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A Political Boomerang for Italy
Giorgia Meloni built much of her European migration strategy around a simple political message: countries should have stronger control over their borders, irregular migration should be reduced, and rejected asylum seekers should be returned more efficiently. But Europe’s new migration framework is now creating an uncomfortable consequence for the Italian prime minister.
As the EU’s new Pact on Migration and Asylum enters its operational phase, countries further north are increasingly looking toward Italy as the member state responsible for asylum seekers who first entered Europe through Italian territory. The result is an extraordinary political reversal: a government that pushed hard for stronger responsibility on countries of first entry is now facing pressure to accept that responsibility itself.
The issue is bigger than Meloni personally. It exposes one of the European Union’s oldest migration problems: the countries located on Europe’s external borders often carry the greatest responsibility for arrivals, while countries farther north receive large numbers of people who move onward after entering the EU.
The new rules were designed to address precisely that problem by combining responsibility with solidarity. The Pact entered into application on 12 June 2026 and establishes clearer rules for determining which member state is responsible for an asylum application, while also creating a mandatory solidarity mechanism for countries facing disproportionate migratory pressure.
Italy Finds Itself on the Other Side of the Dublin Debate
For years, Italy has argued that the European asylum system places too much responsibility on frontline countries such as Italy, Greece, Spain and Cyprus. Geography means these countries are often the first point of entry for people crossing the Mediterranean or other external EU borders.
The traditional Dublin framework nevertheless placed considerable weight on first entry when determining responsibility for an asylum application. That created a political contradiction: the countries facing the greatest arrival pressure were often expected to manage the largest share of asylum procedures.
Meloni’s government therefore attempted to push European migration policy toward tougher external borders, faster returns and greater cooperation with non-EU countries. Yet the new European system simultaneously strengthens mechanisms that can send responsibility back toward the country of first entry.
That is why Italy is now facing a policy dilemma of its own making.
The New Pact Changes the Rules of the Game
The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum is not simply a renamed version of the old Dublin system. It is a much broader package covering screening, registration, asylum procedures, responsibility, returns, border management and solidarity.
The pact was adopted in 2024 and became applicable across the EU on 12 June 2026 after a two-year implementation period.
One of its central objectives is to make the European asylum system more predictable. Member states are supposed to know more clearly which country is responsible for processing an application and what happens when an asylum seeker moves onward to another member state.
That matters enormously for Italy because secondary movement — entering through one EU country and then travelling to another — has long been one of the most politically sensitive parts of the European asylum debate.
From Take-Back Requests to a Faster Notification System
One of the most important changes concerns the mechanism used when an asylum seeker moves from one member state to another.
Under the previous system, a country seeking to transfer an applicant back to the responsible state generally relied on a formal take-back request. In practice, the process could become slow, bureaucratic and politically contentious.
The new framework introduces faster procedures and clearer rules for transfers between member states. The European Commission says the new responsibility system includes more efficient procedures for dealing with applicants who move irregularly between EU countries.
That creates a very different environment for Italy.
A country that once had considerable room to resist individual transfer requests now faces a European system specifically designed to make responsibility transfers more operationally effective.
Italy’s Earlier Suspension Becomes More Politically Important
The political tension is intensified by Italy’s earlier decision to suspend reception of certain Dublin transfers, with the government citing practical and capacity constraints.
That decision was controversial because other member states argued that Italy could not simply step away from responsibilities created by the European asylum framework.
Now, however, the political landscape has changed.
The new pact is being implemented across the EU, and the European Commission has already assessed how member states are handling the new responsibility rules.
Brussels Is Watching Italy Closely
The European Commission’s first assessment, published in July 2026, found that member states had made significant progress in implementing the new responsibility system.
The assessment specifically said Italy had made significant efforts to prepare for the new rules, while also noting that concrete steps were still needed to ensure transfers could take place effectively.
That wording is important.
Brussels is not describing Italy as completely refusing the system. Instead, it is signaling that implementation remains a work in progress and that the practical ability to carry out transfers will be an important test of the new pact.
The Numbers Reveal the Bigger Problem
The political argument becomes even more complicated when the numbers are examined.
The EU recorded almost 178,000 irregular border crossings at its external borders in 2025, a 26% decline from 2024 and the lowest annual level since 2021.
