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A Massive Cloud Data Exposure With a Different Kind of Attack
A new data-extortion operation is putting Microsoft Dynamics 365 environments under intense scrutiny after the emerging group known as ExfilSquad claimed to have stolen hundreds of gigabytes of business data from organizations around the world.
According to analysis from security researchers at Fortra, ExfilSquad has published approximately 382.64GB of allegedly stolen information, representing roughly 27 million records connected to 13 organizations. The exposed information reportedly includes personally identifiable information, customer records, support tickets, internal case-management information, employee details, account data, and other sensitive business records.
What makes the incident particularly concerning is what researchers have not found. There is currently no strong evidence that ExfilSquad exploited a critical vulnerability inside Microsoft Dynamics 365 itself, deployed ransomware across corporate networks, or performed the kind of lateral movement typically associated with major ransomware campaigns.
Instead, the evidence points toward a much quieter and potentially more scalable problem: misconfigured Microsoft Power Pages portals connected to Dataverse databases.
That distinction matters.
The incident demonstrates that attackers do not always need to break through a sophisticated corporate perimeter. Sometimes, the most valuable information can be reached through a legitimate cloud service that has accidentally been configured to expose data to anonymous visitors.
ExfilSquad Emerges With a Major Extortion Campaign
Fortra researchers said ExfilSquad first appeared on July 26, 2026, when the group claimed to have compromised 15 organizations.
At first, however, the claims were difficult to verify.
Threat actors frequently publish victim lists before releasing evidence, using the allegations themselves as leverage against organizations. In an extortion operation, announcing a breach can create immediate pressure even before the attackers prove that they possess meaningful information.
ExfilSquad subsequently began publishing samples and eventually released larger collections of allegedly stolen data through torrent-based distribution.
The
On August 7, ExfilSquad published archives associated with 13 alleged victims.
The Alleged Victims Span Multiple Industries
The victim list is notable because it crosses several sectors rather than focusing on one narrowly defined industry.
Organizations named by the group include entities connected to government, education, aviation, retail, insurance, and technology.
Among the publicly named organizations are the City of Atlanta, City of Houston, Frontier Airlines, Newcastle University, TaylorMade, Viavi Solutions, Wesco International, and the UK Department for Education.
ExfilSquad also published an archive it associated with Microsoft.
However, a threat
Attribution and validation require additional evidence.
The 382GB Archive Contains Highly Sensitive Information
The volume of information allegedly exposed is enormous, but raw storage size does not tell the entire story.
The real risk lies in what those files contain.
The leaked material reportedly includes customer contact information, physical addresses, support requests, service records, internal case-management information, employee details, travel records, complaints, business-account information, and student-related data.
These categories can be highly valuable to criminals because they provide context that can be used for targeted fraud, phishing, impersonation, business-email compromise, and social engineering.
A database containing a
A database containing their name, address, account history, previous support requests, organizational relationships, and internal case information can be dramatically more powerful.
Student Data Raises the Stakes
One of the most troubling examples involves an allegedly leaked District of Columbia Public Schools dataset.
Fortra reported that a censored dataset allegedly contained information relating to approximately 60,000 students, including names, dates of birth, addresses, and school-assignment details.
Student information deserves particularly careful handling because children generally have limited ability to recognize or respond to identity-related fraud.
Even when some fields are incomplete or partially censored, combinations of personal information can create long-term privacy and security risks.
The incident therefore extends beyond conventional corporate data loss. If the allegations are confirmed, the consequences could involve individuals who had no role whatsoever in the security decisions that exposed the information.
Not Every ExfilSquad Claim Has Been Confirmed
There is another important detail hidden inside the rapidly developing story.
ExfilSquad initially named organizations including Zenith Bank Plc and Analog Devices, but those organizations were not included in the final group of 13 published archives.
That discrepancy is important.
Threat actors have a financial incentive to exaggerate the scale of their operations. Listing additional organizations can increase media attention, pressure companies into negotiations, and potentially encourage other victims to pay.
For that reason, security teams and journalists should distinguish between three different concepts: an attacker claiming a victim, an attacker publishing samples allegedly belonging to a victim, and independent researchers confirming the compromise.
Those are not the same thing.
