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Introduction: The War Beneath Europe’s Waters
Europe’s security is increasingly being tested in a place most people never see: the seabed. Beneath the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, the Mediterranean and the Atlantic lie thousands of kilometres of telecommunications cables, electricity interconnectors and other critical infrastructure that quietly support modern European life.
For decades, maritime security was largely associated with protecting ports, ships, naval routes and territorial waters. That definition is changing rapidly. Today, a threat beneath the waves can be just as damaging as one on land. A damaged submarine cable can interfere with communications, disrupt financial activity, affect government services and create serious economic uncertainty. Damage to energy infrastructure can create an entirely different level of strategic pressure.
The European Union is therefore moving toward a broader concept of maritime defence—one that combines naval surveillance, seabed monitoring, artificial intelligence, drones, counter-drone technology, cybersecurity, intelligence sharing and faster repair capabilities.
The shift is not happening in isolation. Recent incidents involving European undersea infrastructure have demonstrated how exposed these systems can be, while Russia’s war against Ukraine has accelerated European concerns about hybrid warfare, sabotage and critical infrastructure protection.
The EU’s response is becoming increasingly structured. Its strategy now extends from preventing attacks and detecting suspicious activity to responding rapidly when infrastructure is damaged and creating enough resilience to ensure that a single incident does not become a continental crisis.
The Invisible Infrastructure Supporting Modern Europe
Submarine cables may be invisible from the surface, but they are among the most important pieces of infrastructure in the modern global economy. The International Telecommunication Union says submarine telecommunications cables carry more than 99% of international data traffic, supporting communications, financial transactions, cloud services, government operations and other essential activities.
That means Europe’s digital economy depends heavily on infrastructure sitting hundreds or thousands of metres below the ocean surface.
Every video call, international bank transfer, cloud application, corporate connection and large volume of cross-border internet traffic ultimately depends on an enormous physical network. Satellites provide valuable redundancy, but they cannot replace the capacity and efficiency of the global submarine cable system.
The vulnerability is therefore obvious: the digital economy may appear virtual, but much of its foundation is physical.
Why Seabed Infrastructure Has Become a Security Priority
For years, submarine infrastructure was primarily treated as an engineering and commercial issue. Cable operators focused on maintenance, repair and reliability, while governments concentrated on broader maritime security.
That distinction is disappearing.
The seabed is increasingly being viewed as a strategic environment where hostile states, criminal groups, proxy actors and other malicious operators could potentially exploit vulnerabilities without immediately triggering the kind of response associated with conventional military attacks.
A vessel operating in the wrong area, an unmanned underwater vehicle approaching critical infrastructure or suspicious activity around a cable landing station can become a security concern even before any physical damage occurs.
This is one reason European governments are increasingly interested in persistent monitoring rather than simply reacting after an incident.
From Accidental Damage to Hybrid Warfare
Not every broken cable is evidence of sabotage.
Submarine cables regularly face accidental threats from fishing activity, anchors, seabed operations, natural hazards and ageing infrastructure. ITU data highlights that human activity is responsible for a large share of cable faults globally.
The security challenge emerges when ordinary vulnerabilities overlap with geopolitical tensions.
A system that is already difficult to monitor becomes considerably more dangerous when a hostile actor deliberately exploits the same weaknesses. This is the essence of the hybrid-threat problem: an operation can remain below the threshold of traditional warfare while still creating substantial economic and political consequences.
Nord Stream Changed the Strategic Conversation
The 2022 Nord Stream explosions became a major turning point in European discussions about critical undersea infrastructure.
Whatever the broader political and investigative conclusions surrounding the incident, the explosions demonstrated something strategically important: critical infrastructure beneath the sea is not automatically protected simply because it is difficult to access.
The seabed can be reached.
Infrastructure can be monitored.
Infrastructure can potentially be disrupted.
And determining who is responsible for an underwater incident can be extremely difficult.
That uncertainty itself creates a security problem.
The Baltic Sea Became Europe’s Warning Signal
The Baltic Sea has become one of the most closely watched maritime environments in Europe.