But the decline does not mean the migration problem has disappeared.
The Central Mediterranean remained one of the EU’s most important migration corridors, and pressure remains highly uneven across member states.
The European Commission therefore designed the new system around two principles: responsibility and solidarity.
Solidarity Was Supposed to Protect Italy
The irony is that the Pact does not simply tell Italy to accept migrants and handle everything alone.
It also creates a mandatory, flexible and needs-based solidarity mechanism intended to support countries facing disproportionate migration pressure.
For 2026, the EU established a reference solidarity pool equivalent to 21,000 relocations or other solidarity efforts, or €420 million in financial contributions.
However, the practical relocation commitments are much smaller than the headline framework suggests.
According to an analysis of the 2026 pledges, countries that are actually required to provide solidarity committed to 8,878 relocations and €76.3 million in financial contributions.
That distinction is crucial.
Why the Solidarity System May Not Satisfy Italy
Italy has long argued that responsibility cannot be distributed fairly simply by asking frontline countries to process arrivals.
Rome wants other European governments to share the physical burden.
But the new solidarity mechanism allows countries to contribute through different forms of support, including relocations, financial contributions and alternative measures.
That means the system does not necessarily translate into large-scale relocation of asylum seekers away from Italy.
For a government trying to demonstrate that Europe is finally sharing responsibility, that limitation could become politically painful.
The Return Policy Creates Another Layer of Conflict
The migration debate does not stop with asylum responsibility.
The EU has also moved toward faster and more coordinated returns of people who do not have a legal right to remain in the bloc.
In June 2026, the Council and European Parliament reached a provisional agreement on new EU-wide return rules designed to make return procedures faster and more effective. The framework also includes cooperation between member states and provisions concerning possible return hubs outside the EU.
This is closely aligned with one of Meloni’s central political objectives.
But there is a major difference between returning someone to another EU country responsible for an asylum claim and returning someone outside the EU altogether.
Returning Someone to Italy Is Not the Same as Returning Them Home
The word “return” can create confusion in migration reporting.
A transfer from Germany to Italy under responsibility rules is not necessarily a deportation to the migrant’s country of origin.
It can simply mean that Italy becomes responsible for examining the person’s asylum application.
A return to a non-EU country, by contrast, requires a completely different legal and diplomatic framework.
This distinction matters because political speeches often compress these different processes into the same word.
Italy’s Albania Strategy Shows the Difference
Meloni has also pursued a highly controversial strategy involving migrant processing and return facilities in Albania.
The project has faced significant legal obstacles in Italy and has been subjected to scrutiny over its compatibility with EU law.
In April 2026, an adviser to the Court of Justice of the European Union issued an opinion indicating that Italy’s Albania arrangement could, in principle, be compatible with EU law if fundamental rights are protected. The opinion was not itself a binding judgment.
That development gave Meloni’s strategy a potential legal lifeline, but it did not eliminate the broader political and operational difficulties.
Europe Is Looking Beyond Italy’s Model
Other European governments have also explored the idea of return hubs outside the EU.
The appeal is obvious.
If rejected asylum seekers cannot be efficiently returned to their countries of origin, governments want alternative arrangements that could make removals more practical.
But the legal reality is much more complicated.
Countries outside the EU must cooperate, agreements must be negotiated, individual rights must be respected and courts can still intervene.
Return Hubs Cannot Solve Everything Overnight
This is one reason why intra-EU responsibility transfers remain so important.
A transfer from Germany to Italy operates within the European legal framework.
A transfer from Germany to a country outside the EU requires additional diplomatic, legal and logistical arrangements.
That makes European internal transfers much easier to implement in the short term than ambitious external return schemes.
The result is an uncomfortable paradox for Meloni.
The European mechanism she helped strengthen may prove easier to use against Italy than some of the external return mechanisms she promoted.
The Political Boomerang
This is where the story becomes more than a technical dispute about asylum law.
Meloni’s political strategy was built around the idea that Europe needed to take migration seriously and establish clearer responsibilities.
Now other governments are effectively saying: if responsibility matters, Italy must accept its share.
That creates a political boomerang.
The argument that once strengthened Italy’s position against other countries can now be turned around and directed at Rome.
