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Coordinated Cyber Assault Hits
In a concerning development for North
Despite widespread warnings and the availability of patches, several telecom providers had yet to secure their systems. This oversight allowed Salt Typhoon to hijack devices, exfiltrate critical configuration files, and establish GRE tunnels to secretly siphon data. Canadian authorities had already been on alert since October 2024, when similar reconnaissance activity was detected across multiple sectors. However, some providers failed to implement necessary safeguards, leaving infrastructure exposed. While some of Salt Typhoon’s efforts remain in the reconnaissance phase, the growing frequency and scope of attacks suggest a clear agenda targeting not only telecom giants but also cloud vendors, MSPs, and government-linked networks.
Canadian Telecom Under Siege: The Timeline of the Attack
Salt Typhoon’s offensive began when the group exploited CVE-2023-20198, a critical Cisco IOS XE vulnerability, during February 2025. The flaw, first exposed publicly in October 2023, allows unauthenticated attackers to gain admin privileges and create backdoor accounts on affected devices. Despite ample time and guidance to mitigate this threat, one unnamed Canadian telecom provider failed to patch the vulnerability, giving Salt Typhoon an easy entry point.
The breach involved the compromise of three network devices, with attackers retrieving configuration files and establishing Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) tunnels. These tunnels enabled the group to discreetly siphon network traffic, raising concerns of espionage involving sensitive data such as subscriber locations, SMS contents, call metadata, and potentially government communications.
Authorities had already been wary. In October 2024, following Salt Typhoon’s cyberattacks on U.S. broadband providers, Canada’s cyber agency reported signs of surveillance operations against key national organizations. But even then, no actual breaches were confirmed, and some providers remained complacent. Now, the attack confirms the consequences of that inaction.
This campaign isn’t isolated. Salt Typhoon is believed to be operating globally, hitting telecommunications and critical infrastructure across dozens of countries. U.S. telecom giants like AT\&T, Verizon, and Viasat have already been affected. Despite Viasat’s assurance that no customer data was impacted, the breach highlights the scale of the operation.
To counter this threat, the Cyber Centre has issued guidance on hardening edge devices, which are frequent targets. Devices at the network perimeter, including routers, firewalls, and VPNs, are especially vulnerable. Additionally, managed service providers (MSPs) and cloud vendors are now high-value targets due to their indirect access to customer networks.
While much of Salt Typhoon’s activity remains in the reconnaissance phase, intelligence shows an increasing shift toward deeper infiltration, possibly laying the groundwork for future supply chain attacks. Canadian authorities now warn that such attacks are “almost certain to continue” over the next two years. Organizations in critical sectors must act swiftly to bolster defenses, enforce patch management, and prevent a widening breach of national cyberinfrastructure.
What Undercode Say:
Dissecting the Salt Typhoon Threat: A Wake-Up Call for Canada’s Cybersecurity Posture
The breach by Salt Typhoon is far more than a technical incident — it’s a calculated geopolitical move reflecting the growing sophistication of state-backed cyber actors. This wasn’t an opportunistic attack; it was strategic, leveraging old vulnerabilities left unpatched by a Canadian telecom provider despite over a year of global alerts.
The exploitation of CVE-2023-20198 is especially troubling because it reflects a pattern in cybersecurity negligence. In an industry where edge devices handle high-value metadata and real-time communications, patching should be a non-negotiable standard, not an afterthought. Yet, Salt Typhoon’s breach proves that some organizations remain perilously reactive rather than proactive.
The timeline of events suggests that Canadian authorities had plenty of early warning signs. Back in October 2024, reconnaissance activity linked to Salt Typhoon had already been flagged. The fact that it took another breach in February 2025 to galvanize broader action points to a critical delay in institutional response.
Salt Typhoon’s strategy focuses on persistent access and data collection via GRE tunnels and configuration manipulation. This indicates long-term planning — not merely stealing data but embedding in systems for future leverage. Their approach aligns with broader espionage campaigns, seeking to understand the structure, behavior, and vulnerabilities of national telecom systems.
What’s especially dangerous is the group’s pivot from targeting just core telecom operators to also probing cloud vendors and MSPs. These third-party services often have deep integration with governmental and corporate systems, creating indirect vectors of compromise. This layered attack model means the threat isn’t just to one provider but potentially cascades across entire supply chains.
Moreover, the continued operation of Salt Typhoon in the reconnaissance phase across multiple industries shows patience and discipline. This is cyber warfare conducted with surgical precision — mapping out systems, harvesting data quietly, and waiting for the right moment to strike. This long game is what distinguishes advanced persistent threat (APT) groups from common cybercriminals.
From a broader lens, this incident exposes flaws in Canada’s national cybersecurity readiness. There is a clear need for mandatory patching compliance, zero-trust architectures, and real-time threat detection frameworks that integrate with global intelligence feeds. The current voluntary model of security upgrades is not fit to deal with adversaries backed by nation-states.
Furthermore, this breach underscores why cyber hygiene should be embedded at every level of the digital infrastructure stack. While technical guidance is being issued, there’s an equal need for policy enforcement, executive accountability, and perhaps even legal ramifications for negligent providers responsible for critical data.
As the geopolitical climate intensifies, especially with rising digital tensions between China and Western nations, attacks like these are likely to escalate in complexity and frequency. Canada cannot afford to remain a soft target. Coordinated, national-level strategies — combining private-sector readiness with government oversight — are now essential.
🔍 Fact Checker Results:
✅ Verified: CVE-2023-20198 is a critical Cisco vulnerability exploited by Salt Typhoon since late 2023.
✅ Verified: Canadian telecom infrastructure was breached in February 2025 due to unpatched systems.
✅ Verified: Salt Typhoon operations have impacted multiple telecom providers globally, including Viasat and AT\&T.
📊 Prediction:
Given Salt Typhoon’s expanding footprint and the lack of full defensive readiness across Canadian networks, future breaches are highly likely over the next 12–24 months.
Expect an increase in indirect attacks via third-party vendors and an eventual escalation toward supply chain infiltration, especially if current security gaps remain unaddressed.
Government-mandated patch compliance frameworks and shared threat intelligence networks will become crucial in countering state-sponsored actors moving forward.
References:
Reported By: www.bleepingcomputer.com
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