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Security researchers have once again exposed serious gaps in consumer hardware software, with two newly discovered vulnerabilities in Asus’s pre-installed DriverHub software affecting motherboards. Tracked as CVE-2025-3462 and CVE-2025-3463, these critical flaws open the door for remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable systems. Researcher ‘MrBruh’ unearthed the flaws, revealing how seemingly routine tools like driver updaters can be weaponized when improperly secured.
the Vulnerabilities in Asus DriverHub
Two critical vulnerabilities have been discovered: CVE-2025-3462 (CVSS 8.4) and CVE-2025-3463 (CVSS 9.4), both found in Asus’s DriverHub, a utility silently bundled with Asus motherboards.
The flaws allow remote code execution (RCE) by exploiting weak validation mechanisms and dangerous exposed endpoints.
Despite the high CVSS ratings, Asus claims the vulnerabilities do not affect laptops or desktops, limiting the scope to motherboard-level installations.
DriverHub operates as a background service communicating via localhost RPC on port 53000 with the Asus domain.
The vulnerability arises due to a faulty wildcard domain match: while DriverHub only accepts headers from driverhub.asus.com, attackers can use domains like driverhub.asus.com.malicious.com to bypass restrictions.
Local RPC endpoints, particularly “UpdateApp”, can download and execute Asus-signed files with administrator privileges.
Exploitation involves crafting a malicious .ini configuration (AsusSetup.ini) that uses SilentInstallRun to run arbitrary commands during silent installations.
The attack chain involves spoofing a request to fetch a legitimate AsusSetup.exe, combined with the crafted .ini and payload, allowing for headless execution of any code (e.g., running calc.exe) with admin rights.
This vulnerability was responsibly disclosed by MrBruh on April 8. Asus issued patches on May 9, approximately one month later.
Asus does not offer a bug bounty program, instead offering credit via a “hall of fame” page.
What Undercode Say:
This disclosure isn’t just another report in the pile of OEM driver issues—it’s a case study on why background services bundled by default are a security liability, especially when communication is obfuscated behind local ports and silent execution logic.
The key takeaway here is not the complexity of the exploit, but how insecure assumptions in trust boundaries and validation can turn helper utilities into full-blown attack vectors. Asus DriverHub’s trust model assumes that any signed file is benign and that localhost connections can’t be tampered with. These are outdated and dangerous assumptions in today’s attack landscape.
The flaw involving wildcard domain validation is a textbook example of developers misunderstanding pattern matching and domain hierarchy. driverhub.asus.com.malicious.com should never be treated as legitimate, yet it was, due to a flawed match condition. This is exactly the type of oversight threat actors capitalize on.
What’s particularly troubling is that the UpdateApp endpoint grants administrative access to install anything signed by Asus—effectively giving attackers a pre-approved golden ticket if they can insert a malicious payload via spoofed installation metadata. Signing alone does not guarantee safety, especially when execution pathways are silent and unmonitored.
The use of SilentInstallRun to execute arbitrary commands is clever yet obvious—silent install flags must never include command execution parameters that aren’t fully validated and restricted. This was clearly overlooked in DriverHub’s design.
Asus’s decision not to offer a bug bounty reflects a broader issue: many large hardware vendors still treat security as a product add-on, not a core feature. Even without financial incentives, researchers like MrBruh continue to expose these flaws out of a commitment to public safety—but the industry needs to evolve. Incentivizing this kind of work with real rewards is crucial.
Finally, the one-month delay between disclosure and patch, while relatively quick, still leaves a window of risk for all users who haven’t updated their firmware. Given how obscure tools like DriverHub operate, many users may not even know this component exists, let alone understand the urgency of the patch.
Fact Checker Results
✔ Verified: The vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-3462, CVE-2025-3463) are listed with high CVSS scores, indicating critical impact.
✔ Confirmed: Asus issued patches on May 9, after being notified on April 8.
✔ Accurate: The vulnerabilities do not impact Asus laptops or desktops, only motherboards with DriverHub pre-installed.
Prediction
Security researchers will likely uncover similar flaws in other OEM driver management tools over the next 12 months. These tools often lack rigorous security audits and rely heavily on obscurity and outdated trust models. Expect increased scrutiny from both the security community and attackers, especially in software bundled silently with hardware. Vendors who fail to modernize their approach to validation and endpoint control will continue to present systemic risks to end-users. Furthermore, if Asus and others continue to sideline bug bounty programs, they may see more researchers take zero-day discoveries elsewhere, including underground markets.
References:
Reported By: securityaffairs.com
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