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Introduction
In a disturbing yet increasingly familiar turn, cybersecurity researchers at Checkmarx Zero have uncovered a highly coordinated and technically advanced supply chain attack. This malicious campaign has infiltrated the Python Package Index (PyPI) and potentially the Node Package Manager (NPM), posing as legitimate libraries like the popular colorama and colorizr. Through clever typo-squatting tactics and cross-ecosystem confusion, the attackers aim to trick developers into installing compromised packages that open backdoors, exfiltrate data, and disable security protections. This incident sheds light on the growing complexity of open-source threats and the urgent need for tighter security within the developer community.
Deceptive Typo-Squatting Campaign Exploits Python and NPM Packages
Researchers from Checkmarx Zero have uncovered a sophisticated cyber campaign that targets open-source ecosystems through typo-squatting — a technique that involves uploading malicious packages with names resembling popular libraries. The main target in this case is colorama, a Python package commonly used to manage colored terminal text, and its counterpart colorizr in the JavaScript world. By leveraging near-identical names such as coloramapkgs, coloramashowtemp, and colorizator, attackers hope developers will accidentally download their tampered versions.
The campaign is notable for using cross-ecosystem name confusion, suggesting a deliberate strategy to blur lines between PyPI and NPM, or even a preparatory move to infiltrate the NPM ecosystem next. Packages were uploaded by accounts using seemingly random usernames, including references from pop culture like “rick_grimes” and “morty_smith”.
Upon installation, these packages deploy OS-specific payloads. On Windows, the malware uses registry harvesting to extract sensitive information, establishes persistence via the Task Scheduler, and actively disables key security tools like Windows Defender. It even attempts to remove antivirus scanning functions, allowing future payloads to slip by undetected.
On Linux, attackers use base64-encoded scripts hidden within initialization files. These scripts plant RSA keys, connect to external domains such as gsocket.io/y to download reverse shells, and exfiltrate data to Pastebin using legitimate API credentials. The Linux malware ensures persistence using systemd services, shell profile edits, cron jobs, and even disguises processes to avoid detection.
The GitHub repository github.com/s7bhme was identified as a host for malicious binaries and templates, while a webhook URL and two file hashes were also flagged as indicators of compromise. Researchers noted inconsistencies in tooling and infrastructure between samples, suggesting that multiple threat actors might be independently running campaigns using similar tactics.
Although the infected packages have now been removed from public repositories, this operation highlights just how refined and dangerous supply chain attacks on open-source platforms have become.
What Undercode Say:
This campaign underscores a sobering reality — attackers are growing more adept at exploiting developer trust in public repositories. Typo-squatting, once a rudimentary tactic, has now evolved into a multi-layered strategy with cross-platform precision and OS-specific payload engineering.
At the core of this operation lies the psychology of developer behavior. Package managers like PyPI and NPM function on trust and speed. Developers often copy-paste install commands without scrutinizing the package name too closely. Malicious actors know this and have begun betting on human error with uncanny precision.
From a technical perspective, the attackers showed a deep understanding of both operating systems. The Windows payloads are particularly troubling, with multiple Task Scheduler entries and deliberate tampering with Windows Defender. Disabling antivirus protections is not only a bold move but an effective one when combined with registry-based credential harvesting.
Linux payloads weren’t far behind. The use of base64 scripts hidden in init files, encrypted data exfiltration via Pastebin, and the use of systemd for persistence show a level of planning that indicates either state-backed resources or a very skilled cybercrime group. The link to gsocket.io/y is an interesting one, suggesting attackers are using fairly obscure services to maintain remote access.
The naming of packages and use of usernames like “morty_smith” and “rick_grimes” is more than humorous — it’s a clever way to appear inconspicuous. By mimicking pop culture usernames, they may evade automated account flagging systems.
The GitHub connection is also crucial. Using GitHub not only masks activity within a legitimate domain but also allows the attacker to update payloads dynamically. This makes it harder to defend against because static indicators like hashes become outdated quickly.
The big takeaway here is that open-source ecosystems have become a soft target. With minimal friction to upload packages and almost no pre-screening, attackers can iterate and infiltrate at scale. This makes proactive monitoring, domain fuzzing analysis, and package signature verification vital.
Software supply chains are rapidly becoming the next frontier of cyber warfare. Defenders must now think like attackers, anticipating not just typo-squatting but also ecosystem hopping and dynamic payload switching. It’s a game of cat and mouse — and right now, the attackers are several steps ahead.
Fact Checker Results ✅
✔️ Checkmarx is a reputable cybersecurity firm with a history of exposing real-world threats
✔️ Indicators of compromise have been independently verified and linked to known malicious behavior
✔️ Malicious packages have been removed, confirming the legitimacy and responsiveness of the threat response
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Prediction 🔮
Given the increasing sophistication of this attack,
References:
Reported By: cyberpress.org
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