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Introduction: When a Compromised Computer Becomes a Product
Cybercriminals have spent years stealing passwords, cookies, documents, and financial information from infected machines. But the underground economy is changing. A compromised computer is no longer valuable only because of what can be stolen from it—it can be valuable because of where it sits, what software it can access, and what opportunities it creates for the next attacker.
That shift is at the heart of BraZetsu, a Python-based Windows malware framework uncovered by Group-IB. The malware appears to have been developed for a very specific purpose: discovering, evaluating, classifying, and monetizing access to corporate environments.
Group-IB links BraZetsu with high confidence to the Brazilian threat actor known as Exilware and says the framework serves as the technical machinery behind an underground marketplace where compromised systems can be sold to other criminals.
The development is particularly concerning because BraZetsu reportedly goes beyond traditional information theft. It performs detailed reconnaissance of infected machines, looks for enterprise applications, searches for financial and certificate files, studies browser activity, profiles infrastructure, and attempts to determine which victims could be most profitable.
Even more interesting—and potentially more disturbing—is the evidence suggesting that generative AI may be involved in the malware’s development or backend analysis process.
This does not necessarily mean BraZetsu is an autonomous AI hacker. Rather, the evidence points toward something more realistic and arguably more important: cybercriminals are increasingly using AI-assisted development and analysis to make malware more adaptable, efficient, and commercially useful.
BraZetsu Is Built for Access, Not Just Theft
Traditional infostealers generally have an obvious objective: steal credentials, browser cookies, cryptocurrency wallets, authentication tokens, or other information that can immediately be monetized.
BraZetsu appears to take a different approach.
Its primary mission is reconnaissance and initial access intelligence.
Once deployed on a Windows machine, it attempts to understand what kind of computer it has compromised, what applications are installed, what business environment the machine belongs to, what sensitive information may be present, and whether the system represents an attractive target.
That distinction matters.
A random employee workstation may have limited value to a criminal marketplace. A workstation connected to an ERP environment, financial infrastructure, industrial systems, healthcare applications, VPN software, or administrative resources could be dramatically more valuable.
BraZetsu appears designed to make that distinction automatically.
From Infection to Commercial Evaluation
The
First, attackers compromise a machine.
Then, instead of immediately deploying ransomware or stealing everything possible, the malware collects intelligence about the environment.
That information can then be used to determine the potential value of the compromised system.
Finally, the access can potentially be offered to other criminals through an underground marketplace.
This creates a division of labor.
One criminal group specializes in obtaining access. Another may specialize in ransomware. Another may purchase credentials. Another may exploit corporate systems after buying access.
BraZetsu therefore fits into a broader trend that has appeared repeatedly across modern cybersecurity investigations: initial access has become a commodity.
The Infected Marketplace Economy
According to Group-IB, BraZetsu is closely associated with Exilware’s so-called “Infected Marketplace.”
The concept is straightforward but dangerous.
Instead of every cybercriminal needing to breach a company themselves, an underground marketplace can offer already-compromised systems as purchasable assets.
The buyer can then potentially use the acquired access for another operation.
This can dramatically lower the technical barrier for criminals.
A threat actor does not necessarily need to discover a vulnerability, develop an exploit, establish persistence, and perform reconnaissance from scratch. They may simply purchase access to a machine that has already been classified as potentially valuable.
That model mirrors legitimate technology marketplaces in an uncomfortable way: information about an asset increases its commercial value.
BraZetsu’s Five-Stage Evolution
BraZetsu has reportedly gone through at least five versions since February 2026.
That rapid evolution is one of the strongest indications that the framework is actively maintained rather than being a forgotten malware experiment.
Earlier versions reportedly concentrated on basic remote access capabilities.
Later releases introduced significantly more reconnaissance functionality.
These improvements include deeper system profiling, discovery of financial documents, browser-history collection, certificate theft, and automated classification of victims.
The evolution suggests that its developers are learning from operational experience.
Every new capability potentially provides better intelligence about compromised organizations—and better intelligence can translate directly into higher-value access.
Enterprise Software Is the Real Prize
One of the most important characteristics of BraZetsu is the breadth of its reconnaissance.
The malware reportedly searches for evidence of enterprise technologies including SAP, TOTVS, Senior, Warsaw, Diebold, SCADA-related platforms, Veeam, Docker, VPN software, healthcare technologies, e-commerce infrastructure, and other business applications.
