Hidden Dangers in the Cloud: AWS Default Roles Expose Accounts to Major Security Risks

In today’s cloud-driven world, ease of use often comes at the cost of security. A newly surfaced set of vulnerabilities in Amazon Web Services (AWS) shows how default configurations in cloud services—especially those that prioritize convenience over control—can silently expand an organization’s attack surface.

A recent security investigation has revealed that several core AWS services, including SageMaker, Glue, and EMR, automatically create service roles with dangerously permissive access, particularly through the AmazonS3FullAccess policy. This seemingly helpful shortcut opens the door to privilege escalation, cross-service exploitation, and even full AWS account compromise.

Let’s take a deeper look at how something as routine as using an AWS service could become a security liability—and what this means for organizations relying on cloud infrastructure.

the Issue (30 lines)

• Recent research has uncovered critical vulnerabilities in default AWS service roles.
• Many AWS services, like SageMaker, Glue, and EMR, automatically generate service roles.
• These roles often include the AmazonS3FullAccess policy, granting full access to S3 buckets.
• S3 serves as a central repository for scripts, config files, and other sensitive resources in AWS.
• When a default role has unrestricted S3 access, it can enumerate, read, and modify critical data.
• This introduces major risks of lateral movement within the cloud environment.
• Attackers can escalate privileges and compromise services by manipulating stored files.
• For instance, a malicious Hugging Face model in SageMaker can gain high-level access.
• Once embedded, the attacker can tamper with assets like Glue scripts or CloudFormation templates.
• Similar risks exist in open-source projects like Ray, which also use overly broad roles.
• These roles effectively bypass isolation boundaries across AWS accounts and services.
• AWS initially provided these roles for ease of onboarding and rapid service deployment.
• However, convenience came at the cost of secure permission granularity.
• Upon responsible disclosure, AWS responded by reducing the permissions of many default roles.
• Services like SageMaker, Glue, and EMR have since narrowed access policies.
• AWS also updated documentation and notified affected customers.
• AWS Lightsail now guides users to create narrowly-scoped custom roles.
• Still, many organizations remain vulnerable due to legacy configurations or oversight.
• Security experts urge organizations to audit all IAM roles regularly.
• The biggest red flag: any service role with AmazonS3FullAccess attached.
• This policy grants broad capabilities like reading, writing, and deleting S3 objects across buckets.
• Attackers can use these capabilities to modify infrastructure code and implant backdoors.
• Many AWS buckets follow predictable naming conventions, aiding attackers in reconnaissance.
• A single compromised role can cascade into full account-level compromise.
• Automated roles may give a false sense of safety but must be treated as potential liabilities.
• Organizations should apply the principle of least privilege (PoLP) aggressively.
• Only essential permissions should be assigned to service roles—nothing more.

– Security posture must be proactive, not reactive.

• Even though AWS has improved defaults, customers must take responsibility for security.
• Ignoring default roles’ risks can lead to severe financial and reputational consequences.
• The cloud isn’t inherently secure—it’s secure only when configured that way.

What Undercode Say: (40 lines)

The findings highlight a persistent theme in cloud security: default configurations often sacrifice security for usability. AWS, like many platforms, seeks to streamline user experience, especially during initial service setup. However, this design choice inadvertently leads to serious exposure, particularly when high-level access permissions like AmazonS3FullAccess are applied liberally.

The core concern here is not just about a single misconfigured policy—it’s systemic. When foundational services across AWS utilize S3 buckets for essential operations, giving broad access to these resources effectively grants the keys to the kingdom. It allows attackers to breach one service and use it as a springboard to others, compromising the integrity of the entire cloud infrastructure.

From an

Security hygiene in cloud environments must evolve. The “assume it’s safe because it’s default” mindset is outdated and dangerous. While AWS has taken steps to address the problem by refining permissions and improving documentation, the burden still lies heavily on users and administrators to inspect and harden their environments.

The implications go beyond Amazon. Other cloud providers face similar critiques, and as multi-cloud becomes more common, these misconfigurations can amplify into inter-cloud vulnerabilities. It’s not just about one role or one account—it’s about organizational security strategy.

One major takeaway is the need for continuous IAM audits. Organizations must review all default and custom roles periodically. Automation tools can assist in flagging risky policies like AmazonS3FullAccess, but human oversight is essential for judgment-based refinements.

Zero trust principles—where no service is assumed secure without verification—should be adopted at scale. Fine-grained access control, role separation, environment isolation, and secrets management are no longer optional best practices; they are requirements.

Organizations must also foster a DevSecOps culture where developers and engineers are aware of the implications of permissions. Security can’t be a post-deployment add-on; it must be embedded into the lifecycle.

AWS has made progress, but the danger of outdated defaults persists. Companies using services like Glue, SageMaker, or Ray must revisit their configurations urgently.

Lastly, this case underscores the need for transparency and responsiveness in cloud ecosystems. AWS’s swift action in mitigating these risks is commendable, but prevention will always be more effective than cure.

Fact Checker Results:

• ✅ Confirmed: AWS default roles were found to include overly permissive policies like AmazonS3FullAccess.
• ✅ Verified: These configurations enabled privilege escalation and cross-service compromise scenarios.
• ✅ Resolved: AWS has updated several default roles and issued mitigations following responsible disclosure.

References:

Reported By: cyberpress.org
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