Virtualizor Update Hijacked: A BGP Attack Turned a Trusted Software Channel Into a Weapon + Video

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A Dangerous New Chapter in Supply-Chain Attacks

A security incident involving Virtualizor, the VPS management platform from Softaculous, has exposed a particularly dangerous weakness in modern hosting infrastructure: sometimes attackers do not need to break the software itself. They can attack the road the software travels on.

Between August 28 and August 30, 2026, attackers hijacked BGP routing for part of the infrastructure used by Softaculous and redirected legitimate traffic toward attacker-controlled servers. During the diversion, a malicious Virtualizor update was delivered to a small number of installations that happened to check for updates.

Virtualizor has confirmed the incident and warned administrators to investigate their systems. The company says routing has been restored, while a new Virtualizor 3.2.9.9 release has been published with a Security Analyzer feature designed to help administrators identify signs of compromise.

Virtualizor

What makes this incident especially troubling is that it combines several attack concepts that security teams normally treat separately: BGP hijacking, TLS certificate abuse, software supply-chain compromise, credential theft, and potentially privileged persistence on virtualization hosts.

For hosting providers, that combination is far more serious than a conventional website compromise.

What Is Virtualizor and Why Does This Matter?

Virtualizor is a web-based virtualization management platform used by hosting companies to create, manage, provision, and sell virtual private servers.

A Virtualizor installation can sit at a privileged position inside a hosting provider’s infrastructure. Rather than controlling a single website, it can help administer virtualization nodes hosting potentially hundreds of VPS instances.

That architecture changes the stakes dramatically.

If an attacker compromises an ordinary website, the damage may be limited to that application. If an attacker compromises software running with administrative privileges on a virtualization host, the potential blast radius can become much larger.

This is why a malicious update delivered through a trusted management platform represents a classic software supply-chain threat.

The software does not necessarily need to contain an exploitable vulnerability.

The attacker simply needs to convince the victim that malicious code is actually legitimate software.

The Attack Started With BGP

The incident began with an attack against Border Gateway Protocol, or BGP, the routing system that helps determine where internet traffic should travel.

According to

Virtualizor

The affected range was 162.55.80.0/24, hosted within Hetzner infrastructure.

The attackers announced an unauthorized route for that network, causing some internet traffic intended for legitimate Softaculous services to be redirected elsewhere.

This is the critical moment in the attack.

The attackers did not necessarily have to compromise the Virtualizor servers directly.

Instead, they interfered with the

Why a More-Specific BGP Route Can Win

BGP has a fundamental property that makes route hijacking possible.

When multiple routes match a destination, networks generally prefer the more-specific route.

For example, a legitimate provider might announce a broader:

162.55.0.0/16

An attacker can attempt to announce a narrower:

162.55.80.0/24

Because /24 is more specific than /16, networks that accept and propagate the unauthorized announcement may send traffic for that particular range toward the attacker’s advertised path.

This does not mean every internet connection automatically follows the malicious route. BGP propagation depends on routing relationships, filtering, topology, and local routing decisions.

But when the route propagates widely enough, the consequences can be severe.

Virtualizor’s reconstruction showed that the unauthorized route propagated extensively during the incident.

Virtualizor

+1

The Attack Was Not Just a Traffic Diversion

At first glance, a BGP hijack might sound like a networking problem.

It was much more than that.

The attackers used the routing diversion to interfere with traffic destined for Softaculous services, including infrastructure involved in Virtualizor updates.

That transformed a network-layer attack into a software supply-chain attack.

The distinction is important.

If someone redirects ordinary web traffic, the immediate consequence might be credential theft or surveillance.

If someone redirects a software update request, however, they may gain an opportunity to place malicious code directly onto the victim’s infrastructure.

That is exactly the scenario security teams fear most.

The Malicious Virtualizor Update

Softaculous confirmed that a malicious Virtualizor update package was delivered to a small number of installations whose traffic was diverted during the attack window.

Virtualizor

The company emphasized that this was not a compromise affecting the entire Virtualizor user base.

Only installations that actually checked for updates while their traffic was being redirected could have received the malicious package.

That limitation is important.

It means the incident should not be interpreted as evidence that every Virtualizor server was compromised.

At the same time, Softaculous cannot produce a definitive list of affected installations because the malicious responses were served from attacker-controlled infrastructure and therefore did not appear in the company’s normal logs.

