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Introduction: When the Network Itself Becomes the Target
For years, defenders have been trained to think about cyberattacks in terms of compromised endpoints, stolen credentials, malicious attachments, ransomware, and breached databases. But some of the most dangerous espionage operations are moving deeper into the infrastructure that quietly makes an entire organization function.
A new investigation by Sygnia into the Chinese-linked cyber-espionage group Fire Ant illustrates exactly how dangerous that shift can become. Instead of stopping after compromising individual computers, the group reportedly spent the past year moving into routers, authentication servers, Linux management systems, and jump hosts.
These machines may not contain the most valuable files in an organization. They may not even attract much attention from security teams. Yet they control something potentially more valuable: access, trust, visibility, and connectivity.
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The Investigation Began With a Router That Did Not Make Sense
The investigation reportedly started with an apparently minor anomaly on a Cisco IOS XR router.
A tunnel interface suddenly appeared operational even though administrators could not find a corresponding configuration entry or commit history explaining its existence.
At first glance, this could have looked like an administrative mistake, a synchronization problem, or a configuration inconsistency.
But investigators quickly realized that something much more serious might be happening.
A Router’s Operational State Could No Longer Be Trusted
The mysterious interface was associated with a VRF and used GRE encapsulation. Yet conventional configuration reviews failed to explain how it had become active.
That discrepancy became a crucial investigative clue.
If the router was doing something that could not be explained by its visible configuration or audit records, then administrators were potentially looking at a system whose operational state had been manipulated independently of its normal management interface.
That distinction is extremely important.
A security team may review configuration history and conclude that nothing suspicious happened. But if an attacker has modified the underlying operating environment, the configuration database itself may no longer tell the complete story.
Fire Ant Went Beneath the Normal Configuration Layer
According to the investigation, Fire
Instead, the reported toolkit was specifically designed to interact with Cisco IOS XR internals.
That is a significant escalation in sophistication.
Rather than treating the router as an ordinary computer, the attackers reportedly targeted functions responsible for logging, command execution, routing, and other operating-system-level behavior.
This approach gives an attacker something much more powerful than simple persistence.
It can potentially allow the attacker to make the device behave differently while appearing normal to administrators.
The Malware Could Manipulate What Administrators Saw
One of the reported components disguised itself as a legitimate boot service and operated according to an unusual schedule.
The malware reportedly became active during odd-numbered hours and stopped during even-numbered hours.
That kind of timing can be useful for an attacker attempting to avoid predictable inspection periods.
It also demonstrates an important reality about persistent malware: being present is not the same as being active all the time.
A backdoor that is constantly running may attract attention through performance anomalies, process monitoring, network connections, or behavioral detection.
A backdoor that deliberately sleeps can be much harder to identify.
The Router’s Logs Were Reportedly Silenced
Perhaps even more disturbing was the reported modification of the router’s logging mechanism.
Sygnia found evidence that a modified syslog function filtered messages according to whether they contained the word “Health.”
Messages that did not satisfy the condition could effectively disappear instead of being forwarded normally.
This is a devastating capability because logging is one of the primary mechanisms defenders depend on when investigating suspicious activity.
If the attacker can selectively determine which events become visible, then the security team is no longer investigating the complete history of the machine.
They are investigating a curated version of reality.
One Small Tunnel Revealed a Larger Infrastructure
The suspicious tunnel ultimately led investigators to another compromised system.
At the opposite end was an older Linux machine that had been incorporated into the attack infrastructure.
From there, Fire Ant reportedly used the compromised environment to explore other connected networks.
This included probing services such as:
SSH
RDP
Web services
Other reachable network infrastructure
The purpose was apparently not simply to maintain access to the first compromised machine.
The compromised infrastructure became a launchpad for discovering what else could be reached.
The “Target Behind the Target” Changes the Threat Model
This is one of the most important lessons from the investigation.
Organizations frequently prioritize servers containing customer information, intellectual property, financial records, or sensitive applications.
That makes sense.
But attackers may instead focus on the systems that provide access to those valuable assets.
A router can provide network reachability.
A TACACS server can control administrator authentication.
A jump host can provide privileged access into restricted environments.
A management server can become a bridge between otherwise isolated systems.
These machines may not hold sensitive data themselves, but they can determine who can reach the systems that do.
