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A Migration Strategy Turns Back Toward Rome
Giorgia Meloni built much of her European migration strategy around a simple political message: countries on the EU’s external borders should have stronger control over arrivals, while migrants who have no right to remain should ultimately be returned. But the political logic of that strategy is now producing an uncomfortable consequence for Italy itself.
As the European Union’s new Migration and Asylum Pact becomes fully applicable, several member states are increasingly looking toward Italy and invoking the bloc’s first-entry responsibility rules. Ireland has now joined Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands in seeking the return of asylum seekers whose journey into Europe passed through Italy.
The development is deeply ironic for Meloni. The Italian government spent years arguing that Europe needed a tougher and more coordinated migration system. Yet the same framework can now be used by northern and western European countries to pressure Italy into accepting responsibility for people who entered the EU through Italian territory.
The political question is no longer simply how Europe can reduce irregular migration. It is becoming a much more difficult question: who is actually responsible for migrants once they have entered Europe?
The Core Principle Behind the Dispute
At the heart of the controversy is the long-standing Dublin principle, under which responsibility for examining an asylum claim can fall on the EU member state through which an applicant first entered the bloc.
The new EU Migration and Asylum Pact, which became applicable on 12 June 2026, keeps responsibility-sharing at the centre of the European asylum system while introducing new procedures intended to make transfers and cooperation between member states more efficient. The European Commission describes the new framework as a system combining responsibility with mandatory solidarity.
For Italy, however, the principle has always carried a disproportionate burden.
Its geographical position makes it one of the major entry points into Europe, particularly along the central Mediterranean route. The same is true, in different ways, for Greece, Spain, Malta and Cyprus.
For years, frontline governments have argued that the first-entry model effectively punishes geography.
Italy’s Position Became a European Test Case
When Meloni entered office in 2022, her government quickly took a harder position on migration and reception. In December 2022, Italy’s Dublin Unit instructed other member states to temporarily suspend transfers to Italy because of the unavailability of reception facilities, with exceptions including family reunification involving unaccompanied minors. EUAA records that the suspension contributed to transfers to Italy falling to an all-time low.
The move was politically significant because it exposed a contradiction at the centre of the European asylum system.
Italy wanted greater European responsibility-sharing, but it was simultaneously reluctant to accept every responsibility generated by the Dublin framework.
That tension never disappeared.
The New Pact Changes the Political Equation
The Migration and Asylum Pact does not simply reproduce the old Dublin system.
Instead, it introduces a broader framework covering screening, asylum procedures, responsibility, solidarity, Eurodac and returns. The European Commission says the new rules are designed to make procedures for cases involving onward movement between member states quicker and more efficient.
That matters enormously for Italy.
Under the old system, transferring responsibility could involve lengthy administrative procedures and formal requests. Under the new framework, the rules are designed to make responsibility clearer and onward-movement cases easier to process.
In political terms, this means that Italy cannot simply rely on administrative paralysis to avoid the consequences of being a major first-entry country.
Ireland Joins the Pressure on Rome
Ireland’s decision to seek transfers to Italy gives the dispute another dimension.
Ireland implemented the Pact through its International Protection Act 2026, which entered into force on 12 June. The Irish government explicitly described the new framework as a mechanism intended to reduce multiple asylum applications and revive the return of applicants to the country where they first applied.
The fact that Ireland is now part of the wider group seeking cooperation from Italy shows how the issue is spreading beyond the traditional northern European destinations.
Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands have also been identified as countries pressing Italy over responsibility for asylum seekers who previously entered through Italian territory.
This creates a growing European coalition with an interest in making the new rules work exactly as designed.
The Irony of Meloni’s Success
There is an obvious political irony here.
Meloni has consistently promoted stronger European border controls, faster returns and greater recognition of the responsibilities of countries dealing with irregular arrivals.
Her government also supported the new migration framework.
Yet a system designed to strengthen the position of frontline states can simultaneously give destination countries a stronger mechanism for sending asylum seekers back toward those same frontline states.
That is the uncomfortable side effect of creating a rule-based European asylum system.
Once the principle becomes enforceable in both directions, political alliances can change quickly.
Italy Supported the Pact Despite the Risks
Meloni herself has portrayed the new framework as an improvement for Italy.
The Italian prime minister has argued that the Pact provides greater protection for countries of first entry and strengthens mechanisms that can facilitate returns.
