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A Carefully Disguised Campaign
Some cyberattacks announce themselves with ransomware notes, encrypted files, or noisy system failures. Others are far more patient. They arrive disguised as something employees already trust, quietly establish persistence, and then wait.
That is what makes the newly documented PATCHCORD campaign particularly concerning. Researchers at Acronis have uncovered an espionage operation targeting Afghan telecommunications providers and critical infrastructure organizations across South Asia. The campaign relies on fake VPN installers, legitimate-looking management software, browser shortcut hijacking, and cloud platforms such as Google Sheets and GitHub Gists to keep communications hidden in ordinary internet traffic.
The operation is not remarkable simply because it contains a new malware family. Its real significance lies in how carefully the attackers combine social engineering, persistence, command execution, cloud abuse, and operational deception into one campaign.
The Discovery of PATCHCORD
Acronis Threat Research Unit identified a previously undocumented C/C++ backdoor called PATCHCORD. According to the researchers, the malware has been delivered through sector-specific lures designed for telecommunications and critical infrastructure organizations.
Rather than distributing a generic file with an obviously suspicious name, the attackers created installers that imitate legitimate software used by their intended victims.
One particularly convincing lure impersonated Afghan Telecom, also known as AFTEL. The fake installer reportedly copied legitimate organizational information, product details, and even references to the company’s genuine support portal.
That level of imitation changes the psychology of the attack.
An employee is not necessarily being asked to install something that looks suspicious. They may believe they are installing a VPN client, troubleshooting application, or telecommunications management utility they were specifically instructed to use.
The Fake VPN Trap
The fake VPN installer is one of the strongest elements of the campaign.
The attacker appears to have researched the intended organization before building the lure. Instead of relying on a generic “Free VPN” or “Security Update” theme, the malicious installer was tailored to the target’s environment.
After execution, a 64-bit Windows implant can be installed while a legitimate browser session opens normally.
That small detail matters.
The Illusion of Normality
A successful phishing attack often depends on what the victim sees immediately after clicking.
If an installer crashes, produces an unfamiliar warning, or leaves the user staring at an empty desktop, suspicion rises quickly.
PATCHCORD takes the opposite approach.
The victim can see something that looks normal while the malware quietly completes its installation in the background.
The browser opens.
The expected application appears to work.
Nothing dramatic happens.
Meanwhile, the attacker has gained a foothold.
Browser Shortcuts Become the Persistence Mechanism
PATCHCORD’s persistence technique is arguably one of its most interesting characteristics.
Instead of relying exclusively on conventional registry-based persistence, the implant searches for shortcuts associated with major browsers, including Microsoft Edge, Google Chrome, and Mozilla Firefox.
The original shortcut is backed up.
The malicious program then modifies the shortcut so that PATCHCORD executes first.
Afterward, the legitimate browser launches.
From the
Why Shortcut Hijacking Is So Effective
This technique takes advantage of an important weakness in human expectations.
People generally do not inspect the command line behind a desktop browser shortcut.
They double-click an icon.
The browser opens.
The user continues working.
That means malicious activity can occur before the application the employee intentionally launched even starts.
It is an elegant form of persistence because it hides behind a routine action that happens thousands of times inside an organization.
PATCHCORD’s Remote Capabilities
Once operational, PATCHCORD communicates with attacker-controlled infrastructure and waits for commands.
Acronis identified several core capabilities within the implant.
These include changing the interval at which the malware communicates with its command-and-control infrastructure, enumerating running processes, executing shellcode directly in memory, executing commands through a hidden shell, and remotely controlling its browser-shortcut persistence mechanism.
Each capability contributes to a larger espionage objective.
The Danger of In-Memory Execution
The ability to execute shellcode in memory deserves special attention.
Traditional malware often leaves artifacts on disk. Investigators can potentially recover executable files, timestamps, hashes, temporary files, or other evidence after an intrusion.
In-memory execution can reduce that footprint.
The malicious payload can be delivered and executed without necessarily creating an obvious standalone executable on disk.
This does not make forensic detection impossible, but it raises the difficulty.
Memory analysis, endpoint telemetry, process behavior, command-line monitoring, and network investigation become increasingly important.
