the Sophisticated Use of Steganography and CVE-2017-0199 for Remote Access Trojan Delivery

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Introduction

Cybersecurity experts continuously face a dynamic and evolving landscape as attackers adapt and refine their methods. One particularly sophisticated technique that has emerged involves the use of steganography, where malicious code is concealed within seemingly harmless image files. This innovative tactic leverages a known Microsoft Office vulnerability (CVE-2017-0199) to deploy the AsyncRAT remote access trojan, a powerful and dangerous tool for hackers. The attack method demonstrates how cybercriminals are exploiting both well-known vulnerabilities and creative evasion techniques to maintain a low profile, complicating detection and mitigation efforts. This article breaks down the attack’s flow, mechanics, and its implications for organizations striving to stay ahead of cybersecurity threats.

Attack Flow and Exploitation Mechanics

The attack begins with a phishing email containing a malicious Microsoft Office document. This document exploits CVE-2017-0199, a remote code execution vulnerability. Once the document is opened, the vulnerability is triggered, executing a remote script without further user interaction. This script, typically an HTA (HTML Application) file, downloads a trojanized version of Prnport.vbs, a legitimate Windows utility designed for managing printer ports.

Malicious code is embedded at the start of the Prnport.vbs script, which then assembles and executes a complex PowerShell command chain. These commands are intentionally obfuscated to impede analysis and detection. Through the execution of this PowerShell script, an image file containing an embedded, base64-encoded DLL injector is downloaded from a server controlled by the attackers. The image appears harmless at first glance but hides malicious data encoded with custom delimiters such as <>.

Upon manual inspection, the encoded section reveals a Windows DLL originally named Microsoft.Win32.TaskScheduler. Using PowerShell, the attackers extract and decode this DLL in-memory, avoiding writing to disk. The DLL functions as an injector and dynamically calls a method called VAI to fetch the final payload—AsyncRAT. The payload URL is obfuscated and reversed, requiring additional decoding within memory, further complicating detection.

Process Hollowing and AsyncRAT Deployment

In the final stage, the attacker uses process hollowing, a technique where a legitimate process (MSBuild.exe) is spawned in a suspended state. The malicious code then “hollows” the memory of the process and injects the AsyncRAT payload. Once injected, the process is resumed, running the RAT under the guise of a trusted executable, making it more difficult for security software to detect malicious activity.

AsyncRAT grants attackers complete control over the infected machine, including the ability to log keystrokes, execute commands, and deploy additional malware. Its loader functionality increases the risk of multi-stage attacks, such as ransomware deployment. The combination of fileless execution and obfuscation techniques significantly raises the complexity of forensic investigations, complicating efforts to track and neutralize the attackers.

What Undercode Say:

This attack highlights a growing trend in cybercrime where adversaries combine well-established vulnerabilities with modern evasion tactics. The use of steganography to conceal malicious payloads within image files represents a creative yet dangerous approach to bypassing security measures. By leveraging CVE-2017-0199 and obfuscating commands with PowerShell, the attackers demonstrate a deep understanding of how to exploit legacy vulnerabilities while maintaining operational security.

The process hollowing technique used to inject AsyncRAT into the MSBuild.exe process is another example of advanced evasion. MSBuild.exe is a trusted Windows process, which makes it an ideal target for hiding malicious code, as most security solutions will not flag it as suspicious. The fileless nature of the attack, where the malicious code resides entirely in memory, complicates efforts to detect and block the threat before it can cause harm.

Furthermore, the use of base64 encoding to hide DLL files within image files is a clever way to bypass traditional signature-based detection methods. Many security tools rely on file signatures to identify malware, but this attack avoids creating any persistent files on the disk, making detection much more challenging.

What makes this attack particularly dangerous is the presence of AsyncRAT, a widely available remote access trojan. Its capabilities go beyond simple backdoor access, allowing attackers to steal data, deploy additional malware, and even escalate privileges. Given the trojan’s potential for use in multi-stage attacks, including ransomware campaigns, organizations must take proactive steps to defend against these types of threats.

To mitigate such attacks, organizations must prioritize the monitoring of legacy vulnerabilities in Microsoft Office products, such as CVE-2017-0199. Defenders should also monitor for suspicious script executions, such as HTA and VBS files, as well as unusual process behavior, like the spawning of MSBuild.exe outside its normal use cases. Another essential defensive measure is the use of endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools capable of identifying fileless malware and obfuscated command chains.

Fact Checker Results

  • The exploit leveraging CVE-2017-0199 is well-documented, and its use in targeted attacks remains a concern, particularly in legacy Microsoft Office installations.
  • The AsyncRAT trojan is widely known for its capabilities, including remote access and malware delivery, which confirms the severity of the attack.

– The

References:

Reported By: cyberpress.org
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