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A New Era of American Cyber Enforcement
The United States may be entering one of the most consequential and controversial chapters in its cybersecurity policy. A newly signed presidential memorandum from the Trump administration seeks to bring private-sector cybersecurity companies into federally coordinated hacking operations against transnational criminal organizations.
The idea is straightforward on paper: cybercriminals are moving faster than traditional law enforcement, using ransomware, cryptocurrency fraud, artificial intelligence and global infrastructure to attack victims at enormous scale. If private companies already possess the technical expertise, intelligence and visibility needed to disrupt those operations, why not put those capabilities to work alongside the federal government?
But cybersecurity rarely stays simple once computers cross borders.
The memorandum has immediately divided experts. Supporters see an opportunity to give the United States a stronger and faster response to cybercrime. Critics warn that allowing private companies to participate in government-directed offensive operations could create serious legal, constitutional, diplomatic and ethical problems.
The disagreement is not simply about whether cybercriminals should be attacked.
It is about who gets to attack them, under whose authority, according to which rules, and what happens when those rules fail.
A Philosophical Shift in U.S. Cyber Policy
Michael Garcia, a former senior official at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, described the initiative as far more than another cybersecurity program.
He characterized it as a philosophical shift in the way the United States approaches cyber conflict.
That distinction matters.
For years, the government and private cybersecurity industry have operated in parallel. Security companies investigate intrusions, identify infrastructure, track criminals, share intelligence and sometimes help dismantle malicious networks. Federal agencies, meanwhile, possess legal authorities that private organizations generally do not.
The new approach attempts to bring those capabilities closer together.
Instead of simply asking private companies to observe, report and defend, the government could potentially use their technical capabilities as part of coordinated disruption operations.
That is a dramatically different relationship.
The Promise Behind the Memorandum
The administration argues that traditional law enforcement has struggled to keep pace with cybercriminal organizations that operate internationally and can launch thousands of attacks simultaneously.
Cybercriminal groups can rent infrastructure in one country, register domains through another, steal cryptocurrency through a third, target victims in the United States and disappear behind layers of compromised machines spread across dozens of jurisdictions.
A government investigation can take months.
A criminal campaign can scale globally in hours.
The
Amanda Naylor, the National Security
That argument has found support among cybersecurity professionals who believe the United States needs a more aggressive model.
The Cybercrime Economy Has Changed
The argument becomes more compelling when viewed against the evolution of cybercrime.
Modern criminal organizations are no longer necessarily small groups of technically gifted individuals operating from bedrooms.
Many function like businesses.
They have developers, negotiators, money launderers, initial-access brokers, infrastructure specialists, affiliate programs and customer-support operations.
Ransomware groups can maintain leak sites.
Scammers can operate enormous call-center networks.
Credential thieves can purchase access to corporate environments.
Cryptocurrency criminals can rapidly move stolen funds across jurisdictions.
Artificial intelligence is also beginning to reduce the cost of producing convincing scams, phishing campaigns and social engineering operations.
The result is a cybercrime ecosystem capable of operating at industrial scale.
The Case for Private-Sector Participation
Former Trump administration cybersecurity official Joshua Steinman strongly supports the broader concept.
He argues that adversaries such as China and Russia already employ extensive cyber capabilities and that the United States should not voluntarily restrict itself to slower methods of responding to criminal infrastructure.
His argument is essentially one of strategic parity.
If American companies possess sophisticated capabilities for finding malicious infrastructure, analyzing malware and disrupting criminal networks, the government could potentially use those capabilities to pursue targets that conventional law enforcement struggles to reach.
Steinman also emphasizes that the memorandum contains restrictions.
The most sensitive operations, he argues, would remain under government control, while private organizations could concentrate on criminal infrastructure that represents a lower threshold of national-security risk.
That distinction could become one of the
The Private Sector Already Holds Valuable Intelligence
Ari Redbord of TRM Labs offered another important argument in favor of the initiative.
Private companies frequently possess information that government agencies cannot easily obtain.
Cloud providers see infrastructure activity.
Cybersecurity firms see malware campaigns.