This is not random software enumeration.
It is business-aware reconnaissance.
Finding an ordinary consumer application may tell an attacker little.
Finding enterprise resource planning software, industrial-control-related technology, backup infrastructure, virtualization components, VPN clients, or financial software can tell an attacker much more.
The infected machine begins to look less like a computer and more like a map into an organization.
Why SAP, ERP and SCADA Discovery Matters
Enterprise applications frequently represent concentrated business value.
ERP platforms can connect finance, inventory, procurement, human resources, manufacturing, and other critical processes.
Industrial environments can control physical operations.
Backup systems can provide access to enormous quantities of organizational data.
VPN software can potentially indicate remote access pathways.
Healthcare platforms can contain highly sensitive information.
E-commerce infrastructure can expose revenue-generating systems.
BraZetsu’s interest in these technologies therefore provides an important clue about its intended victims.
The malware is not simply asking, “What files are on this computer?”
It is effectively asking:
“What kind of organization did we just enter?”
Browser History Instead of Only Passwords
BraZetsu also reportedly examines Chromium-based browsers such as Chrome, Edge, Brave, Vivaldi, and Opera.
Interestingly, its focus is not limited to the credentials and cookies traditionally targeted by information stealers.
Browser history can reveal something different: behavior.
A browsing history can show which internal portals an employee visits, which cloud services they use, which administrative interfaces they access, what suppliers they interact with, and which business systems are important to their daily work.
That makes browser history a reconnaissance resource.
It can help attackers understand the digital ecosystem surrounding a compromised endpoint without necessarily needing to steal every credential immediately.
Screenshots, Processes and Installed Software
BraZetsu can reportedly collect system information, enumerate processes and installed software, capture screenshots, and execute Windows shell commands.
Each capability adds another layer to the
System information identifies the operating environment.
Process enumeration reveals what is currently running.
Installed software can expose security tools, enterprise applications, development environments, remote-access software, and infrastructure components.
Screenshots can provide visual context that automated enumeration may miss.
Shell command execution potentially provides attackers with a mechanism for conducting additional activity after compromise.
Together, these capabilities transform the malware into a remote reconnaissance platform.
Financial Documents Become High-Value Indicators
Another particularly notable feature is
These file formats are particularly relevant to Brazilian financial operations.
Their presence can provide a strong signal that a compromised computer belongs to an organization involved in banking or financial processing.
The malware reportedly also searches for .PFX and .P12 digital certificate files.
Those certificates can be extremely important in enterprise environments because they may be used for authentication, signing, secure communications, or access to business systems.
From an
The Certificate Problem
Digital certificates are often overlooked in endpoint security discussions.
Organizations may deploy strong passwords, multifactor authentication, endpoint protection, and network segmentation while still failing to properly protect certificates and private keys stored on endpoints.
BraZetsu’s certificate discovery capability highlights why this matters.
A certificate file is not automatically equivalent to valid access, and its usefulness depends heavily on how it is configured and protected. Nevertheless, discovering certificate material can provide attackers with valuable intelligence and potentially expose additional authentication pathways.
The lesson for defenders is clear:
Sensitive cryptographic material should be treated as a high-value credential.
A Persistent WebSocket Connection
BraZetsu reportedly communicates with its command-and-control infrastructure using a persistent WebSocket connection.
WebSockets can support long-lived, bidirectional communications between an infected system and a remote server.
For defenders, this makes network telemetry particularly important.
An endpoint repeatedly maintaining an unusual outbound connection—especially to infrastructure unrelated to the organization’s legitimate operations—can become a useful detection signal.
Security teams should therefore investigate persistent connections in combination with process activity, DNS requests, executable provenance, and endpoint telemetry rather than relying on a single indicator.
Pastebin, Base64 and XOR Obfuscation
The
None of these techniques are individually sophisticated.
Base64 is encoding, not encryption.
XOR-based obfuscation is also a common technique seen across malware families.
But their combination can make static analysis and simplistic detection more difficult, particularly when configuration information is separated from the primary malware payload.
The use of public content-hosting services also demonstrates why organizations should not automatically trust traffic merely because it goes to a legitimate or widely used platform.