Incidents involving infrastructure connecting Finland, Germany, Sweden and Lithuania have reinforced concerns about the vulnerability of cables and energy links in a region already shaped by heightened geopolitical tensions.
The Baltic is particularly important because it combines dense infrastructure, busy maritime traffic and proximity to several strategically sensitive countries.
A single suspicious vessel or unexplained infrastructure failure can therefore generate questions extending far beyond the immediate technical problem.
Europe’s Maritime Strategy Is Becoming More Integrated
The EU’s response is not based on one single military program.
Instead, Brussels is building a wider ecosystem of prevention, detection, response, recovery and deterrence.
The European Commission and the EU High Representative’s 2025 approach to submarine cable security explicitly follows this resilience cycle. The strategy focuses on preventing incidents, improving detection, coordinating responses, accelerating recovery and strengthening deterrence against malicious activity.
That is an important change in philosophy.
The objective is no longer simply to stop an attacker.
The objective is to make the entire infrastructure system harder to attack, easier to monitor, faster to repair and less economically devastating when something goes wrong.
The EU Cable Security Action Plan
The EU Action Plan on Cable Security has become one of the central pillars of this approach.
The European Commission adopted the action plan in February 2025 following increasing concern over the security of European submarine infrastructure. The plan covers both telecommunications and energy cables and is built around the entire resilience cycle.
This includes mapping infrastructure, assessing risks, improving monitoring and strengthening the ability of European countries to cooperate during incidents.
The strategy also recognizes that cable security does not end at the cable itself.
Landing stations, repair vessels, manufacturing supply chains, deployment equipment and maintenance operations can all become important parts of the security equation.
Mapping the Seabed Is a Strategic Requirement
You cannot effectively protect infrastructure that you do not understand.
That is why mapping has become a major component of the European approach.
The EU’s submarine cable risk assessment examines infrastructure, technical characteristics, ownership, landing sites, historical incidents and maintenance processes.
The goal is to build a more complete picture of where critical infrastructure exists and which components would create the greatest consequences if disrupted.
This sounds simple, but it is strategically complicated.
The more detailed the map becomes, the more useful it can be for defenders—and potentially for attackers.
The €347 Million Investment Shows the Direction of Travel
Europe is not relying entirely on policy documents.
In February 2026, the European Commission announced €347 million for strategic submarine cable projects under the Connecting Europe Facility. The package included €20 million specifically aimed at improving cable repair capacity.
This matters because resilience is not only about detection.
If a cable is damaged, someone must repair it.
And repair capacity can become a strategic vulnerability of its own.
Repair Ships Could Become Strategic Assets
A damaged cable can remain unavailable while specialized vessels are mobilized, travel to the affected area, locate the failure and perform repairs.
That process can take time.
During a geopolitical crisis, repair vessels could also become difficult to deploy safely.
This means Europe needs not only sensors and surveillance systems but also sufficient industrial capacity to physically restore damaged infrastructure.
The EU’s investment in repair modules reflects this reality.
The Seabed Is Becoming a Sensor Battlefield
Modern maritime defence increasingly depends on knowing what is happening beneath the surface.
Traditional radar can monitor ships above water. Satellites can provide broad maritime awareness. Automatic identification systems can track participating vessels.
But underwater activity presents a different problem.
A submarine, autonomous underwater vehicle or remotely operated system can operate in an environment where traditional surveillance methods are far less effective.
This is where sonar, acoustic monitoring, seabed sensors and other technologies become increasingly important.
Artificial Intelligence Could Transform Underwater Monitoring
The volume of data generated by maritime sensors can be enormous.
Human operators cannot manually examine every acoustic signal, vessel movement and environmental anomaly across thousands of kilometres of infrastructure.
Artificial intelligence could help identify patterns that deserve investigation.
AI systems could potentially compare normal underwater acoustic activity with unusual signatures, correlate vessel movements with infrastructure locations and flag anomalies for human analysts.
This does not mean AI can automatically identify every threat.
Instead, its most realistic near-term role is helping humans process enormous amounts of information more quickly.