Cryptocurrency companies can identify suspicious transaction patterns.
Threat-intelligence organizations can map criminal infrastructure.
Internet companies can observe domain activity and abuse patterns.
The government possesses authorities and investigative powers.
The private sector possesses enormous amounts of technical data.
Combining those capabilities could theoretically create a much more effective response to cybercrime.
The central question is whether that combination can happen without creating a new category of uncontrolled cyber power.
The Attribution Problem
One of the greatest dangers is attribution.
Before a government authorizes an offensive operation, investigators must have reasonable confidence about who actually controls the infrastructure being targeted.
That sounds obvious.
In practice, attribution is extraordinarily difficult.
Cybercriminals routinely compromise innocent servers, rent infrastructure from legitimate providers, use stolen credentials and route traffic through systems belonging to unrelated organizations.
A server in one country does not necessarily mean the attacker is in that country.
A domain registered by one person does not necessarily mean that person controls the malicious operation.
A compromised computer can become a weapon without its owner’s knowledge.
If private companies are encouraged to move quickly, pressure could develop to make attribution decisions faster than the evidence warrants.
That is where an operation intended to target criminals could accidentally hit an innocent organization.
The Nightmare Scenario: Hacking the Wrong Government
Michael Garcia highlighted perhaps the most dangerous possibility.
A private company could mistakenly identify foreign government infrastructure as criminal infrastructure.
Imagine an operation designed to disrupt a ransomware organization.
Investigators identify a server.
Technical indicators suggest the server is part of the criminal operation.
A private company receives authorization.
The operation begins.
Then investigators discover that the infrastructure is actually controlled by, hosted by or connected to a foreign government.
At that point, what began as law enforcement activity could suddenly become an international incident.
The difference between cybercrime enforcement and geopolitical conflict can be only a few incorrect assumptions.
The Constitutional Question
The legal questions are equally complicated.
Garcia raised concerns about the constitutional allocation of powers, particularly the federal government’s authority over matters involving force and international conflict.
The United States has historically maintained a distinction between government power and private citizens.
That distinction becomes increasingly complicated in cyberspace because digital operations do not always look like conventional military force.
A company may not send soldiers across a border.
It may instead disable infrastructure, seize digital assets, manipulate malicious systems or interfere with servers located overseas.
Yet the consequences can still cross sovereign boundaries.
The Ghost of Letters of Marque
Critics have compared the idea to the historical concept of letters of marque.
During earlier periods of American history, private individuals could receive government authorization to attack or seize enemy vessels under specific circumstances.
The model effectively outsourced certain forms of national power to private actors.
Critics argue that history provides a warning.
Once private actors receive extraordinary authority, the government must maintain extremely strong oversight to prevent commercial incentives from influencing decisions that should be based on law and national interest.
The internet makes this issue even more complicated because cyber operations can be conducted remotely, anonymously and at extraordinary speed.
Davi
Security consultant Davi Ottenheimer, despite previously supporting concepts associated with active defense, was sharply critical of the memorandum.
His concern centers on the possibility that the definition of a “criminal” could become dangerously broad.
The memorandum specifically concerns transnational criminal organizations, but critics worry about how targeting categories might evolve over time.
The fundamental fear is not necessarily what the policy says today.
It is what future administrations might do with the authority once the infrastructure exists.
Definitions Become Cyber Weapons
A powerful lesson from cybersecurity is that terminology matters.
If an organization is labeled malicious, defenders may isolate it.
If infrastructure is labeled criminal, investigators may pursue it.
If a person is labeled a threat, extraordinary powers may become available.
The more powerful the operational consequences of a designation become, the more important the designation process becomes.
That is why critics are demanding transparent criteria, independent oversight and meaningful procedures for challenging mistakes.
A system capable of attacking infrastructure must be much more careful than a system capable only of observing it.
The Incentive to Know Less
Ottenheimer raised another unusual but important concern: organizations participating in the program could potentially have incentives to minimize what they know about a target.
Why?
Because more information can sometimes create more legal complications.
If investigators know that infrastructure belongs to an innocent company, targeting it becomes harder to justify.
