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A New Threat to Developer Trust
Microsoft Visual Studio Code has become one of the most important tools in modern software development, particularly for developers working with web3, cloud infrastructure, artificial intelligence, and open-source projects. That popularity also makes its extension ecosystem an increasingly attractive target for cybercriminals.
Security researchers have uncovered a malicious VS Code extension campaign centered around a fake Solidity development tool called “Solidity Pro.” Two extension identifiers have been associated with the activity: helper-beeps.solidity-pro and web3devtoolsx.solidity-pro.
What makes this campaign especially dangerous is not simply that the extensions contain malware. The more serious issue is the breadth of information the malware attempts to steal. Depending on the version, the malicious code can target cryptocurrency wallets, browser data, GitHub and GitLab credentials, AWS session information, Cloudflare tokens, OpenAI API keys, Telegram bot credentials, SSH private keys, source-control secrets, and other highly sensitive developer information.
The Extensions Were Designed to Look Legitimate
The malicious extensions were presented as tools related to Solidity, the programming language widely associated with Ethereum smart-contract development.
For developers searching for convenient tooling, an extension with a name such as “Solidity Pro” may appear completely reasonable. This is precisely where supply-chain attacks become so effective: rather than attacking a developer directly, criminals attempt to compromise the software and tools the developer already trusts.
The extensions are no longer available through Open VSX, according to the supplied research. However, the GitHub repository associated with web3devtoolsx/solidity-pro reportedly remained accessible at the time of the investigation.
That distinction matters. Removing an extension from a marketplace can reduce new infections, but it does not automatically remove copies that may already be installed, cached, archived, mirrored, or distributed through other channels.
The Malware Changed Over Time
According to Yeeth Security, the campaign did not begin with the fully developed information stealer seen in its later versions.
Earlier releases, reportedly ranging from 1.0.0 through 2.4.x, used a different approach. These versions were observed communicating with Cloudflare Workers endpoints and retrieving an encrypted Python payload that was subsequently executed.
This architecture gave the attackers an additional layer of flexibility.
Instead of placing the entire malicious payload directly inside the extension, the extension could act as a delivery mechanism while fetching additional components from infrastructure controlled by the attackers.
Version 3.0.0 Marked a Major Escalation
Starting with version 3.0.0, the behavior reportedly evolved into a much broader information-stealing operation.
Rather than focusing primarily on downloading and executing another payload, the later versions were capable of searching a developer’s machine for valuable credentials and authentication material.
That transformation is significant because developers routinely possess credentials capable of granting access far beyond their individual computers.
A compromised developer workstation can potentially become a gateway into repositories, cloud infrastructure, deployment systems, cryptocurrency wallets, APIs, internal servers, and production environments.
GitHub and GitLab Credentials Were Among the Targets
The malware reportedly searches for GitHub credentials including ghp_ and github_pat_ tokens.
These tokens can be extremely valuable to attackers because source-control credentials may provide access to private repositories, proprietary code, CI/CD workflows, issue trackers, packages, and other development resources depending on the permissions assigned to them.
The stealer also reportedly searches for GitLab glpat- tokens, expanding its reach across multiple source-control platforms.
For organizations, this creates a serious supply-chain risk.
A stolen developer token might not immediately result in a visible intrusion. Instead, an attacker could quietly use it to inspect repositories, download intellectual property, modify code, create malicious releases, or search for additional secrets.
AWS Credentials Could Open the Door to Cloud Infrastructure
The malware also reportedly searches for AWS keys and session tokens.
This is one of the most concerning aspects of the campaign.
Cloud credentials can potentially provide access to storage buckets, databases, compute instances, serverless infrastructure, secrets, logging systems, and other resources.
The actual impact depends heavily on the permissions associated with the stolen credentials. A highly restricted token may provide limited access, while an overly privileged credential could give an attacker a much larger foothold.
This is why developers should never treat cloud credentials stored on workstations as harmless configuration data.
Cloudflare Tokens Are Also Valuable
The campaign reportedly searches for Cloudflare cfat_ tokens as well.
Cloudflare credentials can potentially expose important infrastructure-management capabilities depending on their permissions.
For an organization using Cloudflare to manage DNS, web applications, security controls, or edge infrastructure, compromised credentials could create opportunities for attackers to manipulate services or establish persistence.