TACACS Became Another Critical Attack Point
Fire Ant reportedly went after the authentication layer as well.
Investigators found evidence that the attackers injected a malicious library into a running TACACS authentication daemon.
TACACS systems are commonly used to centralize authentication and authorization for administrators managing network equipment.
Compromising this layer therefore creates an extraordinary opportunity.
Instead of stealing credentials through phishing or malware installed on individual computers, an attacker operating inside the authentication process can potentially observe legitimate administrative sessions as they occur.
Watching Legitimate Administrators Log In
This distinction matters.
Traditional credential theft often depends on convincing someone to enter a password into a fake website, infecting their endpoint, or extracting credentials from a compromised database.
A compromised authentication daemon presents a different scenario.
The attacker is positioned inside the system responsible for deciding whether a login should be accepted.
Every legitimate administrator who connects could potentially become an opportunity for credential collection.
That turns authentication infrastructure into an intelligence source.
The Attackers Also Maintained Linux Backdoors
Fire Ant reportedly maintained several persistent backdoors across Linux systems.
Some of these had apparently remained dormant since 2025.
Their persistence mechanisms were designed to blend into normal system behavior, including appearing as legitimate services.
This is exactly the type of persistence that can survive routine security checks.
An administrator looking at a list of services might see something that appears ordinary and move on.
The malicious component does not necessarily need to look exotic.
It only needs to look believable.
A Fake Security Agent Added Another Layer of Deception
One reported backdoor even masqueraded as a SentinelOne security agent.
That is a particularly aggressive form of deception because it exploits defenders’ expectations.
Security personnel are trained to be suspicious of unknown processes, but a process appearing to belong to an endpoint security product may initially receive the opposite treatment.
Even more concerning, the reported malware could remain active in memory after its associated file had been deleted.
That means simply searching the filesystem could fail to reveal the complete compromise.
Memory Became More Important Than the Disk
This is where traditional incident response becomes increasingly complicated.
Suppose an investigator finds no suspicious executable on disk.
That does not necessarily mean the machine is clean.
A malicious process may already be running in memory.
Similarly, a deleted file may leave behind a running process, injected code, altered kernel state, or other artifacts.
This is why sophisticated infrastructure compromises often require investigators to examine multiple evidence sources rather than relying exclusively on filesystem scanning.
The Backdoor That Did Not Need a Listening Port
One of the most technically interesting findings involved a backdoor that reportedly did not behave like a traditional network service.
It did not simply open a TCP port and wait for an incoming connection.
Instead, it inspected raw network traffic.
The malware waited for specially crafted packets containing a specific activation string, or “magic” value.
When the appropriate packet arrived, the backdoor could activate and provide an interactive shell.
Why a Packet-Triggered Backdoor Is So Difficult to Find
A conventional backdoor can sometimes be discovered through network enumeration.
Security teams scan for unusual listening ports.
They inspect firewall rules.
They monitor connections.
But a backdoor that does not maintain a conventional listening socket can avoid many of those checks.
From the perspective of a standard port scan, there may be nothing suspicious to find.
The malicious code is effectively waiting inside ordinary network traffic.
That makes packet-level monitoring and memory analysis considerably more important.
Possible Links to UNC3886 Add Another Dimension
Sygnia reportedly identified code-level similarities between this backdoor and tooling publicly associated with UNC3886, a China-nexus espionage cluster previously tracked by organizations including Google and Mandiant.
The similarities do not necessarily mean the exact same malware was simply reused.
According to the report, differences in activation strings and packet-handling behavior suggest an evolution rather than straightforward copying.
That distinction matters when analyzing attribution.
Technical overlap can strengthen an investigative hypothesis, but it does not automatically establish that every related tool was developed or deployed by the same operators.
Credential Collection Also Echoes Earlier Techniques
The investigation reportedly identified another interesting technical connection involving credential collection.
Mandiant had previously documented UNC3886 tooling associated with TACACS credential collection in which captured credential records were XORed with 0xEF before being written to a credential log.
The overlap is notable because it suggests that techniques surrounding network authentication infrastructure may have been reused or independently evolved across related espionage operations.
For defenders, the exact attribution question is important.
But the defensive lesson is even more important: authentication infrastructure deserves the same level of scrutiny as traditional servers and endpoints.
