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A Government Cyberattack Turns Into a High-Stakes Extortion Crisis
Berlin is facing a serious cybersecurity crisis after the ransomware operation known as Rhysida claimed that it stole a vast quantity of information from the city-state’s administrative network. The incident, discovered in August, has now escalated into a public extortion attempt, with the attackers threatening to expose stolen government data unless Berlin meets their demands.
The situation is particularly sensitive because the alleged stolen information could include personal records, financial details, government documents, credentials, contracts, internal communications, and potentially highly sensitive material. Berlin officials, however, have taken a firm position: the government will not pay the attackers.
Berlin’s official statements confirm that additional data outflows were discovered during the ongoing forensic investigation, particularly involving the Senate Department for Mobility, Transport, Climate Protection and the Environment. Officials say the exact content and scope of the stolen information are still being investigated.
The ransomware
Berlin Refuses to Be Blackmailed
Berlin Governing Mayor Kai Wegner and Interior Senator Iris Spranger have publicly rejected the attackers’ demands, making it clear that the government will not surrender to the extortion attempt.
The official Berlin statement says that the State Criminal Police Office, the Berlin Public Prosecutor’s Office, and federal security authorities are investigating the suspected perpetrators while forensic specialists continue determining what information actually left the network.
That decision puts Berlin in a difficult position. Refusing to pay may prevent criminals from receiving financial rewards for the attack, but it does not prevent them from publishing stolen information. In modern ransomware operations, the data itself can become more valuable than the encryption of computers.
Rhysida Claims 5.79 TB of Stolen Information
According to the
The claimed material reportedly spans numerous administrative categories, including government records, legal documents, contracts, financial information, human-resources files, infrastructure records, health-related information, mapping data, emails, database dumps, and identity documents.
Reuters reported that the group claimed to have stolen information including tens of thousands of contracts, emails, phone numbers, passwords, and classified material.
However, an important distinction must be made: the existence of the cyberattack and data exfiltration is confirmed, while the full size and precise contents claimed by Rhysida have not been independently verified by Berlin.
Personal Information Could Become a Second Wave of Damage
The potential exposure of personal information could make this incident much more damaging than an ordinary disruption to government IT systems.
The attackers claim that their collection includes names, email addresses, telephone numbers, banking information, IBANs, personnel files, payroll records, administrative-offense records, and other documents containing information about individuals.
The leak-site claims reportedly include information relating to thousands of individuals, including approximately 148 IBANs. Other reported categories include contracts, personnel records, email archives, database exports, and identity documents.
If such information is eventually published, the consequences could extend far beyond Berlin’s government systems. Criminal groups could potentially use exposed information for phishing, impersonation, financial fraud, credential attacks, social engineering, and additional targeted intrusions.
Credentials May Be the Most Dangerous Part of the Alleged Leak
One of the most concerning elements of the attackers’ claims is the alleged theft of credentials.
Rhysida claims that its stolen material includes plaintext credentials, database accounts, payment-system information, password vaults, and credentials associated with senior officials.
If confirmed, this category would deserve immediate priority because credentials can provide attackers with a pathway into additional systems long after the original breach has been contained.
A stolen document may expose information once. A compromised privileged credential can potentially become a reusable key.
That is why incident responders should treat every credential potentially present in the affected environment as compromised until proven otherwise.
Sensitive Government Documents Raise the Stakes
The alleged dataset reportedly contains material related to government operations, including Bundesrat committee records and documents concerning the handling of classified information.
It also allegedly includes documents related to disciplinary proceedings, named cases, administrative matters, and other sensitive government activities.
Berlin has not publicly confirmed the full authenticity or completeness of these specific categories. Nevertheless, their alleged presence demonstrates why data-extortion attacks against government institutions are particularly dangerous.
The objective is no longer simply to shut down servers.
The objective is to obtain enough sensitive information to create political, financial, legal, and reputational pressure.
Critical Infrastructure Information Could Be Particularly Valuable
Another reported category deserves special attention: information concerning critical infrastructure.
The attackers claim to possess security assessments relating to Berlin’s water supply.
Such documents could contain information that is considerably more valuable to an intelligence operation or future attacker than ordinary administrative records.
Even if the documents themselves do not contain operational credentials, information about infrastructure architecture, weaknesses, protective measures, or security assumptions can help adversaries understand how essential services are designed and defended.