The AI Clue Inside BraZetsu
Perhaps the most intriguing part of the investigation is the apparent use of generative AI.
Group-IB reportedly identified logging messages, emojis, code structures, and other characteristics that suggest AI-assisted development.
This is an important distinction.
There is currently a huge difference between malware written with AI assistance and malware autonomously controlled by AI.
The former is increasingly plausible and already represents a major trend across the threat landscape.
An attacker can use AI to generate boilerplate code, debug errors, translate code between languages, improve documentation, develop reconnaissance modules, and accelerate experimentation.
That can reduce development time even for criminals who are not highly experienced programmers.
Could AI Be Ranking Stolen Information?
The more interesting possibility is
Its strings reportedly suggest that an AI engine may analyze collected information and help determine which files or compromised systems deserve priority.
If confirmed operationally, this would represent an important evolution in criminal infrastructure.
Instead of sending every compromised machine to a human operator for manual evaluation, an automated system could potentially assign priority based on observed characteristics.
For example, a system containing enterprise software could be ranked differently from a personal workstation.
A machine associated with financial operations could receive another priority level.
A system showing evidence of valuable infrastructure could be escalated for further investigation.
This would turn malware from a passive collection tool into a decision-support mechanism for criminal operators.
The Human Element Still Matters
It is important not to exaggerate the AI component.
The available evidence does not mean BraZetsu is an independent artificial intelligence capable of conducting an entire cyberattack without humans.
The more realistic interpretation is that AI appears to be another productivity tool within the criminal ecosystem.
This is consistent with a broader pattern seen in cybersecurity throughout 2026: attackers increasingly experiment with AI-assisted development, automated reconnaissance, malicious agents, and LLM-based analysis.
AI does not need to replace attackers to make cybercrime more dangerous.
It only needs to make them faster.
Deep Analysis
What BraZetsu Reveals About Modern Initial Access
From a defensive perspective, BraZetsu should be understood as more than another Windows malware family.
Its architecture reflects the commercialization of compromise.
The most important question is no longer simply whether an endpoint has malware.
The deeper question is:
What does that endpoint provide access to?
Attackers increasingly care about identity, business applications, network position, infrastructure, certificates, remote-access software, backup platforms, and organizational relationships.
That is why endpoint reconnaissance deserves the same attention as credential theft.
Detect Suspicious Python and Nuitka Executables
BraZetsu is reportedly Python-based and associated with Python/Nuitka compilation techniques.
Defenders should therefore pay attention to unexpected compiled Python applications, especially when they appear in unusual user-writable locations.
Useful Windows hunting can begin with process and file telemetry.
Get-Process | Where-Object {
$_.Path -match "python|nuitka"
} | Select-Object Name, Id, Path
The command is not a BraZetsu detector by itself. It is simply a starting point for identifying unexpected Python-related execution.
Investigate Suspicious Outbound Connections
Persistent WebSocket traffic deserves additional investigation when it originates from an unusual process.
Security teams can review active network connections with:
Get-NetTCPConnection -State Established | Sort-Object RemoteAddress | Select-Object LocalAddress,LocalPort,RemoteAddress,RemotePort,OwningProcess
Then correlate the process ID with:
Get-Process -Id <PID>
The important defensive principle is correlation.
A connection becomes much more suspicious when an unknown executable, unusual parent process, unexpected location, and unexplained external destination all appear together.
Search for the Reported Indicators
The supplied indicators should remain defanged in public reporting and ordinary documentation:
c2[.]installscenter[.]com
infectonline[.]store
Security teams can search these indicators across DNS, proxy, firewall, EDR, and SIEM telemetry.
For example, a SIEM investigation could conceptually search for:
dns.query : c2[.]installscenter[.]com
OR
dns.query : infectonline[.]store
Exact syntax depends on the security platform.
Do not treat an IOC match as automatic proof of compromise. Validate the associated host, timestamp, process, DNS activity, and subsequent behavior.
Hunt for Suspicious Certificate Files
Because BraZetsu reportedly searches for .PFX and .P12 files, defenders should identify unexpected certificate material on endpoints.
A basic PowerShell inventory can be used during authorized incident response:
Get-ChildItem -Path C:\Users -Include .pfx,.p12 -File -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Select-Object FullName, Length, LastWriteTime
The existence of these files is not inherently malicious.