The broader lesson is straightforward: anything that authenticates a developer to infrastructure should be treated as a high-value secret.
AI API Keys Are Becoming Prime Targets
One particularly modern element of this campaign is its reported targeting of OpenAI API credentials, including keys beginning with sk-, sk-proj-, and sk-ant-.
The inclusion of these credentials illustrates how quickly information-stealing malware is adapting to modern development environments.
AI APIs are increasingly integrated into applications, automation systems, internal tools, coding assistants, research platforms, and production services.
A stolen API key can therefore have consequences ranging from unauthorized usage and unexpected costs to exposure of applications or data depending on how the key is configured and where it is used.
Cryptocurrency Wallets Are a Major Prize
For developers working in the cryptocurrency ecosystem, the campaign becomes even more dangerous.
The malware reportedly searches for wallet vaults associated with MetaMask, Phantom, Rabby, Coinbase, Trust, and Keplr, among others.
It also reportedly targets mnemonic phrases, seed phrases, Bitcoin WIF credentials, and extended private keys such as xprv.
These are not ordinary passwords.
A cryptocurrency seed phrase or private key can potentially provide direct control over digital assets. If attackers successfully obtain the necessary secret material, victims may have little practical ability to reverse a theft.
Seed Phrases Represent a Particularly Serious Risk
The reported harvesting of mnemonic and seed phrases deserves special attention.
Seed phrases are often treated as the ultimate backup for cryptocurrency wallets. Unfortunately, that also makes them an extremely attractive target for malware.
A developer who stores wallet-related information on the same machine used for software development is effectively putting two highly valuable environments together: their coding infrastructure and their financial infrastructure.
When a malicious extension gains access to the workstation, both can become targets.
SSH Private Keys Could Extend the Attack
The stealer reportedly searches for files containing indicators such as PRIVATE KEY, potentially exposing SSH private keys.
SSH credentials are particularly sensitive in developer environments because they may be used to access remote servers, Git repositories, cloud machines, build systems, or internal infrastructure.
A stolen private key can potentially provide attackers with a foothold that persists beyond the original infected workstation.
If the corresponding public key remains authorized on remote systems, the attacker may be able to authenticate without needing the developer’s password.
Browser Data Expands the Attack Surface
The campaign reportedly targets browser profiles as well.
Modern browsers can contain an enormous amount of sensitive information, including authentication sessions, cookies, saved credentials, extensions, wallet integrations, and other locally stored data.
Even when passwords themselves are protected, session information can sometimes be valuable to attackers.
This means the infection should not be considered merely a cryptocurrency theft incident. It potentially represents a broader compromise of the victim’s digital identity.
Telegram Is Used for Exfiltration
The captured information is reportedly exfiltrated through a Telegram bot.
For attackers, this approach can be convenient because Telegram provides an established communications infrastructure that can be abused to receive stolen files and information.
Using legitimate or widely available services for criminal infrastructure can also make detection more difficult than relying exclusively on obviously malicious domains.
In this campaign, Telegram reportedly functions as the destination for the stolen data rather than merely as a communication platform.
The Malware Tries to Evade Security Scanners
One of the most interesting elements of the campaign is its reported anti-detection strategy.
The malicious extensions allegedly use heavy obfuscation, delayed activation, changing method names, and intermediate versions that appear cleaner.
The objective is to exploit a fundamental weakness in automated security analysis: time and context matter.
A scanner that installs an extension and observes it for only a few minutes may see nothing obviously malicious.
The extension can initially behave like a legitimate development tool.
Then, hours or days later, the malicious functionality can activate.
Delayed Activation Creates a Dangerous Trust Window
This approach is psychologically effective as well as technically useful.
A developer installs an extension and uses it successfully for several days.
Nothing suspicious happens.
The developer begins trusting the software, recommending it to colleagues, or incorporating it into their normal workflow.
Only after that trust has been established does the malicious branch activate.
By that point, security teams may have already approved the software or automated allowlists may have recorded it as legitimate.
Obfuscation Makes Static Detection Harder
Yeeth Security reportedly observed JavaScript obfuscation techniques in which strings are divided across tables and reconstructed during execution.
Method names may also change between releases.
This creates a moving target for signature-based security systems.
A scanner looking for one recognizable malicious function name may fail when the next release uses a different identifier.