PATCHCORD Evolves Into SHEETCORD
The investigation became even more interesting when researchers pivoted from PATCHCORD’s infrastructure and discovered another implant.
Acronis named it SHEETCORD.
Written in Go, SHEETCORD appears to combine functionality associated with earlier malware with capabilities introduced by PATCHCORD.
The development suggests that the operator is not relying on a single static tool.
Instead, its malware ecosystem appears to be evolving.
Google Sheets Becomes a Command Channel
SHEETCORD takes an unusual approach to command and control.
Rather than depending entirely on a conventional attacker-controlled web server, it abuses the Google Sheets API.
Each victim can effectively receive a dedicated spreadsheet area through which commands and responses are exchanged.
That is clever for one important reason.
Google Sheets is not inherently suspicious.
Blending Into Legitimate Traffic
Enterprise networks generate enormous quantities of traffic to legitimate cloud services every day.
Employees use Google services for documents, spreadsheets, collaboration, communication, and data sharing.
Blocking Google Sheets outright would be unrealistic for many organizations.
That creates an attractive environment for attackers.
Instead of making every connection point directly to an obviously malicious server, the malware can communicate through infrastructure associated with a legitimate cloud ecosystem.
This is commonly described as living off trusted services.
The Detection Problem
Security teams therefore face a difficult question.
Is traffic to Google automatically legitimate?
Obviously not.
But identifying malicious Google API activity requires more context than simply looking at the destination domain.
Security systems may need to examine authentication behavior, API usage, unusual spreadsheet access, process ancestry, endpoint identity, timing, and the relationship between a machine and the cloud account it is using.
SHEETCORD and PowerShell
SHEETCORD also demonstrates a subtle evolution in command execution.
PATCHCORD reportedly uses a traditional cmd.exe /c style mechanism.
SHEETCORD instead executes commands through PowerShell using a wrapped script block.
That transition is significant because PowerShell is already a normal administrative component of Windows environments.
Again, the attacker is attempting to hide inside something administrators legitimately use.
HACKERAI C2 Agent
The investigation uncovered another malware family called HACKERAI C2 Agent.
Its command-and-control infrastructure uses GitHub Gists rather than a conventional dedicated server.
GitHub is another highly trusted service.
Developers use it every day to share code, snippets, documentation, and configuration examples.
Malware abusing such a platform can potentially make traditional domain-based blocking less effective.
AI Assistance Appears in the Malware
The HACKERAI C2 Agent also attracted attention for another reason.
Acronis researchers found characteristics that they believe are consistent with AI-assisted development.
These included unusual comments, implementation patterns, and a redundant double-XOR routine using the same key twice.
The researchers did not claim that an AI autonomously created the entire malware operation.
The more realistic conclusion is more important.
Threat actors can now use generative AI as an ordinary development assistant.
AI Is Becoming a Coding Shortcut for Attackers
There is a tendency to imagine AI-powered cyberattacks as futuristic autonomous systems that independently compromise networks.
Reality can be considerably less dramatic.
An attacker can simply ask an AI coding assistant to explain an API, troubleshoot a compilation problem, convert code between languages, generate boilerplate, or improve an existing function.
Even modest assistance can reduce development time.
That means defenders should expect malicious tooling to become easier and faster to modify.
The Operator Made a Serious Mistake
Despite the sophistication of the campaign, the attackers made an operational mistake.
Researchers discovered an exposed staging server.
The server reportedly revealed a substantial portion of the operator’s toolkit and provided an unusually valuable look into the infrastructure behind the campaign.
For defenders, this was a gold mine.
For the attackers, it was potentially disastrous.
A Window Into the Attack Infrastructure
The exposed environment reportedly contained tools and artifacts including SuperShell, a Chinese-language command-and-control framework, remote-access Trojan frameworks, credential-harvesting tools, and exploit code targeting a known OpenSSH vulnerability.
Researchers also identified files apparently following an iOS call-history database format.
That finding raises the possibility that the operators were interested in mobile-device information as well as traditional Windows endpoints.
The evidence does not automatically prove the full scope of mobile compromise, but it provides an important clue about the broader interests of the operation.
Attribution Points Toward APT36
Acronis assessed the activity as potentially connected to APT36, also known as Transparent Tribe.
The researchers deliberately described the attribution as moderate rather than absolute.