Europe Is Testing AI-Powered Acoustic Detection
The EU-backed SOUND2 project is an example of this direction, using artificial intelligence and underwater acoustics to improve maritime threat detection.
Such projects demonstrate why future maritime security will likely combine traditional naval capabilities with technologies more commonly associated with data science and cybersecurity.
The battlefield beneath the sea is increasingly becoming a data-processing problem.
OceanEye and Maritime Awareness
The EU has also invested in maritime awareness technologies.
The €92 million OceanEye initiative cited in the original report reflects the broader European effort to strengthen maritime monitoring and awareness.
The strategic objective is straightforward: identify suspicious activity early enough to investigate it before damage occurs.
That requires combining different sources of information rather than depending on a single sensor.
Satellite observations, vessel tracking, underwater sensors, intelligence reports, weather information and infrastructure maps can become much more powerful when analyzed together.
The Counter-Drone Problem Is Expanding Underwater
The word “drone” no longer means only a small aircraft.
Modern unmanned systems can operate in the air, on the surface and underwater.
That creates a difficult defence problem.
Aerial drones can observe ports and vessels. Surface drones can approach maritime infrastructure. Underwater vehicles can potentially inspect, map or interact with seabed assets.
The EU’s Counter-Drone Action Plan therefore has implications beyond airport security or battlefield aircraft.
It is part of a larger transition toward defending infrastructure from autonomous and semi-autonomous systems operating across multiple environments.
Europe’s New Defence Projects Include the Seabed
In July 2026, the European Commission proposed five large-scale European Defence Projects of Common Interest.
One of the five priority areas is maritime and seabed defence, alongside drones and counter-drone systems, space, air and missile defence, and protection of the EU’s Eastern Flank. The Commission allocated €325 million under the European Defence Industry Programme to support the establishment and deployment of these projects.
This is an important distinction from the original article’s €325 billion wording.
The official Commission figure is €325 million, not €325 billion.
That difference is enormous and is addressed in the fact-checking section below.
Why the €325 Million Figure Matters
Although €325 million is dramatically smaller than €325 billion, it still represents an important political signal.
The EU is effectively saying that seabed defence belongs inside Europe’s broader defence-industrial strategy.
This is about more than purchasing equipment.
It is about encouraging European countries and industries to cooperate on systems that individual countries may struggle to develop independently.
The Industrial Maritime Strategy Adds Another Layer
In March 2026, the EU launched its Industrial Maritime Strategy to strengthen the competitiveness, resilience and sustainability of Europe’s waterborne industries.
That includes shipbuilding, shipping and ports.
The connection to security is significant.
A strong maritime industrial base provides Europe with shipyards, specialized vessels, engineering expertise, manufacturing capacity and supply chains that can become critical during a crisis.
Military readiness ultimately depends on industrial readiness.
Maritime Security Is Also an Economic Security Issue
A cable outage does not need to create a dramatic military confrontation to cause economic damage.
Financial institutions depend on reliable connectivity.
Cloud providers depend on international data links.
Businesses depend on cross-border communications.
Governments depend on secure communications.
Ports and logistics companies depend on interconnected digital systems.
The consequences of a disruption can therefore spread through the economy even if the original physical damage occurs hundreds of kilometres offshore.
The Real Threat Is a Chain Reaction
The most dangerous scenario is not necessarily one cable being cut.
Modern networks often contain redundancy, allowing traffic to be rerouted.
The greater concern is a coordinated or geographically concentrated disruption affecting several infrastructure points simultaneously.
If multiple cables or energy links were damaged in a short period, repair resources could become overwhelmed.
That is why resilience planning must consider not only individual failures but simultaneous incidents.
Cybersecurity and Physical Security Are Converging
The underwater infrastructure problem also demonstrates how cybersecurity and physical security are becoming inseparable.
A cable may be physically protected while its associated landing station remains vulnerable to cyberattack.
A maritime surveillance platform may detect suspicious activity but itself become a target for digital intrusion.
A port may have strong physical security while its operational technology remains exposed.