That position makes the current dispute particularly important.
Italy is not simply being confronted with rules it opposed from the beginning.
It is being confronted with rules that the government itself helped politically legitimize.
Solidarity Remains the Missing Piece
The biggest weakness in the system is the gap between responsibility and solidarity.
The EU has created a mandatory solidarity mechanism intended to support countries under migratory pressure. The European Commission describes it as a permanent mechanism designed to ensure that frontline countries are not left alone.
But the scale of actual relocation remains politically contentious.
For 2026, the effective relocation commitments cited in the European debate amount to 8,878 places, alongside financial contributions. Euronews reported that when only countries actually expected to provide solidarity are counted, the total stands at 8,878 relocations and €76.3 million.
That number looks small compared with the scale of migration pressures across the bloc.
This creates the central contradiction: Europe wants first-entry countries to remain responsible, while destination countries want greater protection from secondary movements, but the redistribution mechanism remains limited.
Why Italy Feels Trapped
Italy therefore faces a difficult strategic choice.
If Rome accepts large numbers of Dublin transfers, it risks increasing pressure on an already politically sensitive migration system.
If it refuses, it risks undermining the credibility of the very European framework that Meloni has publicly supported.
And if Italy tries to demand greater solidarity before accepting transfers, other governments can respond that responsibility and solidarity are separate obligations under the new framework.
This is why the dispute is much bigger than a disagreement over several thousand asylum cases.
It is a test of whether the new European asylum architecture can actually function.
Returns Are Becoming Europe’s New Migration Battleground
The argument is also moving beyond the question of transfers between EU countries.
European governments increasingly want to increase the number of people whose asylum applications are rejected and who are ultimately returned outside the EU.
The European Commission has placed efficient and fair returns among the core elements of the new migration framework.
But returning someone to a country outside the EU is considerably more complicated than transferring responsibility from one EU member state to another.
It often requires diplomatic agreements, identity verification, travel documents and cooperation from the destination country.
That makes intra-EU responsibility transfers an easier mechanism in the short term.
The Return-Hub Strategy Faces Its Own Obstacles
Italy has also promoted the controversial concept of return hubs outside the EU, including its cooperation with Albania.
The broader idea is to move rejected asylum seekers to designated facilities in third countries rather than returning them directly from EU territory.
Several European governments are exploring similar concepts.
But return hubs face significant legal, diplomatic and operational obstacles.
The destination country must agree to receive people. European courts may scrutinize the arrangements. Human-rights safeguards must be respected. And the system must be capable of processing people efficiently.
These challenges mean that return hubs are unlikely to solve Europe’s migration problem overnight.
The Albania Experiment Is a Warning
Italy’s experience with Albania illustrates the difficulty.
The Meloni government presented the Albania arrangement as an innovative model that could help process migrants outside Italy.
But the initiative has encountered repeated legal challenges and judicial intervention.
That matters because it demonstrates how quickly a politically attractive migration policy can collide with European and national legal systems.
The same lesson could apply to future return hubs elsewhere.
France and Spain Create an Unexpected Twist
One of the most interesting elements of the dispute is the position of France and Spain.
Both countries have criticized or questioned Italy’s external return-hub strategy, yet they have also been identified as two countries that have explicitly ruled out Dublin-based returns to Italy.
That reveals how fragmented European migration politics remain.
A government can support stronger external returns while simultaneously resisting the return of migrants to another EU frontline country.
The common objective may be tougher migration control, but the preferred mechanism changes dramatically depending on where the political costs fall.
The Frontline States Versus Destination States
Europe’s old migration divide is therefore returning.
On one side are countries such as Italy, Greece, Spain, Malta and Cyprus, which are geographically exposed to arrivals.
On the other side are countries that receive asylum seekers after they move deeper into Europe.
The first group wants responsibility shared more evenly.
The second group wants stronger mechanisms preventing secondary movements.
The new Pact attempts to reconcile both demands.
Whether it succeeds is now becoming the defining question.
Germany Becomes a Major Pressure Point
Germany is particularly important because of its political and geographic weight inside the EU.
If Berlin begins systematically returning asylum seekers to Italy under the new rules, Rome could face a significant increase in transfer requests.
That would transform the issue from a legal technicality into a major bilateral political dispute.
