Hidden Threats in Plain Sight: Chinese Kill Switches Found in US Solar Farms

Introduction

A recent investigation has unearthed a disturbing possibility: Chinese-made components in U.S. solar farms might serve as silent weapons capable of remotely disabling portions of the American power grid. These hidden “kill switches,” embedded in power inverters, could give Beijing unprecedented control over energy infrastructure at a moment’s notice. As geopolitical tensions rise, this finding raises serious alarms over the hidden vulnerabilities in our critical infrastructure—and what it means for national security.

the Original

Investigators have discovered hidden cellular radios—referred to as “kill switches”—embedded within Chinese-made power inverters used in U.S. and European solar farms. These covert devices can potentially be triggered remotely, enabling China to disable parts of the power grid during times of conflict. The hidden radios were found during security inspections where U.S. experts disassembled inverter components. These communication devices were not listed in the official product documentation, raising red flags about covert tampering.

Although inverters naturally require remote access for updates and maintenance, utility companies typically rely on firewalls to prevent unauthorized communication. However, these rogue devices bypass traditional security measures, creating backdoors for remote interference.

The problem doesn’t stop with solar inverters. In the last nine months, similar undocumented communication devices have been found in batteries from multiple Chinese suppliers. Experts cannot yet quantify the scale of the infiltration but acknowledge the risk is both widespread and deeply concerning.

One anonymous source described this threat plainly: “That effectively means there is a built-in way to physically destroy the grid.” Alarmingly, this is the first public revelation of such rogue hardware, with no formal acknowledgment yet from the U.S. government. The Department of Energy (DOE) admits it faces significant challenges due to a lack of transparency from manufacturers but is working to strengthen domestic supply chains and reduce reliance on foreign equipment.

Meanwhile, recent cyberattacks on the U.S. grid have been attributed—albeit without direct proof—to state-backed hackers from China, Russia, and Iran. This incident underscores the urgency of addressing supply chain security and rethinking how international partnerships affect national defense. Representative August Pfluger, from the House Homeland Security Committee, stressed the severity of the threat and the need to confront China’s actions.

What Undercode Say:

The discovery of embedded rogue communication hardware in Chinese-manufactured power inverters should be a wake-up call for Western nations—especially the U.S.—about the true cost of outsourcing critical infrastructure components. While outsourcing often appears to reduce costs and improve scalability, the trade-off comes in the form of serious security liabilities.

Power inverters are not just passive pieces of solar hardware; they are smart, programmable devices that regulate how solar energy is converted and transmitted to the grid. If compromised, they could be disabled en masse, causing regional blackouts or even nationwide power instability. The existence of hidden cellular radios means that attackers could potentially bypass traditional network defenses and communicate directly with the hardware—without needing access to the broader IT network.

Even more troubling is the fact that these components are widely deployed, and there’s currently no full inventory or auditing process in place to identify which devices may be compromised. In the cybersecurity field, this represents a classic case of “supply chain attack,” where vulnerabilities are baked into systems during manufacturing and lie dormant until activated.

The Department of Energy’s acknowledgment of the issue—while important—is not enough. Without aggressive, transparent testing and full disclosure from manufacturers, these threats will remain in the shadows. The fact that foreign adversaries like the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) could possess the ability to disrupt or destroy parts of the national grid during a conflict represents a strategic vulnerability.

From a technical perspective, solar farms and batteries must be treated as high-value cyber-physical assets. Security must extend beyond software firewalls to include rigorous hardware-level inspections. The U.S. must fund independent testing labs and accelerate the move toward trusted domestic manufacturing, even if it means higher short-term costs.

The real question now is: How many more hidden backdoors exist in other components—routers, transformers, sensors, or even household devices—that we haven’t yet discovered? Cyber warfare has evolved. The battleground is now our infrastructure, and ignoring this evolution could come at a devastating cost.

Fact Checker Results ✅🕵️‍♂️

✔️ Independent investigations confirm the presence of undocumented radios in Chinese inverters.
✔️ U.S. government has acknowledged ongoing risk assessments but not publicly confirmed incidents.
✔️ Reports from Reuters and The Times validate security experts’ concerns.

Prediction 🔮

Expect increased government scrutiny over all foreign-made critical infrastructure components in the coming year. New policies will likely mandate third-party hardware audits, and funding will shift toward domestic tech manufacturing. Meanwhile, adversarial nations may escalate hybrid warfare tactics, combining cyber and hardware infiltration to exploit hidden vulnerabilities in Western energy systems. Solar energy, once seen purely as a green solution, is becoming a potential battlefield.

References:

Reported By: securityaffairs.com
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