Germany Becomes a Central Player
Germany is particularly important because it has long been one of the main destinations for secondary migration within the EU.
Berlin has strong incentives to make the new responsibility system work.
If asylum seekers enter through Italy and subsequently move north, Germany can argue that the European system requires the responsible country to handle the case.
For Germany, this is not simply an Italian problem.
It is part of a broader attempt to make European asylum rules enforceable.
The German Pressure Exposes an Old European Divide
Europe has repeatedly struggled with the same structural division.
Frontline countries complain that they receive disproportionate numbers of arrivals.
Destination countries complain that asylum seekers frequently move onward after arriving in the EU.
Both sides believe the other is failing to carry its share of the burden.
The Pact was supposed to create a compromise between these competing interests.
But compromises can become unstable when migration numbers rise or domestic politics become more aggressive.
Italy’s Mediterranean Partners Face the Same Problem
Italy is not alone.
Greece, Spain and Cyprus also occupy geographically exposed positions and are included among the countries identified as facing migratory pressure for the 2026 solidarity cycle.
These countries have repeatedly argued that the EU cannot build a sustainable migration policy by relying heavily on geography.
The difference is that Italy under Meloni has simultaneously presented itself as one of the strongest advocates of tougher European migration management.
That makes Rome’s current position particularly politically sensitive.
The Spanish and French Exception
The original article highlights an especially striking contradiction: some frontline states have been reluctant to embrace the idea of returning migrants to Italy under the Dublin framework.
That demonstrates that national interests do not always align neatly with geography.
Spain and France have their own political calculations, border pressures and relationships with Italy.
Even countries that criticize Meloni’s external return strategy may hesitate to create a precedent that sends migrants back into another frontline state.
Migration Policy Is Becoming a Political Weapon
European migration policy is no longer simply a question of administration.
It has become one of the most powerful political issues in national elections.
Governments are under pressure to demonstrate that borders are controlled, asylum systems are functioning and irregular migration is being reduced.
At the same time, they must operate within EU law and international refugee protections.
That creates an almost impossible political balancing act.
The Far Right Is Raising the Stakes
The pressure is particularly strong because radical-right parties continue to use migration as a central electoral issue.
When mainstream governments adopt tougher migration policies, they often hope to weaken the far right.
But there is a risk.
If the mainstream adopts the opposition’s language without producing visible results, voters may conclude that only the opposition can deliver the promised change.
That dynamic can push governments toward increasingly aggressive migration policies.
Meloni’s Domestic Challenge Is More Complicated Than It Looks
Meloni therefore has to manage two audiences simultaneously.
At home, she must demonstrate that Italy is defending its borders and national interests.
In Brussels, she must show that Italy is a reliable participant in the European system she helped negotiate.
Those objectives can collide.
Rejecting transfers may appeal to domestic voters who believe Italy already carries too much responsibility.
Accepting them may be necessary to demonstrate compliance with the European rules.
The Real Test Is Implementation
The biggest question is not whether the EU has created new rules.
It has.
The real question is whether those rules will actually work when governments begin applying them under political pressure.
The European Commission’s July assessment already indicates that implementation is uneven and that Italy still needs to take concrete steps to ensure transfers work effectively.
That means the coming months could be more important than the political speeches surrounding the Pact.
The Human Dimension Cannot Be Ignored
Migration policy debates often reduce people to statistics.
But every transfer involves an individual asylum claim, a legal process and potentially a person fleeing war, persecution, poverty or instability.
A system can be efficient while still requiring strong safeguards.
The EU itself says the new Pact is intended to combine border management with protection for people who qualify for international protection.
That balance will determine whether the new system is viewed as a functioning European framework or simply another political compromise waiting to fail.
Deep Analysis
1. The Central Irony
The central irony is straightforward: Meloni promoted stronger European responsibility rules, and those rules can now increase pressure on Italy.
2. Responsibility Has a Price
Being the first-entry country is not merely a legal label. It can translate into reception costs, administrative pressure and political responsibility.
3. Dublin Never Truly Disappeared
The new Pact changes and modernizes the system, but responsibility based on entry remains a central component of European asylum management.
4. Italy’s Strategic Mistake
Italy’s challenge may have been failing to secure a sufficiently strong redistribution mechanism while supporting stronger first-entry responsibility.