If investigators know that a system is connected to a government, the operation becomes more politically sensitive.
If investigators know that U.S. persons could be affected, additional constitutional protections may apply.
A badly designed system could therefore create an unintended incentive to ask fewer questions before acting.
That would be precisely the opposite of what responsible cyber operations require.
The U.S. Person Problem
The memorandum reportedly requires procedures for prior approval when U.S. citizens are targeted and safeguards against unintentionally targeting U.S. people or systems.
That is an important protection.
But accidental targeting is not a theoretical problem in cyberspace.
A criminal may use a compromised American server.
A ransomware group may hide behind a U.S.-based cloud provider.
A botnet may contain thousands of American computers whose owners have no idea their systems have been compromised.
A cryptocurrency wallet may belong to a legitimate user whose funds were mixed into a criminal transaction chain.
Cyber operations therefore require exceptionally precise targeting rules.
What Happens When Innocent Systems Are Hit?
The most difficult question may be what happens after a mistake.
Suppose a private company receives government authorization to disrupt malicious infrastructure.
The company acts in good faith.
The intelligence turns out to be wrong.
An innocent business loses access to critical systems.
A cloud provider suffers disruption.
A foreign company becomes collateral damage.
Who pays?
Who investigates?
Who accepts responsibility?
Who provides compensation?
And can the affected organization challenge the decision?
These questions must be answered before the system becomes operational rather than after the first major incident.
The Foreign Government Problem
Cyber operations do not respect borders.
That means even an operation aimed exclusively at criminal organizations could encounter foreign governments.
A criminal server may be physically located in another country.
A data center may be owned by a multinational company.
A compromised machine may belong to a foreign citizen.
A criminal payment trail may pass through a foreign financial institution.
An operation could therefore collide with another
That creates a diplomatic minefield.
What If Countries Retaliate?
Garcia also raised an important practical concern: foreign governments could react negatively to companies participating in offensive cyber operations.
A government could threaten regulatory action.
It could restrict the
It could terminate contracts.
It could seize local assets.
It could expel employees.
It could impose sanctions.
Or, in a worst-case scenario, it could retaliate through cyber means.
A private company could suddenly become a geopolitical target because of an operation conducted under U.S. authority.
That risk could fundamentally change how multinational cybersecurity firms operate.
Will Companies Actually Participate?
Another unresolved issue is whether enough companies will want to join.
Cybersecurity firms may possess the technical ability to conduct sophisticated operations.
That does not mean they want the legal liability.
Corporate lawyers will ask difficult questions.
What protections does the government provide?
What happens if a foreign country sues the company?
What happens if an operation damages third-party infrastructure?
What happens if attribution proves incorrect?
What happens when employees are subpoenaed?
What happens if the administration changes?
For some companies, the risks may outweigh the potential benefits.
The Fear of Mission Creep
Robert Graham of Errata Security offered a more moderate interpretation.
He emphasized that the program is not simply an invitation for private companies to hack whatever they want.
Government supervision is supposed to remain central.
But he raised another concern: mission creep.
A program could begin with strict government authorization.
Over time, however, officials might become frustrated by delays.
The private sector might be told to move faster.
Operational boundaries could gradually loosen.
What begins as “government-directed operations” could eventually become something much broader.
This is why implementation rules may matter more than the memorandum itself.
Deep Analysis: What a Safe Cyber Disruption Framework Would Need
Authorization Before Action
Any operation should begin with documented authorization defining the target, purpose, legal basis and permitted scope.
A company should never be forced to interpret a vague government instruction as permission for unrestricted activity.
Technical Scope Must Be Explicit
Target identifiers should be precise.
That can include domains, IP addresses, cloud resources, malware hashes, cryptocurrency addresses and other indicators.
But every identifier should carry confidence information and an expiration period.
Old intelligence should not remain permanently actionable.
Attribution Should Be Evidence-Based
Organizations should maintain a confidence score for attribution.
High-impact actions should require substantially stronger evidence than low-risk investigative activity.
The principle should be simple:
The greater the potential damage, the higher the required confidence.
