Listen to this Post
Critical iOS 18.5 Flaw Exposes Apple Devices to Remote Exploits During Activation
Introduction:
A newly discovered security flaw in Appleās latest iOS 18.5 poses a serious threat to device security, targeting the very first moments a device is powered on and set up. Researchers have found that Appleās provisioning infrastructure is vulnerable to unauthenticated and unsigned payloads during device activation, putting users and organizations at risk of stealthy configuration tampering. The flaw lies in Appleās backend system and could be leveraged without any physical access to the device, potentially allowing attackers to silently compromise iPhones and iPads during mass deployment or in enterprise environments. Here’s what this critical vulnerability means for users, IT administrators, and Apple itself.
Severe iOS Activation Vulnerability Exposes Apple Devices to Remote Attacks
Security researchers have unveiled a dangerous vulnerability in Appleās iOS 18.5 activation mechanism that could allow attackers to silently manipulate device configurations without user consent or authentication. The flaw resides in an internal Apple endpoint (`https://humb.apple.com/humbug/baa`) responsible for provisioning logic during device setup.
The core of the issue is that this activation server accepts XML-based property list (.plist) payloads that are neither authenticated nor signed. Worse, the system does not validate or sanitize the inputs, tolerating malformed or dangerous structures such as DOCTYPE declarations ā a known vector for XML External Entity (XXE) attacks.
Attackers can craft malicious XML payloads to inject arbitrary provisioning logic, bypassing Appleās Mobile Device Management (MDM) system and standard security checks. These payloads can be delivered remotely through captive portals, rogue Wi-Fi hotspots, or compromised provisioning servers, making them especially dangerous during large-scale deployments or in hostile environments.
A proof-of-concept attack showed that a crafted plist containing malicious provisioning data was accepted and processed by Appleās backend, returning a 200 OK response ā confirming server-side processing of unauthorized configuration logic. These changes persist across device resets and are invisible in standard logs, allowing silent manipulation of system settings like modem protocols and network behavior.
What makes this vulnerability particularly alarming is its stealth: it doesnāt require physical access, jailbreaking, or persistent malware. It can be used to implant hidden profiles or run background tasks that evade forensic tools. Researchers noted traces of such attacks in system caches like CloudKitAccountInfoCache and CommCenter, raising concerns about undetectable tampering even in newly activated devices.
This security gap draws parallels with high-profile incidents like SignalGate, where communication security was silently compromised. Despite being disclosed to Apple on May 19, no patch or public response has been issued. With devices still vulnerable, experts are calling for urgent updates to Appleās provisioning system to enforce authentication and signature checks and to implement robust error handling.
What Undercode Say:
The iOS 18.5 provisioning vulnerability isnāt just a technical oversight ā itās a systemic weakness in Appleās trusted activation infrastructure. When provisioning logic can be altered without authentication or verification, it undermines the very security Apple promises its users, especially in enterprise and government environments.
Letās break down whatās at stake. Appleās provisioning server accepts unauthenticated XML files, allowing attackers to slip in malicious configurations before a device even reaches the user. Think about the implications for supply chain attacks ā devices coming from the factory, tampered with en route, and activated with compromised policies without leaving a single trace in user-accessible logs.
Apple typically touts its MDM solutions as secure and enforceable, but this flaw completely bypasses them. Any enterprise relying on remote enrollment for fleets of iPhones is at serious risk of having those devices enrolled with rogue settings that persist even after a full device wipe. The absence of cryptographic verification in such a critical layer is a glaring red flag.
The technique doesnāt require exotic hacking skills. All it takes is access to a local network (via a rogue Wi-Fi point or captive portal) during setup ā a scenario very plausible in public or semi-public environments. Attackers could exploit this window to silently modify device configurations, potentially injecting profiles that alter modem behavior, disable security features, or route traffic through malicious proxies.
Even worse, the evidence of such tampering resides in system caches and backend logs, not in typical user-facing audit trails. Security teams might never know a device has been compromised unless they conduct deep forensic analysis ā which is rarely done during routine activations.
Appleās silence on this matter is worrying. The vulnerability was disclosed weeks ago, and yet thereās no mitigation, no patch, and no official acknowledgment. For a company that prides itself on privacy and security, this lack of responsiveness can erode enterprise trust and leave high-value targets exposed.
In sum, this is not a vulnerability to ignore. It strikes at the foundation of Appleās device trust model ā the provisioning phase. Without immediate fixes, organizations need to reevaluate how they deploy and secure Apple devices, especially in sensitive fields like finance, defense, and healthcare.
Fact Checker Results ā
š Exploit confirmed through independent proof-of-concept
š”ļø No authentication or signature verification detected in provisioning server
š
Disclosure made to Apple on May 19 ā no fix as of early June
Prediction:
If left unpatched, this flaw could become a cornerstone exploit for APT groups targeting enterprises and governments. We may soon see its use in advanced supply chain attacks, leveraging stealth provisioning manipulation before the device even lands in the end-user’s hands. Expect enterprise security guidelines to shift toward offline or air-gapped activation workflows until Apple delivers a robust fix.
References:
Reported By: cyberpress.org
Extra Source Hub:
https://www.quora.com
Wikipedia
Undercode AI
Image Source:
Unsplash
Undercode AI DI v2