Fire Ant Did Not Stop at Hiding Malware
Maintaining persistence is only half the problem.
The attackers reportedly went further by modifying evidence of their activity.
Linux authentication and login records stored in files such as wtmp, utmp, and btmp were reportedly manipulated.
In some cases, the real IP address associated with activity was replaced with an internal address.
That can make malicious administrative activity appear to originate from somewhere inside the expected environment.
Sudo Evidence Was Also Targeted
The reported activity also included removing evidence associated with sudo operations from system logs.
This is especially concerning because privilege escalation is one of the most important events investigators look for after a compromise.
If those records are altered, the timeline of the intrusion can become incomplete.
An attacker therefore gains two advantages at once:
They can perform privileged actions.
They can make those actions harder to reconstruct later.
That combination dramatically increases the difficulty of incident response.
The Most Dangerous Assumption Is That Logs Always Tell the Truth
Security teams naturally trust logs.
Logs are timestamped.
They are centralized.
They are searchable.
They form the backbone of SIEM platforms and forensic investigations.
But logs are ultimately produced by software.
If an attacker gains sufficient control over that software, the attacker may be able to alter what gets recorded.
The Fire Ant investigation therefore reinforces a fundamental forensic principle: logs are evidence, not absolute truth.
Independent Evidence Becomes Essential
When infrastructure itself may have been compromised, investigators should compare evidence from several independent sources.
Network telemetry can be compared against endpoint logs.
Memory analysis can be compared against disk artifacts.
External authentication records can be compared against local login history.
Router telemetry can be compared against configuration management systems.
Centralized logging can be compared against packet captures and network-flow data.
The more independent sources agree, the more confidence investigators can have in the reconstructed timeline.
Why Network Infrastructure Is So Attractive to Espionage Groups
Routers and management systems are unusually valuable because they sit at strategic positions.
A compromised workstation may provide access to one employee.
A compromised router may provide visibility into an entire network segment.
A compromised authentication server may expose administrator credentials.
A compromised jump host may provide a controlled route into otherwise isolated environments.
This creates a powerful multiplier effect.
One carefully selected infrastructure compromise can potentially provide access far beyond the original machine.
Critical Infrastructure Raises the Stakes
Sygnia reportedly observed Fire Ant using compromised environments to explore connectivity toward high-value networks, including critical infrastructure.
That is where the consequences become particularly serious.
A compromise does not need to immediately cause an outage to represent a major national-security concern.
An attacker who quietly establishes persistence inside network infrastructure may instead be positioning themselves for future intelligence gathering, disruption, or lateral movement.
The absence of immediate damage should not be mistaken for the absence of danger.
Espionage Often Rewards Patience
Ransomware operators typically want speed.
They enter.
They escalate privileges.
They encrypt systems.
They demand payment.
Cyber-espionage operations can follow a completely different philosophy.
The attacker may spend months establishing persistence.
They may avoid obvious activity.
They may compromise infrastructure gradually.
They may collect credentials without immediately using them.
They may wait until the strategic moment arrives.
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Security Products Alone Cannot Solve This Problem
The SentinelOne impersonation example also illustrates a broader challenge.
A security tool installed on a compromised system is not automatically a trustworthy observer.
If attackers gain sufficiently deep access, they may manipulate processes, logs, services, or even the underlying operating environment.
That does not make security software useless.
It means defenders should avoid building an architecture in which one compromised endpoint or logging source becomes the unquestioned authority.
Network Devices Need Security Monitoring Too
Routers have historically received less attention than laptops and servers.
That needs to change.
Organizations should monitor:
Unexpected configuration changes
Unusual tunnel interfaces
GRE activity
VRF modifications
New or modified services
Unexpected privileged commands
Changes in logging behavior
Abnormal management traffic
Unexplained authentication activity
Firmware and operating-system integrity
A router should be treated as a security-critical computing platform, not merely as a piece of networking equipment.
Authentication Servers Are Crown Jewels
TACACS and similar authentication systems deserve especially strong protection.
They can represent a centralized point through which administrators access numerous network devices.
A compromise can therefore create a cascading credential risk.
Organizations should consider strong segmentation, restricted administrative access, integrity monitoring, independent logging, and frequent review of authentication behavior.
The goal should be to prevent one compromised management component from becoming a master key for the network.