For that reason,
More Than 3,200 NDA Documents Are Allegedly Included
The attackers also claim access to more than 3,200 documents marked as nondisclosure agreements.
The significance of these files is not necessarily the NDA documents themselves. Rather, they could reveal relationships between government agencies and contractors, suppliers, technology providers, consultants, and other organizations.
Such information can help attackers map an
A government network does not exist in isolation. It is connected to vendors, contractors, cloud platforms, software providers, law firms, financial institutions, infrastructure operators, and other organizations.
That makes supply-chain exposure an important concern following a breach of this magnitude.
Forensics Identified Additional Data Outflows
Berlin’s own investigation has already established that additional data was transferred out of the affected environment.
According to the
Berlin says the data outflow occurred between August 7 and August 12, while investigators continue to determine exactly what information was involved.
This is a critical detail because it means the investigation is not based solely on a criminal group’s leak-site announcement. Berlin has independently confirmed that unauthorized data movement occurred.
The Affected Departments Were Isolated
Berlin responded by disconnecting affected government departments from the state network.
The Senate Department for Mobility, Transport, Climate Protection and the Environment and the Senate Department for Urban Development, Building and Housing were isolated from the network as part of the containment measures. Berlin established an ICT emergency response structure and began forensic analysis of the environment.
Network isolation is one of the most important early responses to a suspected intrusion because it can prevent attackers from continuing lateral movement or maintaining access through compromised systems.
It can also make government operations significantly more difficult.
That is the unavoidable price of containment.
The Attack Method Remains Unknown
One major question remains unanswered: How did Rhysida initially get inside?
Berlin has not disclosed the initial access vector.
That missing information matters because understanding the entry point is essential for determining whether other government systems remain vulnerable.
Possible initial access mechanisms in ransomware campaigns can include stolen credentials, phishing, exposed remote-access services, vulnerable internet-facing applications, compromised third-party accounts, malicious software, or other forms of credential theft.
At this stage, however, it would be irresponsible to attribute a specific technique to this incident without evidence.
Rhysida Has a History of Targeting High-Value Organizations
Rhysida emerged as a major ransomware threat in 2023 and has targeted organizations across multiple sectors.
Its victims have included government institutions, healthcare organizations, educational organizations, and businesses.
The
This is why ransomware defense cannot stop at having offline backups.
A company or government agency can recover its servers and still face a devastating crisis if attackers possess sensitive databases, employee information, internal communications, credentials, or confidential documents.
The Election Question Is Especially Important
The timing of the incident makes the situation even more politically sensitive.
Berlin officials have stated that there is currently no evidence that election data was compromised and that the technical environment supporting the upcoming Berlin House of Representatives election is considered secure.
That distinction is important.
A cyberattack against government administration does not automatically mean that election systems have been compromised. Election infrastructure can be separated from ordinary administrative networks and protected using additional controls.
Nevertheless, the proximity of the attack to an election naturally increases public concern.
The authorities will need to maintain transparency without revealing defensive information that could help attackers.
GDPR Pressure Gives Attackers Another Weapon
The attackers are reportedly using potential privacy violations as additional leverage against Berlin.
This is a common strategy in modern ransomware.
Instead of simply saying, “Pay us or your computers remain encrypted,” attackers increasingly say, “Pay us or we publish information belonging to your employees, citizens, customers, and partners.”
For a government, that creates a complicated legal and political problem.
The potential exposure of personal information can trigger regulatory obligations, investigations, notification requirements, lawsuits, and long-term reputational consequences.
The attackers understand this pressure.
They are attempting to turn the
Deep Analysis
Start With Identity and Privilege
The first technical priority after a suspected ransomware breach should be understanding which accounts were potentially compromised.
Security teams should inventory privileged accounts, service accounts, administrative credentials, database users, VPN accounts, cloud identities, and other authentication mechanisms.
A defensive PowerShell inventory can help administrators identify local accounts during an investigation:
Get-LocalUser | Select-Object Name,Enabled,LastLogon
This is not evidence of compromise by itself. It is simply a starting point for identifying accounts that require investigation.
Review Authentication Events
Organizations should examine authentication logs for unusual logins, impossible travel patterns, abnormal administrative activity, and access occurring outside expected working hours.