Many legitimate applications use certificate files.
The objective is to identify unexpected certificate storage and access, especially when combined with suspicious processes or outbound communication.
Hunt for Financial File Discovery
Organizations operating in environments where CNAB files are legitimate should establish what normal activity looks like.
A simple inventory can identify locations containing these file types:
Get-ChildItem -Path C:\Users -Include .240,.400 -File -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Select-Object FullName, Length, LastWriteTime
Again, this should not be treated as a malware signature.
The detection value comes from unusual access patterns.
A previously unseen process suddenly enumerating financial files across multiple directories deserves investigation.
Monitor Public Content Hosting
The use of public services such as Pastebin demonstrates why threat detection should consider context rather than reputation alone.
A connection to a well-known hosting platform is not automatically malicious.
However, if an unsigned executable contacts a public paste service, retrieves encoded content, launches additional processes, and maintains persistent outbound communications, the combined behavior becomes considerably more suspicious.
This is where modern EDR and network telemetry can complement traditional antivirus signatures.
Look Beyond the Endpoint
BraZetsu also reinforces the importance of identity and network telemetry.
If a compromised workstation has access to VPN infrastructure, ERP systems, backup platforms, certificates, or internal administration portals, the investigation should not stop at removing the malware.
Security teams should determine:
Which accounts were used?
Which internal systems were accessed?
Which certificates were present?
Which VPN connections occurred?
Which files were accessed?
Which administrative tools were executed?
Which unusual DNS requests appeared?
Which external destinations were contacted?
Did lateral movement occur?
The endpoint may be only the first visible piece of the intrusion.
Why BraZetsu Matters Beyond Brazil
A Regional Campaign With Global Lessons
BraZetsu has reportedly targeted organizations in Brazil as well as other Iberian and Latin American regions.
The geographic concentration is significant, but defenders elsewhere should not assume they are unaffected.
Malware frameworks built around commercialized initial access can eventually be reused, modified, sold, or copied.
The underground market does not respect national boundaries.
Once a technique proves profitable in one region, there is little preventing similar models from appearing elsewhere.
Cybercrime Is Becoming More Specialized
The BraZetsu model illustrates the increasing specialization of cybercrime.
One actor may obtain access.
Another may operate infrastructure.
Another may develop malware.
Another may purchase access.
Another may deploy ransomware.
Another may monetize stolen financial information.
This specialization allows individuals with limited technical capabilities to participate in sophisticated attacks.
It also makes attribution and disruption more complicated.
The Access Broker Problem
Initial access brokers have become an increasingly important part of the cybercrime ecosystem.
Their business model is based on obtaining unauthorized access and selling it to someone else.
BraZetsu appears particularly suited to this environment because it can help determine which compromised machines are worth selling.
This creates a feedback loop:
Better reconnaissance → better victim classification → better access pricing → greater criminal revenue.
And greater revenue encourages further development.
BraZetsu and the Larger AI Malware Trend
AI Is Lowering the Cost of Development
The broader cybersecurity landscape has already demonstrated that AI can accelerate software development.
That applies to defenders and attackers alike.
Threat actors can potentially use AI to troubleshoot code, generate scripts, understand unfamiliar APIs, analyze malware errors, translate technical documentation, and create variations of existing components.
The danger is not necessarily a dramatic “AI hacker” suddenly appearing.
The more immediate danger is thousands of ordinary criminals becoming somewhat more capable.
That is often enough to change the economics of cybercrime.
Automated Victim Classification Could Change the Market
If
Human analysts are expensive and slow.
Automated classification can operate continuously.
A criminal marketplace could theoretically transform thousands of infections into a ranked inventory of potential targets.
The resulting efficiency could make large-scale campaigns more commercially attractive.
What Undercode Say:
1. BraZetsu Represents a Change in Mindset
The malware is not interesting merely because it is written in Python.
Its real importance is the philosophy behind it.
The attackers appear to be treating compromised machines as commercial assets.
2. Infection Is Only the Beginning
A malware infection should not be considered the final event.
For an access broker, infection may be the first step in determining what the victim is worth.
3. Reconnaissance Has Become a Product
BraZetsu packages reconnaissance into an automated framework.
That makes intelligence collection scalable.
4. Enterprise Software Is a Major Target
The
5. The Endpoint Can Reveal the Organization
A single employee workstation can expose clues about the larger corporate environment.
