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Sophisticated Espionage Campaign Targets Gmail Security Loophole
A new report from Google’s Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) has uncovered a highly targeted and technically advanced phishing operation linked to Russian state-sponsored threat actor UNC6293. Conducted between April and early June 2025, the campaign focused on prominent academics and outspoken critics of Russia, using strategic social engineering and technical manipulation to bypass standard multi-factor authentication (MFA) protocols. The operation leveraged a rarely exploited feature of Google accounts — Application Specific Passwords (ASPs) — to gain persistent, covert access to victims’ email accounts. This revelation not only highlights the evolving tactics of state-backed cyber operations but also raises serious concerns about the security of digital infrastructure used by high-risk individuals.
Covert Operations Exploiting Google ASPs
GTIG, in collaboration with external security researchers, traced a campaign attributed to UNC6293 — a group tentatively linked to the infamous APT29/ICECAP — which employed email impersonation and social engineering to lure victims. The attackers first posed as U.S. Department of State officials, sending credible invitations to virtual meetings with forged email headers to make the messages appear authentic. Once contact was initiated, they followed up with a benign-looking PDF, tailored to each target, that instructed recipients to log in to a fictitious Department of State cloud platform.
However, instead of directing users to malicious sites, the attackers cleverly guided them to Google’s legitimate ASP creation portal. ASPs are one-time, 16-character passwords used to connect apps or devices that don’t support two-step verification. Since ASPs bypass traditional 2SV, they allowed UNC6293 to configure mail clients and gain uninterrupted access to Gmail accounts — completely under the radar of standard security protocols.
Victims were asked to name the ASP in ways designed to blend with official processes, such as “ms.state.gov” or Ukraine- or Microsoft-themed labels. The attackers then requested the ASP be sent back to them, which enabled full email access. GTIG discovered a shared attacker infrastructure using reused IPs like 91.190.191.117 and residential proxies to maintain anonymity and link multiple phishing variants back to the same threat actor.
Google acted swiftly, revoking compromised ASPs and alerting affected individuals. The company also emphasized the benefits of its Advanced Protection Program (APP), which blocks ASP creation altogether and significantly enhances account security for high-risk users. These findings support broader research by Citizen Lab into the growing threat of ASP-based attacks and emphasize the urgent need for hardened protections among vulnerable communities.
What Undercode Say:
The Exploitation of ASPs: A Quiet Security Weak Spot
The UNC6293 campaign reveals a dangerous loophole in modern authentication systems: Application Specific Passwords. While ASPs are designed for convenience, particularly for legacy apps that can’t handle 2SV, they have now become an attractive target for cyber espionage. By using Google’s own secure infrastructure to execute the attack, UNC6293 avoided traditional red flags. The sophistication lies not in malware deployment but in behavioral manipulation — the attackers simply asked for the key, and users unknowingly handed it over.
Social Engineering at an Advanced Level
This campaign goes far beyond basic phishing. The attackers built trust over multiple emails, used legitimate infrastructure, and personalized each message. The inclusion of spoofed government email addresses in the CC line added credibility, making the phishing lures difficult even for cybersecurity-aware users to detect. It’s a stark reminder that even without malware or links, a carefully crafted narrative can breach highly secure systems.
Linking IPs and Infrastructure
The use of reused residential proxies and a specific VPS IP address provided the forensic evidence needed to tie both campaigns together. This overlap suggests centralized planning and supports attribution to a single threat actor cluster. While some may view this as a slip-up by the attackers, it also reflects how even sophisticated operations rely on infrastructure that, when reused, becomes their Achilles’ heel.
Implications for High-Risk Communities
Academics, dissidents, journalists, and policy critics — often the targets of such campaigns — must now rethink their security posture. Relying solely on Google’s default protections is no longer enough. The attack highlights how even MFA can be bypassed when alternate authentication methods like ASPs remain available. GTIG’s recommendation to enroll in the Advanced Protection Program should be taken seriously by all individuals with elevated threat profiles.
The Future of Cyberwarfare
UNC6293’s campaign illustrates a broader evolution in state-sponsored cyber operations: the shift from brute force and malware to stealth, persuasion, and system misuse. As geopolitical tensions rise, particularly in Eastern Europe, such tactics are likely to become the norm rather than the exception. Security solutions must evolve in tandem, focusing more on user behavior analytics and endpoint controls rather than just phishing detection.
Google’s Transparent Response
Credit must be given to Google for openly sharing its findings and revoking compromised ASPs quickly. The company’s collaboration with researchers, along with promoting the APP, demonstrates a proactive stance in hardening defenses. However, it also raises questions about why such a loophole exists without more aggressive alerts or restrictions by default.
Lessons for Cybersecurity Professionals
Security teams must now account for the possibility of “valid credential abuse” — where attackers use features as intended but with malicious motives. Traditional tools like anti-virus or phishing detection won’t flag these ASP-based exploits. Defense strategies must include continuous monitoring, behavior analysis, and strict policies around the use of legacy access methods like ASPs.
🔍 Fact Checker Results:
✅ UNC6293 used legitimate Google ASP mechanisms to bypass 2SV.
✅ Infrastructure reused across campaigns links activity to a common actor.
✅ Google took mitigation steps and recommended enrollment in APP.
📊 Prediction:
⚠️ Expect a sharp rise in phishing campaigns exploiting legitimate access paths like ASPs, particularly targeting individuals in academia, media, and activism. More platforms will soon reevaluate and possibly restrict the use of such legacy features as part of their core security posture.
References:
Reported By: cyberpress.org
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