This Does Not Currently Look Like a Traditional Ransomware Attack
Perhaps the most important finding from the investigation is that there is no clear indication of a conventional ransomware intrusion.
Researchers did not observe evidence suggesting that ExfilSquad entered each organization’s internal network, moved laterally between systems, encrypted corporate computers, and demanded payment to restore operations.
Instead, the activity appears to have focused heavily on data access and extraction.
That approach is becoming increasingly attractive to cybercriminals.
If an attacker can obtain valuable data without deploying malware, breaking domain infrastructure, or maintaining a long-term foothold inside an organization, the operation can become simpler, faster, and potentially harder to detect.
The Power Pages Connection
The leading theory is that ExfilSquad abused publicly accessible Microsoft Power Pages portals that were connected to Microsoft Dataverse.
Power Pages is a legitimate Microsoft platform designed to help organizations build external-facing websites and portals that interact with business information.
That capability is extremely useful.
It can allow customers, suppliers, partners, students, employees, and other authorized users to interact with organizational data through a web interface.
But the same architecture becomes dangerous when permissions are incorrectly configured.
If an organization unintentionally permits anonymous users to read Dataverse information, an attacker may not need to exploit a software vulnerability at all.
The system can simply behave exactly as configured.
When a Feature Becomes an Attack Surface
This is one of the most important lessons from the incident.
Security problems are not always caused by defective software.
Sometimes, the software is operating correctly while the configuration is wrong.
An exposed Power Pages portal can effectively become an internet-facing doorway into business information if access controls are too permissive.
From an
The attacker only needs to discover the portal, understand its data-access behavior, identify what information can be queried, and automate collection.
That turns configuration into an attack surface.
Researchers Found Thousands of Potentially Exposed Portals
Fortra reportedly identified more than 10,000 potentially publicly accessible Power Pages instances during its investigation.
That figure should not be interpreted as 10,000 confirmed breaches.
A publicly accessible portal is not necessarily vulnerable, and a portal that can be reached without authentication does not automatically expose sensitive information.
However, the number demonstrates the potential scale of the problem.
Large cloud platforms contain enormous numbers of customer-created applications. Security teams cannot assume that every application follows the same security model or that every portal has been reviewed recently.
One forgotten configuration can remain online for months or years.
Dataverse Permissions Become the Critical Security Boundary
The key security question is therefore not simply whether an organization uses Power Pages.
The more important question is:
What can an unauthenticated visitor actually access?
Dataverse provides the underlying data layer for many Microsoft business applications.
Organizations can use tables, relationships, business rules, and permissions to control access to information.
If those controls are incorrectly configured, a portal intended to expose a limited amount of public information could potentially provide access to data that was never meant to leave the organization’s internal environment.
The resulting exposure can look deceptively legitimate because the attacker may be interacting with normal application functionality.
Why Traditional Security Tools Can Miss This Type of Attack
Endpoint security software is excellent at detecting many forms of malware.
Network security products can identify suspicious traffic.
EDR platforms can detect malicious processes.
Identity systems can detect abnormal authentication.
But what happens when an attacker simply sends normal web requests to a legitimate Microsoft-hosted application?
There may be no malware.
There may be no suspicious executable.
There may be no ransomware encryption.
There may be no compromised employee account.
The attacker could effectively become another anonymous web visitor.
This is why cloud application security requires a different mindset.
Deep Analysis: Investigating Power Pages Exposure
Identify Publicly Reachable Applications
Security teams should begin by creating an inventory of all Power Pages applications associated with the organization.
The goal is not merely to determine whether a portal exists, but to understand:
Which portals are active?
Who owns them?
Which environments host them?
Which Dataverse tables are connected?
Which identities can access them?
Is anonymous access enabled?
What information is intentionally public?
What information should require authentication?
A basic defensive inventory can begin with Microsoft administration and Power Platform tooling rather than attempting to probe third-party systems.
Review Dataverse Table Permissions
Administrators should examine table permissions and web roles associated with each Power Pages site.
Pay particular attention to permissions that grant read access to unauthenticated visitors.
The security principle should be simple:
If a record does not need to be public, it should not be publicly readable.
Organizations should also review whether inherited permissions accidentally expose related tables or fields.
Review Power Pages Authentication Settings
Administrators should inspect authentication and authorization settings for every portal.
