsoft Edge:
Get-ChildItem "$env:LOCALAPPDATA\Microsoftdge\User Data\Defaultxtensions" |
Select-Object Name
These commands are intended for defensive inventory purposes. Extension identifiers and installation layouts can vary between environments, so centralized browser-management reporting is preferable for large organizations.
Security teams can also search their SIEM for unusual authentication activity using a generic query pattern:
index=auth
| where action IN ("token_refresh","login","password_access")
| stats count by user, src_ip, user_agent, action
| sort - count
The exact syntax will depend on whether the organization uses Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, Elastic, QRadar, or another platform.
A Practical Browser-Extension Security Rule
Security teams should treat every browser extension as privileged software.
That means extension inventory should not stop at identifying whether an extension is installed.
Organizations should know:
Who installed it.
Which permissions it has.
Which websites it can access.
Whether it handles authentication tokens.
How frequently it updates.
Whether its publisher has a security disclosure program.
Whether the extension is approved by the organization.
Whether older versions can remain installed.
An extension can contain fewer lines of code than a traditional desktop application while still having access to extremely sensitive information.
The Supply-Chain Risk Behind the Vulnerability
The Passportal case illustrates a broader cybersecurity problem.
Organizations increasingly outsource critical infrastructure to specialized platforms.
That is efficient.
It also creates dependency chains.
An MSP depends on its password manager.
The MSP manages customers.
Customers depend on the MSP.
Therefore, one vulnerability can potentially move through several layers of organizational trust.
This is why modern security programs must evaluate not only their own software but also the platforms that manage their privileged identities.
What Attackers Would Look For
From an attacker’s perspective, vulnerabilities like this are attractive because they combine three desirable characteristics.
First, the initial trigger can potentially be delivered through an ordinary webpage.
Second, the target contains high-value authentication material.
Third, the resulting access can potentially survive long after the victim leaves the malicious website.
That combination turns a seemingly small browser flaw into a potentially powerful persistence mechanism.
The lesson for defenders is equally clear: short-lived user interaction does not necessarily mean short-lived compromise.
Why Long-Lived Tokens Need Stronger Protection
Long-lived authentication tokens should be treated almost like passwords.
They should have:
Strong revocation mechanisms.
Limited scopes.
Appropriate audience restrictions.
Device or session binding where practical.
Shorter lifetimes when feasible.
Continuous monitoring.
Strong anomaly detection.
Clear incident-response procedures.
The longer a token remains valid, the greater the window in which theft can become useful.
Security and convenience are constantly competing.
The Passportal incident demonstrates what happens when convenience creates too much persistence.
The Bigger Lesson for Password Managers
Password managers remain an essential security technology.
The lesson is not that organizations should stop using them.
Quite the opposite.
The lesson is that password managers deserve the same level of security scrutiny as identity providers, endpoint-management systems, cloud-control planes, and other privileged infrastructure.
A password manager is not merely a productivity application.
It is effectively an identity-security platform.
If compromised, it can potentially unlock the rest of the organization.
What Undercode Say:
A Password Manager Is a High-Value Security Boundary
This vulnerability is a reminder that password managers should be treated as part of an organization’s security perimeter.
The browser extension is not just a convenience feature.
It sits between users, websites, authentication systems, and protected credentials.
That makes its message-handling logic extremely sensitive.
The Browser Is Becoming an Identity Platform
Modern browsers increasingly act as identity containers.
They handle passwords, passkeys, cookies, tokens, extensions, certificates, and authentication flows.
Attackers understand this shift.
They no longer need to attack the operating system first.
Sometimes the browser itself is the shortest path to valuable credentials.
postMessage() Deserves Respect
The vulnerability also highlights a recurring development mistake.
A legitimate browser API can become dangerous when trust assumptions are wrong.
window.postMessage() is not inherently insecure.
The problem occurs when developers treat a message as trusted simply because it arrived at a privileged component.
Every message crossing a security boundary should be treated as potentially hostile.
Should Trigger a Security Review
Using “” in postMessage() is not automatically a vulnerability.
There are legitimate use cases.
However, when sensitive authentication data is involved, unrestricted origins should immediately trigger architectural review.
The receiver must still authenticate the sender.
The sender must also avoid transmitting secrets unnecessarily.
Authentication Tokens Are Credentials
Organizations sometimes protect passwords aggressively while overlooking session tokens.
That is a mistake.
A valid token can sometimes provide the same practical access as a password.
In some circumstances, it can be even more valuable because it may bypass parts of the normal authentication process.
Refresh Tokens Are Especially Sensitive
The reported 100-day refresh-token lifetime makes the issue more concerning.
Long-lived tokens provide convenience.
They also create persistence.
If an attacker steals one, the victim may not realize that the original browser session has become a long-term security problem.
MSPs Face a Multiplier Effect
The MSP angle is perhaps the most important part of this story.
One administrator may represent dozens or hundreds of customer environments.
A compromise of that
This is precisely why MSP security requires additional segmentation and monitoring.
Centralization Creates Concentrated Risk
Centralized password management reduces password reuse and improves security.
But centralization also creates a crown jewel.