Future maritime defence will therefore require security teams capable of understanding both networks and physical infrastructure.
The Shadow Fleet Adds Another Complication
European officials have increasingly discussed the risks associated with Russia-linked “shadow fleet” vessels.
These ships can complicate maritime monitoring because ownership structures, flags, operating patterns and vessel movements may be difficult to assess.
The EU’s cable-security strategy explicitly connects deterrence and protection of critical maritime infrastructure with efforts involving the shadow fleet.
That means maritime security policy is becoming increasingly connected to sanctions, intelligence, shipping regulation and foreign policy.
Europe Cannot Solve the Problem Alone
Submarine cables do not stop at national borders.
A single cable can connect several countries before continuing toward another continent.
An incident in one country can therefore affect multiple jurisdictions.
This makes international coordination essential.
European states need to exchange information, coordinate surveillance, share intelligence and establish procedures for rapid intervention.
The same principle applies globally because submarine cables are part of an interconnected international system.
Resilience Is More Important Than Perfect Protection
No government can guarantee that every kilometre of cable will remain untouched.
There are simply too many cables, too much ocean and too many potential causes of disruption.
The more realistic strategy is resilience.
That means building multiple routes, maintaining repair capacity, improving detection, strengthening landing stations, protecting critical components and ensuring that traffic can be rerouted.
The objective is to make infrastructure difficult to disrupt and quick to recover.
The Human Factor Remains Important
Technology will not eliminate the need for human judgment.
An AI system might detect unusual underwater activity, but analysts must determine whether it is a submarine, a fishing operation, a geological event, an innocent vessel or something genuinely suspicious.
Likewise, an unusual vessel movement may be perfectly legitimate.
False alarms can consume resources and potentially escalate political tensions.
The strongest system will therefore combine automation with experienced human operators.
Europe Is Moving Toward Persistent Monitoring
The direction of European policy suggests that intermittent surveillance will increasingly give way to persistent maritime awareness.
The goal is not necessarily to watch every square kilometre of ocean continuously.
Instead, monitoring can become risk-based.
Critical cable corridors, landing stations, energy connections and strategically important maritime zones can receive higher levels of attention.
That approach makes better use of limited resources.
The Next Generation of Maritime Defence Will Be Networked
Europe’s future seabed defence architecture is unlikely to rely on a single platform.
Instead, it could resemble a giant network.
Satellites observe vessels.
Aircraft provide wide-area surveillance.
Surface drones investigate suspicious activity.
Underwater sensors monitor acoustic signatures.
AI systems process the resulting information.
Human analysts assess the threat.
Naval or coast guard assets respond.
Repair vessels restore damaged infrastructure.
That interconnected chain could become one of Europe’s most important security systems.
Deep Analysis: Commands for Europe’s Underwater Defence
Command 01 — Map Everything Critical
Europe should maintain continuously updated maps of telecommunications cables, energy interconnectors, landing stations, repair facilities and other critical maritime infrastructure.
Command 02 — Prioritize the Most Dangerous Chokepoints
Not every cable segment carries the same strategic importance. European authorities should identify locations where one incident could affect multiple countries or major economic systems.
Command 03 — Monitor the Approaches, Not Only the Cables
Security teams should watch the maritime approaches to sensitive infrastructure rather than waiting for an anomaly directly over the cable.
Command 04 — Build an AI-Assisted Detection Layer
AI should be used to analyze acoustic signals, vessel movements, satellite imagery and other sensor feeds to identify unusual patterns faster than human operators could manage alone.
Command 05 — Keep Humans in the Decision Loop
Automated detection should generate alerts, not automatically make geopolitical decisions. Human analysts must evaluate context before authorities respond.
Command 06 — Expand Underwater Drone Capabilities
Autonomous underwater vehicles could become important tools for inspecting cables, monitoring infrastructure and investigating suspicious objects.
Command 07 — Develop Counter-Drone Systems for Every Domain
Europe needs counter-drone capabilities that address aerial, surface and underwater systems rather than focusing exclusively on aircraft.