Likewise, searching for obvious suspicious strings can become ineffective when those strings are dynamically reconstructed at runtime.
Why This Matters Beyond VS Code
The larger story is not simply about one malicious extension.
It is about the changing nature of software supply-chain attacks.
Developers increasingly install dozens or even hundreds of extensions, packages, plugins, libraries, command-line tools, and AI integrations.
Every additional component represents another potential trust relationship.
Attackers understand this.
Instead of breaking through an
The WhiteCobra Connection
Yeeth Security reportedly said the activity shares a high-level playbook with WhiteCobra, a threat cluster previously associated with malicious VS Code extensions distributing Lumma Stealer.
The connection is important because it suggests that malicious-extension campaigns are not isolated experiments.
Threat actors can learn from previous operations, reuse successful techniques, and adapt them to new developer ecosystems.
The continued appearance of these campaigns suggests that extension marketplaces and open-source repositories are becoming increasingly important parts of the cybercrime economy.
Solidity Developers Have Been Targeted Before
This is also not the first reported incident involving fraudulent Solidity tooling.
In June 2026, Yeeth Security reportedly identified another malicious extension called ethdevtools.solidity-language-support.
The extension allegedly impersonated a legitimate Solidity language-support tool while hiding a delayed clipboard-stealing mechanism.
That malware reportedly targeted BIP-39 seed phrases, Ethereum private keys, and cryptocurrency wallet addresses.
The technique demonstrates how attackers can focus on a very specific developer community rather than distributing generic malware to everyone.
Clipboard Hijacking Can Be Almost Invisible
The previous Solidity-related campaign reportedly used VS
This is particularly dangerous because cryptocurrency users frequently copy wallet addresses rather than manually typing them.
A victim might copy a legitimate address, paste it into a transaction, and assume everything is correct.
If malware silently replaces the copied address with an attacker-controlled address, the victim could transfer funds directly to the criminal.
The attack does not necessarily require suspicious child processes, file creation, or obvious network activity.
The VS Code API Can Become an Attack Surface
The clipboard example demonstrates an uncomfortable reality about developer tools.
Legitimate APIs can become dangerous when abused.
An API designed to help extensions interact with a developer’s environment may also give malicious code useful capabilities.
This means security analysis cannot simply ask whether an extension uses a suspicious system command.
Researchers increasingly need to understand what legitimate APIs can accomplish when combined with malicious logic.
Other Rogue Extensions Are Emerging
The Solidity campaign was reportedly discovered alongside several other suspicious VS Code extensions and npm packages.
One example is an npm package called ascii-fetcher, which allegedly embeds malicious functionality inside a dependency named @jaymara/jsononifier.
In the observed case, the package reportedly decoded an embedded command and executed calc.exe using Node’s child-process functionality.
The use of a harmless-looking system utility can sometimes function as a proof of execution rather than the final malicious payload.
Postinstall Scripts Remain a Major Risk
Researchers also identified a group of ten VS Code extensions reportedly delivering Windows-based BAT, JavaScript, and HTA droppers.
Two of those extensions allegedly bundled npm dependencies that used postinstall hooks to download and execute remote payloads.
This technique is particularly important because npm lifecycle scripts can execute automatically under certain installation conditions.
Developers therefore need to understand not only the code of an extension itself but also the behavior of its dependency tree.
Attackers Are Also Watching VS Code Forks
Another reported extension, DigitalBarberTrim.html-entity-codec, allegedly dropped a remote VSIX file in selected versions after identifying VS Code-based applications such as Cursor, Windsurf, Codium, and Positron.
In other versions, the extension reportedly behaved more like an almost empty stub.
That strategy suggests that attackers are thinking beyond Microsoft’s official VS Code distribution.
The broader ecosystem of VS Code-compatible editors creates additional opportunities for malicious extensions to spread.
Why Developers Are Attractive Targets
Developers are uniquely valuable targets because their computers frequently contain secrets that ordinary users do not possess.
A typical development workstation might have access to GitHub, GitLab, AWS, Azure, Cloudflare, Docker, Kubernetes, SSH infrastructure, databases, CI/CD systems, AI APIs, payment systems, and production environments.
One compromised extension can therefore become the first step in a much larger attack.