Virtualizor

That uncertainty is one of the most difficult aspects of the incident.

The HTTPS Problem Was More Complicated Than It Looks

One of the most unsettling elements of the attack was the use of a technically valid TLS certificate.

Many administrators instinctively trust HTTPS as proof that they are communicating with the correct server.

But HTTPS primarily proves that the endpoint possesses a certificate valid for the requested domain.

If an attacker can manipulate the routing environment and interfere with automated domain-validation traffic, obtaining a valid certificate becomes considerably more dangerous.

Virtualizor reported that the attacker obtained a valid certificate for affected domains while traffic was being diverted. Consequently, affected connections could appear legitimate at the TLS level rather than producing the obvious certificate warning administrators might expect from an ordinary man-in-the-middle attack.

Virtualizor

+1

That is a crucial lesson.

A valid padlock does not prove that the software package behind the connection is trustworthy.

The Real Weakness: Trust in the Update Pipeline

The deepest lesson from this incident is not simply “BGP is dangerous.”

It is that trust must be verified at multiple layers.

An update mechanism may rely on:

DNS resolution.

BGP routing.

HTTPS.

TLS certificates.

Web servers.

Package repositories.

Update metadata.

Package integrity.

Package authenticity.

Installation privileges.

If the final installation process trusts the transport channel without independently verifying the software package cryptographically, compromising an earlier layer can undermine the entire chain.

This is precisely why modern software distribution increasingly relies on signed packages, reproducible builds, transparency mechanisms, and independent integrity verification.

A Small Number of Victims Can Still Mean a Huge Risk

Softaculous says only a handful of servers received the malicious update.

That sounds reassuring.

But infrastructure security cannot be judged solely by victim count.

Imagine a hosting provider operating a small number of Virtualizor management servers, each controlling hundreds of VPS instances.

Compromising one privileged host may provide an attacker with a strategic foothold into an entire hosting environment.

That means the phrase “small number of installations” should not be confused with “small security impact.”

The number of compromised systems and the potential blast radius are two different measurements.

The Most Important Indicator of Compromise

Virtualizor has specifically instructed administrators to look for:

/etc/systemd/system/java-jre-update.service

The presence of this file should be treated as a serious warning sign.

The unusual name is important because attackers frequently disguise persistence mechanisms as legitimate system services.

A service containing “java-jre-update” may appear ordinary to someone scanning quickly through a server.

But administrators should not assume that every service with a familiar-looking name is legitimate.

Defensive Check: Inspect the Suspicious Service

Administrators investigating potentially affected systems can begin with:

sudo test -f /etc/systemd/system/java-jre-update.service \n&& echo "WARNING: suspicious service found" \n|| echo "Service not found"

If the file exists, inspect it before deleting anything:

sudo systemctl status java-jre-update.service
sudo systemctl cat java-jre-update.service
sudo ls -l /etc/systemd/system/java-jre-update.service

Then examine its timestamps:

sudo stat /etc/systemd/system/java-jre-update.service

The goal is not simply to determine whether the file exists.

Security teams should establish when it was created, what it executes, who created it, and what other persistence mechanisms may have been established at the same time.

Deep Analysis: Search for Persistence

A malicious systemd service should trigger a broader investigation.

Administrators can enumerate active services with:

systemctl list-units --type=service --state=running

And inspect enabled services:

systemctl list-unit-files --state=enabled

Search for recently modified systemd units:

sudo find /etc/systemd/system /usr/lib/systemd/system \n-type f -mtime -14 -ls

Investigate cron persistence:

sudo crontab -l
sudo ls -la /etc/cron.d/
sudo ls -la /etc/cron.daily/
sudo ls -la /etc/cron.hourly/

Inspect local accounts:

awk -F: '$3 >= 1000 {print $1, $3, $6, $7}' /etc/passwd

Review SSH authorization files:

sudo find /root /home -name authorized_keys -type f -print

And examine recent authentication activity:

sudo last -a
sudo journalctl --since "2026-08-28 20:00:00 UTC" \n--until "2026-08-30 07:00:00 UTC"

These commands are intended for defensive investigation and incident response. They do not prove that a system is clean by themselves.

Look Beyond the Known IOC

Finding /etc/systemd/system/java-jre-update.service would be significant.