That distinction is important.
Attribution in cybersecurity is rarely a matter of finding one magical fingerprint.
Instead, analysts compare infrastructure, tools, malware characteristics, targeting patterns, development practices, and operational behavior.
The Attribution Puzzle
Several pieces reportedly support the APT36 hypothesis.
Credential-harvesting tools overlap with tooling previously associated with confirmed APT36 activity.
A command-and-control framework has also been independently connected to the group by other researchers.
The Google Sheets communication method resembles techniques observed in an earlier campaign attributed to the same actor.
None of these details alone proves attribution.
Together, however, they create a much stronger pattern.
Rotating Domains, Stable Infrastructure
Another noteworthy characteristic was the
Domains were reportedly rotated while the underlying server remained active for an extended period.
That distinction is valuable for defenders.
Blocking a domain may stop one visible component of an operation, but it does not necessarily eliminate the underlying infrastructure.
If investigators can identify stable hosting patterns, server relationships, certificates, IP history, or behavioral fingerprints, they may be able to connect seemingly unrelated domains to the same campaign.
Why Telecom Operators Are Attractive Targets
Telecommunications companies are strategically valuable.
They sit at the intersection of communications, identity, infrastructure, customer information, and national connectivity.
Compromising one telecom environment can provide intelligence that goes far beyond a single workstation.
For espionage operators, telecommunications organizations can therefore offer enormous strategic value.
Critical Infrastructure Raises the Stakes
The same logic applies to energy, government, defense, and other critical infrastructure organizations.
The attacker does not necessarily need to shut down a power station or destroy a telecommunications network.
Espionage can be valuable by itself.
Credentials, network architecture, operational documents, employee communications, configuration data, and access relationships can all become intelligence assets.
The Real Lesson From PATCHCORD
The most important lesson is not simply “watch for PATCHCORD.”
Malware names change.
Domains change.
Cloud platforms change.
Command-and-control infrastructure changes.
The underlying attack strategy remains familiar.
The attacker wants to become part of the victim’s normal workflow.
That is why fake VPN software, browser shortcuts, PowerShell, Google Sheets, and GitHub can all become weapons.
Deep Analysis
Detecting Suspicious Browser Shortcut Modification
Security teams should inspect browser shortcuts for unexpected command-line modifications.
On Windows, administrators can review shortcut targets with PowerShell:
Get-ChildItem "$env:USERPROFILE\Desktop","$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu" -Filter .lnk -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
ForEach-Object {
$_.FullName
}
A shortcut pointing directly to the expected browser executable is normal. Unexpected executable paths, scripts, command interpreters, or unusual arguments deserve investigation.
Inspecting Browser Processes
Security analysts can also review active browser processes:
Get-CimInstance Win32_Process |
Where-Object {
$_.Name -match 'chrome|msedge|firefox'
} |
Select-Object Name, ProcessId, ParentProcessId, CommandLine
The objective is not to automatically classify every unusual process as malicious.
The objective is to establish whether the browser was launched through an unexpected parent process or command line.
Looking for Suspicious PowerShell Activity
Because SHEETCORD reportedly uses PowerShell for command execution, defenders should monitor suspicious PowerShell activity.
A basic investigation command is:
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{
LogName='Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational'
Id=4104
} -MaxEvents 100
Organizations with appropriate logging should correlate these events with endpoint telemetry and process ancestry rather than relying on isolated PowerShell alerts.
Reviewing Process Relationships
Parent-child relationships can be extremely valuable.
A normal user launching Chrome might produce a process chain associated with Explorer or a legitimate application launcher.
A suspicious chain might involve a browser shortcut launching an unknown executable, followed by PowerShell, followed by network activity.
Conceptually:
Explorer
└── Malicious Shortcut
└── PATCHCORD
├── PowerShell
├── Browser
└── Network Connection
This kind of behavioral chain can be more revealing than a single malware signature.
Hunting for Suspicious API Usage
Organizations using Google Workspace should pay particular attention to unusual Google Sheets API behavior.
A simple question is:
Which endpoints are suddenly accessing spreadsheets they have never used before?
Security teams should correlate:
User identity
Device identity
API access
Spreadsheet ownership
Authentication history
Access frequency
Geographic anomalies
Process origin
New OAuth permissions
The goal is to detect abuse of legitimate services rather than block the services themselves.