For example, a defensive Power Platform review can focus on configuration concepts such as:
Authentication:
Anonymous Access -> Review Authenticated Users -> Required where appropriate
Dataverse:
Table Permissions -> Review Web Roles -> Review Read Permissions -> Least Privilege Create/Write/Delete -> Explicitly Restricted
The objective is not to disable Power Pages universally.
The objective is to make sure public access is intentional.
Search Internal Configuration Records
Security teams can also search their own asset inventories and configuration-management systems for Power Pages deployments.
Example defensive searches might look conceptually like:
service = "Microsoft Power Pages" environment = "production" anonymous_access = true
Or:
platform = "Power Platform" component = "Dataverse" public_exposure = true
These are inventory concepts rather than exploit commands, but they can help security teams identify systems that deserve immediate review.
Monitor Unexpected Data Volume
A sudden increase in data requests should also receive attention.
If a portal normally receives hundreds of requests per day but suddenly generates millions of record-access operations, defenders should investigate.
Potential signals include:
High request volume
Repeated record enumeration
Unusual geographic sources
Large sequential queries
Abnormal API consumption
Unexpected anonymous traffic
Attackers performing automated collection may generate traffic patterns that are substantially different from normal customer behavior.
Review Logs Before Deleting Evidence
Organizations investigating suspected exposure should preserve relevant logs before changing configurations.
Useful evidence can include:
Web access logs
Power Platform telemetry
Dataverse activity records
Identity logs
Application logs
WAF logs
Proxy records
Cloud security alerts
Incident responders should establish the earliest suspicious access, determine what records were reachable, and identify whether data was actually retrieved.
The Difference Between Exposure and Exploitation
A crucial forensic distinction is the difference between exposure and confirmed data theft.
A database might have been accessible anonymously without evidence that an attacker actually downloaded its contents.
Conversely, a large volume of suspicious requests could provide stronger evidence that automated collection occurred.
Therefore, investigators should avoid declaring a breach solely because an insecure configuration existed.
The correct process is to correlate configuration state, access logs, application telemetry, and external evidence.
Automated Enumeration Could Make the Problem Worse
If
Attackers can potentially discover publicly accessible portals, test their responses, identify available data structures, and determine whether records can be retrieved.
At scale, automation changes the economics of cloud reconnaissance.
A human attacker manually examining one portal might not find much.
An automated system capable of testing thousands of applications can discover the handful that expose highly valuable datasets.
This is one reason the reported discovery of more than 10,000 potentially accessible Power Pages instances deserves attention.
Cloud Misconfiguration Is Becoming a Strategic Cybersecurity Problem
For years, organizations focused heavily on traditional vulnerabilities such as remote-code-execution flaws, privilege escalation bugs, and unpatched internet-facing servers.
Those threats remain serious.
But modern cloud environments introduce another category: legitimate functionality configured in an insecure way.
The attacker does not necessarily need to defeat Microsoft’s security model.
They may only need to find a customer deployment where the customer configured that model incorrectly.
This changes the responsibility equation.
Cloud providers secure the underlying infrastructure, but customers remain responsible for many aspects of identity, permissions, application configuration, and data governance.
SaaS Does Not Mean Risk-Free
Software-as-a-Service platforms often provide stronger infrastructure security than organizations could build themselves.
But SaaS does not eliminate application-security responsibilities.
A company can have perfectly patched cloud infrastructure and still expose sensitive information through a poorly configured portal.
The security boundary has moved.
Instead of asking only, “Is the server patched?”, organizations must also ask:
“Who can access this data, through which application, under which conditions, and why?”
Why CRM and ERP Data Is Especially Valuable
Dynamics 365 CRM and ERP environments can contain an unusually rich concentration of information.
CRM systems can include customer names, contact details, account histories, service interactions, complaints, and sales information.
ERP environments may contain financial, operational, supplier, inventory, and business-process information.
When these datasets are combined with personally identifiable information, they become attractive targets for cybercriminals.
The attacker does not necessarily need millions of credit-card numbers.
A detailed business profile can be enough to conduct convincing fraud.
The Social Engineering Risk Could Outlive the Leak
Data exposure creates risks that can persist long after the original incident.
Suppose an attacker obtains a
That information can be used to construct highly believable phishing messages.
