Listen to this Post
A Live Security Lab Inside Black Hat Europe
Black Hat Europe 2025 was not only a gathering of researchers, attackers, and defenders—it was also a fully operational, high-pressure security environment. Behind the scenes, the Network Operations Center and Security Operations Center were tasked with one clear mission: keep the conference infrastructure secure, stable, and trustworthy despite constant exposure to real-world threats.
Cisco XDR’s Role in the Conference SOC
During the event, Cisco XDR operated as a Tier-1 and Tier-2 detection and response platform for Cisco engineers and analysts embedded in the Black Hat Europe 2025 NOC/SOC. While Cisco was not the official provider of XDR, SIEM, firewall, or collaboration services, the NOC leadership approved the use of additional partner tools to enhance detection depth and operational efficiency.
A Multi-Vendor Security Fabric in Action
As the Official Security Cloud Provider to Black Hat, Cisco integrated Cisco XDR with Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Attack Analyzer, Secure Malware Analytics, Cisco Secure Firepower IDS, Cisco Secure Access, and several third-party intelligence sources. Logs from Palo Alto Networks firewalls and Corelight Open NDR were ingested into Splunk and correlated into incidents through Cisco XDR, forming a unified detection and response pipeline.
Reducing Detection and Response Time
This tightly integrated ecosystem significantly reduced Mean Time to Detect and Mean Time to Respond. Instead of siloed alerts scattered across platforms, analysts saw correlated incidents enriched with context, observables, and intelligence verdicts—critical in an environment as dynamic as Black Hat.
The First Morning Alert
On the morning of December 10, the first day of briefings and keynotes, Cisco XDR Incident Management surfaced a notable detection. At 07:29 UTC, an incident was generated flagging malicious activity involving the external IP address 195[.]58[.]49[.]249.
Initial Indicators of Malicious Activity
The alert correlated multiple signals pointing to communication with a known malicious IP. Cisco XDR enriched the incident with intelligence source attribution, helping analysts immediately understand why the traffic was suspicious and where the verdicts originated.
Expanding the Investigation with Network Telemetry
While the initial alert suggested communication with a Russia-based IP, deeper inspection using Corelight Open NDR revealed a broader pattern. The device was not communicating with a single endpoint but with dozens of distinct external malicious IPs, all over TCP port 22067.
Signs of a Distributed Botnet
This traffic pattern strongly indicated participation in a distributed botnet. The port usage aligned with known CoinMiner-related activity and similar malware families. The Palo Alto Networks firewall team independently confirmed these detections, reinforcing confidence in the findings.
Absence of DNS as a Red Flag
Further analysis through Cisco Secure Access and Corelight showed something unusual: no DNS queries preceded the outbound connections. Direct IP communication without DNS resolution is often associated with malware attempting to evade detection and monitoring.
Turning Observations into Automation
As a result, the Cisco team created a new XDR workflow on the spot. This automation checks DNS logs from multiple sources during incident creation to determine whether recent name resolution activity exists. The goal was simple but powerful: remove manual investigation steps and accelerate future triage.
TLS Without Identity
Corelight Investigator revealed another suspicious detail. The traffic used TLS 1.3 but lacked a Server Name Indicator. Encrypted traffic without SNI reduces visibility and is frequently abused by malicious tools seeking to blend into encrypted noise.
Why Missing DNS and SNI Matter
Individually, missing DNS or SNI may not be conclusive. Together, they significantly increase suspicion. Combined with known malicious IPs and abnormal port usage, the behavior clearly warranted deeper inspection.
Diving into Packet Captures
One analyst shifted focus to packet captures collected by Corelight Open NDR. While examining TLS 1.3 handshakes, an often-overlooked but highly valuable artifact emerged: JA3 fingerprints.
Understanding JA3 Fingerprints
JA3 hashes are derived from the TLS ClientHello packet and capture a client’s cryptographic preferences. These attributes are combined into an MD5 hash that tends to remain consistent for specific applications, bots, or malware families.
Fingerprints as Behavioral Identity
Because browsers, automation tools, and malware often use distinct TLS configurations, JA3 fingerprints can act as behavioral identifiers. They allow analysts to recognize software without decrypting traffic.
The Breakthrough Moment
A quick lookup of the observed JA3 hash led to an unexpected result. The fingerprint matched Syncthing, an open-source peer-to-peer file synchronization tool.
Syncthing and Port 22067
Syncthing is designed to synchronize files directly between peers. When direct connections fail, it falls back to public relay servers—commonly communicating over port 22067. This perfectly aligned with the observed network behavior.
Malicious or Misconfigured
At this stage, the investigation shifted perspective. The traffic was not necessarily advanced malware but unauthorized P2P software operating in a sensitive environment. In a Black Hat NOC, that distinction matters less than the risk introduced.
Identifying the Source Asset
With a clearer understanding of the traffic, the team moved to asset identification. Cisco XDR automation enriched the incident with asset scope, physical location within the venue, and asset classification based on SSID usage.
Context Changes Everything
The device was identified as a Sales/Operations machine deployed by Black Hat, not a guest or attendee system. This elevated the severity and required immediate remediation.