Investigating GitHub Gist Abuse
The same principle applies to GitHub.
Blocking GitHub entirely may disrupt legitimate development workflows.
Instead, defenders should investigate endpoints that unexpectedly retrieve data from Gists, especially when the activity originates from non-development systems.
For example:
Get-NetTCPConnection -State Established |
Where-Object {
$_.RemotePort -in 80,443
} |
Select-Object LocalAddress,LocalPort,RemoteAddress,RemotePort,OwningProcess
This is only a starting point. Network telemetry and DNS logs provide much more useful historical context.
Searching for Suspicious Shortcut Arguments
Defenders can also use endpoint management platforms to search for browser shortcuts containing unusual parameters.
Particular attention should be paid to shortcuts that invoke:
powershell.exe
cmd.exe
wscript.exe
cscript.exe
mshta.exe
rundll32.exe
These binaries are legitimate Windows components, but their presence in browser shortcuts should be investigated carefully.
Memory Analysis Matters
PATCHCORD’s in-memory shellcode capability means disk-based scanning alone may not provide complete visibility.
Security teams should therefore consider endpoint detection platforms capable of capturing:
Process injection
Suspicious memory allocation
Executable memory regions
Unusual thread creation
Shellcode-like behavior
Process hollowing indicators
Abnormal parent-child relationships
The important principle is simple: absence of a suspicious file does not mean absence of malicious execution.
EDR Should Focus on Behavior
A modern endpoint defense strategy should not depend exclusively on hashes.
A new malware sample can have a new hash within seconds.
Behavior is harder for attackers to change completely.
A chain involving shortcut modification, unexpected execution, memory-based payloads, PowerShell activity, and cloud API communication is much more valuable than any single indicator.
Network Detection Needs Context
Traditional network defense often focuses on known malicious IP addresses and domains.
PATCHCORD demonstrates why that approach is insufficient.
Infrastructure can rotate.
Cloud platforms can be legitimate.
Domains can disappear.
Attackers can move their communications through services defenders cannot simply block.
Behavioral network analytics therefore becomes increasingly important.
Protecting High-Value Organizations
Telecom and critical infrastructure organizations should assume that highly targeted phishing may contain accurate branding and organizational details.
Security awareness programs should therefore teach employees something more sophisticated than “look for bad spelling.”
A professional-looking installer can still be malicious.
A familiar company name can still be fake.
A legitimate-looking domain can still be part of an impersonation campaign.
Software Installation Should Be Controlled
One of the strongest defenses against fake VPN installers is application control.
Organizations should maintain approved software catalogs and restrict installation privileges wherever operationally possible.
If employees can install arbitrary VPN clients, remote-access tools, and management utilities without administrative review, social engineering becomes much easier.
Browser Shortcuts Should Be Monitored
Because browser shortcut hijacking is central to PATCHCORD, organizations should consider monitoring changes to .lnk files associated with major browsers.
Unexpected modifications can be an early warning signal.
A security platform can potentially detect:
Shortcut modified
↓
Unknown executable introduced
↓
Browser launched
↓
Network connection established
That sequence is considerably more suspicious than a browser process viewed in isolation.
Cloud Services Are Not Automatically Safe
Google Sheets and GitHub are trusted because legitimate organizations use them.
That trust should not become blindness.
Security teams need a more nuanced model:
Trusted service + unusual behavior = investigate.
The destination alone cannot establish whether the activity is legitimate.
Attribution Should Remain Probabilistic
The APT36 assessment is also a useful reminder about attribution.
Cybersecurity attribution should rarely be presented as absolute certainty unless the evidence is exceptionally strong.
Threat actors reuse tools.
Malware developers borrow code.
Infrastructure can be purchased.
Tactics can be copied.
A responsible assessment distinguishes between evidence, confidence, and conclusion.
The Exposed Server Was the Biggest Intelligence Break
Ironically, the most revealing part of the campaign may not have been the malware at all.
It was the
An unsecured staging server can expose development history, tooling, credentials, malware samples, infrastructure relationships, and operational habits.
Attackers spend enormous effort hiding their operations, yet a single exposed server can undermine months of secrecy.