German politicians are already warning that
From Berlin’s perspective, the logic is straightforward: if Italy was the country responsible for the initial entry, the new rules should be applied.
From Rome’s perspective, the argument is more complicated: responsibility without sufficient solidarity could simply transfer pressure from one European border to another.
The NGO Dispute Adds Another Layer
The Italian government has also connected the issue to German-based NGOs involved in maritime search-and-rescue operations.
Italian officials have argued that some rescue operations may contribute to a pull factor encouraging irregular migration.
NGOs and their supporters strongly dispute this interpretation.
The disagreement has become another source of friction between Rome and Berlin.
Instead of discussing only asylum law, the two governments are now also arguing over maritime rescue, border enforcement, responsibility-sharing and the role of civil society organizations.
The Political Timing Could Be Crucial
The migration dispute is unfolding at an especially sensitive political moment.
Migration has become one of the most powerful electoral issues in Europe, particularly as right-wing and far-right parties continue to gain support in several member states.
For mainstream governments, appearing too permissive can create political vulnerability.
For conservative governments, appearing too restrictive can generate legal and diplomatic problems.
Meloni therefore has limited room for manoeuvre.
She must satisfy domestic voters who expect a tougher migration policy while simultaneously demonstrating that Italy remains a reliable European partner.
Meloni’s Hardline Strategy Faces Its Biggest Test
The fundamental problem is that migration policy is no longer controlled by individual governments.
Italy can tighten its own borders.
Germany can increase removals.
France can strengthen border controls.
Ireland can accelerate asylum processing.
But people who enter through one country can continue moving across the Schengen area unless the European system functions collectively.
That makes cooperation unavoidable.
And cooperation means accepting obligations that can sometimes produce politically inconvenient outcomes.
The Deeper Problem Is Geography
Italy cannot change its geographical position.
Its Mediterranean coastline makes it one of the natural gateways into Europe.
No political slogan can eliminate that reality.
A sustainable European migration system therefore has to recognize geography while avoiding a situation in which frontline states carry every responsibility.
This is precisely where the new solidarity mechanism is supposed to help.
The question is whether the mechanism is large enough to make a meaningful difference.
The Numbers Reveal the Imbalance
The scale of
The Council of the EU reported 45,077 irregular arrivals across the bloc during the first half of 2026, based on data through June.
Against that background, thousands of relocation places may provide some relief, but they cannot fundamentally redistribute responsibility across a continent of hundreds of millions of people.
This is why the political fight over Dublin transfers is likely to continue.
Even if the new rules function perfectly, they cannot by themselves eliminate the underlying imbalance between countries of entry and countries of destination.
The Human Dimension Cannot Be Ignored
Behind the legal terminology are people whose lives are being moved between bureaucratic systems.
An asylum seeker transferred from Germany to Italy may have already established social connections, language skills or family relationships in the country where they applied.
At the same time, European governments argue that allowing unrestricted onward movement would make the common asylum system impossible to operate.
Both realities can exist simultaneously.
That is why the debate cannot be reduced to either “open borders” or “closed borders.”
The real challenge is building a system that is predictable, enforceable and compatible with fundamental rights.
What Happens If Italy Continues Resisting?
If Rome continues resisting Dublin transfers, the dispute could escalate into a broader institutional confrontation.
The European Commission could increase legal pressure.
Other member states could challenge Italy through EU procedures.
Italian politicians could respond by demanding stronger solidarity mechanisms.
And the political dispute could become increasingly intertwined with national election campaigns.
That would be dangerous for the credibility of the new Pact.
What Happens If Italy Accepts?
If Italy begins accepting a significant number of Dublin transfers, another political problem emerges.
The opposition could accuse Meloni of accepting responsibility for a system she previously criticized.
Her European partners, however, could portray the decision as evidence that the new Pact is finally functioning.
Meloni would then have to explain to Italian voters why Italy should accept people transferred from other EU states while continuing to demand greater assistance from those same countries.
The EU Is Testing Its Own Rules
The most important feature of this story is that Europe is now testing the system it spent years building.
The Pact is no longer an abstract legislative project.
It is operating in real disputes involving Italy, Germany, Ireland and other member states.
The outcome of these early cases could establish political expectations for years to come.
If transfers become routine, the first-entry principle will gain renewed strength.
If governments repeatedly refuse them, the Pact could quickly lose credibility.