5. The Solidarity Gap
The solidarity mechanism is politically important, but thousands of relocations remain modest compared with the scale of migration pressure experienced across Europe.
6. The 8,878 Figure
The 8,878 figure refers to relocation pledges from countries effectively required to provide solidarity, rather than the entire €21,000 reference framework for the 2026 solidarity pool.
7. Europe’s Mathematical Problem
Even a well-designed system struggles when responsibility numbers and political expectations are dramatically larger than actual relocation capacity.
8. Germany’s Incentive
Germany has a strong reason to make the new transfer system work because it wants to limit uncontrolled secondary movement.
9. Italy’s Incentive
Italy has the opposite short-term incentive: it wants European partners to recognize that frontline states cannot indefinitely absorb disproportionate pressure.
10. The Political Contradiction
Both arguments can be logically valid at the same time.
11. Geography Still Matters
European law can distribute legal responsibility, but it cannot change geography.
Italy will remain geographically closer to major Mediterranean migration routes.
12. Border Controls Have Limits
Even stronger external borders cannot eliminate every irregular crossing.
Smuggling networks adapt, routes change and geopolitical events can quickly alter migration patterns.
13. The Frontex Warning
The 2025 decline in irregular crossings was significant, but Frontex and European institutions continue to warn that migration pressure can shift rapidly.
- Lower Numbers Do Not Mean Lower Politics
Migration can become more politically explosive even when absolute numbers fall.
The reason is that public perceptions, housing pressure, asylum backlogs and political campaigning do not always move in parallel with border statistics.
15. Return Hubs Are Politically Attractive
Return hubs allow governments to demonstrate that they are exploring alternatives to traditional deportation systems.
16. But They Are Legally Difficult
The legal status of migrants, individual asylum rights, judicial review and agreements with third countries make external processing complicated.
17. Albania Is the Test Case
Italy’s Albania experiment illustrates both the ambition and the difficulties of externalizing parts of migration management.
18. Courts Remain Powerful
National and European courts can significantly affect how migration policies are implemented.
19. The Pact Cannot Eliminate Litigation
Even a comprehensive EU framework will generate legal disputes when individual rights and national enforcement policies collide.
20. Returns Are Not Automatically Deportations
This distinction should remain central to responsible reporting.
21. Internal Transfers Are Different
Moving an asylum seeker from Germany to Italy under EU responsibility rules is legally different from deporting that person to a non-EU country.
22. Political Language Can Blur the Difference
The word “return” can make different legal processes appear identical when they are not.
23. NGOs Are Another Flashpoint
Meloni’s government has repeatedly criticized migrant-rescue organizations and argued that rescue operations can influence migration decisions.
24. The Pull-Factor Debate Remains Unresolved
Whether rescue operations significantly increase departures remains a contested political and academic question, and it cannot be reduced to a simple cause-and-effect formula.
25. Schengen Adds Another Layer
Border controls inside the Schengen area can become a political response when governments believe neighboring states are failing to control secondary movement.
26. Internal Borders Challenge EU Integration
The more frequently member states restore internal controls, the more pressure is placed on one of the EU’s most visible achievements: free movement.
27. The Ceuta Dimension
Recent tensions surrounding Ceuta demonstrate how quickly migration can become a diplomatic dispute between EU partners rather than simply a domestic border issue.
28. Frontline Countries Are Not Always United
Italy, Spain, Greece and Cyprus may share geographical exposure, but their governments do not necessarily share the same political strategy.
29. National Interests Come First
EU solidarity becomes difficult when governments believe another member state’s policy could increase pressure on their own population.
30. Elections Change the Calculation
Migration becomes especially difficult to compromise on during election periods.
31. The Far Right Benefits From Conflict
Every visible disagreement between EU governments can become political ammunition for parties arguing that the European system is broken.
32. Mainstream Governments Face a Trap
Governments can become trapped between voters demanding tougher policies and European institutions demanding legal compliance.
33. Meloni Is Caught in That Trap
Italy now has to prove that its tough migration approach can coexist with European responsibility rules.
34. Germany Has Its Own Political Pressure
German governments face strong domestic demands to reduce irregular migration and secondary movement.
- The New System Will Be Judged by Numbers
Political promises will ultimately be measured by how many transfers happen, how quickly asylum claims are processed and how many rejected applicants are actually returned.
