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Introduction: Cyber Pressure as a Tool of Modern Conflict
Denmark has become the latest European country to publicly accuse Russia of using cyber-attacks as a weapon of hybrid warfare. According to a newly released assessment from the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS), pro-Russian hacktivist groups carried out destructive and disruptive cyber operations targeting Danish critical infrastructure and public-facing digital services. These incidents, spanning from a cyber-attack on a water utility in 2024 to election-related disruptions in 2025, underline how cyberspace has become an extension of geopolitical confrontation, particularly in the context of Europe’s support for Ukraine.
Summary of the Original
Official Attribution by Danish Intelligence
In a public statement released on December 18, 2025, the Danish Defence Intelligence Service formally attributed a series of cyber-attacks against Denmark to Russian-aligned threat actors. The intelligence agency assessed with high confidence that Russia was responsible for recent destructive and disruptive cyber activity affecting both critical infrastructure and government-related websites.
Attack on Danish Water Infrastructure
One of the most serious incidents highlighted by DDIS was a destructive cyber-attack against a Danish water utility in 2024. The agency concluded that the pro-Russian hacktivist group Z-Pentest was responsible for this operation. Targeting water utilities is considered especially dangerous due to the potential real-world impact on public health and safety, even if physical damage does not materialize.
Election-Related Disruptions
In addition to infrastructure attacks, Russian-linked cyber actors were blamed for a wave of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks targeting Danish websites ahead of the 2025 municipal and regional council elections. According to DDIS, these attacks were not designed to cause lasting damage but were instead used as a platform to draw public attention, disrupt access to information, and undermine trust during a politically sensitive period.
Named Hacktivist Groups
The Danish intelligence service specifically named two groups: Z-Pentest, which it linked to the 2024 water utility attack, and NoName057(16), which it said was responsible for the 2025 DDoS campaign. Both groups are widely known in cybersecurity circles for their pro-Russian stance and for conducting attacks aligned with Kremlin geopolitical interests.
Links to the Russian State
DDIS assessed that both Z-Pentest and NoName057(16) maintain links to the Russian state. While they present themselves as independent hacktivists, the intelligence service concluded that they function as instruments of Russian hybrid warfare. Their activities support broader strategic objectives rather than purely ideological or spontaneous motivations.
Hybrid Warfare Strategy
According to the DDIS statement, the Russian state uses these groups to create insecurity in targeted countries and to punish states that support Ukraine. This approach allows Russia to exert pressure while maintaining a degree of plausible deniability, blurring the line between state-sponsored cyber operations and grassroots hacktivism.
International Context and Advisory
The Danish assessment was published shortly after a global cybersecurity advisory warned of increased activity by pro-Russian hacktivist groups targeting critical infrastructure worldwide. This advisory was initially issued on December 10 and updated on December 18, 2025.
Broad International Cooperation
The advisory was co-signed by 23 law enforcement and intelligence agencies, including the Five Eyes countries, multiple EU member states, Europol, and Eurojust. The wide range of signatories highlights the shared concern among Western nations regarding coordinated cyber threats linked to Russia.
Groups Named in the Advisory
Several groups were identified in the advisory, including Cyber Army of Russia Reborn (CARR), NoName057(16), Sector16, and Z-Pentest. These names overlap with those cited by Danish intelligence, reinforcing the credibility of the assessment.
Techniques and Methods
The advisory detailed the techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTPs) used by these groups in past campaigns. These included DDoS attacks, website defacements, data manipulation attempts, and disruptive operations aimed at maximizing psychological and political impact rather than purely technical damage.
What Undercode Say:
Hacktivism as a Smokescreen
The Danish intelligence assessment reinforces a pattern seen repeatedly since the invasion of Ukraine: so-called hacktivist groups operating as informal extensions of state power. While groups like NoName057(16) and Z-Pentest brand themselves as patriotic volunteers, their consistent targeting of NATO and EU-aligned countries suggests coordination rather than coincidence.
Plausible Deniability in Action
Russia’s use of hacktivist proxies allows it to deny direct involvement while still achieving strategic effects. This model mirrors earlier tactics seen in Eastern Europe, where cyber operations create disruption without crossing clear red lines that would trigger direct retaliation.
Why Water Utilities Matter
Targeting a water utility is not random. Critical infrastructure attacks generate fear because they touch everyday life. Even limited disruptions can undermine public confidence in government preparedness and emergency response, which is often the real objective of such operations.
Election Timing Is Not Accidental
The DDoS attacks ahead of Denmark’s municipal and regional elections highlight how cyber operations are synchronized with political calendars. Even if voting systems remain untouched, disrupting information access during elections can weaken democratic processes indirectly.
Psychological Impact Over Physical Damage
Most of these attacks are not designed to cause long-term outages. Instead, they aim to send a message: “We can reach you.” This psychological pressure is a defining feature of hybrid warfare and often proves more effective than outright destruction.
Shared Targets, Shared Playbook
The overlap between the Danish intelligence findings and the international advisory shows a common playbook used across multiple countries. The same groups, tools, and narratives appear repeatedly, indicating centralized strategic guidance.
Low Cost, High Visibility
DDoS attacks remain popular because they are cheap, noisy, and highly visible. Even unsophisticated attacks can generate headlines, amplify fear, and force governments to respond publicly, which benefits the attacker’s propaganda goals.
Cyber Operations as Political Messaging
Statements by hacktivist groups often accompany attacks, framing them as retaliation for support to Ukraine. This messaging is part of the operation itself, transforming technical disruptions into political statements.
The Risk of Escalation
While current attacks are mostly disruptive, there is a constant risk that future operations could escalate into more destructive actions. Critical infrastructure remains a tempting target if geopolitical tensions worsen.
Defensive Challenges for Small States
Countries like Denmark, despite strong cybersecurity capabilities, face unique challenges due to interconnected infrastructure and high digitalization. This makes even limited attacks more noticeable and socially disruptive.
Collective Defense Beyond NATO
The involvement of Europol, Eurojust, and non-NATO EU states in the advisory shows that cyber defense increasingly extends beyond traditional military alliances. Cyber threats are treated as a shared security problem requiring legal, technical, and intelligence cooperation.
Attribution as a Strategic Tool
Publicly naming Russia and specific groups is itself a defensive strategy. Attribution removes ambiguity, counters propaganda, and builds international consensus around the nature of the threat.
The Long Game
These cyber campaigns should be seen not as isolated incidents but as part of a sustained pressure strategy. Their cumulative effect is designed to normalize disruption and test the resilience of democratic societies over time.
Fact Checker Results
Attribution Credibility
The claims are supported by Denmark’s national intelligence service and align with a multi-country cybersecurity advisory. ✅
Consistency With Known Threat Activity
The named groups and techniques match previously documented campaigns across Europe. ✅
Evidence Transparency
While technical details remain classified, the convergence of multiple intelligence sources strengthens confidence in the assessment. ❌
Prediction
Continued Targeting of Civil Infrastructure
Pro-Russian hacktivist groups are likely to continue probing water, energy, and transportation systems as symbolic targets. 🔮
Increased Election-Related Cyber Activity
Future European elections may see similar DDoS and influence-oriented cyber operations. 📊
Stronger Public Attribution by Governments
Western states will increasingly name and shame cyber actors to counter hybrid warfare narratives. 🛡️
🕵️📝✔️Let’s dive deep and fact‑check.
References:
Reported By: www.infosecurity-magazine.com
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