Not finding it is not the same thing as proving that a server is uncompromised.

This distinction matters enormously in incident response.

Attackers can modify or delete their persistence mechanisms. They can use different filenames. They can create accounts, SSH keys, timers, cron jobs, binaries, kernel-level persistence, containers, or other mechanisms.

Security teams should therefore treat the published service as a known indicator, not as a universal definition of compromise.

A complete investigation should examine authentication logs, process history where available, file modifications, outbound connections, user accounts, SSH keys, scheduled tasks, and system integrity.

Rotate Credentials Instead of Assuming They Are Safe

Softaculous recommends administrators rotate relevant API credentials and restrict access.

That is sensible because credentials used during a suspected compromise window must be treated cautiously.

At minimum, affected operators should review:

Virtualizor API credentials

SSH credentials

Hosting control-panel credentials

Cloud credentials

Database credentials

Backup credentials

Customer-management credentials

Automation credentials

If an attacker obtained privileged access to a virtualization host, changing only the Virtualizor password may not be enough.

Credential rotation should be performed from a known-clean system whenever possible.

SSH Keys Deserve Special Attention

Passwords are not the only authentication mechanism attackers can abuse.

SSH keys can provide persistent access long after passwords have been changed.

Administrators should therefore inspect:

sudo find /root /home -type f -name authorized_keys -print

Then manually review unfamiliar keys:

sudo cat /root/.ssh/authorized_keys

For each unexpected key, determine:

Who owns it?

When was it created?

Why does it exist?

Which automation system uses it?

Was it present before the incident?

Has it appeared on other servers?

Never delete an unfamiliar key blindly during an investigation if doing so could destroy evidence.

Check Outbound Connections

A compromised server may continue communicating with attacker-controlled infrastructure after the original intrusion.

Administrators can inspect current network connections with:

sudo ss -tunap

For listening services:

sudo ss -lntup

And inspect recent network-related activity through available logs and monitoring systems.

The objective is to identify unexpected destinations, unfamiliar processes, unusual listening ports, or connections that began around the known attack window.

Package Integrity Is the Bigger Security Lesson

The incident highlights a security principle that should be familiar to every software vendor:

Transport security and software authenticity are not the same thing.

HTTPS protects a connection.

It does not independently guarantee that a software package is genuine if the trust model allows an attacker-controlled endpoint to present a valid certificate.

Cryptographic package signing provides an additional layer.

If the update client verifies a package signature using a trusted vendor public key, simply redirecting traffic is no longer enough.

The attacker would need access to the

Softaculous Plans Cryptographic Signing

Softaculous says it plans to implement cryptographic signing for software packages going forward and migrate to improved infrastructure. Virtualizor 3.2.9.9 also introduces a Security Analyzer feature in the administration panel.

Virtualizor

That is arguably one of the most important long-term responses to the incident.

Better infrastructure can reduce the probability of another routing compromise.

But cryptographic package signing can reduce the consequences if traffic is compromised again.

Security architecture should assume that individual layers will eventually fail.

The Client Portal Creates Another Risk

The BGP diversion also affected traffic associated with Softaculous’ client and billing infrastructure.

That creates a separate concern from the malicious update itself.

Users who logged into affected services during the incident window should consider their credentials potentially exposed and review account activity.

Anyone who entered payment information should also monitor financial statements and look for suspicious transactions.

This is particularly important because users are accustomed to trusting a familiar HTTPS page.

In this case, that trust could have been exploited without producing the obvious browser warning that usually signals a certificate problem.

The Incident Is Still Under Investigation

Softaculous has stated that its investigation remains ongoing and that it has not identified malicious packages affecting its other products at this stage.

Virtualizor

That wording matters.

There is a major difference between:

No other products were compromised.

and:

“We have not identified malicious packages affecting other products.”

The second statement reflects an investigation that is still developing.

Security teams should therefore avoid both extremes: there is no reason to assume every Softaculous product was compromised, but there is also no reason to treat the Virtualizor incident as completely isolated until the investigation is finished.

What Undercode Say:

1. The Most Dangerous Part Was Trust

This attack demonstrates how much modern infrastructure depends on invisible layers of trust.

2. BGP Is Rarely Visible to Administrators

Most server administrators never think about BGP while managing a VPS.

1. Yet BGP Can Influence Where Their Software Comes From

That makes routing security directly relevant to software security.