The Real Prize May Not Be Cryptocurrency
Cryptocurrency theft may be the most immediately visible threat, but the stolen developer credentials could ultimately be more valuable.
An attacker who obtains an AWS token, GitHub personal access token, SSH key, and Cloudflare credential may be able to move through an organization’s infrastructure.
They could potentially search repositories for additional secrets, alter source code, access production systems, or establish persistence.
In that sense, the wallet-stealing capability may be only one component of a much larger intrusion strategy.
Deep Analysis: How the Attack Chain Works
Command 1 — Initial Installation
The attack begins with a developer installing what appears to be a legitimate Solidity development extension.
Command 2 — Trust Establishment
The extension behaves normally enough to avoid immediately triggering suspicion and begins establishing trust with the victim.
Command 3 — Payload Retrieval
Earlier versions reportedly contacted Cloudflare Workers infrastructure to retrieve an encrypted Python payload.
Command 4 — Runtime Decryption
The downloaded payload can then be decrypted or reconstructed during execution rather than being presented plainly inside the extension.
Command 5 — Delayed Activation
Later versions reportedly use randomized delays, allowing the extension to remain apparently harmless during short automated security tests.
Command 6 — Environment Discovery
Once activated, the malware searches the
Command 7 — Credential Collection
The stealer reportedly searches for GitHub, GitLab, AWS, Cloudflare, OpenAI, Telegram, SSH, and cryptocurrency-related secrets.
Command 8 — Wallet Discovery
Cryptocurrency wallet vaults, seed phrases, mnemonic information, Bitcoin credentials, and other wallet-related material become potential targets.
Command 9 — Browser Theft
Browser profiles can be examined for authentication information and other valuable data.
Command 10 — Data Packaging
Collected information can be organized into files or structured data suitable for transmission to the attacker.
Command 11 — Exfiltration
The campaign reportedly uses a Telegram bot to upload stolen information.
Command 12 — Post-Compromise Abuse
Once credentials reach the attacker, the extension itself may no longer be necessary. The stolen credentials can potentially be reused against external services.
Command 13 — Lateral Movement
Cloud, source-control, SSH, and infrastructure credentials could potentially allow attackers to move from one compromised developer machine into additional systems.
Command 14 — Supply-Chain Expansion
If source-control credentials are compromised, attackers could potentially investigate private repositories and look for opportunities to compromise downstream software.
Command 15 — Persistence
Stolen credentials may provide persistence even after the original malicious extension is removed.
What Undercode Say:
Developer Tools Have Become High-Value Targets
The most important lesson from this campaign is that developer tooling should no longer be treated as a low-risk software category.
Trust Is the Weapon
The attackers do not need to convince a developer to execute an obviously malicious program.
They only need to convince the developer to install something useful.
Extension Names Matter
A name such as “Solidity Pro” immediately communicates legitimacy to a developer searching for Solidity-related functionality.
That familiarity can reduce skepticism.
Marketplace Presence Is Not Proof of Safety
An extension being listed on a marketplace does not guarantee that it is permanently safe.
Malicious code can be introduced through updates, dependencies, compromised accounts, or deceptive publishing practices.
Reputation Can Be Manufactured
Attackers can release clean versions first, collect users, and introduce malicious functionality later.
That makes reputation-based security alone insufficient.
Delayed Malware Changes Detection
Traditional sandboxing often evaluates software over a limited period.
Malware that intentionally waits before activating can exploit this limitation.
Obfuscation Is Becoming More Sophisticated
Modern malicious extensions can dynamically construct strings, change identifiers, and separate malicious behavior across different components.
Developers Hold Exceptional Privileges
A developer workstation is often more powerful than a typical employee endpoint.
It may have access to source code, production systems, cloud accounts, and deployment credentials.
One Extension Can Become an Enterprise Incident
The infection of one developer machine could potentially expose credentials that belong to an entire organization.
API Keys Are Digital Assets
OpenAI, cloud, database, GitHub, and other API credentials should be treated like valuable secrets, not ordinary configuration text.
Cryptocurrency Creates Irreversible Consequences
When a seed phrase or private key is stolen, financial losses can be immediate and difficult or impossible to reverse.
SSH Keys Deserve Special Attention
Organizations should know exactly which SSH keys exist on developer machines and where those keys are authorized.