Deep Analysis: The Political Trap Inside Europe’s New Migration System
The First-Entry Rule Creates a Structural Problem
The fundamental weakness of the first-entry model is that geography determines responsibility.
Countries located on
That makes the system structurally uneven from the beginning.
Meloni Wanted European Responsibility
Meloni’s political message has long been that migration should be treated as a European problem rather than an Italian problem.
The new Pact partially embraces that argument.
But European responsibility does not necessarily mean that responsibility disappears from the country of first entry.
The Pact Combines Responsibility With Solidarity
The
Frontline states retain important responsibilities.
Other states contribute through relocation, financial assistance or other forms of solidarity.
The political question is whether that exchange is sufficiently balanced.
The Relocation Numbers Remain Limited
The 8,878 relocation figure illustrates the challenge.
Even if every relocation occurred exactly as planned, it would represent only a fraction of Europe’s broader migration pressures.
That means the first-entry principle will remain extremely important.
Italy Is Therefore More Exposed Than Meloni Expected
The stronger the first-entry system becomes, the more important Italy’s geographical position becomes.
The policy Meloni supported can therefore produce a result that is politically uncomfortable for her government.
Germany Has Strong Incentives to Use the New Rules
Germany has historically been one of
If the new rules make transfers easier, Berlin has a clear incentive to use them.
Ireland Adds Political Diversity to the Pressure
Ireland’s involvement shows that this is not simply a northern European campaign against Mediterranean countries.
The issue is spreading across different political and geographical parts of the EU.
Spain and France Demonstrate the Contradiction
Their reluctance to accept Dublin transfers to Italy while criticizing external return hubs demonstrates that governments often support migration control only when the mechanism does not shift costs onto them.
Migration Policy Is Becoming Transactional
The European debate increasingly resembles a negotiation.
Countries want stronger borders, faster returns, fewer secondary movements and more solidarity.
But each government wants the financial and political burden distributed elsewhere.
The Pact Cannot Solve Geography
No regulation can change the
Italy will remain a major entry point.
Greece will remain exposed to eastern Mediterranean routes.
Spain will remain exposed to western routes.
A Permanent Redistribution Mechanism Is Essential
If the EU wants the first-entry principle to survive politically, it needs a solidarity mechanism capable of compensating frontline states more convincingly.
Otherwise, political resistance will return.
Returns Are Easier Inside the EU
Transferring someone from Germany to Italy is legally and logistically simpler than returning that person to a distant non-EU country.
This explains why Dublin transfers could become more prominent.
External Return Hubs Are More Complicated
Return hubs require agreements with third countries and must survive judicial scrutiny.
Their implementation will therefore take longer.
Italy Is Betting on Externalisation
Meloni’s government has invested heavily in the idea that migration can be managed beyond Italy’s borders.
The Albania model is the clearest example.
But Externalisation Has Limits
A country can sign agreements, build facilities and negotiate partnerships, but it cannot eliminate legal challenges or diplomatic complications.
European Courts Remain Powerful
Migration policy is constrained by EU law, national courts and fundamental-rights obligations.
That limits how quickly governments can implement politically popular ideas.
The Political Centre Is Under Pressure
Migration has become one of the issues most capable of reshaping European elections.
Mainstream parties are increasingly forced to compete with harder-line movements.
Meloni Faces Competition From the Right
A government that has already adopted a hard migration position can still face pressure from politicians demanding even stronger measures.
That creates an incentive for Meloni to avoid appearing weak.
Germany Faces Similar Pressure
German politics is also experiencing growing competition from the right.
That makes migration policy particularly sensitive for Berlin.
The Risk Is a European Blame Game
Instead of solving migration collectively, governments may increasingly blame one another.
Frontline countries blame destination countries.
Destination countries blame entry states.
Governments blame NGOs.
Politicians blame EU institutions.
The New Pact Could Either Reduce or Increase Conflict
If the rules are applied consistently, they could reduce uncertainty.
If governments selectively enforce them, they could create even greater political tension.
Italy’s Choice Is Strategically Difficult
Rome can either defend its earlier refusal to accept transfers or embrace the framework it helped support.
Neither option is politically painless.
Germany’s Choice Is Also Difficult
Berlin can insist on transfers while risking a confrontation with Rome, or negotiate broader solidarity in exchange for restraint.
The Real Test Is Implementation
The legislation itself is no longer the biggest question.