If an organization puts all its keys into one vault, that vault becomes one of the most attractive targets on the network.
Defense must therefore extend beyond the vault itself.
Token Theft Needs Its Own Detection Strategy
Traditional credential monitoring is not enough.
Organizations should monitor refresh-token activity, session anomalies, unusual API calls, unexpected devices, and geographic inconsistencies.
Attackers can operate with stolen tokens without ever knowing the victim’s actual password.
Password Rotation Is Not the Whole Answer
Rotating passwords is useful after a suspected compromise.
But if an attacker has already obtained a session token, changing the password may not automatically invalidate that token.
Session revocation and token invalidation therefore need to be part of the response plan.
TOTP Secrets Are Particularly Valuable
The reported exposure of TOTP-related information increases the potential impact.
If attackers obtain both account credentials and the associated second-factor secret, an important security barrier can effectively disappear.
That is why MFA secrets should be treated as high-value credentials.
Cryptographic Secrets Should Stay Secret
Another architectural lesson is the handling of key-related information inside tokens.
Encoding is not encryption.
A JWT can provide integrity without providing confidentiality.
Sensitive key material therefore deserves proper encryption and lifecycle management.
The Best Fix Is Architectural
The strongest security improvement is not simply adding one origin check.
The system should minimize what a webpage can request, minimize what the extension can expose, minimize token lifetime, and require strong authorization before returning secrets.
Defense in depth matters.
Nonces Are Useful Security Controls
The reported addition of nonce validation is particularly important.
A properly designed nonce can help distinguish an expected communication flow from an unsolicited message.
However, nonce validation must be implemented correctly and combined with origin and context checks.
Browser Isolation Matters
Organizations should consider separating administrative work from ordinary browsing.
Privileged administrators should ideally use hardened browser profiles or dedicated administrative environments.
The fewer risky websites opened from a privileged session, the smaller the attack surface.
The Human Factor Still Matters
No technical control completely eliminates phishing and malicious websites.
Administrators should understand that simply visiting a webpage can sometimes be enough to trigger exploitation of a browser-extension vulnerability.
Security awareness therefore remains relevant even when no file is downloaded.
Automatic Updates Need Verification
Automatic extension updates are valuable.
But enterprises should not blindly assume that every endpoint has updated.
Centralized compliance reporting should confirm that vulnerable versions are gone.
Incident Response Should Assume the Worst
If an endpoint was running the vulnerable version during the exposure period, security teams should investigate before declaring the environment safe.
The investigation should focus on evidence of token use, credential retrieval, API access, and suspicious administrative activity.
Logging Is a Security Investment
Without sufficient logs, token abuse can become difficult to reconstruct.
Organizations should retain authentication and privileged-access events long enough to investigate delayed compromises.
The 100-day token lifetime makes this particularly important.
Zero Trust Applies to Extensions Too
Zero Trust is often discussed in terms of networks and identities.
But the same principle applies inside browsers.
A webpage should not automatically trust an extension.
An extension should not automatically trust a webpage.
Every cross-boundary request needs verification.
Security Teams Should Map Crown Jewels
Organizations should identify their most valuable credential stores.
Password managers, identity providers, PAM platforms, and cloud-control systems belong near the top of that list.
These systems deserve enhanced monitoring and faster patching.
Vendors Also Have a Responsibility
The reported response from N-able demonstrates why coordinated vulnerability disclosure matters.
Researchers need a channel for reporting dangerous findings.
Vendors need the ability to reproduce and fix them quickly.
Customers need clear remediation guidance.
The entire ecosystem benefits when these three pieces work together.
Speed Matters
The reported disclosure timeline—from July 6 to the July 9 patch—is encouraging.
Critical vulnerabilities should not remain unresolved for weeks when a practical fix can be produced quickly.
Fast response reduces the window available to opportunistic attackers.
The Vulnerability Is Bigger Than One Product
The underlying problem is not unique to Passportal.
Any browser extension that processes privileged messages can potentially face similar risks.
Developers should audit extension messaging, iframe communication, content scripts, token storage, and cross-origin requests.
Developers Need Better Threat Models
Security testing should include malicious websites, hostile iframes, compromised origins, unexpected message senders, replayed requests, and manipulated browser contexts.
Testing only the intended application workflow is not enough.
Attackers do not follow the intended workflow.
Security Should Be Tested From the Outside
A useful security question is simple:
“What happens if an attacker controls the webpage?”
If the answer is that the attacker can influence privileged extension behavior, the design deserves immediate scrutiny.
The Most Dangerous Bugs Often Look Small
A few lines of insecure message handling can expose an enormous amount of data.
That is one of the defining characteristics of modern application security.
The size of the vulnerable code does not determine the size of the potential breach.
Password Managers Are Infrastructure
Organizations should stop thinking of password-management software as an ordinary SaaS application.
It is infrastructure.
It protects infrastructure.
Its availability, confidentiality, and integrity directly influence the security of everything around it.
Attack Surface Is Moving
The attack surface is no longer limited to servers and endpoints.
Browsers, extensions, authentication tokens, APIs, SaaS integrations, and cloud identities are now equally important.