On Windows systems, defenders can begin reviewing successful logons with:
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{
LogName='Security'
Id=4624
} -MaxEvents 1000
Security Event ID 4624 represents successful logons, but the surrounding fields must be analyzed carefully to determine whether activity is legitimate.
Failed authentication attempts can also be reviewed using Event ID 4625:
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{
LogName='Security'
Id=4625
} -MaxEvents 1000
Search for Privilege Escalation
If an attacker obtained ordinary credentials and later gained administrative privileges, investigators should reconstruct the sequence.
Look for newly created accounts, unexpected group membership changes, unusual service creation, scheduled tasks, remote administration, and authentication from systems that normally have no administrative relationship.
A simple Windows command for reviewing local administrators is:
Get-LocalGroupMember -Group "Administrators"
Unexpected accounts in privileged groups should be investigated rather than automatically deleted, because removing evidence can complicate forensic analysis.
Investigate Network Connections
Network telemetry is essential for determining whether attackers maintained external communication.
Defenders can review active TCP connections with:
Get-NetTCPConnection | Sort-Object State,RemoteAddress | Select-Object LocalAddress,LocalPort,RemoteAddress,RemotePort,State
This does not identify malicious connections automatically.
The real value comes from correlating network activity with endpoint logs, DNS records, proxy logs, firewall telemetry, identity events, and known organizational behavior.
Hunt for Data Exfiltration
The Berlin case demonstrates why outbound traffic monitoring is just as important as inbound protection.
Security teams should examine unusual data transfers, especially large outbound connections, unexpected cloud-storage uploads, archive creation, database exports, and transfers occurring outside normal business patterns.
Useful investigation questions include:
Which systems transmitted unusually large quantities of data?
Which accounts initiated the transfers?
What destinations received the information?
Were archives created before transmission?
Did the transfer occur shortly after privilege escalation?
Were unusual compression tools used?
Did the activity involve database servers or file repositories?
Were cloud-storage credentials accessed?
Did the same identity access multiple departments?
Protect the Investigation Itself
Incident response systems must be protected from the attacker.
Investigators should assume that compromised credentials may include security administrators, domain administrators, service accounts, backup accounts, and monitoring-system credentials.
Evidence collection should therefore be performed from trusted systems wherever possible.
Credentials should be rotated in a controlled sequence, with special attention to privileged accounts and secrets stored in scripts, configuration files, password managers, CI/CD systems, and service integrations.
Do Not Destroy Evidence
One of the biggest mistakes organizations can make during a ransomware incident is immediately wiping every suspicious machine.
Rebuilding systems may be necessary, but investigators should preserve forensic evidence first when operationally possible.
Relevant evidence can include:
Windows event logs
EDR telemetry
Firewall logs
VPN records
DNS logs
Proxy logs
Authentication records
Cloud audit logs
Database audit trails
File-access logs
Memory captures
Disk images
Scheduled-task information
PowerShell logs
Network-flow records
The objective is not merely to restore operations.
It is to answer the most important questions: How did they get in? What did they access? What did they steal? What remains compromised?
Rotate Secrets Strategically
If credentials were exposed, password changes alone may not be sufficient.
Organizations should consider rotating API keys, service credentials, database passwords, VPN credentials, cloud secrets, signing keys, certificates, application tokens, and other authentication material.
Particular attention should be given to secrets that were stored in plaintext or embedded inside configuration files.
A credential that appears harmless inside a stolen document could provide access to an entirely different environment.
Assume Lateral Movement Until Proven Otherwise
Government networks frequently contain interconnected systems.
An attacker who compromises one department may attempt to move toward shared services, identity infrastructure, databases, file servers, backup systems, or other agencies.
Therefore, investigators should not restrict their search to the system where suspicious activity was initially discovered.
They should investigate authentication relationships and lateral movement across the wider environment.
Ransomware Is Now a Data Security Problem
The Berlin incident illustrates a fundamental change in ransomware.
Encryption is no longer the entire story.
The most damaging stage can happen before encryption, when attackers quietly collect information for days or weeks.
This means organizations need strong data-loss prevention, network segmentation, privileged-access management, centralized logging, endpoint detection, identity protection, and continuous monitoring.
Backups remain essential, but backups cannot make stolen information disappear.