The real question is whether governments will actually enforce it.
Europe Has Entered a New Phase
For years, EU migration debates focused on negotiating legislation.
Now the debate is shifting toward enforcement.
The First Cases Will Matter Disproportionately
Early transfers can create precedents.
If they become routine, governments will have stronger incentives to follow them.
Refusals Could Create a Chain Reaction
If one frontline state refuses transfers, others may be tempted to do the same.
That could undermine the entire responsibility framework.
Solidarity Must Become More Than a Political Slogan
Frontline states need measurable support rather than broad promises.
Without it, the system will remain politically fragile.
Migration Cannot Be Solved Through Returns Alone
Returns are necessary for a functioning asylum system, but they address only one part of the problem.
Legal migration, border management, asylum processing and international cooperation also matter.
The EU Needs Faster Decisions
Long asylum procedures create uncertainty for applicants and governments alike.
Faster decisions can reduce the period during which people remain in legal limbo.
Human Rights Will Remain Central
Any attempt to accelerate returns will face scrutiny over due process, non-refoulement and individual protection rights.
The Political Pressure Will Continue
Even if irregular arrivals decline, migration will remain a major electoral issue.
Meloni’s European Influence Is Now Being Tested
Meloni succeeded in moving
The next test is whether she can manage the consequences of that influence.
The Irony Is Hard to Ignore
The political framework Meloni promoted to protect Italy from uncontrolled migration pressure may now be used by other governments to send migrants back toward Italy.
Europe Has Not Solved Its Migration Problem
The new Pact represents a major institutional change, but it does not erase the fundamental conflict between responsibility, solidarity and geography.
The Next Battle Will Be Over Enforcement
The most important migration fights of the coming months may take place not in Brussels, but in national ministries, courts and border offices.
Italy Is at the Centre of That Battle
Because of its location and political importance, Italy could become the first major test of whether the EU’s new asylum architecture works in practice.
What Undercode Say:
The Irony Is the Story
The most important element here is not simply that European countries are asking Italy to accept migrants. It is that the pressure is arriving through a framework that Meloni’s government publicly supported.
Rules Can Cut Both Ways
Political leaders often support international rules because they believe those rules will protect their own interests. But once the rules become binding, other governments can use them too.
Italy Wanted More Europe
Meloni’s broader strategy was to make migration a European responsibility. The new Pact does exactly that in some respects, but European responsibility also means European enforcement.
The First-Entry Principle Remains Problematic
The geographical imbalance has not disappeared. Italy is still more exposed to Mediterranean arrivals than countries farther north.
Solidarity Is the Missing Ingredient
A system based on first entry can only remain politically sustainable if frontline countries receive meaningful support.
Eight Thousand Places Are Not a Structural Solution
The 8,878 relocation figure is significant politically but limited compared with the scale of Europe’s migration challenge.
The New Pact Is Already Being Tested
The Pact became applicable on 12 June 2026, meaning European governments are now moving from legislative negotiations to actual implementation.
Ireland’s Move Matters
Ireland’s implementation of the Pact gives it a clearer framework for dealing with responsibility and onward movement.
Germany Could Become the Biggest Pressure Point
Germany has both the political incentive and the administrative capacity to make Dublin transfers a major issue.
Meloni Cannot Easily Reject the System
Rejecting the rules could undermine her broader argument that Europe needs stronger collective migration management.
But Accepting Everything Has a Domestic Cost
Every transfer accepted by Italy can become ammunition for domestic political opponents demanding an even tougher migration policy.
The Right Will Push Harder
Migration remains one of the easiest issues for right-wing parties to use against governing coalitions.
The Centre Will Be Forced to Respond
Mainstream parties increasingly need credible migration policies rather than simply criticizing the far right.
The Courts Will Remain Important
Migration enforcement cannot be separated from European legal obligations.
Return Hubs Are Not a Magic Solution
The concept is politically attractive, but legal and diplomatic barriers make it difficult to implement rapidly.
The EU Needs Both Control and Capacity
Border enforcement without adequate reception capacity creates pressure on frontline states.
Reception Capacity Is a Strategic Resource
Italy’s 2022 suspension of Dublin transfers demonstrated how quickly capacity constraints can disrupt the European system.
The Pact Tries to Close That Gap
The new rules aim to combine clearer responsibility with solidarity and more efficient procedures.
