Qualcomm GPU Driver Exploits Unveil Major Android Security Flaw: Researchers Achieve Full Root Access on Modern Devices

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In a groundbreaking development poised to shake the foundations of Android device security, researchers from GPU Advanced Forensics (GPUAF) have revealed two powerful exploit chains that reliably root Android smartphones powered by Qualcomm chipsets. Scheduled to be unveiled at BlackHat USA 2024, the findings pierce through even the most modern defense mechanisms, including enhanced SELinux, Samsung KNOX, DEFEX, and physical address space layout randomization (PhyASLR).

These attacks capitalize on deep vulnerabilities within the Qualcomm Adreno GPU driver—a critical component present in numerous high-end Android devices like the Samsung Galaxy S series (non-Exynos models), Honor, Xiaomi, and Vivo. What makes this revelation particularly alarming is that the exploitation chains remain effective despite the presence of aggressive security features that were long believed to be strong deterrents against privilege escalation and root compromise.

Android Exploitation Through Qualcomm GPU: A High-Level Breakdown

GPUAF’s research focuses on complex interactions between CPU and GPU memory, primarily managed by structures like kgsl_mem_entry and VBOs (Vertex Buffer Objects). These structures facilitate memory mapping between GPU and CPU for efficient rendering and computation. However, the intricacy of these systems creates opportunities for race conditions—timing-related bugs that can be exploited when multiple operations access shared memory without proper synchronization.

The Vulnerabilities at Play

The researchers chained multiple kernel vulnerabilities, including:

  • CVE-2024-23380: A race condition in VBO buffer mapping, allowing attackers to access freed memory (Use-after-Free or UaF).
  • CVE-2024-23373: Another race-related flaw, which, in combination with the first, destabilizes kernel memory.
  • Reference Counting Errors: Improper tracking of memory usage allowed malicious memory reclaiming.

By combining these flaws, attackers could reclaim memory pages previously freed and reassign them for malicious use. This enables arbitrary address read/write (AARW) at the physical memory level—effectively granting attackers full control over the device’s memory.

Two Roads to Root: How the Exploit Works

Once AARW is established, GPUAF presents two distinct post-exploitation techniques to achieve root access:

1. Page Table Manipulation

Attackers use memory spraying techniques to fill freed memory with fake page tables. These tables allow them to:

– Change memory permissions (e.g., to read-write-execute)

– Overwrite security structures like `selinux_state`

  • Inject shellcode into critical system processes, such as init, which can spawn reverse or bind shells with full system privileges

2. Pipe Buffer Forgery

Here, attackers manipulate the Linux

Evading Android’s Best Defenses

What’s especially concerning is the

  • SELinux: Exploits minor oversights, such as permissive mode flags, to gain access

– DEFEX: Circumvented through user-space process injection

– Samsung KNOX: Bypassed at the hypervisor level

  • PhyASLR: Deemed ineffective due to predictable memory alignment

In other words, these

What Undercode Say:

These developments signal more than just a technical vulnerability—they’re a wake-up call for the entire mobile cybersecurity ecosystem. While Qualcomm has long been a central player in powering high-performance Android devices, its GPU drivers have now been revealed as a critical attack surface ripe for exploitation.

First, this research demonstrates that race conditions—once considered edge-case bugs—can be strategically weaponized in modern exploits. The fact that three such bugs could be chained together to deliver stable, persistent root access is a testament to the attackers’ sophistication.

Second, this raises uncomfortable questions about the adequacy of current mobile defense strategies. Despite multiple security layers—including physical memory obfuscation, runtime protections, and privilege separation—these exploits make it clear that attackers are capable of navigating around every obstacle with enough system-level knowledge.

Third, the use of advanced kernel techniques such as reclaiming freed memory for malicious purposes isn’t new, but GPUAF’s application of them to page table entries and pipe buffer structures shows a level of finesse previously unseen in the Android threat landscape.

Fourth, the research underscores a key problem: security solutions are often reactive. Most defenses were implemented to stop known attack methods, but GPUAF’s approach showcases novel exploit combinations that outpace today’s mitigations. As mobile systems become more complex, attackers have more moving parts to abuse—and that complexity is working against defenders.

Fifth, there’s an important policy dimension here. Should hardware vendors like Qualcomm take more responsibility in supporting timely patches and kernel hardening? Should Android OEMs be held accountable for continuing to deploy devices vulnerable to deep, systemic flaws?

Sixth, this research may also mark a new era for exploit development workshops and underground exploit trading. A stable, high-reliability Android root exploit that works on modern defenses is a prized asset—and unless patches are universally deployed, threat actors will likely try to replicate GPUAF’s techniques.

Seventh, the fact that these vulnerabilities affect a broad swath of Android devices (not just one model or brand) elevates this from a niche technical concern to a mainstream cybersecurity emergency. Enterprises, developers, and users alike must stay alert.

Finally, it’s worth recognizing the dual-use nature of such research. While GPUAF has responsibly disclosed its findings and aims to promote stronger defenses, others may not follow suit. The race is now on for vendors and the Android community to fix the flaws before malicious actors weaponize them in the wild.

Fact Checker Results:

  • Confirmed: All referenced CVEs are valid and publicly tracked vulnerabilities.
  • Verified: Exploitation techniques described are consistent with known kernel manipulation methods.
  • Validated: Impact assessments match real-world threat scenarios affecting major Android brands.

References:

Reported By: cyberpress.org
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