Command 08 — Protect Cable Landing Stations
Landing stations are critical transition points between underwater infrastructure and terrestrial networks. Their physical and cyber protection should be treated as part of the same security architecture.
Command 09 — Increase Repair Capacity
The ability to repair damaged infrastructure rapidly can be as important as detecting the original attack.
Command 10 — Maintain Strategic Repair Vessels
Europe should ensure that specialized vessels and trained crews remain available during major emergencies rather than relying entirely on commercial availability.
Command 11 — Create Shared European Response Procedures
When infrastructure crosses borders, countries should not waste critical hours negotiating responsibilities after an incident.
Command 12 — Conduct Multi-Cable Stress Tests
Exercises should simulate simultaneous damage to several cables and energy connections rather than testing only isolated failures.
Command 13 — Integrate Cyber and Maritime Intelligence
Physical incidents and cyber incidents should be analyzed together because attackers may combine both methods during a hybrid operation.
Command 14 — Track Suspicious Maritime Behavior
Vessel history, ownership structures, route deviations, loitering patterns and unusual activity near critical infrastructure should be incorporated into risk assessments.
Command 15 — Protect the Supply Chain
Cable security also depends on manufacturers, specialized components, repair equipment, ports and vessels. Weaknesses anywhere in that chain can become strategic vulnerabilities.
Command 16 — Build Redundancy Into the Network
The safest cable is not necessarily an indestructible cable. It is a cable whose failure does not cause catastrophic disruption because alternative routes are available.
Command 17 — Strengthen European Industry
Europe needs domestic expertise capable of producing ships, sensors, drones, cable equipment and other technologies required to protect and repair maritime infrastructure.
Command 18 — Share Intelligence Faster
Information about suspicious activity should move quickly between governments, naval forces, coast guards, intelligence agencies and infrastructure operators.
Command 19 — Improve Attribution
Deterrence depends partly on the ability to establish responsibility. Better surveillance, forensic capabilities and intelligence cooperation can strengthen Europe’s ability to attribute hostile activity.
Command 20 — Treat the Seabed as Strategic Territory
The biggest conceptual change may be this: Europe can no longer treat the seabed as a passive environment.
It is becoming a strategic domain.
What Undercode Say: Europe Is Entering the Age of Seabed Security
The Invisible Battlefield Is Becoming Visible
Europe’s underwater infrastructure crisis is not simply a story about cables. It is a story about how modern societies have become dependent on infrastructure that most citizens never think about.
The internet feels wireless, but its backbone is largely physical.
Financial systems appear digital, but their international connectivity depends on cables.
Energy systems appear automated, but they depend on physical infrastructure crossing national borders.
This creates an enormous strategic paradox.
The Most Important Infrastructure Is Often the Least Visible
Governments have historically invested heavily in protecting airports, bridges, roads, military bases and government buildings because their strategic importance is obvious.
A cable resting quietly on the seabed does not create the same visual impression.
But the consequences of damaging one can be surprisingly large.
That makes underwater infrastructure an attractive target for anyone seeking disruption without the immediate visibility of a conventional attack.
Europe’s Strategy Is Moving in the Right Direction
The EU’s biggest strength is that its current strategy increasingly recognizes the full lifecycle of an infrastructure incident.
Prevention alone is insufficient.
Detection alone is insufficient.
Response alone is insufficient.
Repair alone is insufficient.
A resilient system requires all four.
The European Commission’s 2025 cable-security approach explicitly reflects this prevention, detection, response, recovery and deterrence model.
The €347 Million Program Is More Significant Than It Looks
The EU’s February 2026 announcement of €347 million for strategic submarine cable projects represents a practical move from political concern toward infrastructure investment.
The €20 million repair-capacity component is particularly important because Europe cannot simply assume that damaged infrastructure will repair itself.
Fast recovery is part of deterrence.
An attacker gains more leverage when disruption lasts for weeks or months.
If Europe can restore connectivity quickly, the strategic value of sabotage declines.
The Biggest Challenge May Be Detection
Finding a damaged cable after the fact is much easier than identifying an attacker before damage occurs.