Implementation Will Determine Its Reputation
The Pact will ultimately be judged by whether governments can make it work on the ground.
Italy Could Become the Symbol of the New System
If Rome begins accepting significant transfers, it may become the clearest example of the first-entry principle being enforced.
Or Italy Could Become Its Biggest Obstacle
If transfers remain blocked, other governments may challenge the legitimacy of the entire mechanism.
Europe Is Entering a Political Feedback Loop
Tougher migration rules can create stronger expectations for enforcement, which can then create new domestic political conflicts.
Meloni’s Strategy Has Become a Two-Way Street
Italy wanted other countries to take migration more seriously. Those countries are now asking Italy to take its own responsibilities more seriously.
The Coming Months Will Be Crucial
The first wave of practical disputes under the new Pact could establish how the system operates for years.
The Biggest Question Is Trust
European asylum policy requires governments to believe that their partners will respect common rules.
Without Trust, Dublin Cannot Work
If member states refuse responsibility whenever the political cost becomes uncomfortable, the system eventually breaks down.
Without Solidarity, Frontline States Will Resist
If Italy, Greece, Spain, Malta and Cyprus feel abandoned, political resistance will inevitably grow.
Europe Needs a Balance
The durable solution is neither unlimited onward movement nor unlimited responsibility for frontline countries.
A Functioning System Must Be Predictable
Applicants, governments and courts all need to know which country is responsible and what happens next.
Migration Policy Has Become a Test of European Unity
The dispute between Rome and other capitals is ultimately a dispute over whether Europe can act collectively.
Meloni’s Next Move Will Matter
How the Italian government responds could influence the credibility of the entire Pact.
The European Migration Debate Is Entering Its Enforcement Era
The legislation has arrived. Now Europe has to prove that it can actually enforce it.
Verification of the Main Claim
✅ Confirmed: Ireland has joined Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands in seeking cooperation from Italy over asylum responsibility, according to the Euronews report published on August 24, 2026.
Verification of the New Pact
✅ Confirmed: The EU Migration and Asylum Pact became applicable on June 12, 2026, introducing new rules covering responsibility, solidarity, asylum procedures and returns.
Verification of the Relocation Figure
✅ Confirmed with context: The 8,878 figure is consistent with reporting on the effective 2026 solidarity commitments, although it represents the relocation pledges from countries required to provide solidarity rather than every possible movement under the broader EU mechanism.
Verification of Italy’s Dublin Suspension
✅ Confirmed: EUAA and European Commission material confirms that Italy’s Dublin Unit issued a December 2022 circular temporarily suspending transfers because of reception-capacity problems, with limited exceptions.
Verification of EU Arrival Statistics
❌ Needs Updating: The original article’s statement that Frontex recorded almost 178,000 irregular crossings into the EU should not be presented as a current 2026 figure without a clear date. The Council of the EU currently reports 45,077 irregular arrivals through June 2026, using a different reporting period and methodology.
Prediction
(+1) The new EU migration framework is likely to make Dublin-based disputes more frequent, because responsibility and onward-movement procedures are now being implemented under a common EU-wide framework.
(+1) Italy is likely to accept at least some transfers rather than openly reject the new system, particularly because the Meloni government has publicly supported the Pact and wants Italy to remain influential in European migration policy.
(+1) Migration will remain one of Europe’s defining political issues through the next election cycle, with governments under pressure to demonstrate stronger border management and faster returns.
(-1) The first-entry principle is unlikely to eliminate the fundamental conflict between frontline and destination countries. Without substantially stronger solidarity, countries such as Italy and Greece will continue arguing that geography places an unfair burden on them.
(-1) Return hubs are unlikely to become a rapid solution to Europe’s migration pressures. Legal challenges, bilateral negotiations, capacity constraints and human-rights requirements will continue to slow their implementation.
(-1) The dispute between Italy and Germany could intensify if transfers increase sharply, particularly if Rome argues that responsibility must be accompanied by significantly greater financial and operational solidarity.
The Larger Outlook
The most consequential question is no longer whether Europe wants tougher migration rules. That political shift has already happened.
The real question is whether European governments are prepared to accept the consequences of those rules when the responsibility lands on their own doorstep.
For Meloni, that may be the most uncomfortable part of all.
She helped champion a European migration model built around stronger borders, returns and clearer responsibility.
Now the rest of Europe is asking Italy to live by it.
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