Instead of sending:
Your account has been compromised.
An attacker can reference a real organization, a real service interaction, and a legitimate-looking case number.
The more contextual information criminals possess, the more convincing their impersonation becomes.
Extortion Is Evolving Beyond Encryption
The ExfilSquad campaign also reflects a broader shift in cybercrime.
Ransomware groups historically relied heavily on encryption.
Today, criminals can monetize stolen information without encrypting a single computer.
Data theft can be faster and less disruptive to the attacker.
There is also no requirement to maintain the same level of access needed to deploy ransomware across an enterprise.
If valuable data has already been copied, the attacker can simply threaten publication.
The Torrent Strategy Creates Additional Pressure
Publishing stolen information through torrents can also make containment more difficult.
Once a dataset is distributed across multiple systems and copied by third parties, removing the original leak does not necessarily remove the information from circulation.
Victims may therefore face a long-term exposure problem rather than a single website takedown.
This is particularly serious when datasets contain personal information.
What Organizations Using Power Pages Should Do Now
Organizations should immediately inventory every Power Pages site they operate.
They should identify all anonymous-access configurations and verify that each one is intentional.
Dataverse permissions should be reviewed table by table, especially for customer, employee, student, financial, and support-related records.
Inactive or forgotten portals should be disabled rather than left exposed.
Security teams should also review historical logs for unusual anonymous activity and unexpectedly large data-access patterns.
Least Privilege Is the Strongest Defense
The principle of least privilege remains one of the most effective defenses against this class of incident.
Users should have only the access they require.
Applications should expose only the data they require.
Anonymous visitors should have access only to information that is deliberately public.
Anything else creates unnecessary risk.
Organizations Should Treat Portals as Internet-Facing Applications
One common mistake is to treat a Power Pages portal as merely another business application.
From a security perspective, it should be treated as an internet-facing application.
That means it deserves:
Regular vulnerability assessment
Configuration reviews
Authentication testing
Authorization testing
Logging
Monitoring
Ownership tracking
Incident-response coverage
The fact that Microsoft operates the underlying cloud infrastructure does not remove the organization’s responsibility for the application layer.
What Undercode Say:
- The Real Story Is Bigger Than 382GB
The headline number is impressive, but storage volume is not the most important metric.
The real issue is the number of sensitive records allegedly exposed.
2. Twenty-Seven Million Records Changes the Conversation
Twenty-seven million records represent a potentially enormous privacy and fraud risk.
Even if portions of the dataset prove duplicated or incomplete, the reported scale deserves immediate investigation.
3. This Is a Configuration Security Story
The incident appears to demonstrate how configuration can become an attack vector.
Organizations do not always need to suffer from an unpatched vulnerability to experience a serious breach.
4. Power Pages Deserves More Security Attention
External-facing Power Pages applications should be treated with the same seriousness as traditional web applications.
They can sit directly between the public internet and business data.
5. Anonymous Access Should Be Exceptional
Anonymous access can be useful for legitimate public content.
It becomes dangerous when connected to confidential Dataverse records.
6. Dataverse Permissions Need Continuous Review
A configuration that was safe six months ago may no longer be safe after application changes.
Permissions should therefore be reviewed continuously rather than only during deployment.
7. Forgotten Applications Are Dangerous
Organizations frequently accumulate applications that no one actively manages.
Those forgotten portals can become invisible attack surfaces.
8. Cloud Security Requires Shared Responsibility
Microsoft can secure the cloud infrastructure.
Customers still need to secure their identities, applications, permissions, and data.
9. Security Teams Need Better Asset Visibility
You cannot secure an application you do not know exists.
Every organization should maintain an accurate inventory of externally accessible cloud applications.
10. Public Does Not Mean Harmless
A portal may appear to expose only harmless information while indirectly revealing sensitive records through related tables or application logic.
Security testing must therefore examine the complete data-access model.
11. Threat Actors Are Becoming More Efficient
Attackers increasingly look for opportunities that require less noise.
Abusing legitimate functionality can be much quieter than deploying malware.
- Data Theft Can Be More Profitable Than Encryption
Criminals do not necessarily need to lock computers to create financial pressure.
A large database can itself become the ransom.
- Extortion Groups Have an Incentive to Exaggerate
Organizations should not automatically accept every victim claim.