4. The Attack Chained Multiple Trust Systems

The attackers combined routing manipulation with certificate validation and software distribution.

1. That Combination Is Far More Powerful Than a Simple MITM

A normal interception may trigger certificate warnings.

1. This One Did Not Necessarily Trigger Them

The attacker obtained a technically valid TLS certificate for affected domains.

7. The Padlock Was Not Enough

HTTPS can protect the connection while failing to answer the deeper question: “Is this actually the vendor’s software?”

8. Cryptographic Signing Is the Missing Layer

A properly implemented package-signing system can provide independent authenticity verification.

9. Vendors Should Assume Routing Can Fail

The

10. Software Updates Need Their Own Identity

An update should prove that it originated from the legitimate publisher.

11. Hosting Providers Face Higher Stakes

Virtualization management software frequently operates with extensive privileges.

1. A Single Host Can Represent Many Customers

Compromising a management node can potentially create consequences far beyond one machine.

1. “Small Number” Does Not Mean “Low Risk”

The attack surface is determined by privilege and connectivity, not simply victim count.

14. The Missing Logs Are Particularly Important

Because redirected requests never reached Softaculous infrastructure, the vendor cannot reconstruct every affected installation.

1. That Is a Nightmare for Incident Response

Investigators normally depend on server-side logs to identify suspicious activity.

1. Here, the Attacker Controlled the Missing Part of the Conversation

The malicious traffic existed outside the

1. Customers Must Become Part of the Investigation

When the provider cannot identify every affected system, every operator must perform local checks.

18. This Changes the Incident-Response Model

The question becomes “Could my server have been exposed?” rather than simply “Was my server on the vendor’s list?”

19. The Systemd IOC Is Valuable

The suspicious java-jre-update.service gives defenders a concrete starting point.

1. But It Must Not Become a False Negative Test

A missing IOC does not guarantee that an attacker never accessed the machine.

21. Attackers Can Adapt

They can rename services, create accounts, install SSH keys, or use other persistence mechanisms.

22. Credential Rotation Is Therefore Essential

A potentially exposed credential should be replaced rather than merely monitored.

23. SSH Keys Need the Same Treatment

Persistent authentication is especially valuable to attackers.

24. API Keys Are Particularly Dangerous

Automation credentials can provide access without requiring interactive login.

25. Hosting Companies Should Investigate Laterally

One compromised management node should trigger investigation of connected infrastructure.

1. Customers Should Be Considered Part of the Blast Radius

A compromised hypervisor is not an isolated computer.

1. Update Infrastructure Should Be Treated Like Production Infrastructure

It deserves monitoring, segmentation, access controls, and independent integrity protections.

28. BGP Monitoring Should Become Normal

Organizations operating critical update services can monitor route announcements for unexpected changes.

29. RPKI Can Help

Route Origin Validation can reduce some classes of unauthorized route announcements.

1. But RPKI Is Not a Complete Solution

Routing security needs multiple layers, including filtering, monitoring, and operational controls.

31. Certificate Authorities Also Matter

Automated certificate validation can be affected by network-level manipulation.

1. Domain Validation Is Not the Same as Organizational Trust

A technically valid certificate does not prove that the server is operated by the company users expect.

33. Software Vendors Need Independent Trust Anchors

Package signatures are one of the strongest ways to achieve this.

34. Customers Should Demand Signed Updates

Especially when software runs with root-level privileges.

35. Transparency Can Help Too

Signed metadata, reproducible builds, public release hashes, and transparency systems can make supply-chain attacks harder to hide.

1. Security Must Survive Compromise of Individual Layers

The network can fail.

The DNS layer can fail.

The web server can fail.

The certificate layer can fail.

The package repository can fail.

The security architecture should still have another line of defense.

37.

The new Security Analyzer and planned package-signing improvements are meaningful steps.

1. The Incident Should Become a Design Lesson

The industry should not wait for another poisoned update before strengthening update verification.

1. BGP Hijacking Is Not Just a Networking Problem

It can become a credential-theft, espionage, malware-delivery, and supply-chain problem.

40. The Biggest Lesson Is Simple

Never allow one layer of trust to authenticate the entire software supply chain.

Deep Analysis: How the Attack Chain Worked

Stage One: Route Manipulation

The first stage involved unauthorized BGP routing.