Operational Security Is Part of Cybersecurity
This incident demonstrates that attackers must protect themselves as carefully as they protect their victims.
A sophisticated implant means little if its backend is publicly accessible.
A rotating domain strategy means little if all domains resolve to the same exposed infrastructure.
An advanced C2 framework means little if configuration files reveal how it is being operated.
Cybersecurity is ultimately a contest of operational discipline.
What Undercode Say:
The Campaign Is More Important Than the Malware Name
PATCHCORD deserves attention, but the broader campaign is the real story.
Social Engineering Has Become More Precise
Attackers are moving away from generic phishing and toward highly researched impersonation.
Familiar Branding Is Becoming Dangerous
Victims increasingly need to verify software through trusted distribution channels rather than visual appearance.
Browser Shortcuts Are an Underappreciated Attack Surface
Users trust browser icons so strongly that shortcut manipulation can remain invisible.
Persistence Does Not Have to Look Sophisticated
A simple shortcut modification can be more practical than an elaborate kernel-level persistence mechanism.
Cloud C2 Changes the Defensive Equation
Blocking attacker infrastructure becomes harder when communications travel through legitimate services.
Google Sheets Is Not the Enemy
The problem is malicious behavior occurring through a legitimate platform.
GitHub Can Also Become an Infrastructure Layer
Developer platforms can be abused without the platform itself being malicious.
AI-Assisted Malware Development Is Already Practical
Attackers do not need autonomous AI agents to benefit from generative AI.
Small AI Improvements Can Scale Quickly
A faster coding workflow can allow attackers to create and modify malware more rapidly.
Human Expertise Still Matters
AI can accelerate coding, but operational decisions still require targeting, infrastructure, and strategic planning.
Memory Forensics Is Becoming More Important
File-based investigation can miss payloads that exist primarily in memory.
Endpoint Telemetry Is Critical
The process that launches a browser can be more informative than the browser itself.
Parent-Child Relationships Reveal Hidden Behavior
Unexpected process chains often expose malicious execution.
Legitimate Tools Can Become Attack Tools
PowerShell demonstrates how normal administrative technology can be weaponized.
The Same Applies to Cloud Platforms
Trust should be assigned to behavior, not simply to domains.
Infrastructure Rotation Is Not Enough
Attackers can change domains while leaving deeper infrastructure patterns untouched.
Stable Hosting Patterns Are Valuable Indicators
Defenders should investigate relationships between apparently unrelated infrastructure.
Attribution Requires Multiple Signals
No single tool or technique should be treated as definitive proof.
APT36 Attribution Is Plausible, Not Absolute
The available evidence reportedly points in that direction, but moderate confidence should remain moderate confidence.
Critical Infrastructure Needs Stronger Installation Controls
Employees should not freely install arbitrary VPN and management software.
Security Awareness Must Evolve
“Don’t click suspicious links” is no longer sufficient for highly targeted operations.
Employees Need Verification Workflows
Software should be validated through approved channels before installation.
Telecom Networks Are Strategic Intelligence Targets
The information available inside telecom environments can be extremely valuable to espionage operators.
Government Systems Face Similar Risks
Attackers can exploit trusted internal workflows rather than attempting noisy attacks.
Critical Infrastructure Cannot Rely Only on Perimeter Defense
The initial foothold may originate from an employee workstation.
Endpoint Isolation Can Limit Damage
Rapid isolation can prevent an initial implant from becoming a long-term espionage platform.
Least Privilege Still Matters
A compromised employee account should not automatically provide broad administrative access.
Cloud Identity Needs Monitoring
Compromised credentials can make malicious cloud activity appear legitimate.
API Monitoring Is Becoming Essential
Traditional network inspection is not enough when malware communicates through APIs.
Security Teams Need Cross-Layer Correlation
Endpoint, identity, network, DNS, and cloud telemetry should be analyzed together.
Threat Hunting Should Follow Behavior
Searching only for known hashes will miss evolving malware.
Malware Evolution Should Be Expected
PATCHCORD becoming SHEETCORD suggests continued tooling development.
Attackers Learn From Defensive Pressure
Moving from dedicated servers toward cloud services can be a direct response to detection.
Defensive Teams Must Adapt Equally Fast
Detection strategies must evolve as quickly as attacker infrastructure does.