Independent Review Should Exist
Sensitive operations should receive independent legal review before execution.
For especially consequential actions, judicial or equivalent external oversight could provide an additional safeguard.
Government authorization alone should not automatically eliminate accountability.
U.S. Person Protections Must Be Operational
A policy cannot simply say that Americans will be protected.
It needs technical procedures capable of identifying U.S. persons and systems before action occurs.
Those procedures should include escalation mechanisms when uncertainty exists.
Third-Party Infrastructure Needs Protection
Cybercriminals routinely hide behind legitimate infrastructure.
Therefore, an authorized operation should include procedures for minimizing collateral damage.
If a server hosts both malicious and legitimate services, the operation must account for both.
Evidence Should Be Preserved
Operations should generate detailed audit logs.
Those records should document:
Who authorized the operation.
Who approved the target.
Which intelligence supported attribution.
Which systems were identified.
What technical actions were taken.
When each action occurred.
What unexpected systems were encountered.
What data was collected.
When the operation ended.
Whether collateral effects occurred.
These records would be essential for later investigations.
Defensive Validation Can Begin With Simple Tools
Before any operational decision, security teams can use ordinary defensive tools to validate indicators and understand the environment.
For example:
dig +short suspicious-domain.example
This can help identify DNS resolution information during investigation.
whois suspicious-domain.example
Where available, registration information can provide additional context, although it should never be treated as proof of criminal ownership.
curl -I https://suspicious-domain.example
A simple HTTP header request can help analysts understand what infrastructure is exposed.
nslookup suspicious-domain.example
This provides another method for examining DNS records.
Malware Intelligence Should Be Correlated
Security teams can also compare hashes against internal telemetry:
sha256sum suspicious-file.bin
The resulting SHA-256 hash can then be compared with trusted threat-intelligence sources.
The critical point is that a hash match alone does not prove who operates a system.
Indicators must be correlated with additional evidence.
Network Evidence Matters
Defensive teams can inspect established connections on Linux systems with:
ss -tunap
And on Windows:
Get-NetTCPConnection
These commands can help defenders identify unexpected network activity inside systems they are authorized to investigate.
They are useful precisely because they remain within normal defensive administration rather than providing instructions for unauthorized intrusion.
Logging Is More Important Than Speed
A mature program should prioritize evidence collection over rushing toward disruption.
Useful Linux searches might include:
journalctl --since "24 hours ago"
Windows administrators can examine security events with PowerShell:
Get-WinEvent -LogName Security -MaxEvents 100
The objective is to reconstruct what happened before deciding what should happen next.
The Victim Compensation Question
Ari Redbord raised one of the most practical questions surrounding the memorandum: what happens to recovered money?
Disrupting criminal infrastructure is useful.
Recovering stolen funds is better.
Returning those funds to victims is better still.
A successful program should therefore measure more than the number of servers disrupted.
It should ask how many victims were protected.
How much money was recovered?
How many criminal networks were permanently dismantled?
How much infrastructure was merely replaced?
And how many legitimate organizations were accidentally affected?
Metrics Will Define the Program
Poor metrics could encourage bad behavior.
If success is measured by the number of systems disrupted, organizations could become incentivized to disrupt more systems.
If success is measured by arrests, investigators might prioritize cases that are easier to prosecute.
If success is measured by money recovered, operations might focus disproportionately on financially attractive targets.
A better system would use several measures simultaneously.
Cybersecurity success should ultimately mean reduced harm, not simply more activity.
What Undercode Say:
1. The Idea Is Powerful
The concept behind the memorandum is understandable.
Cybercrime has become too large and too fast for traditional enforcement models to handle alone.
2. The Risk Is Equally Powerful
The problem is that offensive cyber capability is fundamentally different from ordinary cybersecurity.
A mistake can spread beyond the intended target.
3. Attribution Is the Center of Everything
If attribution is wrong, the entire legal justification for an operation can collapse.
4. Speed Cannot Replace Evidence
Cybercriminals may operate quickly, but governments should not respond by lowering evidentiary standards.