Jump Hosts Need the Same Protection as Production Servers
Jump hosts are another overlooked category.
Their entire purpose is to provide controlled access into sensitive environments.
That makes them incredibly attractive to attackers.
A compromised jump server can effectively become a staging point for lateral movement.
Organizations should minimize software installed on these systems, restrict outbound connectivity, use strong authentication, monitor administrative sessions, and maintain independent telemetry.
A jump host should be considered a high-value security boundary.
Deep Analysis: Hunting for Fire Ant-Style Persistence
Inspect Unexpected Network Interfaces
On Linux systems, administrators can begin by reviewing interfaces and routes:
ip addr ip link ip route ip rule
Unexpected interfaces, unusual routes, or unexplained policy-routing rules should be investigated against approved network documentation.
Review GRE and Tunnel Activity
Look specifically for tunnel-related configuration:
ip tunnel show ip -d link show
On networking equipment, configuration and operational state should be compared independently.
An interface that exists operationally without an expected configuration history deserves immediate investigation.
Search for Suspicious Services
Review system services and recently modified service definitions:
systemctl list-units --type=service --all systemctl list-unit-files
Then examine suspicious units:
systemctl cat <service-name> systemctl status <service-name>
Pay particular attention to services with misleading names, unusual execution paths, or unexpected startup behavior.
Examine Running Processes
A deleted malicious file can potentially leave a process running.
Check active processes:
ps auxww
Then inspect executable mappings:
ls -l /proc/<PID>/exe cat /proc/<PID>/maps
A process whose executable points to a deleted file should receive immediate attention.
Look for Deleted Executables
One useful starting point is:
lsof | grep deleted
This can reveal processes that still have deleted files open.
It is not proof of compromise, but it can expose artifacts that a normal filesystem search would miss.
Review Authentication Evidence
Examine the traditional login databases and authentication logs:
last lastb lastlog
Where available, also review:
journalctl --since "7 days ago"
Investigators should compare these records against centralized authentication telemetry rather than assuming the local records are complete.
Search for Suspicious Sudo Activity
Review privilege escalation activity:
journalctl _COMM=sudo
On systems using traditional authentication logs, inspect the relevant files:
grep -i sudo /var/log/auth.log
The exact log location varies by distribution.
If records appear inconsistent with centralized telemetry, treat that discrepancy as an investigative signal.
Examine Network Connections
Check active sockets:
ss -tulpn ss -tpna
But remember that a packet-triggered backdoor may not expose a conventional listening port.
Therefore, an apparently clean ss result does not eliminate the possibility of a deeper network-level implant.
Capture Network Traffic for Investigation
Where appropriate and authorized, defenders can inspect traffic with:
tcpdump -ni any
For a specific interface:
tcpdump -ni eth0
Investigators should look for unusual management traffic, unexplained tunnel activity, unexpected source addresses, and anomalous packets reaching infrastructure systems.
Verify System Integrity
On managed Linux environments, compare important binaries and configuration files against known-good baselines.
For example:
rpm -Va
or on Debian-based systems:
debsums -c
These tools are useful, but they should not be treated as definitive if the operating environment itself may have been compromised.
Preserve Memory Before Destroying Evidence
If a system is suspected of hosting a memory-resident backdoor, avoid immediately rebooting it unless operational or safety requirements demand it.
A reboot can destroy valuable volatile evidence.
Incident responders should follow established forensic procedures for memory acquisition, process analysis, kernel inspection, and evidence preservation.
What Undercode Say: The Infrastructure Is Becoming the Battlefield
The Old Security Model Is Breaking Down
The traditional model focused heavily on protecting endpoints and databases.
Fire Ant demonstrates why that model is no longer sufficient.
Attackers increasingly care about the systems connecting everything together.
Trust Is More Valuable Than Data
A router may contain very little interesting data.
Yet controlling that router can provide something more valuable than files: trust and reachability.
That changes how organizations should prioritize infrastructure security.
Authentication Systems Are Strategic Targets
A compromised authentication server can potentially expose access across dozens or hundreds of devices.
That makes authentication infrastructure a strategic asset.
It should be protected accordingly.
Logging Must Be Treated as a Potentially Compromisable Layer
Centralized logging is essential.
But the systems generating those logs must also be protected.
A compromised endpoint can potentially lie to the SIEM.