Defenders need visibility across all of them.
The Future Will Require Shorter Trust Chains
The safest systems increasingly minimize permanent trust.
Short-lived credentials, narrowly scoped permissions, explicit authorization, hardware-backed authentication, and continuous verification can reduce the damage caused by a single stolen token.
The Final Lesson
CVE-2026-15580 is a strong example of how a seemingly modest browser-extension flaw can become a serious identity-security event.
The vulnerability demonstrates why authentication tokens must be protected like passwords, why privileged browser extensions require rigorous isolation, and why MSP platforms deserve special attention.
Most importantly, it reinforces a fundamental security principle:
Never trust a message simply because it came from inside the browser.
✅ CVE-2026-15580 and the Critical Rating
The supplied article identifies the Passportal vulnerability as CVE-2026-15580 and reports a CVSS v4.0 score of 9.4.
Within the source material provided for this rewrite, these details are presented as established vulnerability information.
They should nevertheless be checked against
✅ Version 3.49.6 as the Recommended Fix
The source states that N-able released Passportal extension version 3.49.6 to address the vulnerability.
The
Organizations should confirm the installed version through their own endpoint-management or browser-management systems.
✅ The Vulnerability Involved Extension Messaging
The supplied report attributes the issue to unsafe handling of browser-extension messaging involving window.postMessage().
The security principle behind the concern is well established: sensitive cross-context messages require strict origin, source, and request validation.
The exact implementation details should be confirmed against the original technical disclosure.
⚠️ The 100-Day Token Lifetime
The source reports that a refresh token could remain valid for up to 100 days.
That is one of the most consequential details in the report because token lifetime directly affects potential persistence after theft.
However, organizations should verify the exact token policy and whether the lifetime applied universally or only under particular conditions.
⚠️ Reported Exposure of Cryptographic Material
The article reports that authentication material contained fields described as an organization key and phrase.
This claim should be treated carefully because the exact meaning, sensitivity, encoding, and cryptographic role of those fields matter.
Security teams should rely on the original technical disclosure when determining whether actual encryption keys or related key-management material were exposed.
✅ Immediate Updating Is Appropriate
Regardless of the precise exploitation details, running a vulnerable version of a security-sensitive password-management extension is unnecessary risk once a fixed release is available.
Organizations should prioritize removal of vulnerable versions and investigate potentially exposed sessions where appropriate.
Prediction
(+1) Password-Management Vendors Will Tighten Browser Security Boundaries
The most likely positive outcome is that this incident will encourage password-management vendors to perform deeper security reviews of their browser extensions.
Expect greater use of strict origin validation, nonce-based request verification, isolated administrative contexts, shorter-lived tokens, and more restrictive extension permissions.
(+1) Token Theft Detection Will Become More Important
Security products are likely to place greater emphasis on detecting suspicious token use rather than focusing exclusively on stolen passwords.
This could lead to better behavioral detection around refresh-token abuse, unusual API activity, device changes, and impossible-travel patterns.
(+1) MSPs Will Reevaluate Their Password Vault Architecture
Managed service providers have a particularly strong reason to review how credentials are centralized.
The incident could accelerate adoption of stronger segmentation, privileged access management, dedicated administrative browsers, and more aggressive credential rotation policies.
(-1) Long-Lived Browser Sessions Will Remain a Major Weakness
The negative scenario is that organizations continue treating browser sessions as harmless after authentication.
If stolen refresh tokens remain valid for extended periods and session revocation is poorly understood, attackers could retain access long after the original compromise has been forgotten.
(-1) Browser Extensions Will Continue to Be Underestimated
Many enterprises still treat extensions as minor productivity software.
That mindset could become increasingly dangerous.
A privileged extension may have access to credentials, browsing contexts, cookies, authentication workflows, and internal application data, making it a genuine security boundary rather than a simple add-on.
Final Takeaway: One Browser Tab Can Hide a Much Bigger Threat
The Passportal vulnerability is a powerful reminder that modern attacks do not always begin with malware.
Sometimes there is no executable file.
No suspicious download.
No obvious phishing email.
No dramatic ransomware screen.
Sometimes the attack begins when a victim simply opens a webpage while a privileged browser extension is running in the background.
That is what makes vulnerabilities such as CVE-2026-15580 particularly uncomfortable.
The attacker may only need to cross one poorly protected browser boundary to reach authentication material that was never supposed to be accessible to ordinary web content.
For Passportal users, the immediate priority is straightforward: update to version 3.49.6 or later, identify systems that were running the vulnerable release, review authentication and API activity, invalidate potentially exposed sessions, and rotate high-value credentials or TOTP secrets when exposure cannot be ruled out.
For the broader cybersecurity community, the lesson is even larger.
The security of a password vault does not depend solely on the encryption protecting the database.
It depends on every component surrounding that vault—the browser, the extension, the message handlers, the authentication tokens, the APIs, the identity layer, and ultimately the assumptions developers make about what can be trusted.
In modern cybersecurity, the weakest boundary can become the fastest route to the crown jewels.
And sometimes, that boundary is only a few lines of JavaScript.
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