5. Private Expertise Is Valuable
Private cybersecurity companies often have extraordinary visibility into criminal ecosystems.
That knowledge should absolutely be used.
6. But Expertise Is Not Sovereignty
Technical capability does not automatically create government authority.
The two must remain separate.
7. Authorization Needs Boundaries
A company should know exactly what it is allowed to do and what it is forbidden from doing.
8. Every Operation Needs an Exit Strategy
Authorities should know how an operation will stop before it begins.
9. Collateral Damage Must Be Expected
The possibility of hitting legitimate infrastructure should be treated as a central planning issue.
10. Cloud Computing Makes Targeting Harder
Modern criminal operations can share infrastructure with legitimate businesses.
That makes traditional IP-based targeting increasingly dangerous.
11. Criminals Hide Inside Compromised Systems
The machine being used by a criminal may belong to an innocent victim.
That distinction is critical.
12. Cryptocurrency Adds Another Layer
Digital assets cross borders almost instantly.
Operations involving wallets and exchanges therefore require international coordination.
13. AI Will Increase the Pressure
AI can help criminals automate social engineering, fraud and reconnaissance.
The government will face increasing pressure to respond faster.
14. AI Could Also Improve Attribution
Machine learning can correlate massive amounts of technical evidence.
But automated conclusions should not become automatic authorization.
15. Human Review Remains Essential
The more powerful the action, the more important human accountability becomes.
16. Classified Rules Need Accountability Too
A classified annex may contain sensitive operational information.
That does not mean the entire framework should become immune from oversight.
- Courts Could Provide an Important Safety Valve
Independent judicial review could reduce the possibility of politically motivated targeting.
18. Political Neutrality Is Essential
Cybercrime enforcement must remain focused on demonstrable criminal activity.
Political disagreement cannot become a substitute for evidence.
19. Definitions Should Be Narrow
Terms such as “criminal organization” need objective and enforceable definitions.
20. Designations Need Procedures
There should be clear mechanisms for correcting mistaken designations.
21. Private Companies Need Legal Protection
Companies will not participate confidently if they believe they could be abandoned when an operation creates legal problems.
22. Government Responsibility Must Remain Visible
Outsourcing technical work cannot mean outsourcing responsibility.
23. Foreign Governments Must Be Considered
Every cross-border operation carries diplomatic consequences.
24. Third Countries Are Not Empty Space
A criminal operation may pass through infrastructure located in countries uninvolved in the crime.
25. International Law Still Matters
Cyberspace does not eliminate national sovereignty.
26. Transparency Can Build Trust
Not every operational detail needs to be public.
But the rules governing the system should be understandable.
27. Audits Should Be Mandatory
A powerful program should be independently reviewed after major operations.
28. Mistakes Should Be Reported
A culture that hides mistakes will eventually repeat them.
29. Victims Should Matter More Than Headlines
The real goal should be reducing harm to ordinary people and businesses.
- Disruption Is Not the Same as Victory
Taking down infrastructure may temporarily inconvenience criminals.
Permanent disruption requires dismantling the underlying organization.
31. Criminal Economies Adapt
When one server disappears, another can appear.
When one cryptocurrency route closes, another can replace it.
- Intelligence Sharing Could Be the Biggest Benefit
The program may prove most valuable if it improves cooperation between government and industry.
- Offensive Operations Should Be the Last Step
Investigation, intelligence collection, legal seizure and coordinated disruption should generally precede high-risk actions.
34. Technical Power Needs Institutional Restraint
The United States has some of the
That makes restraint more important, not less.
- The Program Could Become a Global Model
If successful, other governments may adopt similar approaches.
That could be positive if strong safeguards are established.
- It Could Also Normalize Private Cyber Warfare
If poorly controlled, the initiative could encourage governments worldwide to delegate offensive cyber activity to corporations.
That would be a dangerous precedent.
37. The 60-Day Window Matters
The memorandum itself may be less important than the implementation framework that follows it.
38. Rules Will Determine Reality
Targeting procedures, authorization requirements and oversight mechanisms will determine whether the program becomes responsible enforcement or uncontrolled cyber power.