36. Administration May Matter More Than Rhetoric
The biggest transformation could occur quietly inside national asylum administrations rather than in political speeches.
37. Data Sharing Will Become Critical
Systems such as Eurodac are intended to improve identification and responsibility determination across the EU, making it harder for secondary movement to disappear into administrative gaps.
38. Italy Cannot Simply Ignore the System
If the Pact becomes operationally effective, unilateral resistance becomes increasingly difficult.
39. Europe Still Has No Perfect Solution
The EU has improved its framework, but it has not eliminated the underlying conflict between border responsibility, solidarity, humanitarian protection and domestic politics.
40. The Real Political Boomerang
The deepest lesson for Meloni is that policies designed to strengthen national responsibility can eventually be used against the country that demanded them.
41. The Next Battle Will Be Implementation
The immediate fight is likely to move away from negotiating the Pact itself and toward enforcing it.
42. Italy’s Leverage Remains Significant
Italy remains one of the EU’s most important Mediterranean countries and cannot simply be treated as an administrative transit point.
43. Brussels Needs Italy
The European system needs Italian cooperation because Italy sits on one of the bloc’s most important external migration routes.
44. Italy Needs Europe
At the same time, Italy needs European solidarity because the country cannot sustainably carry every consequence of Mediterranean migration alone.
45. The Final Balance
The success or failure of the new migration system will ultimately depend on whether Europe can make responsibility and solidarity work together instead of allowing them to become competing political weapons.
What Undercode Say:
The Policy Has Come Full Circle
The most striking element of this story is not that European countries are asking Italy to take responsibility. It is that the new system makes such demands more structurally credible.
Meloni Helped Build the Framework
Meloni’s government supported the EU Pact because it believed stronger responsibility rules could protect frontline states. The problem is that the same rules can also make Italy responsible for people who later move north.
This Is Not Simply a Defeat for Italy
It would be too simplistic to describe the development as Italy “losing” the migration argument. The Pact also recognizes that countries under migratory pressure need solidarity, and Italy is one of the countries identified for support in 2026.
The Real Weakness Is Redistribution
The more serious problem is that solidarity remains limited compared with the political scale of the migration debate.
Europe Has Chosen a Compromise
The EU did not abolish first-entry responsibility.
Instead, it kept responsibility rules while adding a solidarity mechanism.
That compromise may work administratively, but it remains politically fragile.
Italy Wants Both Protection and Relief
Rome wants tougher external borders, faster returns and stronger European responsibility rules.
At the same time, it wants other countries to share more of the burden created by Mediterranean arrivals.
Those objectives are not necessarily contradictory, but they require a much stronger solidarity system than the current numbers provide.
Germany Wants Enforcement
Berlin’s position is easier to understand from a domestic perspective.
If people enter Europe through Italy and subsequently seek asylum in Germany, German authorities have a political incentive to enforce the responsibility rules.
The Same Rule Creates Different Winners
A first-entry rule can benefit Italy when it prevents secondary movement.
But it can also burden Italy when other countries actually enforce transfers.
That is the fundamental contradiction.
The New Pact Will Test Political Consistency
European governments now have fewer excuses for arguing that the rules are unclear.
The Pact is operational.
The Commission is monitoring implementation.
The next question is whether governments will respect the system when doing so becomes politically uncomfortable.
Numbers Matter More Than Speeches
The real measure of success will be practical.
How many people are transferred?
How quickly are asylum claims processed?
How many rejected applicants are returned?
How much solidarity reaches frontline states?
Those numbers will tell us more than political declarations.
The Human Cost Must Stay Visible
Behind every administrative transfer is a human being navigating an extremely complex legal system.
Europe can demand stronger border controls while still maintaining legal protections.
The challenge is making those principles work simultaneously.
Meloni’s Biggest Challenge
Meloni’s greatest challenge may not be convincing Europe to adopt tougher migration rules.
She already helped move Europe in that direction.
Her bigger challenge is demonstrating that the tougher system can also work in Italy’s interests when the rules are applied equally to every member state.
The European Migration System Is Entering a New Era
The old Dublin system was widely criticized for being slow, politically divisive and difficult to enforce.
The new Pact attempts to repair those weaknesses.