The Exposed Server Offers a Final Warning
Operational security failures can destroy even sophisticated espionage campaigns.
The Biggest Lesson Is Simplicity
The attacker did not need a futuristic weapon.
They needed a convincing installer, a clever persistence method, trusted cloud infrastructure, and patience.
That combination can be extraordinarily dangerous.
✅ PATCHCORD Was Reported as a Previously Undocumented Backdoor
Acronis researchers documented PATCHCORD as a C/C++ implant targeting Afghan telecom providers and South Asian critical infrastructure. The campaign’s use of fake VPN and management software was a central part of the investigation.
✅ SHEETCORD Uses Google Sheets for Command and Control
The research describes SHEETCORD as a Go-based implant that abuses the Google Sheets API for communications. This represents a significant shift away from conventional attacker-controlled web infrastructure.
✅ The Campaign Shows Evidence of AI-Assisted Development
Acronis identified coding characteristics it considered consistent with LLM-assisted development in HACKERAI C2 Agent. This should not be interpreted as proof that AI autonomously created the malware.
❌ APT36 Attribution Is Not Proven With Absolute Certainty
The evidence reportedly supports a moderate-confidence connection to APT36, also known as Transparent Tribe. Attribution should therefore be treated as an assessment rather than an indisputable fact.
Prediction
(+1) Cloud-Based C2 Abuse Will Become More Common
As defenders become better at identifying traditional malicious domains and dedicated command servers, attackers will increasingly exploit legitimate cloud services.
(+1) Browser Shortcut Monitoring Will Gain Attention
Endpoint security products are likely to place greater emphasis on shortcut modifications because they offer a relatively simple persistence mechanism with strong stealth characteristics.
(+1) AI Will Accelerate Malware Development
Generative AI is likely to become a routine development aid for cybercriminals, helping them translate code, troubleshoot implants, generate boilerplate, and adapt existing tooling.
(+1) Behavioral Detection Will Become More Valuable
The combination of unusual process ancestry, memory execution, shortcut manipulation, PowerShell activity, and cloud API access is likely to become more useful than static malware signatures.
(-1) Traditional Domain Blocking Will Become Less Effective
Blocking known malicious domains will remain useful, but campaigns using Google, GitHub, and other legitimate services will make destination-based detection increasingly incomplete.
(-1) Generic Security Awareness Training Will Become Less Effective
Employees cannot always distinguish a malicious installer from a legitimate one simply by looking at branding. Organizations will need stronger software verification and controlled installation processes.
(+1) Exposed Infrastructure Will Remain a Major Threat to Attackers
Even sophisticated threat actors can compromise their own operations through configuration mistakes. Defensive research teams will continue searching for exposed staging systems because they can reveal entire malware ecosystems.
The Bigger Warning Behind PATCHCORD
Espionage Is Becoming Quieter
PATCHCORD illustrates how modern espionage campaigns can operate without creating the dramatic signs associated with ransomware.
Trust Is the Battlefield
The attackers exploited something more valuable than a vulnerability: trust.
Trust in a familiar company name.
Trust in a browser icon.
Trust in Google Sheets.
Trust in GitHub.
Trust in PowerShell.
Normal Behavior Can Hide Abnormal Intent
That is the uncomfortable reality security teams now face.
The malicious operation does not always need to look strange.
It only needs to look normal enough.
The Defensive Mindset Must Change
The strongest organizations will not simply ask, “Is this service legitimate?”
They will ask:
“Is this behavior legitimate for this user, this device, at this time, using this process, with this identity, and for this purpose?”
That is the level of context required to detect campaigns like PATCHCORD.
The Final Lesson
PATCHCORD, SHEETCORD, and HACKERAI C2 Agent show an attacker ecosystem evolving in several directions at once: custom malware, browser persistence, memory execution, cloud-based command channels, legitimate-service abuse, and AI-assisted development.
The campaign is a warning that sophisticated espionage does not always arrive looking sophisticated.
Sometimes it arrives as the VPN installer your employee was expecting.
Sometimes it hides behind the browser they open every morning.
And sometimes the attacker does not need to build a suspicious command server at all.
They can simply hide inside the cloud services everyone already trusts.
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References:
Reported By: securityaffairs.com
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