Source-Control Tokens Can Be Dangerous
A compromised GitHub or GitLab token could potentially expose proprietary code and development infrastructure.
Cloud Credentials Increase the Blast Radius
An attacker who obtains cloud credentials may be able to move beyond the infected computer.
Dependency Security Is Essential
The malicious npm dependency examples show why developers must inspect the entire dependency tree rather than only the extension’s visible code.
Postinstall Scripts Need Scrutiny
Automatic installation scripts can become an effective mechanism for retrieving additional malicious payloads.
VS Code Forks Expand the Ecosystem
Cursor, Windsurf, Codium, Positron, and other VS Code-based environments create additional surfaces for extension abuse.
Security Teams Need Behavioral Detection
Blocking known malware signatures alone may not be enough.
Organizations should also monitor suspicious behavior such as unexpected scripting engines, remote downloads, credential harvesting, and unusual child processes.
Command-Line Activity Can Provide Clues
Unexpected use of cscript, mshta, cmd, curl, or PowerShell deserves investigation when associated with an extension installation.
Network Monitoring Still Matters
Outbound communication from a development editor should be evaluated when it does not match the extension’s expected functionality.
Cloudflare Workers Can Be Abused
The campaign demonstrates that attacker infrastructure does not always look obviously malicious.
Legitimate cloud platforms can be misused as delivery infrastructure.
Telegram Can Become an Exfiltration Channel
Security teams should consider whether developer machines unexpectedly communicate with Telegram infrastructure.
The Crypto Community Is Especially Exposed
Web3 developers often combine source-control credentials, cloud infrastructure, private keys, wallets, and blockchain APIs on the same machines.
Separation Can Reduce Damage
Keeping high-value cryptocurrency wallets and production credentials separate from everyday development environments can significantly reduce potential impact.
Secrets Should Be Rotated Quickly
If a malicious extension was installed, simply deleting it should not be considered sufficient.
Potentially exposed credentials should be revoked and replaced.
Access Logs Should Be Reviewed
Organizations should examine GitHub, GitLab, cloud, SSH, and other authentication logs for suspicious activity following a suspected infection.
Existing Sessions May Also Matter
Removing a token may not automatically terminate every active session or credential derived from it.
Developers Need Better Extension Hygiene
Every extension should have a clear purpose, reputable ownership, recent maintenance history, and a reasonable dependency footprint.
Minimalism Is a Security Strategy
Installing fewer extensions reduces the number of trusted components that can potentially become compromised.
Open-Source Does Not Mean Automatically Safe
Source availability can help security researchers inspect software, but malicious or obfuscated code can still hide inside seemingly legitimate projects.
Security Reviews Must Evolve
Modern extension security requires more than searching for obvious calls such as child_process.
Legitimate APIs can also be abused.
Clipboard Monitoring Deserves More Attention
The earlier Solidity campaign demonstrates how clipboard manipulation can potentially bypass traditional indicators of malicious behavior.
AI Credentials Add a New Dimension
The targeting of OpenAI and other AI-related credentials shows that attackers are adapting to the modern developer stack.
The Developer Workstation Is Becoming a Security Boundary
It should be protected with the same seriousness applied to servers and production infrastructure.
Organizations Should Assume Credential Exposure
When a high-risk extension is discovered on an employee workstation, defenders should investigate what credentials were present rather than assuming the malware failed.
Removal Is Only the First Step
Deleting the extension removes one component.
Credential rotation, session revocation, log analysis, endpoint investigation, and repository review may still be necessary.
The Supply Chain Is the New Battlefield
Attackers increasingly understand that compromising trusted software can provide a shortcut into otherwise well-protected organizations.
Developers Need Security Awareness
The best defense begins with understanding that convenience tools can carry enormous security consequences.
The Bigger Warning
The “Solidity Pro” incident is ultimately a warning about trust.
Developers install extensions because they want to move faster. Attackers exploit that same desire for speed and convenience.
✅ Malicious Solidity Extensions Were Reported
Security researchers identified extensions named helper-beeps.solidity-pro and web3devtoolsx.solidity-pro as malicious and associated with credential-stealing behavior.
✅ The Reported Stealer Targets High-Value Credentials
The reported indicators include cryptocurrency wallets, seed phrases, GitHub and GitLab tokens, AWS credentials, Cloudflare tokens, OpenAI-related API keys, Telegram tokens, browser information, and SSH private keys.