The ocean is enormous.
The number of legitimate vessels is enormous.
Underwater conditions are complicated.
Acoustic environments are noisy.
Weather can interfere with surveillance.
This is exactly why AI and sensor fusion could become so important.
AI Could Become Europe’s Underwater Watchtower
The future may involve systems continuously learning what “normal” looks like across major maritime corridors.
A vessel passing through an area may be normal.
The same vessel slowing down repeatedly near critical infrastructure may deserve attention.
A particular acoustic signature may be ordinary in one location but suspicious in another.
AI can help identify those relationships.
But the system must remain carefully designed because an incorrect automated judgment could produce unnecessary escalation.
Drones Will Change the Economics of Surveillance
Traditional naval platforms are expensive.
They cannot be everywhere.
Unmanned systems could allow Europe to distribute surveillance across much larger areas.
Small autonomous systems could perform routine inspections while larger assets respond to anomalies.
This could make continuous monitoring more affordable and scalable.
Europe Needs a Layered Defence Model
The strongest underwater-security architecture will probably resemble layered cybersecurity.
The first layer is prevention.
The second is monitoring.
The third is anomaly detection.
The fourth is investigation.
The fifth is physical response.
The sixth is rapid repair.
The seventh is redundancy.
If one layer fails, another should compensate.
The Goal Should Not Be Absolute Protection
Absolute protection is unrealistic.
There will always be accidents.
There will always be equipment failures.
There will always be natural hazards.
And determined adversaries will continue searching for weaknesses.
The goal should instead be to make attacks difficult, detection fast, response coordinated and consequences limited.
That is what resilience really means.
The Baltic Sea Could Become Europe’s Testbed
Because of its dense infrastructure and geopolitical sensitivity, the Baltic region is likely to remain a major testing ground for European maritime security.
Lessons learned there could influence security policies across the North Sea, Mediterranean and Atlantic approaches.
The same technologies could eventually be applied to energy infrastructure, offshore wind connections and other strategic assets.
The Energy Dimension Is Just as Important
Telecommunications cables receive much of the attention because they carry international data.
But electricity infrastructure beneath the sea is equally important.
Europe is increasingly dependent on cross-border electricity interconnectors and offshore renewable energy.
A damaged energy cable can therefore create consequences that extend far beyond telecommunications.
Future European seabed strategies will need to treat digital and energy infrastructure as interconnected security assets.
Industry Could Become a Security Capability
Europe’s industrial maritime strategy is therefore more than an economic policy.
Shipyards, ports, specialized engineering firms and marine technology companies can become strategic assets during a crisis.
A continent that cannot build or repair the equipment required to protect its infrastructure will remain dependent on external suppliers.
Strategic autonomy begins with industrial capacity.
The Private Sector Has a Critical Role
Governments cannot protect every cable alone.
Telecommunications companies, energy operators, shipping firms, cable manufacturers and repair companies own or operate much of the infrastructure.
Security therefore requires public-private coordination.
Operators must be able to share relevant information with authorities without creating unnecessary risks to commercially sensitive data.
The Future Threat Could Be Coordinated
One of the most concerning possibilities is a multi-domain operation.
An adversary could combine cyber intrusion, maritime surveillance, disinformation, physical sabotage and drone activity.
None of these actions would necessarily be catastrophic individually.
Together, however, they could create confusion and overload decision-makers.
That is the essence of modern hybrid warfare.
Europe Must Prepare for Ambiguity
The most difficult incidents may be those where responsibility is unclear.
A cable failure could be an accident.
A suspicious vessel could have an innocent explanation.
An underwater drone could be conducting legitimate research.
A cyberattack could originate through infrastructure in another country.
This ambiguity can slow response.
European security architecture therefore needs strong evidence-gathering capabilities as well as strong defensive capabilities.
Resilience Could Become a Deterrent
There is a strategic advantage to being able to say that an attack will not achieve its intended objective.
If a cable is damaged and traffic is rerouted within minutes, the attacker gains less.
If a replacement cable can be installed quickly, the disruption becomes shorter.