Independent Telemetry Is Becoming Mandatory
Organizations need telemetry that attackers cannot easily modify from the compromised environment.
Network-level monitoring is particularly valuable because it provides an external perspective.
Memory Forensics Deserves Greater Attention
Disk-based investigations can miss fileless or memory-resident implants.
Memory should therefore become a normal part of investigations involving sophisticated infrastructure compromises.
Network Devices Are Computers
Routers increasingly contain complex operating systems, software packages, management interfaces, and programmable functionality.
They should be secured and monitored like computers.
Vendor Defaults Are Not Enough
Following vendor hardening guides is important, but it cannot replace continuous monitoring.
A device can be properly configured today and compromised tomorrow.
Administrative Paths Need Segmentation
If a compromised Linux management host can reach every critical router, the organization has created an enormous blast radius.
Segmentation can dramatically limit that risk.
The Most Dangerous Assets May Look Boring
Attackers do not necessarily need the most powerful server.
Sometimes they need the boring machine nobody watches carefully.
A forgotten jump host can be more valuable than a heavily protected database.
Persistence Is a Strategic Investment for Espionage Groups
Long-term implants allow attackers to return even after individual credentials are changed.
That is why defenders must hunt for persistence, not merely remove known malware.
Dormant Malware Is Still a Threat
A backdoor that sleeps most of the time can remain invisible for months.
Organizations should therefore look for unexplained persistence even when no active malicious behavior is obvious.
Attackers Can Weaponize Normal Administration
Legitimate administrator sessions are especially valuable.
Once attackers compromise authentication infrastructure, ordinary administrative behavior can become a source of intelligence.
Credential Rotation Is Not Always Enough
Changing passwords is important after credential theft.
But if the authentication system itself is compromised, newly generated credentials can potentially be exposed again.
The underlying system must also be trusted before credentials are considered safe.
Incident Response Must Question Its Own Evidence
If the attacker can alter logs, investigators cannot simply collect logs and declare the timeline complete.
Evidence must be cross-validated.
Configuration History Is Not Absolute Truth
The mysterious Cisco tunnel demonstrates the importance of comparing intended configuration with actual runtime state.
Those are not always identical.
Network Visibility Is a Security Control
Network telemetry is not merely useful for troubleshooting.
It can provide evidence that remains available when endpoint logs have been manipulated.
Critical Infrastructure Creates a Larger Risk
The compromise of infrastructure connected to critical systems can have consequences beyond one organization.
That makes infrastructure espionage a national-security concern in some environments.
Attack Paths Matter More Than Individual Machines
Security teams should understand relationships between assets.
Knowing that a server is vulnerable is useful.
Knowing that the server can reach a critical authentication system is much more useful.
Asset Inventories Must Include Network Infrastructure
Organizations often have better inventories of laptops than routers, appliances, management servers, and legacy systems.
That imbalance creates blind spots.
Legacy Systems Can Become Strategic Weapons
The aging Linux machine discovered in the reported operation demonstrates why old systems cannot simply be ignored.
A vulnerable legacy host may become an ideal stepping stone.
Security Appliances Can Become High-Value Targets
Ironically, systems intended to improve security can become especially valuable if attackers compromise them.
A fake security-agent process is a reminder of that risk.
Security Teams Need Cross-Domain Expertise
Modern infrastructure attacks cross boundaries.
Networking knowledge alone is insufficient.
Linux, authentication, memory forensics, routing, malware analysis, and incident response increasingly overlap.
Attackers Are Moving Down the Stack
Endpoint compromise happens at the application and operating-system level.
Infrastructure compromise can go deeper.
The closer an attacker gets to the underlying platform, the harder traditional monitoring can become.
Specialized Malware Signals Investment
Tooling designed specifically for IOS XR suggests that attackers are willing to invest heavily when the target justifies the effort.
That is a warning for organizations operating strategically important infrastructure.
Espionage Groups Do Not Need Ransomware
A compromise can remain invisible for years without encryption or extortion.
The absence of ransomware should never be interpreted as evidence that a compromise is insignificant.
“No Alert” Does Not Mean “No Attack”
A sufficiently capable attacker may deliberately design malware to avoid the signals security teams normally monitor.
This is why proactive threat hunting matters.