What Undercode Say:
Berlin’s Refusal Sends an Important Signal
Berlin’s refusal to pay is significant because governments are among the most attractive ransomware targets in the world.
Public institutions hold enormous quantities of sensitive information, yet they also operate under political, legal, and operational pressure.
Attackers know that shutting down a government department can create immediate public consequences.
Data Theft Can Be More Dangerous Than Encryption
The alleged 5.79 TB figure is attention-grabbing, but the more important question is what was inside those files.
A terabyte of ordinary documents is not necessarily catastrophic.
A few gigabytes containing privileged credentials, infrastructure diagrams, identity documents, financial records, or sensitive government communications can be considerably more dangerous.
The 1.44 Million Files Claim Needs Caution
The reported number of files should not automatically be interpreted as 1.44 million unique sensitive records.
Attackers can count backups, duplicates, temporary files, system files, archives, database fragments, and other objects.
Until Berlin completes its forensic assessment, the actual impact remains uncertain.
The Confirmed Part Is Still Serious
Even without accepting every Rhysida claim, the incident is already serious.
Berlin has confirmed unauthorized data outflows.
It has confirmed that affected departments were isolated.
It has confirmed that forensic investigations are continuing.
Those facts alone establish that this was not merely an unsubstantiated ransomware threat.
Credentials Could Become the Long-Term Threat
If the
Passwords can be changed.
But compromised authentication architecture, trust relationships, service accounts, certificates, tokens, and privileged access pathways can require a much more extensive recovery operation.
Government Networks Need Identity-Centric Security
Traditional perimeter security is increasingly insufficient.
Modern attackers frequently enter using legitimate credentials and then attempt to behave like legitimate users.
This makes identity monitoring, conditional access, multifactor authentication, privileged access management, and continuous authentication extremely important.
Network Segmentation Can Limit the Blast Radius
The fact that Berlin was able to isolate affected departments highlights the importance of segmentation.
If every government system can communicate freely with every other system, a single compromised account can become a bridge into a much larger environment.
Segmentation creates friction for attackers.
That friction can buy defenders valuable time.
Critical Infrastructure Data Requires Special Handling
Information relating to water systems, transportation, energy, communications, and other critical infrastructure should receive stronger controls than ordinary administrative documents.
Even internal assessments can become intelligence material when combined with other information.
Sensitive infrastructure documents should therefore be classified according to their operational consequences, not simply their administrative label.
The Election Environment Is a Separate Security Story
Officials saying that election systems remain secure is important, but it should not be interpreted as proof that the entire government environment is safe.
Election security should be assessed independently.
The best approach is to maintain separate monitoring, segmentation, access controls, backups, and incident-response procedures around election infrastructure.
The Attack Shows Why Logging Matters
Without detailed logs, organizations may know that they were hacked without knowing what happened.
That difference is enormous.
A good logging strategy allows defenders to reconstruct timelines, identify compromised identities, discover lateral movement, and determine what information may have been accessed.
Exfiltration Detection Needs More Attention
Many organizations invest heavily in detecting malicious files but pay less attention to abnormal outbound data movement.
That is a mistake.
If attackers can steal sensitive information quietly, they can continue extortion even after the organization restores every affected computer.
Ransomware Defense Must Include Data Governance
Organizations cannot protect information they do not understand.
Government agencies should know where sensitive data lives, who can access it, how long it is retained, and which systems can export it.
Reducing unnecessary data retention can also reduce the potential damage of a future breach.
Privileged Accounts Are High-Value Targets
Administrators should be treated as prime targets.
Privileged accounts should use strong authentication, tightly controlled permissions, dedicated administrative workstations, and detailed monitoring.
Where possible, privileges should be temporary rather than permanent.
Password Vaults Must Be Protected Like Crown Jewels
The alleged theft of password-vault information is particularly alarming.
A password manager can increase security dramatically, but if an attacker gains access to the vault itself or its recovery mechanisms, the security model can collapse.
Vault administrators therefore require especially strong authentication and monitoring.
Incident Response Must Be Practiced Before the Crisis
The worst time to decide who will lead an incident is during an incident.
Organizations should already know who controls network isolation, who contacts law enforcement, who handles regulators, who communicates with employees, who manages public statements, and who coordinates forensic investigators.
Berlin’s activation of an ICT emergency response structure demonstrates why centralized coordination matters.