Independent validation remains essential.
14. Samples Matter More Than Announcements
Publishing verifiable samples gives a threat
Even then, researchers must establish whether the data is authentic, current, and associated with the claimed victim.
15. Leaked Data Can Create Secondary Attacks
The stolen information could potentially become fuel for phishing, impersonation, fraud, and business-email compromise.
The consequences may therefore extend beyond the original breach.
16. Education Data Is Particularly Sensitive
Student information requires additional protection because exposed records can affect individuals who may have little ability to defend themselves against identity abuse.
- Organizations Should Assume Data May Be Copied
Once sensitive data reaches an attacker, organizations should plan around the possibility that it has been duplicated.
Takedowns cannot guarantee deletion.
18. Detection Must Move Into the Cloud
Traditional endpoint monitoring cannot provide complete visibility into SaaS data access.
Organizations need cloud telemetry as part of their security operations.
19. Abnormal Read Activity Matters
Repeated anonymous requests and unusual record-access patterns should be treated as potential indicators of automated enumeration.
20. Volume Can Be a Signal
A sudden spike in application requests may reveal automated collection even when every request individually appears legitimate.
21. Identity Is Still Central
Strong authentication cannot solve every Power Pages exposure problem, but eliminating unnecessary anonymous access can remove an entire category of risk.
22. Permissions Are the New Perimeter
In cloud environments, access policies often matter more than the physical location of the server.
23. SaaS Security Needs Ownership
Every portal should have an accountable business and technical owner.
Unowned applications are security liabilities.
24. Security Reviews Should Follow Business Changes
When a portal adds a new Dataverse table or changes its workflow, its security model should be reassessed.
25. Automated Discovery Changes the Threat Model
Attackers can scan the internet continuously.
Organizations therefore cannot rely on obscurity to protect exposed applications.
26. Security by Obscurity Is Not Security
An obscure portal URL is not an access-control mechanism.
If sensitive data is accessible without proper authorization, the URL itself provides little protection.
27. Logging Is Essential
Without sufficient telemetry, organizations may never know whether an exposed portal was actually abused.
28. Incident Response Must Include SaaS
Incident-response plans should explicitly cover Microsoft cloud applications and business platforms.
29. Data Classification Matters
Organizations should know which Dataverse tables contain public, internal, confidential, and highly sensitive information.
30. Minimize What the Portal Can Reach
A public website should not automatically have visibility into an entire business database.
Its permissions should be narrowly scoped.
31. Security Teams Should Test Like Attackers
Defenders should evaluate what an unauthenticated internet visitor can discover and retrieve.
This can reveal weaknesses before criminals do.
32. Misconfiguration Can Become a Supply-Chain-Like Problem
When the same cloud platform is deployed across thousands of organizations, a common configuration mistake can potentially affect many independent environments.
- The Platform Is Not Necessarily the Vulnerability
This distinction is critical.
The available evidence points toward customer-side exposure rather than a confirmed Dynamics 365 software flaw.
34. Attribution Requires Patience
Cybersecurity investigations rarely produce perfect answers immediately.
Organizations should avoid making definitive claims before forensic evidence is available.
35. Extortion Creates Psychological Pressure
Attackers want victims to believe they have no time to investigate.
Security teams should resist that pressure and establish the facts.
- Public Leak Pages Are Evidence, Not Absolute Truth
Threat actor websites can provide valuable clues.
They should still be treated as adversarial sources.
37. Security Teams Need Continuous Exposure Management
Internet exposure changes constantly.
A portal that was secure yesterday could become exposed after an administrative change today.
38. The Best Defense Is Preventive
The easiest breach to investigate is the one that never happens.
Regular permission reviews are cheaper than dealing with millions of exposed records.
39. Power Pages Administrators Should Take Notice
The ExfilSquad allegations provide a timely reason for organizations to review their Power Pages deployments.
This is not about abandoning the platform.
It is about using it securely.
40. The Biggest Lesson Is Simple
Modern attackers do not always need to break the door.
Sometimes, they look for a door that was accidentally left open.
✅ 382.64GB of Allegedly Stolen Data
The reported archive size is approximately 382.64GB, according to the supplied reporting surrounding Fortra’s investigation.
However, the amount should be described as allegedly stolen data rather than independently verified data from every claimed victim.