The Attack Surface Is Bigger Than the Internet Edge
The modern attack surface includes internal routers, management planes, authentication services, jump hosts, orchestration systems, and monitoring platforms.
Every trusted connection creates potential value for an attacker.
Security Architecture Should Assume Partial Failure
Defenders should design environments where compromising one system does not automatically compromise everything connected to it.
This is the practical value of segmentation and zero-trust principles.
High-Privilege Systems Need Stronger Isolation
The more systems an asset can administer, the more aggressively it should be isolated.
Administrative convenience should not dictate security architecture.
Independent Logging Should Be Protected Separately
Logs should ideally be transmitted to systems that compromised endpoints cannot modify.
Write-once storage and separate administrative domains can strengthen forensic reliability.
Network Authentication Deserves Zero-Trust Thinking
Authentication servers should not automatically be trusted simply because they live inside the corporate network.
Their integrity must be continuously evaluated.
Fire Ant Shows Why Threat Hunting Must Be Creative
The suspicious tunnel was not necessarily an obvious malware alert.
It was an inconsistency.
Security teams need to investigate anomalies that do not fit expected system behavior.
Small Anomalies Can Reveal Major Campaigns
The entire investigation reportedly grew from a single unexplained interface.
That is an important reminder for analysts: unusual behavior deserves context, even when it initially appears harmless.
The “Target Behind the Target” Is the Bigger Story
Fire
Those machines were stepping stones.
The ultimate objective was access to connected environments.
Defenders Must Protect Reachability
Protecting sensitive data remains essential.
But organizations must also protect the infrastructure that determines who can reach that data and through which path.
The Future of Defense Will Be More Infrastructure-Aware
Security programs will increasingly need to monitor routing systems, authentication planes, management servers, and network operating systems with the same intensity historically reserved for endpoints.
The Final Lesson Is Simple
The most important message from the Fire Ant investigation is not about one malware sample or one hacking group.
It is about trust.
If the router can lie, the authentication server can be manipulated, and the logs can be rewritten, then defenders must build security systems that do not depend on a single source of truth.
The network itself has become part of the battlefield.
✅ Fire Ant Targeted Network Infrastructure
The central claim is consistent with
✅ Log Manipulation Was a Major Part of the Reported Activity
The investigation describes selective manipulation of router logging and modification of Linux authentication and login records. This supports the article’s broader warning that compromised infrastructure can undermine conventional forensic evidence.
⚠️ Attribution Requires Care
The reported technical similarities to tooling associated with UNC3886 are significant, but technical overlap does not automatically prove that every related component was created by the same organization. Attribution should therefore remain appropriately qualified.
Prediction
(+1) Infrastructure Security Will Become a Much Higher Priority
As attackers increasingly recognize the strategic value of routers, authentication servers, and management hosts, organizations will invest more heavily in protecting these systems.
(+1) Independent Network Telemetry Will Become Standard
Security teams will increasingly deploy monitoring outside the compromised endpoint itself, making it harder for attackers to manipulate every available source of evidence.
(+1) Memory-Based Incident Response Will Expand
Fileless and memory-resident techniques will push organizations toward more frequent memory acquisition and volatile-data analysis during major incidents.
(+1) Authentication Infrastructure Will Receive Stronger Isolation
TACACS, RADIUS, identity platforms, and privileged-access systems will increasingly be treated as crown-jewel assets requiring segmentation and dedicated monitoring.
(-1) Legacy Network Equipment Will Remain a Major Blind Spot
Many organizations still operate aging routers, management systems, and appliances that receive less security attention than modern cloud workloads and endpoints.
(-1) Log-Based Investigations Will Become Less Reliable on Their Own
As attackers gain the ability to manipulate local logging, investigations relying on a single telemetry source will increasingly risk producing incomplete or misleading conclusions.
(+1) Threat Hunting Will Shift Toward Behavioral Inconsistencies
Small anomalies such as unexplained interfaces, unusual services, unexpected routes, and discrepancies between configuration and runtime state may become increasingly important indicators of sophisticated intrusion.
(+1) The “Target Behind the Target” Will Shape Future Defense
The most valuable asset in an attack may not be the final database or application. It may be the trusted infrastructure that provides the attacker with a path toward it. Organizations that understand and defend those paths will be far better positioned against the next generation of long-term cyber-espionage campaigns.
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