Transparency Is a Difficult Balance
Governments have to communicate with citizens while protecting an active investigation.
Too little information creates uncertainty.
Too much technical information can reveal defensive weaknesses or help attackers understand what investigators have discovered.
The strongest communication strategy is factual, frequent, and careful about unverified claims.
The Attackers Benefit From Confusion
Ransomware groups understand how media cycles work.
A huge number such as 5.79 TB attracts attention.
A claim involving classified documents attracts even more.
The public should therefore distinguish carefully between confirmed information and statements made by criminals attempting to increase pressure.
The Leak Site Is Part of the Attack
The publication of a victim on a ransomware leak site is not merely an announcement.
It is psychological warfare.
The attackers are attempting to convince employees, citizens, journalists, regulators, and political leaders that the situation is catastrophic.
That pressure is designed to accelerate the
Berlin’s Next Challenge Is Verification
The city now needs to establish precisely what was stolen.
This will likely involve comparing attacker claims with endpoint telemetry, database access logs, file-access records, network flows, backups, and forensic artifacts.
Only then can Berlin determine whether the most alarming claims are genuine.
GDPR Could Become a Major Consequence
If personal data was exposed, Berlin may face significant regulatory obligations.
The eventual impact will depend on the categories of information involved, the number of affected individuals, the security controls that were in place, and the conclusions of the investigation.
The legal consequences could therefore continue long after the technical incident is closed.
Third-Party Risk Should Also Be Investigated
Government departments frequently exchange information with contractors and service providers.
If credentials or contracts were stolen, attackers may attempt to use them to target external partners.
The incident-response process should therefore extend beyond
Backups Are Necessary but Not Enough
A clean backup can restore availability.
It cannot restore confidentiality.
This is the central lesson of double-extortion ransomware.
Organizations must defend both their systems and their data.
AI Will Make Future Attacks Harder to Detect
The broader cybersecurity environment is increasingly shaped by automation and AI-assisted attacks.
Attackers can use automation to analyze stolen information, identify valuable documents, generate convincing phishing messages, and prioritize high-value accounts.
That means defenders need automation of their own.
Detection Must Become Faster
If an attacker can remain inside a network for days without triggering meaningful alerts, the organization is already losing.
Detection systems need to identify unusual identity behavior, abnormal data access, privilege escalation, lateral movement, and large-scale outbound transfers.
Governments Are Becoming Prime Cyber Targets
Public institutions combine three attractive qualities for attackers: enormous datasets, complex infrastructure, and high public pressure.
That makes government cybersecurity a national-security issue rather than simply an IT problem.
Berlin’s Case Could Become a Warning for Other Cities
Large municipalities should examine their own environments after watching what happened in Berlin.
They should ask whether administrative networks are properly segmented, whether sensitive databases are encrypted, whether privileged credentials are protected, and whether unusual data transfers can be detected quickly.
The Most Valuable Defense Is Preparation
The best ransomware incident is the one that becomes contained before attackers can achieve their objectives.
That requires preparation before the first suspicious login.
Asset inventories, MFA, segmentation, immutable backups, endpoint detection, centralized logging, tested recovery procedures, and trained personnel all contribute to resilience.
Refusing the Ransom Does Not End the Crisis
Berlin’s decision not to pay is only the beginning.
The city must still determine what was stolen, protect potentially affected individuals, rotate compromised credentials, investigate persistence, assess critical infrastructure exposure, and prepare for possible publication.
The Real Damage May Take Months to Measure
Cyberattacks often produce immediate headlines but delayed consequences.
A stolen credential may be abused weeks later.
A leaked identity document may enable fraud months later.
A sensitive government document may become valuable only when combined with another dataset.
The full impact therefore cannot be measured simply by whether systems are back online.
The Strongest Response Is Containment Plus Transparency
Berlin’s approach will ultimately be judged by what happens next.
If authorities can contain the intrusion, accurately identify the affected data, protect citizens, strengthen the infrastructure, and communicate responsibly, the city can turn a major breach into a lesson in cyber resilience.
Ransomware Is a Test of Institutional Resilience
The central question is no longer whether an organization can prevent every attack.
No organization can guarantee that.
The more realistic question is whether it can detect an intrusion quickly, limit the attacker’s movement, protect its most sensitive systems, recover operations, and minimize harm.