✅ Approximately 27 Million Records
The campaign has been reported as involving approximately 27 million records.
The figure should still be treated cautiously because large leak datasets can contain duplicate, outdated, or unrelated information.
✅ ExfilSquad Appeared in July 2026
Fortra reportedly observed ExfilSquad emerging on July 26, 2026.
The
✅ Power Pages and Dataverse Are Central to the Investigation
The leading technical theory involves publicly exposed Power Pages portals connected to Dataverse.
This is fundamentally different from claiming that attackers exploited a confirmed vulnerability in Dynamics 365 itself.
❌ Every Claimed Victim Should Be Considered Confirmed
A threat
Independent forensic confirmation is required to establish the precise scope and authenticity of each alleged breach.
❌ The Incident Has Not Been Established as a Dynamics 365 Zero-Day
Current evidence described in the investigation does not establish a software vulnerability in Dynamics 365 as the root cause.
The stronger theory involves authorization and configuration problems surrounding externally accessible Power Pages environments.
❌ 10,000 Public Power Pages Instances Do Not Equal 10,000 Breaches
The reported discovery of more than 10,000 potentially accessible instances is an exposure indicator, not a confirmed victim count.
A publicly reachable portal may still have correctly configured permissions and expose no sensitive information.
Prediction
(+1) Cloud Permission Security Will Become a Bigger Priority
The most likely positive development is that incidents such as the ExfilSquad campaign will push organizations to take SaaS permissions and external application exposure more seriously.
Security teams are increasingly moving beyond traditional vulnerability management toward continuous exposure management, where cloud applications, identities, APIs, and permissions are continuously evaluated.
Organizations that respond properly will inventory their Power Pages deployments, eliminate unnecessary anonymous access, review Dataverse permissions, improve telemetry, and monitor unusual data-access patterns.
That would make this incident a valuable warning rather than simply another breach headline.
(+1) Automated Cloud Exposure Discovery Will Improve
Security platforms are likely to become increasingly capable of automatically identifying externally accessible SaaS applications and dangerous permission combinations.
Instead of waiting for an attacker to discover an exposed portal, defenders will increasingly receive alerts such as:
Public application detected
↓
Anonymous access enabled
↓
Sensitive Dataverse table reachable
↓
High-risk configuration identified
↓
Security team alerted
↓
Access restricted
That transition could significantly reduce the window between accidental exposure and defensive action.
(-1) Data Extortion Will Continue Growing
The negative prediction is that groups like ExfilSquad may represent a broader evolution toward data-only extortion.
Attackers do not necessarily need ransomware when sensitive information itself provides enough leverage.
As organizations migrate more business processes into SaaS platforms, criminals will increasingly investigate cloud applications for exposed data.
(-1) Secondary Fraud Could Become the Bigger Consequence
The publication of personal and business information may eventually create more damage through secondary attacks than through the original extortion event.
Phishing campaigns, impersonation, fake support calls, targeted fraud, and business-email attacks can continue long after a leak becomes old news.
Final Analysis: The Cloud Door That Attackers May Not Have Needed to Break
The ExfilSquad incident is a reminder that modern cybersecurity is no longer simply a race between attackers searching for software vulnerabilities and defenders installing patches.
The battlefield has expanded.
Organizations now operate hundreds or thousands of cloud services, portals, APIs, SaaS applications, identities, databases, and automated integrations. Each one can become a path to sensitive information if permissions are incorrectly configured.
The most disturbing possibility in the ExfilSquad case is therefore not necessarily that attackers discovered an extraordinary new exploit.
It is that they may have found legitimate applications that were already willing to provide them with the information they wanted.
That is a fundamentally different security problem.
If the investigation ultimately confirms that publicly accessible Power Pages portals enabled the alleged data theft, organizations will have another powerful lesson to absorb: cloud security is not only about protecting the infrastructure. It is about protecting the data relationships built on top of it.
A perfectly maintained cloud platform can still become the source of a massive breach when authentication, authorization, or Dataverse permissions are mismanaged.
And as the reported 27 million records demonstrate, a small configuration mistake can have consequences measured not in a few compromised accounts, but in hundreds of gigabytes of exposed information.
The attackers may not have broken through the wall.
They may simply have found an open door.
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