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A Deep Dive Into CVE-2025-0072: The ARM Mali GPU Driver Vulnerability That Breaks MTE
A newly revealed security flaw has sent shockwaves through the Android community. Tracked as CVE-2025-0072, this high-severity vulnerability targets the ARM Mali GPU driver — a critical piece of software powering flagship Android smartphones like Google’s Pixel 7, 8, and 9 series. Although a patch was released in May 2025 via driver version r54p0, the exploit it enabled is both sophisticated and alarming. The vulnerability allows a rogue Android app to bypass Arm’s Memory Tagging Extension (MTE) — a defense designed to block dangerous memory errors — and take full control of the kernel. That means complete compromise of the device at the deepest level.
Here’s what’s at stake, how the attack works, and why it signals a broader concern in kernel-level driver design.
The Breakdown of CVE-2025-0072
The CVE-2025-0072 vulnerability was discovered in late 2024 and disclosed responsibly to ARM, which patched the issue in May 2025. It affects recent ARM Mali GPUs using the Command Stream Frontend (CSF), a subsystem that handles communication between applications and the GPU via command queues. These queues, managed by the kbase_queue structure, can be bound and unbound to groups and mapped into user space memory.
The exploit takes advantage of a flaw in how GPU memory pages are mapped and freed. By unbinding a queue from a terminated group and rebinding it to a new one, an attacker can trigger a use-after-free condition — a classic vulnerability type that lets freed memory be used again, often in unintended ways. In this case, the attacker can manipulate memory allocation timing so that the freed GPU memory pages are reallocated for sensitive structures like GPU page table global directories (PGDs).
Once this happens, the attacker-controlled app can write to the GPU page tables directly, which ultimately leads to arbitrary kernel memory modification, including executing kernel-level code — the most privileged level of control on a device.
The particularly troubling aspect is how the exploit bypasses the Memory Tagging Extension (MTE). MTE is supposed to catch this kind of abuse by tagging and checking memory accesses. But due to how the GPU driver handles memory mapping, the normal MTE protections are sidestepped — the kernel doesn’t detect the unsafe memory use, allowing the attack to proceed without triggering alerts.
Security researchers say this kind of attack is not just a Mali GPU problem — it highlights a wider systemic issue in how kernel drivers manage complex memory operations. If drivers don’t follow strict memory safety rules, even the best hardware mitigations can be rendered useless.
What Undercode Say:
This vulnerability isn’t just a footnote in Android security — it’s a stark warning. CVE-2025-0072 highlights a recurring theme in modern computing: hardware protections like MTE are only as good as the software that supports them.
ARM’s Memory Tagging Extension was designed to make memory corruption attacks nearly impossible. But as we see here, driver-level logic flaws can bypass even the most sophisticated protections. That’s deeply concerning. Especially because GPU drivers, unlike application code, run with elevated privileges and touch many layers of the system — from user space to the kernel.
The attack method used in this case is especially elegant in its subtlety. It doesn’t rely on brute force or basic memory corruption. Instead, it takes advantage of mismanaged memory states during queue unbinding and rebinding, leveraging ioctl system calls in a carefully orchestrated sequence. The result is a controlled overwrite of kernel memory without tripping memory safety alarms. It’s a masterclass in exploiting architectural blind spots.
This isn’t just an isolated threat to Pixel devices. The CSF architecture is becoming more common in Android devices, meaning millions could be vulnerable if they don’t update. That said, the real takeaway isn’t just “patch your phone.” It’s a wake-up call for how we treat device drivers in the security chain.
Drivers like Mali’s often don’t get the same scrutiny as app code or operating system kernels. But they bridge the user and kernel space, handling memory mappings, resource allocation, and permission checks. That makes them prime targets — and critical weak points — for attackers.
The good news? ARM responded quickly, issuing a patch in their r54p0 driver and working with Android to include it in the May 2025 security bulletin. But the bad news is that use-after-free vulnerabilities like this one will continue to surface unless GPU and kernel driver codebases undergo rigorous code review, fuzzing, and formal verification.
In a world where MTE, PAC (Pointer Authentication), and other mitigations are becoming standard, attackers are shifting their focus. They’re no longer just looking for buffer overflows — they’re hunting for subtle implementation bugs that let them turn safety features against themselves.
If anything, CVE-2025-0072 shows us that the next generation of exploits will be smarter, stealthier, and more system-aware. Defenses must evolve accordingly, not just in the hardware but in the discipline of secure driver development.
Fact Checker Results ✅
The vulnerability is confirmed by GitHub reports and ARM advisories.
MTE bypass via GPU page tables is a validated attack vector.
The fix was officially released in May 2025 in driver version r54p0. 🔒🔍📱
Prediction 📡
As driver vulnerabilities become the new frontier for kernel-level attacks, we predict a growing trend of zero-days in GPU and I/O drivers, especially as mobile devices increase in complexity. Future Android updates will likely include tighter sandboxing for driver interactions and more aggressive runtime validation for memory operations. Expect MTE and similar protections to be revised for deeper integration with driver-level logic — or be bypassed again.
References:
Reported By: cyberpress.org
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