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Introduction
In a major security alert for the open-source community, more than 60 malicious packages were discovered in the NPM ecosystem, designed to exfiltrate sensitive system information and send it to a Discord webhook controlled by threat actors. This dangerous campaign, uncovered by Socketās Threat Research team, began on May 12 and highlights growing threats to developer environments, particularly those involving CI/CD pipelines. In a separate but related incident, another group of 8 data-wiping packages went undetected for two years, targeting some of the most popular JavaScript ecosystems including React and Node.js. These incidents underscore the urgent need for enhanced vigilance and package vetting practices within the developer community.
šØ Summary of the Malicious NPM Package Campaign (30-line Digest)
A total of 60 malicious packages were discovered in the NPM repository. These packages were designed to collect sensitive system information upon installation and transmit it to a Discord webhook. The attack campaign began on May 12, with the packages being uploaded by three distinct publisher accounts.
Each malicious package featured a post-install script that executed automatically during the ānpm installā process. The script harvested a range of data, including hostname, internal IP address, username, system DNS servers, and working directory. Additionally, it tried to detect whether it was running in a virtual analysis environment by scanning for specific hostname patterns and DNS markers.
The malicious packages were cleverly disguised with names mimicking legitimate libraries, such as flipper-plugins, react-xterm2, and hermes-inspector-msggen. These were likely chosen to blend into existing projects and trick developers into installing them, particularly within automated testing and CI/CD pipeline environments.
Socketās researchers did not find evidence of more advanced attacks like privilege escalation or data wiping from these 60 packages. However, the type of information collected points to reconnaissance activities that could enable more targeted follow-up attacks.
Though initially still live at the time of Socketās report, the packages had been downloaded about 3,000 times before being taken down from NPM.
In a related threat campaign, Socket also revealed eight additional malicious packages that acted as data wipers. These packages, uploaded under the username xuxingfeng, used typosquatting techniques to impersonate legitimate tools. Targeting frameworks like React, Vue.js, and Vite, they contained payloads that activated on specific hardcoded dates to delete files, sabotage JavaScript methods, and damage browser storage.
These wipers stayed undetected for over two years and accumulated 6,200 downloads. Their long dormancy was made possible through careful obfuscation and payload delays. While the current threat appears neutralized due to expired activation dates, the code remains dangerous and could be updated to re-enable destructive functions.
Both incidents underscore the growing trend of sophisticated supply chain attacks in open-source ecosystems and the increasing use of developer trust and automation workflows as attack vectors.
š What Undercode Say:
The recent wave of malicious NPM packages marks a chilling reminder of how vulnerable the open-source ecosystem has become. Developers now face the dual challenge of innovation and cybersecurity, where even trusted package managers like NPM can harbor threats. This particular campaign was no brute-force hack but a calculated infiltration designed to weaponize trust.
Attackers behind the 60 packages chose names that sound legitimateāan old but effective trick in software supply chain attacks. The packages didnāt just install codeāthey activated scripts on install, silently collecting environment details that could be used to map internal networks or even identify if the environment is a honeypot or sandbox.
That kind of reconnaissance suggests a methodical approach. While no second-stage payloads were found, the infrastructure and behavior point to a modular attackāfirst gather data, then decide whether to launch a full breach. And the fact these packages targeted CI/CD workflows shows attackers are keenly aware of automation trends in software development. If you poison the pipeline, you poison the product.
On the flip side, the data wiper packages present a different flavor of danger. These were destructive, timed bombs with the ability to wipe or sabotage systems. They relied on typosquatting and were strategically positioned in major ecosystems like React and Vue.js. Their survival for two years is alarming and speaks volumes about the need for better NPM security and detection mechanisms.
Moreover, the use of legitimate-looking packages by the same author to build trust before launching attacks is a social engineering tactic transferred into code repositories. It’s not just the codebase under attackāit’s the entire trust model of open-source collaboration.
Developers need to move beyond relying solely on NPMās moderation. Manual vetting, dependency monitoring tools like Socket, and periodic audits are becoming non-negotiable. Especially in automated build pipelines, one bad install command can compromise everything.
This is a wake-up call. The combination of data theft and data destruction within the same ecosystem should push security to the forefront of development practices. It’s no longer just about writing good codeāitās about knowing where that code comes from.
š Fact Checker Results
ā The packages were indeed verified by
ā
The malicious scripts executed post-install and targeted environment reconnaissance
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Data wipers were active for two years with over 6,000 downloads
š”ļø
š® Prediction
Given the increasing sophistication of NPM-based attacks, we can expect future threats to become even harder to detect. Attackers may blend reconnaissance and payload phases more subtly, making use of time delays, encrypted data channels, or adaptive behavior based on host fingerprinting. Open-source security tools will evolve, but so will the evasion techniques. Developers and enterprises will likely prioritize SBOM (Software Bill of Materials) practices and invest more heavily in static and dynamic analysis tools as a first line of defense. The zero-trust principle will begin to extend from networks to code dependenciesātrust nothing, verify everything.
References:
Reported By: www.bleepingcomputer.com
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