Conceptually, the attack looked like:

Victim Server

|

| Update Request

v

Internet Routing

|

X Unauthorized BGP Route

|
v

Attacker Infrastructure

Instead of:

Victim Server

|
v

Internet Routing

|
v

Softaculous Infrastructure

The attacker effectively inserted their infrastructure into the path for affected destinations.

Stage Two: Traffic Interception

Once traffic was diverted, the attacker could receive requests intended for Softaculous services.

That created opportunities to observe requests, respond to them, and potentially deliver altered content.

The exact impact depended on which service was accessed and whether the victim’s traffic followed the malicious route at that moment.

Stage Three: TLS Trust Was Circumvented

The attacker reportedly obtained a valid certificate for affected domains during the routing diversion.

That meant the

The result is particularly dangerous:

HTTPS = Valid
Domain = Expected
Certificate = Valid
Server = Malicious
Software = Malicious

This demonstrates why certificate validation alone is insufficient for high-value software distribution.

Stage Four: The Update Became the Payload

The attacker did not need to convince users to manually download a suspicious executable.

The malicious content arrived through the normal update mechanism.

That is a much stronger position for an attacker.

The

The

And the resulting code could execute with the privileges available to the Virtualizor installation.

Stage Five: Persistence

The reported:

/etc/systemd/system/java-jre-update.service

is significant because systemd services can provide persistent execution after reboot.

A defender discovering such a service should therefore investigate its contents, timestamps, executable targets, associated users, and related artifacts.

Do not simply assume that deleting the file completely removes the compromise.

Stage Six: Credential Exposure

The attack also potentially exposed credentials entered into affected Softaculous services.

That creates a second category of risk.

Even if an administrator removes the malicious service, credentials captured during the incident could remain valid.

Therefore:

Detect compromise

↓

Contain system

↓

Rotate credentials

↓

Audit access

↓

Rebuild if necessary

↓

Restore trusted software

is safer than simply deleting a suspicious file and returning to normal operations.

How Administrators Should Respond

1. Check the Known IOC

Run:

sudo test -f /etc/systemd/system/java-jre-update.service \n&& echo "POTENTIAL COMPROMISE" \n|| echo "IOC not found"
2. Inspect Rather Than Immediately Destroy Evidence

sudo systemctl cat java-jre-update.service
sudo stat /etc/systemd/system/java-jre-update.service
3. Review Authentication

sudo last -a
sudo journalctl --since "2026-08-28 20:57:00 UTC" \n--until "2026-08-30 06:10:00 UTC"
4. Search SSH Keys

sudo find /root /home -type f -name authorized_keys -print
5. Inspect Scheduled Persistence

sudo crontab -l
sudo ls -la /etc/cron.d/
sudo systemctl list-timers --all
6. Review Network Activity

sudo ss -tunap
sudo ss -lntup
7. Rotate Credentials

Rotate potentially exposed:

Virtualizor API keys

SSH keys

Administrator passwords

Hosting API credentials

Cloud credentials

Database credentials

Automation secrets

8. Use a Known-Clean Administration System

Credential rotation should ideally be performed from a machine that has not been exposed to the potentially compromised host.

9. Rebuild High-Risk Systems When Appropriate

If reliable evidence indicates that an attacker obtained root-level control, rebuilding from trusted media can provide substantially stronger assurance than attempting to manually clean every artifact.

10. Investigate Connected Infrastructure

Hosting providers should extend the investigation to other management nodes, automation servers, backup systems, monitoring infrastructure, and customer-facing systems that may have trusted the compromised host.

✅ The BGP Hijacking Incident Is Confirmed

Virtualizor officially disclosed that its infrastructure was affected by an unauthorized BGP route announcement between approximately August 28 and August 30, 2026. The vendor confirmed that traffic was diverted away from its infrastructure.

Virtualizor

✅ A Malicious Virtualizor Update Was Delivered

Softaculous confirmed that a malicious Virtualizor update reached a small number of installations whose update traffic was diverted during the incident. This is not merely a theoretical supply-chain risk; the vendor confirmed actual malicious package delivery.

Virtualizor

✅ The Exact Victim List Is Unknown

Because redirected requests were served by attacker-controlled infrastructure rather than Softaculous’ legitimate servers, the vendor said it cannot produce a definitive list of affected installations.