But repairing the machinery does not automatically resolve the political conflict underneath it.
Europe Still Has the Same Fundamental Question
Who should be responsible when a person enters the EU through one country but wants to build a life in another?
The Pact provides a stronger legal answer.
It does not necessarily provide a politically satisfying one.
The Bigger Lesson
Migration policy cannot be built around slogans alone.
A system that emphasizes responsibility without solidarity will frustrate frontline countries.
A system that emphasizes solidarity without enforcement will frustrate destination countries.
Europe needs both.
The Coming Months Will Be Critical
The first months of implementation will reveal whether the new system produces genuine cooperation or simply relocates the old arguments into a new legal framework.
Italy will be one of the most important tests.
A European Stress Test
If Italy accepts responsibility while receiving meaningful solidarity from other governments, Meloni could ultimately argue that the Pact works.
If Italy is forced to absorb transfers without sufficient support, the political backlash could be severe.
The Political Boomerang Is Real
Meloni wanted Europe to become tougher on migration.
Europe is becoming tougher.
But toughness also means enforcing responsibilities against governments that previously resisted them.
Italy may now discover that a stronger European migration system is not something any member state can control entirely.
Accuracy of the EU Pact
✅ Fact: The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum entered into application on 12 June 2026 and includes new rules covering responsibility, screening, asylum procedures, returns and solidarity.
The 8,878 Relocation Figure
✅ Fact: The 8,878 figure is supported when referring specifically to the relocations pledged by member states effectively required to provide solidarity, while the wider 2026 reference pool is 21,000 relocations or other solidarity efforts.
The 178,000 Border-Crossing Figure
✅ Fact: Frontex recorded almost 178,000 irregular border crossings at EU external borders in 2025, a 26% decrease from 2024.
Commission Assessment of Italy
✅ Fact: The European Commission’s July 2026 assessment said Italy had made significant efforts to prepare for the new responsibility rules, while additional concrete steps were needed to ensure transfers took place effectively.
Return Rules
✅ Fact: EU institutions reached a provisional agreement in June 2026 on new rules intended to make returns of people without a legal right to stay faster and more effective, including provisions concerning cooperation and possible return hubs outside the EU.
Prediction
(+1) The EU Will Gradually Increase Pressure on Italy to Implement Responsibility Transfers: As the Pact becomes more operational, member states are likely to use its procedures more aggressively, making it increasingly difficult for Italy or any other frontline state to resist responsibility transfers.
(+1) Italy Will Demand More Solidarity in Exchange for Compliance: Rome is likely to accept more responsibility while simultaneously demanding greater relocation commitments, financial support and cooperation from northern European governments.
(+1) Migration Will Remain a Major European Election Issue: The combination of irregular migration, asylum backlogs, border controls and return policies is likely to keep migration near the center of European political campaigns.
(-1) The New Pact Is Unlikely to End the Frontline-versus-Destination Conflict: Even with clearer rules, Italy, Greece, Spain and Cyprus are likely to continue arguing that responsibility without sufficiently large-scale solidarity leaves them carrying too much of the burden.
(-1) External Return Hubs Will Not Become an Immediate Complete Solution: Agreements with third countries, judicial challenges, capacity limitations and human-rights requirements mean return hubs are unlikely to replace intra-EU responsibility transfers quickly.
(+1) The Biggest Change Will Be Administrative Rather Than Symbolic: The success of the Pact will increasingly depend on databases, notifications, deadlines, transfers and national asylum capacity rather than political speeches.
(+1) Meloni May Ultimately Reframe the Outcome as a European Success: If Italy receives meaningful solidarity while other countries accept stronger first-entry responsibility rules, Meloni could argue that the system she supported is finally producing the burden-sharing framework Italy wanted.
(-1) If Solidarity Remains Too Small, Political Tensions Will Intensify: The gap between the scale of migration pressure and the number of actual relocations could become one of the EU’s most important political vulnerabilities.
Final Outlook
(+1) The European migration system is entering a genuinely consequential phase: The Pact is now operational, the responsibility framework is being tested, and Italy sits directly at the center of that experiment. The coming months will show whether Europe has finally created a system capable of combining enforcement, responsibility and solidarity — or whether it has simply given its oldest migration dispute a new set of rules.
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