- The First Major Mistake Could Define the Program
One serious incident involving an innocent company or foreign government could fundamentally alter public and international perceptions.
- The Best Outcome Is Neither Maximum Aggression nor Maximum Restraint
The ideal outcome is disciplined capability: fast enough to fight modern cybercrime, but constrained enough to prevent the cure from becoming another source of instability.
✅ The Memorandum Seeks Greater Private-Sector Participation
The article accurately describes the central concept as an effort to involve private-sector capabilities in federally coordinated efforts against transnational cybercrime and fraud.
The important distinction is that the policy is described as a government-coordinated framework rather than simply granting companies unrestricted permission to hack.
✅ Attribution and Legal Authority Are Genuine Core Concerns
The concerns raised by cybersecurity experts about attribution, cross-border operations, U.S. persons and constitutional authority are legitimate issues that any offensive cyber program must address.
Cyber infrastructure frequently crosses jurisdictions, making mistaken attribution a particularly serious operational risk.
✅ The 60-Day Implementation Period Is Crucial
The article correctly identifies the implementation period as a major factor in determining how the memorandum will function in practice.
The eventual operational rules—target selection, authorization, oversight, evidence requirements and procedures for accidental targeting—could be more consequential than the headline policy itself.
⚠️ Historical Comparisons to Letters of Marque Have Limits
Comparing modern cyber operations to historical privateers is useful as an analogy because both involve private actors receiving government authorization.
However, cyber operations, privateering and modern law enforcement are not legally identical, so the comparison should not be treated as a direct equivalence.
⚠️ Offensive Cyber Operations Are Not Automatically Equivalent to Military Force
The legal status of a cyber operation depends heavily on its purpose, target, jurisdiction, effects and governing authority.
Therefore, broad claims that every private cyber operation would automatically constitute an act of war would oversimplify an extremely complicated legal field.
Prediction
(+1) A More Structured Government-Industry Cyber Partnership Is Likely to Emerge
The most likely positive outcome is that the 60-day implementation process produces a tightly controlled framework that allows private cybersecurity companies to contribute intelligence, technical expertise and carefully authorized disruption capabilities.
If strict attribution standards, independent oversight, clear targeting rules and liability protections are established, the model could significantly improve the U.S. response to ransomware, cryptocurrency fraud and large-scale cybercrime.
The greatest potential benefit is not simply giving companies permission to “hack back.”
It is creating a faster bridge between private-sector visibility and public-sector authority.
That combination could make it substantially harder for criminal organizations to operate anonymously.
(-1) The Greatest Danger Is Mission Creep
The negative scenario is considerably darker.
A program created to target transnational criminal organizations could gradually expand into broader forms of offensive cyber activity.
Pressure for speed could weaken attribution standards.
Political considerations could influence targeting.
Private companies could become exposed to foreign retaliation.
An operation could accidentally strike legitimate infrastructure or another government’s systems.
If that happens, the policy could transform from an innovative law-enforcement experiment into a precedent that other governments use to justify their own private-sector cyber forces.
The Next 60 Days Could Matter More Than the Original Announcement
Ultimately, the memorandum should not be judged only by its ambition.
It should be judged by its safeguards.
The United States has a legitimate interest in disrupting cybercriminal organizations that steal billions of dollars, attack businesses and exploit ordinary citizens.
Private cybersecurity companies can bring extraordinary technical capabilities to that fight.
But the government must remember one fundamental principle:
The fact that cybercrime is becoming more aggressive does not mean the rules governing legitimate cyber power can become weaker.
The real test will be whether the United States can build a system powerful enough to confront modern criminals while disciplined enough to protect innocent people, companies, foreign partners and the rule of law.
If it succeeds, the memorandum could mark the beginning of a new generation of public-private cyber defense.
If it fails, it could establish something far more dangerous: a world in which governments increasingly outsource offensive digital power to private companies and hope that everyone involved knows where the line is.
In cybersecurity, history has repeatedly shown that hoping people respect the line is not a security strategy.
The line has to be written, enforced, audited—and impossible to misunderstand.
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References:
Reported By: cyberscoop.com
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