⚠️ Attribution and Impact Require Care
The technical findings describe observed malware behavior and similarities to previous campaigns, but claims about a specific threat actor, the ultimate operators, and the number of victims should not be treated as proven without additional independent evidence.
Prediction
(+1) Security Screening Will Become More Behavioral
VS Code and other developer ecosystems are likely to increase behavioral analysis of extensions, especially around credential access, remote payload retrieval, obfuscated code, and suspicious runtime activity.
(+1) Developer Credential Protection Will Improve
Organizations will increasingly move toward short-lived credentials, stronger token restrictions, hardware-backed authentication, and centralized secret management.
(+1) Extension Security Will Become a Bigger Enterprise Issue
Security teams are likely to treat developer extensions as part of the software supply chain rather than harmless productivity add-ons.
(-1) Malicious Extensions Will Continue Exploiting Trust
Attackers are unlikely to abandon this strategy because it is highly scalable and can target developers who already possess valuable privileges.
(-1) Cryptocurrency Developers Will Remain Prime Targets
The combination of cryptocurrency wallets, private keys, blockchain infrastructure, cloud accounts, and development credentials makes web3 environments particularly attractive.
(+1) Detection Will Shift Toward Developer Behavior
The strongest defenses will increasingly combine extension reputation, dependency analysis, endpoint telemetry, network monitoring, credential controls, and behavioral detection rather than relying on a single antivirus signature.
What Users Should Do Now
Remove Suspicious Extensions
Anyone who installed the identified Solidity Pro extensions should remove them and treat the affected machine as potentially compromised.
Revoke Exposed Credentials
Potentially exposed GitHub, GitLab, AWS, Cloudflare, OpenAI, Telegram, SSH, and other credentials should be revoked and replaced rather than merely left in place.
Review Cryptocurrency Wallets
Users who stored seed phrases, private keys, or wallet vaults on an affected machine should treat those secrets as potentially exposed and investigate their wallets immediately.
Review Authentication Logs
Check source-control, cloud, infrastructure, and API logs for unusual logins, token usage, repository activity, or geographic anomalies.
Inspect Dependencies
Developers should examine extension and npm dependency graphs for unexpected packages, installation scripts, remote downloads, or suspicious postinstall behavior.
Monitor Suspicious Commands
Security teams should alert on unusual execution of cscript, mshta, cmd, curl, and PowerShell, particularly when the activity originates from a development environment.
Block Known Infrastructure
Where verified indicators are available, organizations should block known command-and-control domains and investigate historical connections to them.
Separate Critical Secrets
The safest long-term strategy is to avoid keeping cryptocurrency private keys, production credentials, long-lived cloud tokens, and other highly privileged secrets unnecessarily exposed on everyday development machines.
The Larger Cybersecurity Warning
Developers Are Becoming the New Treasure Chest
The most dangerous part of this campaign is not the name “Solidity Pro,” nor even the fact that malware was hidden inside a VS Code extension.
It is what the attackers expected to find after gaining access to a developer’s machine.
GitHub tokens.
Cloud credentials.
SSH keys.
AI API keys.
Cryptocurrency wallets.
Browser sessions.
Infrastructure secrets.
The modern developer workstation can contain enough information to unlock an entire digital ecosystem.
Trust Must Be Earned Continuously
A software extension should not become permanently trusted simply because it behaved correctly when it was installed.
As this campaign demonstrates, attackers can exploit delayed execution, obfuscation, changing code, malicious dependencies, and legitimate APIs to stay below the radar.
The future of developer security will therefore depend increasingly on continuous verification.
The Real Lesson of Solidity Pro
The central lesson is simple but increasingly important:
The software that helps developers build the future can also become the doorway attackers use to compromise it.
For developers, the answer is not to stop using extensions, open-source tools, or modern development platforms.
The answer is to understand what those tools can access, minimize unnecessary privileges, protect credentials, monitor suspicious behavior, and treat every third-party component as part of the security boundary.
In an ecosystem where one innocent-looking extension can potentially expose cryptocurrency wallets, cloud infrastructure, source code, AI services, and private servers, convenience can no longer come before trust.
And when an extension asks for access to the heart of a developer’s digital life, verification is no longer optional.
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