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Cybersecurity researchers are always on the lookout for patterns and anomalies in attacker behavior. One of the most effective tools for understanding brute-force attempts and malicious access tactics is the SSH honeypot — a decoy system designed to lure attackers. The Cowrie honeypot, in particular, plays a critical role in collecting this data, especially when integrated with the DShield network. In this article, we explore a recent username report compiled by Dr. Johannes B. Ullrich, which analyzes SSH and Telnet usernames observed over the past month. From odd typos to mistaken command-line usage, this data provides fascinating insights into how attackers operate — and the errors they make along the way.
SSH Username Report Summary (Last 30 Days):
- Honeypot Foundation: The data was collected using Cowrie, a full-featured SSH and Telnet honeypot developed by Michel Oosterhof and integrated into the DShield honeypot system.
- Username Observation Window: The report focuses on usernames seen at least five times in the past 30 days, giving a snapshot of current brute-force attempts.
3. New Username Highlights:
- ysoperator: Possibly a reused name; no helpful Google results to confirm origin.
– uery: Likely a misspelling of “query”.
- tamatiek: Possibly a Japanese personal or character name.
- shughes: Probably a typical first initial + last name format (e.g., “S. Hughes”).
- dbmasteruser: Suggests targeted attempts at privileged database accounts.
4. Unexpected Entries:
- /usr/share/wordlists/logins.txt: Instead of a username, the attacker appears to have pasted a filepath — possibly due to misconfigured brute-force tools.
5. Typo or Parsing Errors:
– atascientist: Likely intended as “datascientist”.
- ackupadmin: Probably “backupadmin”, hinting at tool formatting bugs or input errors.
- These may arise when scripts accidentally trim characters or misinterpret inputs.
- User Behavior Insight: Many brute-force attempts come from automated tools, which can produce incorrect usernames due to command line errors or poorly designed scripts.
- Data Access: A JSON file (`https://isc.sans.edu/sshallusernames.json`) is publicly available for deeper analysis.
- Password Report in Progress: The researcher is also compiling password data — a harder task due to its sheer variety and volume.
- Key Takeaway: No username is truly “safe.” Attackers are attempting a wide range of inputs, from generic admin names to typos and even file paths.
- Human Errors in Attacks: One of the most telling signs — even attackers fumble. Misused scripts and filenames in place of usernames reflect amateur attempts or hastily written attack tools.
What Undercode Say:
At Undercode, we believe this report highlights an important pattern often overlooked in cybersecurity — the fallibility of attackers. Here’s a deeper analysis from a technical and strategic perspective:
- Attack Vectors Are Evolving, but Not Perfect: While bots and brute-force tools are improving, this report shows that attackers often use generic or malformed usernames — revealing laziness, errors, or poorly configured scripts.
- Username Enumeration Still Effective: Seeing names like dbmasteruser or shughes indicates that attackers use common corporate formats to guess privileged accounts. This stresses the importance of avoiding predictable usernames in production environments.
- Scripted Attacks = Repetitive Patterns: Names appearing multiple times suggest that attackers are running large-scale, automated attacks with predefined username lists. Detecting and analyzing these repetitions can improve defense strategies.
- Human Oversight in Automation: The inclusion of a file path like
/usr/share/wordlists/logins.txtsignals a critical oversight — perhaps an attacker testing a script without fully understanding its functionality. These mistakes are goldmines for defenders, indicating tool origins and attacker skill levels. - Potential for Fingerprinting Tools: By analyzing repeated typo patterns (like “uery” or “ackupadmin”), security teams can trace the specific tools or scripts being used in brute-force campaigns.
- SSH as a Common Target: SSH remains one of the top entry points for attackers. Tools like Cowrie give defenders critical telemetry to stay ahead.
- Low-Level Threats Are Still Useful Intelligence: Even poorly executed attacks help uncover global brute-force trends, botnet behavior, and actor capability.
8. Defensive Implications:
– Use multi-factor authentication (MFA) where possible.
– Avoid default or easily guessable usernames.
- Monitor authentication logs for malformed or oddly structured usernames — a potential red flag.
- Consider implementing delay-based response mechanisms to thwart fast brute-force attempts.
- Community and Collaboration Matter: The open sharing of data, such as the JSON username dump, empowers researchers and defenders worldwide.
- AI-Driven Defense Can Benefit from This Data: Training anomaly detection models on username input patterns (e.g., filenames as usernames) could enhance early warning systems.
- Honeypots Remain Valuable: Cowrie continues to be a powerful tool for understanding how attackers think and where they make mistakes.
- Maturity Level of Attackers Varies Greatly: The mix of sophisticated usernames (like dbmasteruser) and absurd ones (like the path) shows the wide range of attacker experience levels.
- Typo Detection Might Be a Clue: A recurring issue like missing first characters could point to a bug in specific brute-force frameworks.
- Real-Time Monitoring Suggested: Tracking newly seen usernames in near real-time may help identify zero-day campaigns or new botnets in their infancy.
- Language Clues for Attribution: Names like “tamatiek” may offer linguistic or cultural hints about the attack source, helping with threat attribution.
- User Enumeration Protections: Implementing settings that return generic login failure messages can reduce information leakage.
- Social Engineering Remains a Risk: Many of these usernames may also be harvested from breached company credentials, reused in brute-force attacks.
- Behavioral Logging Is Key: Record failed login attempts in detail — not just IPs, but usernames, timing, and request headers.
- Exploration for Further Research: Password dataset (in development) could reveal even more about attacker methods.
- Final Thought: This username list may seem basic, but it’s a digital fingerprint of attackers’ minds — revealing assumptions, tool limitations, and potential vulnerabilities in their processes.
Fact Checker Results:
- Cowrie Honeypot Verified: Confirmed as a well-known and actively maintained SSH/Telnet honeypot.
- Username Report Authentic: The JSON data link and format are publicly accessible from SANS/ISC sources.
- Researcher Credibility: Johannes Ullrich is a recognized authority in the cybersecurity community and Dean of Research at SANS.edu.
Let me know if you’d like a visual data breakdown or timeline based on the JSON file.
References:
Reported By: https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/New
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