If surveillance identifies suspicious activity before an attack occurs, the attacker faces greater risk.
Resilience therefore becomes a form of deterrence.
Europe’s Underwater Strategy Is Still Developing
The EU has made significant progress, but the problem is far from solved.
The Commission’s 2026 work continues to focus on cable security policy, risk assessment, mapping and projects of European interest. A July 2026 procurement initiative also seeks further support for the security and resilience of submarine cable infrastructure during 2026–2027.
That demonstrates that European seabed security is becoming an ongoing program rather than a temporary reaction to individual incidents.
The Strategic Question Is No Longer “Could It Happen?”
For years, governments could treat serious seabed disruption as a theoretical risk.
That is becoming increasingly difficult.
The real question now is how quickly Europe could detect, attribute, contain and recover from a coordinated incident.
That is a much harder problem.
Europe Is Building a New Security Layer
The EU’s emerging strategy suggests that maritime defence will increasingly include a permanent security layer beneath the waves.
It will involve sensors, AI, drones, naval forces, coast guards, intelligence agencies, infrastructure operators, repair vessels and industrial suppliers.
That is a major transformation.
The Seabed Could Become One of the Most Important Security Domains of the 2030s
The strategic importance of undersea infrastructure is likely to increase as Europe becomes more dependent on cloud computing, AI, digital finance, renewable energy and international connectivity.
More digital dependence means greater infrastructure dependence.
More infrastructure dependence means greater security requirements.
And greater security requirements mean that the seabed will increasingly become part of mainstream national and European defence planning.
Submarine telecommunications cables carrying more than 99% of international data traffic is accurate. The ITU repeatedly identifies subsea cables as the backbone of international connectivity and says they carry over 99% of international data flows.
The EU’s submarine-cable security strategy is accurately described as a combination of prevention, detection, response, recovery and deterrence. The European Commission formally presented this resilience-cycle approach in February 2025 and has since expanded it through risk assessments, a security toolbox and funding programs.
The original €325 billion figure is incorrect. The European Commission announced five European Defence Projects of Common Interest in July 2026 and allocated €325 million, not €325 billion, to support their establishment and deployment under the European Defence Industry Programme.
Prediction
(+1) Europe will continue increasing investment in seabed surveillance, autonomous systems, maritime sensors and submarine cable resilience as governments recognize that digital and energy infrastructure are now inseparable from national security.
(+1) AI-assisted maritime monitoring will become increasingly important because European authorities will need to process huge quantities of vessel, satellite and underwater acoustic data that human operators cannot efficiently analyze alone.
(+1) Repair capacity will become a strategic priority. Governments are likely to treat specialized repair vessels, equipment and trained crews as critical infrastructure capabilities rather than purely commercial resources.
(+1) The distinction between cybersecurity and maritime security will continue to disappear as physical infrastructure and digital networks become increasingly interconnected.
(-1) Europe is unlikely to achieve complete protection against seabed incidents. The sheer scale of the maritime environment, legitimate vessel traffic, natural hazards and accidental damage makes total prevention unrealistic.
(-1) The biggest risk may not come from a single dramatic attack but from multiple smaller incidents occurring close together, creating uncertainty, overwhelming repair capacity and forcing governments to decide whether the damage was accidental or deliberate.
(+1) By the end of the decade, seabed infrastructure protection is likely to become a permanent pillar of European defence planning, alongside air, land, maritime, space and cyber security.
The Bigger Picture: Europe Is Learning to Defend What It Cannot See
The most important lesson from Europe’s underwater security challenge is simple: modern defence is no longer limited to what governments can see from the surface.
Some of the infrastructure most essential to European society lies hidden beneath the sea.
Protecting it requires a completely different mindset—one that combines naval power with artificial intelligence, industrial capacity with cybersecurity, surveillance with rapid repair and national defence with international cooperation.
The EU is now building that architecture.
The question is no longer whether the seabed matters.
It is whether Europe can make the invisible infrastructure beneath its waters resilient enough that disrupting it becomes difficult, detectable and ultimately ineffective.
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