Virtualizor

✅ Administrators Should Check for the Suspicious Systemd Service

The vendor specifically identifies /etc/systemd/system/java-jre-update.service as an indicator that administrators should investigate. Its presence should trigger an immediate security response rather than being ignored.

❌ It Is Incorrect to Say Every Virtualizor Server Was Compromised

The available evidence does not support that conclusion. Softaculous explicitly says the malicious update reached only a small number of installations, specifically those that checked for updates while their traffic was diverted.

Virtualizor

❌ A Valid HTTPS Certificate Does Not Prove the Update Was Safe

The incident demonstrates why TLS alone is not sufficient to establish software authenticity. A connection can be encrypted and certificate-valid while still delivering malicious content if the underlying trust model has been compromised.

Virtualizor

+1

Prediction

(+1) Software Supply Chains Will Become Far More Cryptographically Verified

The Virtualizor incident is likely to accelerate a broader movement toward cryptographically signed software updates, signed metadata, stronger build provenance, independent integrity verification, and more resilient update infrastructure.

Hosting companies have too much at stake to rely solely on HTTPS and conventional repository security.

If vendors learn the right lesson from incidents like this, future update clients will increasingly verify not only where a package came from, but also who cryptographically authorized it.

(+1) BGP Security Will Receive More Attention From Software Vendors

For years, BGP security was primarily viewed as a telecommunications and networking concern.

That perception is changing.

When a BGP attack can redirect a software update and potentially place malicious code on privileged infrastructure, application-security teams have a direct reason to care about routing security.

(+1) Hosting Providers Will Strengthen Update Isolation

The most mature hosting providers are likely to begin treating update infrastructure as a critical security boundary.

Expect stronger segmentation, route monitoring, package signing, independent verification, credential isolation, and more aggressive incident-response procedures around management platforms.

(-1) Legacy Update Systems Will Remain Attractive Targets

The negative side of the prediction is equally important.

Older management platforms and legacy update mechanisms remain attractive because they often carry enormous privileges while relying on assumptions that were reasonable years ago but are increasingly dangerous today.

Attackers have learned that compromising the supply chain can be easier and more scalable than attacking every customer individually.

The Bigger Warning for the Hosting Industry
One Hijacked Route Can Become a Software Supply-Chain Attack

The Virtualizor incident is a powerful reminder that cybersecurity is no longer divided neatly into networking, endpoint security, identity, and application security.

Those layers overlap.

A routing attack became a traffic interception attack.

The interception became a certificate problem.

The certificate problem became an update-delivery problem.

The update-delivery problem became a potential server compromise.

And the server compromise could potentially become a hosting-infrastructure problem.

That is the modern threat landscape.

Trust Must Be Broken Into Multiple Layers

The safest architecture assumes that every individual trust mechanism can eventually fail.

BGP may be manipulated.

DNS may be manipulated.

A certificate may be valid.

A server may be compromised.

A repository may be redirected.

A credential may be stolen.

A management panel may be abused.

But if the update itself requires a cryptographic signature that only the legitimate vendor can produce, attackers have to overcome another independent security boundary.

That is the lesson Softaculous now has an opportunity to institutionalize.

Virtualizor Administrators Should Treat This as an Incident-Response Event

For administrators running Virtualizor, this should not be treated as an ordinary “update available” notification.

The appropriate mindset is investigation first, trust later.

Check the published indicators.

Review authentication activity.

Inspect systemd.

Audit SSH keys.

Investigate scheduled tasks.

Review outbound connections.

Rotate credentials.

Upgrade to the vendor’s security release.

And if reliable evidence indicates that a privileged system was compromised, seriously consider rebuilding it from trusted sources rather than assuming that removing one known malicious file has restored security.

The most dangerous compromise is often the one that looks clean after the obvious artifact has been deleted.

The Final Lesson

The Virtualizor incident is a warning written across several layers of the internet at once.

BGP determines where traffic goes.

TLS determines whether a connection can be authenticated cryptographically.

Software signing determines whether the package itself can be trusted.

When those protections are treated as interchangeable, one compromised layer can undermine the others.

When they are designed as independent security boundaries, an attacker can win one battle without automatically winning the entire war.

That distinction could determine whether the next BGP hijacking becomes a temporary routing incident—or the beginning of a devastating software supply-chain compromise.

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