Installed software, browser history, certificates, processes, and network connections can reveal surprisingly extensive information.
6. Browser History Deserves More Attention
Security teams often focus heavily on passwords and cookies.
But browser history can reveal the systems employees depend on every day.
7. Certificates Should Be Protected Like Credentials
A certificate sitting quietly on a workstation may be just as important as a password from an attacker’s perspective.
8. Public Hosting Services Can Be Abused
Pastebin and similar services are legitimate platforms.
But legitimate infrastructure can still become part of malicious communication chains.
- Obfuscation Does Not Need To Be Sophisticated
Base64 and XOR are old techniques.
Attackers do not always need advanced cryptography if their objective is simply to make analysis slightly harder.
10. The Criminal Economy Is Becoming Modular
BraZetsu fits naturally into a modular cybercrime ecosystem.
Developers build tools.
Access brokers obtain victims.
Marketplaces distribute access.
Customers monetize it.
11. Initial Access Has Economic Value
The ability to enter a corporate network can itself become a product.
That changes how organizations should think about perimeter security.
12. Every Endpoint Is Potentially an Asset
Attackers may not know what a compromised computer is worth until they inspect it.
This is why endpoint telemetry is so important.
13. Automated Classification Is Particularly Concerning
If machines can be automatically ranked, criminals can spend human attention only on the most promising victims.
14. AI Could Amplify Existing Criminal Models
AI does not need to invent new attack methods to be dangerous.
It can make established methods faster and cheaper.
15. Human Operators Still Matter
The evidence surrounding AI-assisted development should not be exaggerated.
There is an important difference between AI-assisted malware and autonomous cyber operations.
16. Speed Is the Real AI Advantage
The most immediate advantage attackers can gain from AI is development speed.
More iterations can mean better malware.
17. Security Teams Face the Same Opportunity
Defenders can also use automation and AI to classify alerts, correlate telemetry, analyze malware, and prioritize incidents.
18. Detection Must Become Behavioral
A single filename or hash will not reliably stop evolving malware.
Behavioral signals are increasingly important.
19. WebSocket Traffic Should Be Contextualized
Persistent connections from unusual processes deserve attention.
But defenders should avoid treating every WebSocket as malicious.
20. IOC Matching Is Only the Beginning
Finding an indicator should trigger investigation rather than automatically ending it.
21. Identity Telemetry Is Critical
If malware discovers certificates, VPN software, or enterprise applications, identity systems become an important part of the investigation.
22. Lateral Movement Must Be Considered
An infected endpoint may have already been used as a bridge into other systems.
23. Financial Systems Require Special Monitoring
The reported interest in CNAB-related files demonstrates that attackers understand regional business workflows.
24. Regional Malware Can Become Global
A campaign focused on Latin America today could inspire copycats elsewhere tomorrow.
25. Cybercrime Learns From Profit
Successful criminal techniques tend to be reused.
26. Marketplaces Increase Attacker Efficiency
A marketplace removes the need for every criminal to conduct every stage of an intrusion.
- Access Brokers Reduce the Barrier to Entry
Buying access can be easier than developing an intrusion capability from scratch.
28. Enterprise Security Needs Asset Context
It is not enough to know that a laptop is infected.
Defenders need to know what that laptop can reach.
29. Sensitive Files Need Better Controls
Organizations should monitor unusual access to financial records, certificates, backups, and other high-value data.
30. Least Privilege Becomes More Important
The less an endpoint can access, the less valuable it becomes after compromise.
31. Segmentation Can Destroy Attack Value
Strong network segmentation can prevent a compromised workstation from becoming a gateway into critical infrastructure.
32. EDR Should Be Properly Tuned
Endpoint detection tools should be configured to identify unusual scripting, process creation, network connections, and file access.
33. Threat Hunting Should Be Continuous
Waiting for an antivirus alert is not enough against evolving frameworks.
34. Malware Development Is Becoming Faster
AI-assisted programming may shorten the time between malware concepts and operational releases.
35. Defenders Must Shorten Their Own Cycle
Security teams need faster detection, triage, containment, and remediation.
36. The Real Battle Is Economic
Cybersecurity is increasingly a competition over attacker cost versus defender cost.