Berlin is now being tested on exactly that measure.
✅ Berlin Was Targeted by a Confirmed Cyber Incident
Berlin officially confirmed an ICT security incident affecting its state administrative network and said forensic investigations identified additional data outflows. The affected departments were isolated from the network as part of the response.
✅ Berlin Confirmed an Extortion Attempt
On August 28, Berlin’s governing mayor and interior senator publicly stated that the state was being blackmailed and that Berlin would not give in to the attackers’ demands.
⚠️ The 5.79 TB and 1.44 Million Files Figures Are Attacker Claims
Rhysida’s leak-site listing reportedly claims approximately 5.79 TB of data and around 1.44 million files. Berlin has not independently confirmed that complete figure, so it should be presented as a claim rather than an established measurement.
⚠️ The Full Data Contents Remain Unconfirmed
Berlin has explicitly stated that the content and scope of the affected data are still being examined and that personal or other non-public information cannot yet be ruled out. Therefore, claims concerning every individual category of allegedly stolen information should be treated cautiously until forensic investigators verify them.
✅ Election Systems Are Currently Considered Secure
Berlin Interior Senator Iris Spranger stated that officials had found no evidence that election data was compromised and that the technical environment supporting the upcoming Berlin House of Representatives election is considered secure.
Prediction
(+1) Berlin Will Gradually Contain the Incident Without Paying
The most likely positive outcome is that Berlin continues refusing the ransom while completing its forensic investigation and strengthening the affected network.
The attackers may still publish some information, but refusing payment prevents the criminal operation from receiving a direct financial reward and avoids creating an incentive for another round of extortion.
Berlin is also likely to accelerate identity-security controls, network segmentation, privileged-access protections, logging, and data-loss monitoring across its government infrastructure.
(+1) The Incident Will Push Other European Governments Toward Stronger Data Protection
A breach involving government records, credentials, contracts, personal information, and infrastructure documents would serve as a powerful warning to other municipalities.
European governments are likely to reassess how administrative networks are segmented, how sensitive documents are classified, and how quickly stolen credentials can be invalidated.
(-1) Sensitive Information Could Still Be Published
The greatest unresolved danger is that Berlin’s refusal to pay does not prevent the attackers from releasing stolen data.
If even a fraction of the most sensitive claims prove genuine, affected individuals and organizations could face phishing, fraud, impersonation, credential attacks, and further targeted intrusions.
(-1) The Incident Could Become a Long-Term Security Problem
If privileged credentials, service accounts, infrastructure documents, or third-party access information were genuinely stolen, the incident could require months of remediation.
The technical breach may eventually be closed, but the information stolen during the intrusion could continue creating security risks long after Berlin declares its network recovered.
Final Analysis: Why the Berlin Attack Matters
This Is Bigger Than a Ransomware Infection
The Berlin incident illustrates how ransomware has evolved from a destructive malware problem into a complex intelligence, privacy, and national-security threat.
The attackers do not necessarily need to keep Berlin’s computers encrypted forever.
They only need to possess information that Berlin cannot afford to see published.
The Data Is the Weapon
The alleged 5.79 TB figure may eventually prove exaggerated, partially accurate, or remarkably close to reality.
But the exact number is less important than the principle behind the attack.
Modern ransomware groups weaponize information.
They steal it, categorize it, advertise it, threaten to publish it, and use the victim’s legal and political responsibilities as leverage.
Berlin Now Has to Prove Its Resilience
The city has already taken several important steps by isolating affected departments, activating emergency response structures, involving law enforcement and federal security authorities, and continuing forensic analysis.
Now comes the harder part.
Berlin must determine what happened, what was stolen, whether any credentials remain exposed, whether attackers maintained persistence, and whether other government systems were touched.
The Most Important Lesson
The central lesson is simple: a government cannot assume that recovering computers means recovering security.
The real recovery begins when defenders understand the attacker’s path, remove every remaining foothold, rotate every compromised secret, validate critical systems, monitor for secondary attacks, and protect the people whose information may have been exposed.
Berlin’s refusal to pay may become one of the defining decisions of this incident.
But the true measure of the city’s response will not be whether it paid the ransom.
It will be whether Berlin can emerge from the attack with a stronger, more segmented, more observable, and more resilient digital infrastructure than it had before the attackers arrived.
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