Operating Without Endpoint Tools
Unlike enterprise SOCs, Black Hat environments restrict EDR and endpoint forensics tools. Analysts could not remotely isolate or investigate the device, forcing a return to hands-on incident response.
Old-School Response in a Modern SOC
The response plan was clear and decisive. First, locate and physically isolate the machine in the Sales Suite to stop P2P beaconing.
Cleaning the Infection
Next, the device required a full antivirus scan or complete re-imaging. The behavior suggested a botnet loader or residual software from prior usage.
Credential Risk Assessment
Because the device was used in a sales context, all credentials accessed on the system were considered potentially compromised and required resetting.
The On-Site Discovery
The on-site investigation revealed the root cause. The offending system was a rented notebook connected to a display for demos. It had not been cleaned or re-imaged after previous use.
A Small Oversight, Big Exposure
This oversight left behind software artifacts that triggered the suspicious network behavior. In a conference like Black Hat, even benign misconfigurations can quickly resemble real attacks.
Incident Documentation and Reporting
The incident and its resolution were formally documented in the Black Hat Europe NOC report, contributing to institutional learning and transparency.
Cisco XDR’s Operational Impact
Throughout the event, Cisco XDR proved critical as an open, automated detection and response platform. Analysts could view attack chains, enrich incidents, update statuses, and collaborate across teams in real time.
Collaboration as a Force Multiplier
Using Slack, Webex, Splunk, firewall consoles, and Secure Access, teams shared insights rapidly. Cisco XDR served as the connective tissue tying technical findings to coordinated action.
Automation Born from Experience
New automations were created during the event based on live incident findings. This feedback loop turned operational pain points into reusable workflows.
A Real-World Proof Point
Black Hat Europe 2025 demonstrated how XDR platforms are not theoretical tools but living systems that evolve during real incidents under real pressure.
What Undercode Say:
XDR as a Conference-Scale Security Backbone
This incident highlights a critical truth: modern security is less about individual tools and more about orchestration. Cisco XDR’s value did not come from being the only platform in use, but from its ability to unify signals across vendors into a single investigative narrative.
Network Telemetry Still Matters
Despite the dominance of endpoint detection in many enterprises, this case shows the enduring power of network-level visibility. Corelight NDR, firewall logs, and TLS metadata provided decisive clues when endpoint tools were unavailable.
JA3 as an Underused Advantage
JA3 fingerprinting remains underutilized in many SOCs. Here, it served as the pivot point that transformed a vague “malicious IP” alert into a precise understanding of application behavior.
Contextual Awareness Reduces Panic
Not every suspicious pattern is an active attack. By layering context—asset ownership, location, and function—the SOC avoided overreaction while still enforcing strict remediation.
Automation Should Be Built in the Fire
The most effective automations are born from real incidents. The DNS-correlation workflow created during Black Hat is a textbook example of turning investigation friction into long-term efficiency.
Conferences Are Adversarial Environments
Security teams should treat large conferences as hostile networks by default. Temporary devices, rented hardware, and rapid deployment cycles create fertile ground for misconfigurations and latent infections.
XDR Beyond the Enterprise
This case proves XDR is not limited to corporate SOCs. Temporary, high-risk environments benefit just as much—if not more—from unified detection and response.
Human Analysts Still Matter
Automation accelerated detection, but human curiosity solved the case. From questioning missing DNS to inspecting JA3 fingerprints, analyst intuition remained irreplaceable.
The Cost of Asset Hygiene
Failing to re-image a demo laptop seems minor, yet it triggered a multi-team investigation. Asset hygiene is not busywork—it is preventive security.
A Blueprint for Future Events
Black Hat Europe 2025 offers a repeatable model for securing large-scale events: multi-vendor visibility, centralized correlation, aggressive automation, and disciplined response.
Fact Checker Results
Claim: Cisco XDR reduced MTTD and MTTR during Black Hat Europe 2025 — ✅ Supported by correlated incident handling and automation evidence
Claim: The suspicious traffic was definitively malware — ❌ Investigation showed unauthorized P2P software rather than confirmed malware
Claim: JA3 fingerprinting was central to attribution — ✅ JA3 analysis directly led to identifying Syncthing traffic
Prediction
XDR platforms will become standard for securing large temporary events and conferences 🎯
Network-centric detections like JA3 will regain prominence as TLS encryption deepens 🔐
On-the-fly SOC automation will evolve from a bonus into an operational expectation ⚙️
🕵️📝✔️Let’s dive deep and fact‑check.
References:
Reported By: blogs.cisco.com
Extra Source Hub (Possible Sources for article):
https://www.stackexchange.com
Wikipedia
OpenAi & Undercode AI
Image Source:
Unsplash
Undercode AI DI v2
Bing
🔐JOIN OUR CYBER WORLD [ CVE News • HackMonitor • UndercodeNews ]
📢 Follow UndercodeNews & Stay Tuned:
𝕏 formerly Twitter 🐦 | @ Threads | 🔗 Linkedin | 🦋BlueSky | 🐘Mastodon