37. Automation Changes That Equation
Automation can make both attacks and defense more scalable.
38. BraZetsu Is a Warning Sign
Its significance lies less in any single technical feature and more in the combination of reconnaissance, classification, communication, and commercialization.
39. Compromise Can Be Resold
An organization may be attacked by one group and compromised by another without realizing that its access was effectively being treated as merchandise.
40. The Future Will Favor Better Intelligence
The attackers who understand which systems matter most can potentially monetize fewer infections more efficiently.
And that is ultimately what makes BraZetsu worth watching.
✅ BraZetsu Is Reported as a Python-Based Windows Framework
The supplied report describes BraZetsu as Python-based malware targeting Windows systems.
Its reported capabilities include reconnaissance, system profiling, command execution, and data discovery.
The framework has reportedly evolved through multiple versions since February 2026.
✅ Group-IB Linked the Malware to Exilware
Group-IB reportedly attributed BraZetsu with high confidence to the Brazilian threat actor Exilware.
The reported connection is strengthened by infrastructure and technical overlaps described in the investigation.
Attribution should nevertheless be treated as an intelligence assessment rather than absolute proof of individual identity.
✅ The Malware Targets Enterprise Information
The reported reconnaissance includes enterprise applications, financial files, digital certificates, browser information, processes, installed software, and system details.
This supports the assessment that BraZetsu is designed for victim profiling rather than simple commodity data theft.
❌ BraZetsu Should Not Automatically Be Described as a Fully Autonomous AI Hacker
Evidence of AI-assisted development or possible backend AI analysis does not establish that the malware independently conducts complete cyberattacks.
The safer interpretation is that AI appears to be involved in development and/or analysis capabilities.
That distinction is important because sensational descriptions can obscure the actual technical risk.
✅ The Reported IOCs Should Remain Defanged
The domains c2[.]installscenter[.]com and infectonline[.]store should remain defanged when published in ordinary articles.
Security teams can use them within controlled threat-intelligence, SIEM, EDR, DNS, or incident-response environments according to their operational procedures.
Prediction
(+1) Defensive AI Will Become More Important
As attackers increasingly experiment with AI-assisted malware development and automated victim classification, defenders are likely to respond with more automated threat hunting, behavioral detection, and AI-assisted incident triage.
The strongest security teams will increasingly combine human expertise with automation rather than attempting to investigate every signal manually.
(+1) Access Marketplaces Will Become More Intelligence-Driven
Future initial-access operations are likely to place greater emphasis on automatically determining the value of compromised systems.
Machines connected to valuable applications, identities, certificates, backups, or sensitive business processes may receive higher priority than ordinary endpoints.
(+1) Enterprise Endpoint Profiling Will Become a Bigger Security Priority
Organizations are likely to increase monitoring for unusual software discovery, certificate access, financial-file enumeration, browser-history collection, and suspicious outbound communications.
The endpoint will increasingly be treated as an important intelligence source—not merely a device that needs antivirus protection.
(-1) AI-Assisted Malware Will Continue Lowering the Barrier for Attackers
If generative AI continues making software development faster, smaller criminal groups may be able to produce increasingly capable malware without maintaining large development teams.
That could increase the volume and diversity of threats seen by defenders.
(-1) Compromised Endpoints Could Become More Valuable Underground
As criminal marketplaces improve their ability to classify victims, attackers may become more selective about which systems they sell and which they exploit themselves.
This could make enterprise-focused infections particularly attractive.
The Bigger Warning Behind BraZetsu
BraZetsu is not just another malware family to add to a threat-intelligence database.
It represents something bigger: the industrialization of compromise.
A corporate computer can now be evaluated as an asset. Its software can reveal its industry. Its browser history can reveal its workflows. Its certificates can reveal potential authentication opportunities. Its financial files can reveal its importance. Its network connections can reveal the infrastructure surrounding it.
And once that information is collected, the compromised machine can potentially enter an underground economy where access itself has a price.
The most important lesson for defenders is therefore simple.
Do not ask only whether an attacker can compromise an endpoint. Ask what the attacker can learn from it after compromise—and what that knowledge could be worth.
That is the battlefield BraZetsu exposes.
And with AI potentially helping criminals automate parts of that process, the next generation of malware may not need to become dramatically more destructive.
It may simply become better at knowing which victims are worth attacking.
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